POLITICAL CRITIQUE OF AXEL HONNETH'S RECOGNITION OF JURGEN HABERMAS DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to express Honneth's critique of Habermas' deliberative democracy. This research uses qualitative methods that are critically analytical in comparing the thoughts of Habermas and Honneth. The theory used is the sociology of knowledge from Karl Mannheim's. In the sociological theory of knowledge Mannheim says that man and his existence in the social environment can not be separated from his environment, a subjectivity that knows there is always interference from the social, political environment in which he lives. The results of this study reveal that the deliberative criticism of Democracy echoed by Habermas still leaves problems. The problem in deliberative democracies hints at rational communication, yet everyone does not have the same knowledge of rationality. For the educated person he has communication and knowledge rationally, but for the unlearned person does not have it, so they must represent his voice. In the Indonesian context, deliberative democracy is still wishful thinking. The public space referred to by Habermas has not yet gained a place in Indonesia, because the representation system that is the hallmark of representative democracy can be said to be pseudo-representation because there is no proportional bargaining position between constituents and their people's representatives. As Honneth's critiq ue of Habermas the weakness of deliberative democracy, Honneth offers a form of intersubjective relation based on three areas of recognition namely love, self-confidence, self-respect, solidarity.

Keywords: *Deliberative Democracy, Critique, Habermas, Honneth.*

A. Introduction

Honneth carries the theory of recognition, the theory of cognition aims at the one hand to try to further develop critical theory and at the

same time re-examine how structures and institutions are interrelated. The central discovery in Habermas's idea that human development can only be achieved through a process of intersubjectivity, was expanded by Honneth by adding a central role of recognition and appreciation in the process.[1]

Respect is at the heart of Habermas' theory that communicative actions and distortions in communication are forms of harassment or disrespect. Going beyond Habermas, Honneth said that recognition precedes the prerequisites of such intersubjective communication. It was on that aspect of recognition that Honneth entered and criticised his predecessor's way of thinking which was considered communicatively normatively oriented to ethical turn.[2]

From the theory of communicative action promoted by Habermas which focused on the aspect of congenital rationality, on the contrary Honneth takes attention to the pre-cognitive aspect which is then called the ethical turn.[3] Ethical turning in its development is referred to as critical theory, in other words Honneth wants to divert Habermas' communicative turn towards ethical turn as a normative basis for the dismantling of social pathology problems in society. Habermas' communicative turn was judged by Honneth to be focused on linguistic problems of an instrumental ratio. For Habermas, intersubjectivity is related to linguistic structure as a pragmatic dimension of communicative action between subjects then explicit through discursive argumentation.[4]

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[1] Januar Rizal, "Paradigmatik Teori Rekognitif", *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional*,(Vol, 5. No, 1. Thn: 2018), hlm, 21.

[2] Volker Schmitz, ed., *Axel Honneth and the Critical Theory of Recognition* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), hlm. 2.

[3] Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*,trans. oleh Joel Anderson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), hlm. 160.

[4] Katia Genel, "Jacques Rancière and Axel Honneth: Two Critical Approaches to the Political," dalam *Recognition or Disagreement: A Critical Encounter on The Politics of*

In contrast to Habermas, Honneth argues that language is not the only basic aspect of intersubjectivity relations, but the struggle for social recognition of the subject becomes the most important thing. Thus, Honneth complements Habermas' claim that the root of social problems is at the level of abstraction with the addition of the argument that conflict problems and their solutions at the concrete level also need to be considered. From Honneth's view it is considered that the normative expectation of the individual is the substance of recognition, it also contains critical potential that can involve the dynamics of social transformation.[5]

The result of the dynamics of social transformation that ignores the principle of justice in the absence of intersubjectivity has implications for social conflict. For Habermas individual or group justice can only be obtained through procedural processes or equivalent cognitive communication.[6] However, Honneth thinks that to get justice, there must be a prerequisite that precedes it, namely respet and recognition as a form of elimination from missreognition. To obtain recognition is embodied the normative ideals of a just society empirically confirmed through historical recognition. Thus, Honneth sought to develop a normative basis for good life (ethical life) by designating moral structure or grammatics as a prerequisite for intersubjective relations. [7]

In order to realise a confession, the law in the realm of recognition, normatively, Honneth offers what is called a law inseparable from the rest

Freedom, Equality, and Identity, ed. oleh Katia Genel dan Jean-Philippe Deranty (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), hlm. 15.

