

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE VIOLATION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A NARRATIVE FROM MADURA

Abdul Hannan

Institut Agama Islam Negeri Madura
Email: hannan.taufiqi@gmail.com

Abstrak: Penelitian ini memiliki tujuan khusus mengkaji dan membahas praktik pelanggaran kebebasan beragama atau berkeyakinan dalam dinamika penanganan dan penyelesaian konflik keagamaan di internal muslim di Madura kontemporer. Pembahasan dalam kajian ini fokus menjawab dua pertanyaan penelitian, bagaimana penyelesaian konflik keagamaan yang selama ini terjadi di internal muslim di Madura? Bagaimana praktik pelanggaran hak kebebasan beragama atau berkeyakinan dalam penyelesaian konflik di internal muslim di Madura? Secara metodologi, penelitian ini merupakan kajian lapangan yang dilakukan berdasarkan penelitian kualitatif. Jenis dan sumber data yang digunakan ada dua, primer dan sekunder. Perspektif yang digunakan adalah sosiologi agama dan hukum Kebebasan Beragama atau Berkeyakinan. Berdasarkan analisa data lapangan studi ini mendapati temuan bahwa bercermin pada dinamika penanganan dan penyelesaian kasus konflik internal muslim di Madura semisal konflik Sunni-Syiah di Sampang, penutupan mesjid muslim Wahabi di Pamekasan hingga tuduhan penistaan agama terhadap Kiai Fathor, proses dan praktik penyelesaian konflik di internal Muslim di Madura sejauh ini cenderung melanggar semangat kebebasan beragama atau berkeyakinan. Demikian karena dalam kenyataannya, praktik yang ada selama ini kerap bertentangan dengan prinsip hukum kebebasan beragama atau berkeyakinan. Baik itu perspektif hukum internasional sebagaimana termuat dalam piagam kebebasan beragama berupa Kovenan Internasional Hak-hak Sipil dan Politik atau Deklarasi Universal Hak Asasi Manusia (DUHAM). Selai itu, juga bertentangan dengan perspektif hukum nasional, dalam hal ini adalah UUD NRI 1945, sebagaimana termuat dalam Pasal 28A sampai 28J. Pasal 28E ayat satu, Pasal 29 ayat dua UUD NRI 1945, dan Pasal 22 UU HAM.

Kata Kunci: Pelanggaran Kebebasan Beragama, Manajemen Konflik, Konflik Keagamaan dan Internal Umat Islam, Madura

Judul: Praktik Pelanggaran Hak Kebebasan Beragama Atau Berkeyakinan dalam Penyelesaian Konflik Internal Islam di Madura

Abstract: This research aims to examine and discuss the violation of freedom of religion or belief in relation to the handling and resolution of internal religious conflicts among Muslims in contemporary Madura. The focus of this study is to address two research questions: How are the religious conflicts within the Madura Muslim community resolved? What are the practices that violate the right to freedom of religion or belief when resolving internal conflicts among Muslims in Madura? Methodologically, this research is conducted as a qualitative field study. Two types of data, primary and secondary, are utilized for analysis. The sociological perspective on religion and the law of Freedom of Religion or Belief are employed in this study. Through the analysis of field data, it was found that the handling and resolution of internal Muslim conflict cases in Madura reflect certain dynamics. These dynamics include the Sunni-Shia conflict in Sampang, the closure of the Wahhabi Muslim mosque in Pamekasan, and accusations of religious blasphemy against Kiai Fathor. The study also examines the process and practice of resolving internal conflicts among Muslims in Madura. However, it is evident from this research that Muslims in Madura tend to violate the concept of freedom of religion or belief. This is primarily due to the fact that existing practices often clash with the legal principles of freedom of religion or belief. Such clashes can be observed from both an international legal perspective, as outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and a national legal perspective, including Article 28A to 28J, Article 28E paragraph one, Article 29 paragraph two of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as Article 22 of the Human Rights Law.

Keywords: Violations of Religious Freedom, Conflict Management, Religious Conflict, Internal Muslim Conflict, Madura



INTRODUCTION

Madura is an archipelago located at the eastern end of the Java Island. It is known for its abundance of religious symbols, such as Islamic boarding schools, religious figures known as *Kyai*, and various religious organizations. All three of these elements are deeply ingrained in the lives of the Madurese.¹ This religious presence has had a positive impact on the local community, shaping their religious dimension. However, there is also a negative aspect to the strong religious identity within Madurese. At times, it leads to excessive religious attitudes and behaviors, resulting in fanaticism and religious militancy.²

In recent years, this has become evident through various religious dynamics in Madura. One striking example was the conflict that occurred between Sunni and Shia Muslims in Sampang in 2011 and 2012, referred to as the Bloody Lebaran (*Lebaran Berdarah*).³ This tragic incident revealed a dark side of religious life in Madura, involving intimidation, violence, and acts of terror against the Shiite Muslims of Sampang.⁴ Religious facilities and homes were burned, forcing many Shiites to flee from Madura. Unfortunately, similar incidents have continued to emerge, violating religious freedom in Madura. These conflicts have been triggered by various factors, including allegations of religious blasphemy, hate speech, and claims of heresy against certain sects or teachings. Some recent examples include the forced closure of a Wahhabi Muslim place of worship in Pamekasan, accusations of religious blasphemy against Kiai Fathorrahman, and the forced disbandment of Hanan Attaki in Pamekasan.⁵

If we examine the numerous instances of religious conflict in Madura, the discussions surrounding Islamic issues and cases in Madura remain not only important but also interesting. This significance stems from the understanding that religious conflicts have the potential to escalate and lead to significant social unrest. If these conflicts are not addressed and studied seriously, there is a high likelihood that they will spiral out of control and recur in the future. This becomes particularly intriguing as the handling of internal religious conflicts among Muslims in Madura has shown a tendency towards favoring specific groups.

¹ Abd A'la, Ahwan Mukarrom & Mukhammad Zamzami, "Kontribusi Aliansi Ulama Madura (AUMA) dalam Merespons Isu Keislaman dan Keumatan di Pamekasan Madura" (2018) 8:2 *Religio J Studi Agama-Agama* 227–255, online: <<http://jurnalfuf.uinsby.ac.id/index.php/religio/article/view/793>>.