[5] F. Budi Hardiman, *Demokrasi Deliberatif: Menimbang Negara Hukum dan Ruang Publik dalam Teori Diskursus Jurgen Habermas* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2009), hlm. 16.

[6] Habermas. *Communication and The Evolution of Society*. T. McCarthy, Translator.(Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), hlm. 20.

[7] Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*, hlm. 167.

either in the sense of the realm of love and solidarity, nor internally separated from the subjects who are members in its scope. This indicates that justice is the primary claim of the law, measured by the extent to which it can provide guarantees of mutual recognition. Although Habermas also voiced justice as Honneth also held this view. Therefore, justice as honneth's analysis so that the guarantee will ensure and secure the fulfilment of basic needs, equality, and participation contributions to his community. Briefly, recognition is the standard for what is claimed to be justice. [8]

B. Methods

This research uses qualitative methods that are critically analytical in comparing Habermas and Honneth's thoughts on democracy and Honneth's critique of Habermas' deliberative democracy. The theory used is the sociology of knowledge from Karl Mannheim's.[9] In the sociological theory of knowledge Mannheim says that man and his existence in the social environment can not be separated from his environment, a subjectivity that knows there is always interference from the social, political environment in which he lives. Similarly, the two figures Habermas and Honneth cannot escape the social, political, and events surrounding it.[10] Human knowledge is not a hollow product of the social sphere that surrounds it, therefore a thought is born from the historical scope of the individual's life.[11]

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[8] Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (Malden: Polity Press, 2007), 4.

[9] Karl Mannheim, dalam Simon Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,* Terj. Yudi Santoso, Cet. Ke-I, 2013, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2013), hlm. 530.

[10] Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: *Menyingkap Kaitan Pikiran dan Politik,* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1991), hlm. 291-292.

[11]*Ibid*., hlm. 292-293.

Departing from Mannheim's sociological theory of knowledge, there is always a relationship between the thinker, the environment, the meaning and the results of his thinking. The sociology of knowledge looks at the psychological context of the thinker, the space and time of his life. Therefore, to draw conclusions from ideas, one must look at the scope of one's life so that one is able to take ideas as a whole. This theory then borrowed to track the knowledge of Habermas and Honneth in describing the problems of democracy. This theory is also used to trace the lives of two figures such as the setting of life, life history, the psychology of the author, the influences of other scientists so that they have an impact on the product of their thinking, namely about democracy.[12]

The operational theory of sociology of knowledge in this study is to reveal the knowledge of a figure in space and time and the influence of his environment in this case Habermas and Honneth. In Mannheim's view, ideology is a form of knowledge that lives in society and reflects its society. Knowledge is inherent in culture, where the basis is society. Knowledge is a group production because it requires social recognition. Similarly, Habermas and Honneth are products of their social environment, so in this theory they want to express how each figure views democracy in their respective environments.[13]

C. Result and Discussion

1. Deliberative Democracy

In order to prevent the domination and hegemony of political coalition power through democratic procedures and processes, later more and more experts spoke of "deliberative democracy." According to various

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[12] Muhayar Fanani, *Metode Studi Islam....,* hlm. 38-39.
[13] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia…,* hlm. 5-6.

studies, "deliberative democracy" or sometimes called "discursive democracy" is a democracy that makes "deliberation" a central praxis in the decision-making process.

The basic term and concept of "deliberative democracy" is a relatively new invention introduced more broadly by Joseph M. Bessette in 1980 in Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government. Although relatively new, there are political experts who trace the roots of deliberative democracy to classical Greek times and to the political philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002) or the sociological philosopher Jurgen Habermas (born 1929) who emphasised "consensual democracy".