² Abd Hannan, *Fanatisme Komunitas Pesantren NU Miftahul Ulum dan Stigma Sosial pada Muhammadiyah di Kabupaten Pamekasan* Universitas Airlangga, (2017) [unpublished].

³ Muhammad Aziz Khoiri & Leila Chamankhah, "Survival Mechanism of the Shia Community Post-Shia-Sunni Sampang Conflict in 2012" (2021) 4:2 *Al-Mada J Agama Sos Dan Budaya* 240–251, online: <<https://e-journal.ikhac.ac.id/index.php/almada/article/view/1248>>.

⁴ Nafiysul Qodar, "26 Agustus 2012: Lebaran Berdarah Warga Syiah di Sampang Madura", (26 August 2019), online: *liputan6.com* <<https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4046654/26-agustus-2012-lebaran-berdarah-warga-syiah-di-sampang-madura>>.

⁵ Hilda Meilisa Rinanda, "Heboh Pengajian Ustaz Hanan Attaki Dibubarkan di Pamekasan", (18 February 2023), online: *detikjatim* <<https://www.detik.com/jatim/berita/d-6575358/heboh-pengajian-ustaz-hanan-attaki-dibubarkan-di-pamekasan>>.

Reflecting on past experiences of resolving Sunni-Shia conflicts in Sampang, the pattern of conflict resolution appears to be more exclusive.⁶ The policies put in place tend to favor certain groups while ignoring others, particularly minority groups with limited social access and power.

Looking at the dynamics of religious conflict among Muslims in Madura, various studies have been conducted from political, economic, and religious perspectives. From a political standpoint, research findings suggest that religious conflict arises as a result of authority or power contestation involving specific religious social groups or organizations. This notion is supported by findings from scholars such as Muhammad Afdillah (2016)⁷ and Abdul A'la (2020).⁸ Meanwhile, according to Madar Hilmy (2015), the religious conflict in Madura is an outcome of the struggle for economic resources. It is important to note that both authors agree that economic factors play a role in the conflict.⁹ Humaidi (2014) also acknowledges that differences in religious sects and understandings have contributed to the conflict. Even if there are other triggering factors, they only serve as triggers and are not the main factor that causes the conflict to escalate and worsen.¹⁰

Different from the three perspectives mentioned earlier, this study aims to strengthen and address the weaknesses and deficiencies identified in previous studies. Unlike those studies, this research takes a unique approach by focusing on the violation of the right to freedom of religion or belief during the handling and resolution of internal religious conflicts among Muslims in Madura. The preparation and writing of this study will involve scientific research conducted directly in the field through observations and in-depth interviews with both key and supporting informants. The theoretical perspective of this research combines the sociological perspective of religion with the legal and political aspects of freedom of religion and belief (*Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan: KBB*), emphasizing human rights elements.

While previous studies tend to focus on internal issues and show bias towards the dominant group, this research also recognizes the importance of studying the dimension of

⁶ Syukron Mahbub, "Konflik dan Kekerasan Sunni-Syiah Sampang Prespektif Kultur Kekerasan dan Hak Asasi Manusia" (2018) 2:1 Voice Justicia J Huk Dan Keadilan.

⁷ Muhammad Afdillah, *Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik: Melacak Akar-Akar Kekerasan Agama antara Komunitas Sunni dan Syiah di Sampang, Jawa Timur* (Yogyakarta: CRCS (Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies) Progam Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya Sekolah Pascasarjana Lintas Disiplin, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2016).

⁸ Abd A'la & Ahwan Mukarrom, "Power-Knowledge Relations of the Elder and the Younger Madurese Muslim Scholars in Propagating Islamism in Madura: A Counter-Narrative" (2020) 10:1 Teosofi J Tasawuf Dan Pemikir Islam.

⁹ Masdar Hilmy, "The Political Economy of Sunni-Shi'ah Conflict in Sampang Madura" (2015) 53:1 Al-Jamiah J Islam Stud, online: <<https://aljamiah.or.id/index.php/AJIS/article/view/53102>>.

¹⁰ M Alie Humaedi, "Kerusuhan Sampang: Kontestasi Aliran Keagamaan dalam Wajah Kebudayaan Madura" (2014) 13:2 J Multikultural Multireligius 17.

human rights violations, particularly relating to freedom of religion or belief. Examining this dimension objectively can shed light on public debates surrounding these topics. Moreover, the lack of attention given to these dimensions of violations within a number of internal Muslim conflicts in Madura has set a negative precedent for handling and resolving religious conflicts in the region. The existing process has failed to provide sufficient legal support and deterrents for violators, while efforts to protect, defend, and restore the rights of victims remain insufficient. This research holds significant value for several reasons. Firstly, despite previous studies on religious conflicts in Madura, there exists a scarcity of research that comprehensively examines the political, legal, and human rights aspects, particularly from the dimension of KBB. Secondly, previous research on internal Muslim conflicts in Madura has primarily focused on religious aspects, neglecting other important perspectives.¹¹ This study aims to address these gaps by providing a broader understanding of the conflict dynamics.¹²

METHOD

The authors conducted qualitative research to obtain descriptive data from written or spoken words and observed behaviours. This type of research emphasises the quality and essential aspects of goods or services. The primary objective is understanding the meaning behind events or social phenomena, which can contribute to theoretical concept development. A qualitative approach is employed to explore and describe the reality of the studied events, facilitating the collection of objective data.¹³ Inductive data analysis is employed in qualitative research, where hypotheses are not tested before the study. Instead, the focus is on extracting abstract and specific findings derived from the field.¹⁴ Data collection in this study involved field research, which included observations, interviews, documentation, and reference searches.¹⁵ During the observation process, the researcher directly recorded what was seen, heard, or felt in the research environment, focusing solely on factual descriptions without including personal opinions.¹⁶

¹¹ Fathiyah Wardah, "Kasus Syiah Sampang akan Dilaporkan ke Dewan HAM PBB", (29 August 2012), online: *VOA Indones* <<https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/kasus-syiah-sampang-akan-dilaporkan-ke-dewan-ham-pbb/1497638.html>>.

¹² JEO Kompascom, "Konflik dan Pelanggaran HAM, Catatan Kelam 20 Tahun Reformasi", (June 2018), online: *KOMPAS.com* <<https://jeo.kompas.com/konflik-dan-pelanggaran-ham-catatan-kelam-20-tahun-reformasi>>.

¹³ Nurul Zuriah, *Penelitian Kualitatif dan Kuantitatif*, (Jakarta: Bumi Aksara, 2009), hal 91.

¹⁴ Nusa Putra, *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif Pendidikan*, (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2012), hal 42.

¹⁵ Ummul Hidayatyllah dkk, "Implementasi Literasi Al-Qur'an Dalam Pembinaan Karakter Religiusitas Peserta Didik pada SMA/SMK Di Kabupaten Sidenreng Rappang", *Jurnal Tarbawi*, Vol 06. No 1, 2021, hal 35.

¹⁶ Nursapia Harahap, *Penelitian Kualitatif*, (Medan: Wal Ashri Publishing, 2020), hal 77.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Some Religious Conflicts in Madura

Regarding the religious freedom crisis in Madura, we have not found any quantitative data that provides detailed information on how resistant the Madurese are towards religious freedom. Most studies on violations of religious freedom in Madura have been qualitative, focusing on specific events or cases. Any available information on this topic tends to appear sporadically through the media. However, it's important to note that the lack of quantitative information does not mean that the state of religion in Madura is normal. In fact, since the violent Sunni-Shia incident in Sampang in 2012, there have been several cases and social events related to religious elements that have emerged from time to time.¹⁷

Based on field research, we have identified at least five major religious cases in Madura which illustrate the violation of religious freedom. Interestingly, these cases mostly involve internal Muslim circles, with many of them related to Islamic mass organizations and sectarian motives. These cases include conflicts between Shia and Sunni Muslims in Sampang (2012), the conversion of Sampang Shia Muslims to Sunni Muslims (2021), accusations of religious blasphemy against Kiai Fathorrahman in Pamekasan, the forced disbandment of Ustaz Hanan Attaki (2023), the forced closure of Wahhabism mosques in Pamekasan (2023), and most recently, the rejection of KH.H. Imamuddin Ustman al Bantani's presence in Pamekasan by several local religious figures (2023).

Sunni- Shiite Conflict in Sampang

In 2012, a conflict arose between Sunni and Shia Muslims in Sampang, Madura. The conflict was characterized by the local community's rejection of the Shia presence in Sampang, which led to acts of intimidation, terror and destruction.¹⁸ The conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in Sampang has a long history, with symptoms dating back to 1998 when Tajul Muluk began preaching as the leader of the Shiites. This led to an increase in the number of Shiites in Sampang over the years. In 2004, disharmonious Sunni-Shia relations in Madura led to physical conflict, marked by acts of terror and intimidation against Tajul Muluk, the leader of the local Shia community, as well as Shia residents, Tajul Muluk's house, and his Misbahul Huda Islamic boarding school. In 2004, disharmonious Sunni-Shia relations in Madura led to physical conflict, marked by acts of terror and intimidation against Tajul Muluk, the leader of the local Shia community, as well as Shia residents, Tajul Muluk's house,

¹⁷ Zainuddin Syarif & Abd Hannan, "Fundamentalism and the Challenges of Religious Moderation in the New Normal Era" (2021) 25:1 Madania J Kaji Keislam, online: <<https://ejournal.iainbengkulu.ac.id/index.php/madania/article/view/4260>>.

¹⁸ Ahmad Hamdi, "Klaim Religious Authority dalam Konflik Sunni-Sy'i Sampang Madura" (2014) 6 Islam J Studi Keislam 215.

and his Misbahul Huda Islamic boarding school.¹⁹ These findings come from an investigation by the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (*Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan: KONTRAS*). In 2004, disharmonious Sunni-Shia relations in Madura led to physical conflict, marked by acts of terror and intimidation against Ustaz Tajul Muluk, the leader of the local Shia community, as well as Shia residents, Tajul Muluk's house, and his Misbahul Huda Islamic boarding school. Terror and intimidation persisted in 2006, 2009, 2011, and peaked in 2012.²⁰

The conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims in Sampang-Madura is one of the worst examples of religious strife in Madura's history, particularly in the context of freedom of religion or belief. Negative treatment and actions were directed towards Madurese Shia Muslims, who are a minority group in Madura. Negative actions towards Shiites include intimidation, terror, expulsion, and coercion to abandon their beliefs and convert to Sunni teachings, as seen in Madura.²¹ Following a violent incident, a Shia resident lost their life after being struck by a sharp object. Additionally, a mob burned down dozens of residences belonging to Shia Muslims in Sampang, as well as their places of worship and Islamic boarding schools, which served as the focal point of their daily educational and religious activities. It doesn't stop there, since this conflict exploded in 2011, Sampang's Shiite Muslims had to leave their hometowns, they were forced to leave their homes and belongings because of rejection and threats from local residents. In 2013, after living in the Sampang sport hall for two years, the Shiite residents of Sampang were relocated to Sidoarjo. In 2021, several Sampang Shia Muslims were allowed to return to their hometown after pledging allegiance, renouncing Shia teachings, and embracing Sunni teachings.²²

Forced Assimilation of Shia Muslim into Sunni in Sampang

On 5th November 2020, the handling of the Sampang Shia case entered a new phase. This was due to the willingness of a number of Shia groups to make a self-pledge, abandon their beliefs as Shia believers and become Sunni Muslims.²³ According to field data research, more than 270 Sampang Shia residents, led directly by Tajul Muluk, pledged allegiance as adherents of Sunni teachings. After spending almost a decade in refugee camps, the refugees

¹⁹ Sudarto, "Politik Penodaan dalam Kasus Syiah", online: [<https://civs.ugm.ac.id/politik-penodaan-dalam-kasus-syiah-sampang/>](https://civs.ugm.ac.id).

²⁰ KONTRAS Surabaya, *Laporan Investigasi dan Pemantauan Kasus Syi'ah Sampang* (KONTRAS Surabaya, 2012).