Etymologically the word deliberation comes from the Latin word deliberatio which means consultation, weighing or deliberation. According to Hansen, the idea of deliberation can be drawn from the thought of some philosophers and political thinkers since the 18th century such as, Rouessau, de Tocqueville, J.S. Mill, Dewey and Koch. However, experts generally agree that the term deliberative democracy was introduced by J.M. Bessette in 1980. Nonetheless, the thinker who was seen as most instrumental in developing and popularising the deliberative model of democracy was Jurgen Habermas, a second-generation critical philosopher of the Frankfurt School (frankfurter scule), Germany. The deliberative model of democracy was also developed by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens in their social theories of modern society. In short, Habermas gave philosophical foundations to the idea of a deliberative democratic model, while Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens supported social theory to the model.

This deliberative use of the term confirms a different political approach to understanding democracy. This difference is closely related to efforts to improve the quality of existing democratic practices by improving the character and form of participation. For proponents of this model,

contemporary democracy is undergoing serious degradation, increasingly caught up in personal conflicts of interest, political behaviour that prioritises imagery over substance, coachman debates in the public sphere and power fights for personal and/or group ambitions and gains.

Habermas (1992) describes deliberative democracy as a model of democracy that gives birth to the rule of law whose legitimacy stems from the quality of deliberation procedures, not only in formal state institutions (such as parliament), but also most importantly in society as a whole. That is, political decisions can only be accepted and binding on all members of society if they are the product of a process of dialogue that begins in the periperi region, which moves towards parliament through democratic and constitutional procedures.

This deliberative model of democracy is the starting point of the democratic process outside the formal institutions of the political system and is located in a more informal public domain that serves as a bridge connecting the various organisations and associations that make up civil society. This model views that every public policy must be tested first through public consultation or through public discourse with the existence of a "public sphere." Habermas wants to open up a wider space for the public in the process of forming public policy.

The concept of "public space" that Habermas refers to is not just the availability of a forum to discuss every public policy. Habermas views the existence of public space by stating that public space is not just a place but a condition that allows constituents to always act as sounding boards in voicing the public interest for public policymaking. A public sphere that can show a discourse between constituents and their representatives that leads to a public policy that is truly in favour of the public interest.

In the context of a democratic state, access to public opinion is guaranteed by the state, where public opinion is born from every conversation of individuals who then form a public body. Habermas added that citizens behave as a public body when they speak in a non-prohibited way, namely with guaranteed freedom of association and assembly, as well as the freedom to express and publish their opinions on matters of public interest. At the heart of Habermas thinking, all legal and policy products made by the state, whether in the legislative, executive, and judicial realms, must go through a process of testing and discourse by civil society.

Habermas's critical thinking on deliberative democratic models rests on dialogue that rests on at least two grand narratives. First, as a major part of his criticism of Marxism (including against the early generations of the Frankfurt School) which he said relied too heavily on what he called the philosophy of consciousness. This philosophy sees the subject only as a monological entity, formed not on the basis of its relationship with other subjects but rather on the basis of its struggle to control nature for its material interests reflected in the development of the forces of production as the most important explanatory base in the tradition of Marxist thought. Second, a way of thinking that prioritises communicative action as the most important form of human activity, and considers it the only way out to unify modern society that rests on rationalism, otherwise called instrumental ratios. According to Habermas the human being is complex, so he offers a conception of "communicative ratio," a conception of thinking by communicating with each other. In more detail Habermas explains, the capacity of organising and integrating implied in communicative action has to do with two things. First, everyone who engages in speech inevitably has to adjust his behaviour based on the conditions that allow a logical dialogue to take place (for example not imposing a will). Secondly, at the same time

the rules that influence this behaviour are accepted as something that has legitimacy and must be obeyed.

The deliberative democratic model initiated by Habermas is not a new discourse in the dialectic of democracy in Indonesia. For some civil society groups in Indonesia, this discourse is considered very promising for the future of post-Reformation democracy. The existence of a public space to discuss public policy is very strategic for democratic development. However, in the current Indonesian context, deliberative democracy is still ansich's wishful thinking. The public space referred to by Habermas has not yet gained a place in Indonesia, because the representation system that is the hallmark of representative democracy can be said to be pseudo-representation because there is no proportional bargaining position between constituents and representatives of the people. This condition makes it difficult for public spaces to be created in such a system of representation. Public space is not solely the presence of forums such as hearings, public discussions or crowded aspiration houses during the recess of the people's representatives.