²¹ AMAN Indonesia, *Dilema Kebebasan Beragama di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Pembakaran Rumah Ibadah di Sampang Madura* (2012).

²² Taufik Rachman, "Ini Kronologi Bentrok Sampang Versi BASSRA", (27 August 2012), online: *Repub Online* <<https://republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/12/08/27/m9eyb6-ini-kronologi-bentrok-sampang-versi-bassra>>.

²³ Raja Eben Lumbanrau, "Baiat Pengungsi Syiah Menjadi Suni: Cari Jalan untuk Pulang, Namun Trauma Warga 'Membekas dan 'Tak Akan Pernah Pulih'", (3 November 2020), online: *BBC News Indones* <<https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-54550917>>.

are unable to obtain their rights and freedom. The only way for them to be accepted by the local residents and live a normal life is by converting to Sunni Islam.

This has sparked a debate among various social institutions. Some view the initiation of Madurese Shia Muslims as a positive step towards resolving the ongoing Sampang Shia-Sunni case in Madura. Furthermore, the Sampang Madura Shia party leader, Ustaz Tajul Muluk, admitted that the decision to renounce Shia teachings and convert to Sunniism was a personal choice based on self-awareness, rather than coercion or pressure from external parties.²⁴ Additionally, there is an opposing view that the initiation of allegiance to the Sampang Shia Muslims in Madura violates the right to freedom of religion. The state appears to be failing in its duty to protect the Shia Muslims of Sampang, resulting in their continued vulnerability. The pledge made by the Sampang Shia Muslim group can be seen as a desperate attempt to seek justice in the absence of state intervention.²⁵ Furthermore, it is widely believed that the induction of Shia Muslims in Sampang, Madura is coerced and involves a series of systematic and structured events with the involvement of various parties and groups. It is concerning that state officials and local religious elites, including the regional government and *kiai* or *ulama* circles, are reportedly involved in this practice.²⁶

Blasphemy Accusation against Kiai Fathorrahman

A case that drew public attention in Madura was the alleged religious blasphemy committed by one of the religious figures in Pamekasan, Kiai Fathor.²⁷ The incident occurred in 2022, and it began with complaints from the public that Kiai Fathor had adhered to and taught Islamic beliefs or teachings that deviated from the general teachings. According to field data, there are six teachings of Kiai Fathor that the public considers to be harassing and disrespectful to Islamic teachings. These include: Firstly, Kiai Fathor allegedly claimed that Imam Mahdi had pledged allegiance during the 2019 presidential election. Secondly, those who voted for Prabowo in the same election were said to have committed a sin and must repent by reciting *istigfar*, praying seven salutations, and paying a fine equivalent to the price of an *aqikah* goat. Third, women who are menstruating are obligated to pray and fast and do not need to make up for missed fasts during Ramadan. Fourth, the position of Prophet

²⁴ Detik.Com, 'Pengungsi Syiah Sampang Dibiai Jadi Suni di Tengah Keinginan Pulang Kampung', detiknews, 2020, <https://news.detik.com/bbc-world/d-5242909/pengungsi-Syiah-sampang-dibiai-jadi-suni-di-tengah-keinginan-pulang-kampung>.

²⁵ BBC News Indonesia, "Tajul Muluk dan Ratusan Pengungsi Syiah Sampang Minta Dibiai Jadi Muslim Sunni: MUI sambut baik, Setara Sebut 'negara alpa'", (22 September 2020), online: *BBC News Indones* <<https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-54230881>>.

²⁶ bbc.com, 'Warga Syiah Sampang "Dipaksa Bertobat"', BBC News Indonesia, 12 August 2013, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2013/08/130812_pengungsi_Syiah_syahadat_ulang.

²⁷ Media Jatim, "Fatwa MUI Pamekasan yang Rahasia, dan Permintaan Tabayun dari Pihak Kiai Fathor", (21 January 2023), online: <<https://mediajatim.com/2023/01/21/fatwa-mui-pamekasan-yang-rahasia-dan-permintaan-tabayun-dari-pihak-kiai-fathor/>>.

Muhammad (pbuh) is the same as that of Allah SWT. Fifth, there are no *ulama* because *ulama* is a title, not a form. Sixth, the *Dajjal* is a characteristic, not a form.²⁸

In subsequent developments, the issue of blasphemy and religious blasphemy committed by Kiai Fathor in turn invited strong reactions from the public. Tens of thousands of members of the Pamekasan Islamic Movement (*Gerakan Umat Islam Pamekasan: GUIP*) demonstrated, demanding that the local police carry out legal proceedings and arrest Kiai Fathor. He was accused of spreading deviant teachings in Pamekasan, and Madura in particular.²⁹ The movement grew larger after a fatwa was issued by the local Indonesian Ulema Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia: MUI*). The MUI issued a fatwa classifying the teachings presented by Kiai Fathor as heretical and deviant, outside of true Islam. MUI Pamekasan suggested that Kiai Fathor immediately repent to Allah, and they hoped that the Pamekasan police would carry out the legal process. The legal process against Kiai Fathor is still ongoing, and the case has not yet found any clarity.

Forced Dispersal of Hanan Attaki's Preaching

In Madura, there was another case of religiously motivated violations when Hanan Attaki's preaching activities in Pamekasan were forcibly disbanded. The event, which was supposed to be held at the Al-Muttaqin Mosque in Laden, was rejected by a group of people and several local religious organizations. The local branch of *Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)* and the *Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (GP Ansor)*, one of its autonomous bodies, were among several religious organizations that resisted the arrival of Hanan Attaki.³⁰ Additionally, the local village head shared the same attitude, refusing due to concerns of potential chaos and instability in the area. Notably, despite some Islamic mass organizations in the local area refusing, at least ten mass organizations supported this activity. One of these organizations was the *Front Pembela Islam (FPI)*, which even took responsibility for ensuring security of the event.³¹

Prior to the preaching event of Hanan Attaki, there were indications of rejection from the Islamic community and mass organizations in Pamekasan. However, due to human rights considerations, the police were unable to intervene. Despite resistance from several Islamic organizations, the event as scheduled. However, they had to be stopped midway due to direct

²⁸ Media Jatim, "Belasan Ribu Warga Demo Polres Pamekasan, Minta Kiai Fathor Segera Ditangkap | Media Jatim", (20 January 2023), online: <<https://mediajatim.com/2023/01/20/belasan-ribu-warga-demo-polres-pamekasan-minta-kiai-fathor-segera-ditangkap/>>.

²⁹ Faisol Faisol, "Kapolres Pamekasan Janji Secepatnya Proses Laporan Dugaan Penyebaran Aliran Sesat", (20 January 2023), online: *news* <<http://suarajatimpost.com/kriminal/kapolres-pamekasan-janji-secepatnya-proses-laporan-dugaan-penyebaran-aliran-sesat>>.

³⁰ Syukri Rahmatullah, "Ketua PC GP Ansor Pamekasan Soal Hanan Attaki: Kami Sudah ke Polres Tak Digubris", (20 February 2023), online: *beritasatu.com* <<https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/1028623/ketua-pc-gp-ansor-pamekasan-soal-hanan-attaki-kami-sudah-ke-polres-tak-digubris>>.

³¹ Rinanda, *supra* note 5.

actions and protests in the field, which had the potential to trigger social chaos on a large scale. It is believed that continuing the event could cause more harm than good.³² According to reports, Hanan Attaki's religious teachings conflict with the local religious culture. He is allegedly involved in managing the transnational extremist organization, *Hisbut Tabrir Indonesia* (HTI). Additionally, his lecture style has been deemed offensive and controversial, as he referred to Prophet Musa as a thug and wrestler.³³

The Forced Closure of a Wahabi Mosque

A month after the forced disbandment of the Hanan Attaki in Pamekasan, a similar incident occurred in the same location. However, this time it involved the forced closure of the Wahhabi Muslim mosque in Pamekasan.³⁴ This case originated from allegations of defamation against Kiai H. Hasyim Asy'ari, the founder of NU, by Yasir Hasan, a Salafi religious figure. The alleged defamation occurred during a religious assembly at a mosque, which was streamed live on YouTube. During his presentation, Yasir Hasan stated that the commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad birthday is considered a heresy. He also claimed that KH Hasyim Asy'ari also did not permit this activity. This religious statement quickly went viral and sparked both support and opposition in society, resulting in massive protests and violent conducts.³⁵

The peak of the incident was the mass mobilization of *Nabdiyin* in Pamekasan. They demanded that Yasir Hasan apologize publicly. Furthermore, they insisted the police to take immediate legal action because they considered the perpetrator to have committed hate speech and defamation. Additionally, the community forcibly closed the Salaf mosque.³⁶ In the action to close the mosque, the village head participated. Local village officials had ordered the mosque to be sterilized from all forms of religious activities several hours before the action took place. To ensure this, they stripped all facilities such as electricity and loudspeakers, and blocked all entrances to the mosque so that religious activities could no

³² Tim detikJatim, "Pengajian Ustaz Hanan Attaki di Pamekasan Dibubarkan, Begini Duduk Perkaranya", (18 February 2023), online: *detikjateng* <<https://www.detik.com/jateng/berita/d-6575999/pengajian-ustaz-hanan-attaki-di-pamekasan-dibubarkan-begini-duduk-perkaranya>>.

³³ Ayu Almas, "Pengajiannya di Pamekasan Dibubarkan, Ustaz Hanan Attaki Bongkar Hubungannya dengan HTI", (23 February 2023), online: *War Ekon* <<https://wartaeconomy.co.id/read482246/pengajiannya-di-pamekasan-dibubarkan-ustaz-hanan-attaki-bongkar-hubungannya-dengan-hti>>.

³⁴ ANTARA News Agency, "Polres Pamekasan periksa tiga orang terkait laporan ujaran kebencian", (31 January 2023), online: *ANTARA News Jawa Timur* <<https://jatim.antaranews.com/berita/676290/polres-pamekasan-periksa-tiga-orang-terkait-laporan-ujaran-kebencian>>.

³⁵ Supyanto Efendi, "Kasus Yasir Hasan Tak Tuntas, Kinerja Polres Pamekasan Disorot Tokoh NU", (14 March 2023), online: *LingkarJatim* <<https://lingkarjatim.com/uncategorized/kasus-yasir-hasan-tak-tuntas-kinerja-polres-pamekasan-disorot-tokoh-nu/>>.

³⁶ Hentty Kartika, "Ribuan Warga NU di Madura, Tuntut Ustad Yasir Penganut Ajaran Wahabi Ditangkap", (31 January 2023), online: <<https://www.tvonenews.com/daerah/jatim/97700-ribuan-warga-nu-di-madura-tuntut-ustad-yasir-penganut-ajaran-wahabi-ditangkap>>.

longer function and run as usual.³⁷ Although Yasir Hasan has publicly clarified and apologized, the legal process against him is still ongoing.

The Arson of MWCNU Office in Sumenep

The burning of the NU's office in Sumenep has become a religious issue among in Madura. The office of MWCNU (*Representative Branch Council of NU*) was set on fire, and it attracted the attention of many groups. Based on my field data, two incidents of arson occurred at different times. The first incident took place on Sunday, April 23, 2023, at 05:00 am local time, while the second incident occurred on Friday, May 5, 2023, at 02:00 am local time. Both incidents had the same motive. The fire started with a burning pile of firewood next to the office building and then spread to the office.³⁸

At first, neither the community nor the office administrators had any suspicions. However, a similar pattern to the incident in Sumenep began to emerge. The chronology and motive were relatively similar, with the fire starting from a pile of wood near the office. This unusual motive raised questions and suspicions from the locals, particularly office administrators. The local police conducted an investigation, which revealed that the perpetrator of the incident was a 44-year-old man with the initials S. He is a local resident living in Jambu Village, Lenteng District, Sumenep. The suspect said he was agitated because of the office location which block the road and irrigation channels resulted in waterlogging and flooding during rainfall. Despite repeated reminders, the management has not taken immediate action to clean it up, causing disruption to the activities of the suspect and local residents.

The Portrait of Religious Conflict Resolution in Madura

Based on the description of the cases above, it can be concluded that the Muslim Madura is vulnerable to conflict, particularly during electoral periods.³⁹ The number and list of cases could increase if the study of religious conflict were expanded beyond internal conflicts within Muslims. The religious conflicts among Muslims in Madura, as described above, are a complex and multifaceted issue. It is important to note that the issue is likely just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the dynamics of religious conflict in Madura. Hence, religious conflict in Madura is multifaceted and involves different dimensions and actors, which affects the way it is managed and resolved.

³⁷ Kuswanto Ferdian, "Masjid di Pamekasan Disegel Ribuan Warga, Ceramah Ustaz Yazir Hasan Jadi Pemantik", (25 January 2023), online: *Tribunjatim.com* <<https://jatim.tribunnews.com/2023/01/25/masjid-di-pamekasan-disegel-ribuan-warga-ceramah-ustaz-yazir-hasan-jadi-pemantik>>.

³⁸ Ahmad Rahman, "Pelaku Pembakaran Kantor MWC NU Sumenep Tertangkap", (Mei 2023), online: *detikjatim* <<https://www.detik.com/jatim/berita/d-6717411/pelaku-pembakaran-kantor-mwc-nu-sumenep-tertangkap>>.

³⁹ Media Jatim, "Rentan Terjadi Konflik, Puluhan Warga Pamekasan Tuntut Bupati Segera Laksanakan Pilkades", (8 February 2023), online: <<https://mediajatim.com/2023/02/08/rentan-terjadi-konflik-puluhan-warga-pamekasan-tuntut-bupati-segera-laksanakan-pilkades/>>.

Based on the analysis of data obtained in the field, conflict actors between Muslims in Madura can be individuals or groups. Group actors are people whose identity and common interests are bound by organizational ties, religious orientation, and other collective identities. Therefore, group actors can be social organizations, youth organizations, and religious organizations. Madura has several prominent actor groups, including the Madurese Ulama Alliance (*Aliansi Ulama Madura: AUMA*), the Madura Young Kiai Forum (*Forum Kiai Muda Madura*), the Madura Islamic Boarding School Ulama Gathering Agency (*Badan Silaturahmi Ulama Pesantren Madura: BASSRA*), and the Indonesian Ulema Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia: MUI*).⁴⁰ Based on a study by A'la, the outbreak of religious conflict between adherents of Sunni Islam and Shia Islam in Sampang, Madura is thought to be strongly connected to the names of these socio-religious organizations. Similarly, in the case of accusations of religious blasphemy against Kiai Fathorrahman in Pamekasan, several Islamic organizations, including the socio-religious organization Pamekasan Islamic Community Movement (*Gerakan Ummat Islam Pamekasan: GUIP*), were identified as playing a strategic role in the incident.⁴¹

Meanwhile, in Madura, individual actors are referred to as elites. These figures are known for their social status and influence. These elites possess social capital due to their power, authority, and high social class. They control natural, economic, and political resources. Additionally, they hold religious privilege as the religious elite in Madura. There are three local elite figures in Madura: *kalebhun* (village head), *bhejingan* (belater), and *kiai* (religious elites).⁴² What is the position and role of the three local elites in the Muslim conflict in Madura?

When considering past cases of religious conflict among Muslims in Madura, it is difficult to ignore the involvement of the three local elites mentioned. These elites have consistently played a significant role in previous conflicts. It is worth noting that each of them has a history of involvement in various religious conflicts. For instance, in the case of closing the Wahabi Mosque due to accusations of blasphemy against KH. H. Hasyim Asy'ari, the village head (*kalebhun*), as the government representative at the village level, was involved. This was done by allowing anarchist actions to be carried out by the masses.⁴³ A similar pattern also emerged in the conflict triggered by the Kiai Fathor case.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ A'la & Mukarrom, *supra* note 8.

⁴¹ Abd Hannan & Zainuddin Syarif, "Konservatisme vs. Moderatisme: Kontestasi Pemikiran Keagamaan Kontemporer di Kalangan Ormas Islam Lokal di Madura, Indonesia" (2022) 10:2 FIKRAH 329, online: <<https://journal.iainkudus.ac.id/index.php/fikrah/article/view/16475>>.

⁴² Abdur Rozaki, *Menabur Kharisma Menuai Kuasa; Kiprah Kyai dan Blater Sebagai Rezim Kembar di Madura* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Marwa, 2004).

⁴³ Eben Haezer, "Kades di Pamekasan Segel Masjid Setelah Ustadnya Viral Karena Sebut Peringatan Maulid Nabi Bidah", (25 January 2023), online: [Tribunmataraman.com](https://tribunmataraman.com)

Meanwhile, the handling and resolution of religious conflicts and cases related to freedom of religion and belief in Madura has so far been exclusive. Many conflict resolution decisions are unbalanced and benefit the majority group, especially groups associated with the elite, namely *keiai*. Therefore, handling and resolution is not directed at accommodative and moderate decisions, but the decisions are more about efforts to maintain the status quo, create dominance, and be intimidating. In fact, in some cases the decisions or solutions taken are detrimental to minority groups. This can be seen, for example, in the resolution of the Shia conflict in Sampang. The Shia group in Sampang was finally forced to admit that they were heretics and return to being Sunnis. A similar thing happened to the resolution of Hanan Attaki's rejection so that the preaching event was canceled. The government is not trying to find a solution that can bridge the interests of both parties.⁴⁵

The Concept and Theories of Religious Freedom

The discussion of freedom of religion and belief is not a new topic in Indonesia. It has garnered attention from various parties, including scholars, researchers, social activists, religious figures, and the government. The significant number of parties emphasizing the discourse on freedom of religion and belief indicates its importance and interest. The importance of this issue lies in the fundamental right of every individual to practice their religion according to their own choice. Despite the legal protection of freedom of religion and belief, violations of this right still occur frequently. Therefore, the topic of religious freedom remains controversial in society and is often considered taboo.⁴⁶

Globally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees the right to freedom of religion and belief. Article 8 of the ICCPR protects every individual's freedom of thought, religion, and belief.⁴⁷ Therefore, no one should be forced to adopt a particular religion or belief. The state is obligated to guarantee and protect each person's right to choose or abandon their beliefs. At the same time, the state must not restrict or interfere with a person's right to religion and belief.⁴⁸

What falls under the category of freedom of religion or belief? According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil

<<https://mataraman.tribunnews.com/2023/01/25/kades-di-pamekasan-segel-masjid-setelah-ustadnya-viral-karena-sebut-peringatan-maulid-nabi-bidah>>.

⁴⁴ Jatim, *supra* note 24.

⁴⁵ Almas, *supra* note 29.

⁴⁶ Kikue Hamayotsu, "The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance" (2013) 43:4 J Contemp Asia 658–677, online: <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2013.780471>>.

⁴⁷ Zainal Abidin Baqir et al, *Membatasi Tanpa Melanggar: Hak Kebebasan Beragama atau Berkeyakinan* (Yogyakarta: CRCs (Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies) Program Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya Sekolah Pascasarjana Lintas Disiplin, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2019).

⁴⁸ Jeroen Temperman, "The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 'Right to be Protected against Incitement'" (2019) 7:1 J Law Relig State 89–103, online: <https://brill.com/view/journals/jlrs/7/1/article-p89_89.xml>.

and Political Rights (ICCPR), there are seven things that are included in freedom of religion and belief: 1) freedom to choose or change beliefs; 2) freedom to manifest religious teachings or rituals; 3) free from coercion; 4) protection from discrimination on the basis of religion or belief; 5) rights for parents and children regarding trust; 6) the right to object on the basis of conscience; and 7) under what circumstances the above rights may be limited. These seven dimensions are then divided into two major rights, namely internal rights and external rights. Internal rights are inherent and owned by every individual. These rights include the freedom to practice, change, or not practice any religion.⁴⁹ They are absolute and cannot be infringed upon by anyone, including the state. The state is obligated to respect and protect the religious and belief rights of every citizen under all circumstances. Internal rights are human rights that are inherent in every individual and are not granted by anyone. They are naturally attached to a person.

The International Covenant states that external rights encompass the freedom to express or manifest religious teachings or values, whether in the form of ritual, worship, or thought. Article 18, paragraph (3) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees every person the freedom, either alone or with others, in public or private places, to practice their religion and beliefs in teaching, practicing, worshiping, and organizing activities.⁵⁰ Concretely, external religious rights include religious activities practiced in public spaces, such as rituals, individual and group activities, use of religious symbols, propagation of religion, and religious education in accordance with the parents' religion.⁵¹ These rights have limitations, and the government can impose controls and restrictions in certain places, times, and conditions, especially if their fulfillment disrupts public order and interests.

In the context of Indonesian legislation, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia places significant emphasis on religious freedom as a non-derogable right, as stated in Articles 28A to 28J. Article 28E, paragraph one, clearly and emphatically states that every person is free to embrace and worship according to their religion.⁵² The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia guarantees the right to freedom of religion in Article 29, paragraph two. This article states that every resident has the freedom to embrace their own religion and worship according to their beliefs. This aligns with human rights principles regarding freedom of religion and belief, as stated in Article 22 of the Human Rights Law. Technical

⁴⁹ Temperman, *supra* note 44.

⁵⁰ Paul M Taylor, *A Commentary on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The UN Human Rights Committee's Monitoring of ICCPR Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

⁵¹ Jerome B Elkind, "Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in New Zealand" (1981) 75:1 Am J Int Law 169–172, online: <<https://www.cambridge.org/core/article/application-of-the-international-covenant-on-civil-and-political-rights-in-new-zealand/FAC7FB3DD5B116AC8E59428D1957C2A9>>.

⁵² Febri Handayani, "Konsep Kebebasan Beragama Menurut Uud Tahun 1945 Serta Kaitannya dengan HAM" 20.

term abbreviations have been explained. The language is formal and free from contractions, colloquial words, informal expressions, and unnecessary jargon. The text is grammatically correct and free from errors. The state guarantees the freedom of every person to embrace their own religion and worship according to their beliefs. Subjective evaluations have been excluded. The language has been made clear, concise, and objective. The text adheres to conventional structure and formatting features. The content of the improved text is as close as possible to the source text.

The Analysis of Religious Freedom Violation in The Process of Conflict Resolution in Madura

Conflicts can arise due to struggles over economic resources, power, or influence. Therefore, efforts to handle and resolve conflicts must prioritize the principles of firmness, neutrality, and objectivity, taking into account the interests of both parties. It is important to avoid resolving conflicts by solely focusing on the aspirations and demands of one party. Resolving conflicts in a way that is perceived as unfair can lead to dissatisfaction and potentially create new, larger conflicts. Therefore, it is important to prioritize justice when resolving conflicts.

Resolving conflicts between Muslims in Madura can often violate the principles of balance and justice as regulated by Article 18 of the ICCPR concerning freedom of religion and belief.⁵³ Violations of ICCPR provisions can be observed in the resolution of conflicts between Muslims in Madura, which are often exclusive and only benefit one party. The state's resolution of conflicts in Madura can be discriminatory against minority Islamic groups. In instances of religiously motivated violence, individuals and minority groups have not received adequate protection and legal support to ensure their rights as citizens are upheld. The consequences of these actions are significant. Minority groups are often marginalized and denied their rights and ownership. Additionally, there are implications for the recurrence of cases involving shackling and violations of freedom of belief, religion, and worship in Madura, which continue to occur from time to time.

The resolution of conflicts between Muslims in Madura has been marked by discrimination. One such example is the conflict between Shia and Sunni Muslims in Sampang, known as the Bloody Eid. During this event, minority Muslims were subjected to negative treatment from various parties due to accusations of adhering to heretical and deviant teachings. In this incident, the Shiite Muslim minority in Sampang was not only excluded from everyday interactions, but they were also intimidated, terrorized, and

⁵³ Heiner Bielefeldt & Michael Wiener, *Menelisik Kebebasan Beragama; Prinsip-Prinsip dan Kontroversinya*, 1st ed (Bandung: PT Mizan Pustaka, 2021).

physically attacked. Their houses, mosques, and madrassas were damaged and burned,⁵⁴ resulting in dozens of families losing their homes and hundreds of Shia Sampang residents being forced to leave their villages and land. Finally, for several years, they had to flee because the village government where they lived refused to accept, guarantee, and protect them.

The peak of the discriminatory treatment experienced by Sampang Shia Muslims was when they were forced to renounce their faith.⁵⁵ They were compelled to declare themselves as heretics and repent to return to the true path of Islam. Those who refused to identify as Sunnis were threatened with expulsion from Madura and barred from returning. However, those who agreed to convert to Sunni Islam were permitted to go back to their hometowns. This was a challenging decision that took an emotional toll. After almost ten years of living in refugee camps, a number of Sampang Shiite Muslims received permission to return to their hometown starting in November 2021. However, this permission came at a cost: they were required to pledge allegiance, make promises, and oaths of allegiance to abandon Shia teachings and become Sunni. It is important to note that this condition was necessary to return home to Sampang.⁵⁶

Discriminatory conflict resolution occurred in the closure of the Wahabi Mosque in Pamekasan. The mosque was closed by the masses after one of the Wahhabi figures delivered a lecture via YouTube that was considered insulting and contained hate speech against KH. Hasyim Asy'ari, the founder of NU.⁵⁷ A group of Nahdliyin responded to this hate speech by raiding the Wahabi Mosque, and then they forced the government and police to close the mosque. The speaker was reported to the police. It is interesting to note that the officials of Nyalabuh Village seemed to tolerate the forced closures carried out by the residents. As of the writing of this article, the mosque remains closed and cannot be used for worship by local residents.

The legal products, Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1945 Constitution, guarantee the freedom of individuals to practice, change, or not practice any religion. These regulations are examples of non-discriminatory conflict resolution practices. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the freedom to establish a

⁵⁴ Moch Andriansyah, "Warga Syiah di Sampang Diserang, 1 Tewas dan 5 Luka", (26 August 2012), online: *merdeka.com* <<https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/warga-syiah-di-sampang-diserang-1-tewas-dan-5-luka.html>>.

⁵⁵ BBC Indonesia, "Pengungsi Syiah Sampang Dibaiat Jadi Suni di Tengah Keinginan Pulang Kampung", (5 November 2020), online: *detiknews* <<https://news.detik.com/bbc-world/d-5242909/pengungsi-syiah-sampang-dibaiat-jadi-suni-di-tengah-keinginan-pulang-kampung>>.

⁵⁶ Raja Eben Lumbanrau, "Baiat pengungsi Syiah Sampang menjadi Suni: Cari Jalan untuk Pulang, Namun Trauma Warga 'Membekas dan 'tak Akan Pernah Pulih' Serta Kekhawatiran Soal 'Taqiyyah'", (3 November 2020), online: *BBC News Indones* <<https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-54550917>>.

⁵⁷ Kartika, *supra* note 32.

religion or belief of one's own choice, including the freedom to choose not to establish any religion or belief, and the freedom to carry out religious activities and beliefs.⁵⁸ When handling and resolving conflicts between Shia Muslims and Sunni Muslims in Sampang, Madura, it is important to uphold these three rights. This means that there are no restrictions or interventions for any party, including internal and external rights. However, in practice, these three principles often receive minimal attention and are even ignored in many handling and resolution processes.

Meanwhile, the 1945 Constitution guarantees the freedom of every resident to embrace their own religion and worship according to their beliefs, as stated in Article 29, paragraph 2. Additionally, Articles 28A to 28J clearly guarantee the fulfillment and protection of the human rights of every Indonesian citizen. Article 28E, paragraph one, states that citizens are free to embrace religion and worship according to their beliefs.⁵⁹ Based on this law, it is evident that negative actions taken during the handling and resolution of internal Muslim religious conflicts in Madura, including those against the minority Shia Muslim group, are unconstitutional and disregard basic human rights. These actions not only contradict Indonesia's normative principles of religious freedom but also undermine the value of human dignity.

CONCLUSION

Cases of conflict between Muslims in Madura have increased in the last ten years, rather than declining. Since the Sunni and Shi'ite conflict in 2011 and 2012, several cases of religious conflict between Muslims have occurred in various districts in Madura. For example, there was a conflict over the forced closure of the Wahhabi mosque, a conflict over the blasphemy of Kiai Fathor, a conflict over rejecting Hannan Attaki's lectures and recitations, and arson at the MWCU office.

Each case was resolved with a different approach. Some cases may be resolved with a cultural approach, while others may require state intervention. Religious conflict cases in Madura are often resolved in a reactive and discriminatory manner towards one of the conflicting parties, resulting in discrimination and discrediting of minority groups' rights. An example of this discrimination can be seen in the handling of Sunni-Shia cases.

In order to resolve the conflict, Shia groups were compelled to renounce their beliefs and swear that they were no longer Shia. Additionally, they were required to acknowledge that their beliefs had been misguided. Failure to comply with these requirements would result in being barred from returning to their hometown and even being expelled from

⁵⁸ Temperman, *supra* note 44.

⁵⁹ Abd Hannan, "Penganut Agama Kepercayaan dan Problem Kebebasan Berkeyakinan di Indonesia: Perspektif Sosiologi Agama" (2022) 13:1 MawaIzh J Dakwah Dan Pengemb Sos Kemanus, online: <<https://jurnal.lp2msasbabel.ac.id/index.php/maw/article/view/2209>>.

Madura permanently. On the other hand, if they are willing to pledge themselves as Sunnis, they are allowed to return to their hometowns safely. This solution may appear to be a step towards resolving the conflict. However, in reality, it violates their religious and belief rights in order to maintain the status quo.

It has been argued that the resolution of internal conflicts among Muslims in Madura violates the spirit of freedom of religion or belief. This claim can be analyzed from two perspectives: the international law perspective and the national normative law perspective. The charter of religious freedom in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides the basis for the international legal perspective. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights advocates for the existence of freedom of religion or belief. The national legal perspective in this case refers to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which alludes and declares the spirit of freedom of religion or belief for each citizen. Several laws, including Articles 28A to 28J, touch on this matter. Article 28E paragraph one of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Article 29 paragraph two, and Article 22 of the Human Rights Law all guarantee the freedom of every citizen to practice their own religion and beliefs.

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