The deliberative democratic model gives importance to decision-making processes or procedures that emphasise deliberation and exploring problems through dialogue or sharing of ideas between parties and citizens. Citizen engagement is at the core of deliberative democracy, in contrast to the basic idea of representative democracy which emphasises representation. If the deliberative democratic model prioritises cooperation between ideas and between parties, then representative democracy is a competition between ideas and between parties. However, it is not impossible for the grand narrative of deliberation to be applied in a representative democratic system, where the process of forming or making policies by people's representatives is coloured by the involvement of the people/constituents through a

deliberative process. In short, the important elements of the deliberative democracy model consist of: (1) the participation of citizens, (2) the availability of space to be involved in the process (public space), and (3) the existence of communication between citizens and between citizens and policymakers (the state). The author believes that if important elements of the deliberative democracy model can be applied, especially in the process of policymaking and the formation of legal products in Indonesia (in cause laws and regulations) then the policies or legal products produced must have a responsive legal character. This box is a very relevant solution for democratic practices in Indonesia in the future. This is in line with the opinion of Joseph Kristiadi (1999) that democracy refers to the highest popular power.

2. Critique of Axel Honneth's on Deliberative Democracy

Axel Honneth was born in Essen Germany on July 18, 1949, studied in Bon, Bochul, Berlin and Munich under Jurgen Habermas. Axel Honneth was a contemporary philosopher of Frankfurt critical theory.He was a third-generation figure after Horkheimer and Adorno who was a first-generation figure and Habermas as a second-generation figure of the Frankfurt critical developed a critical analysis of social problems. The term critical theory was coined by Horkheimer to answer concerns in scientific and social situations as well as in the scientific field. This Frankfurt School criticised the teachings in the social field that existed at that time including Orthodox Marxism, but also simultaneously criticised the social situation at that time that needed change. In an article Horkheimer explains the intent of critical

theory. In the theory Horkheimer analysed the functioning of science and society. 14

Recognition takes on a new plot in Honneth's critical thinking. This theory certainly takes distance from previous thinkers especially Habermas. Honneth did not reject completely Habermas thinking regarding the act of communication, only that according to him the theory of communicative action has not sufficiently addressed social conflicts in modern society, overcoming the rate of instrumental ratios in modern society. Habermas developed the capacity of communicative ratios, on the contrary Honneth paid more attention to the pragmatic dimension and the affective side of the human being as a precondition for communication between subjects. According to Honneth Habermas' theory of communicative action limits itself to the cooling aspect only forgetting to other aspects, whereas Honneth always offers recognition. This theory has a psychological that every human being needs to be recognised for good self-actualization in an environment that supports human development basically always being in dialogical relationships with others and reciprocal relationships with other people or communities that form his identity.15

The deliberative democracy conceived by Habermas still leaves problems. The problem in deliberative democracies hints at rational communication, yet everyone does not have the same knowledge of rationality. For the educated person he has communication and knowledge rationally, but for the unlearned person does not have it, so they must represent his voice. Thus, deliberative democracy in this regard found a dead end, so it was criticised by Honneth as its successor.

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14 Diah Meltikasari," Rekognisi Axel Honneth Gramatika Moral Bagi Defisit Rasionalitas", *Jurnal Filsafat*, (Vol, 7. No, 4.Thn: 2021), hlm, 34.

15Otto Gusti Madung," Rekognisi Dan Kosep Pengakuan Intersubjektif Pemikiran Axel Honneth, *Jurnal Filsafat Dan Teologi*, (Vol. 7. No. 2. Thn: 2014), hlm, 29.

Honneth's critique by basing his knowledge on the theory of recognition; recognition of the subject becomes a necessary condition or in other words becomes a normative basis for the formation of the subject as a moral agent and for the creation of positive human relations. However, the relationship is dualism, meaning that failure in the relationship will cause disrespect in the form of violent social exclusion, contempt for abilities and others that destroy one's self-confidence and self-esteem, the destruction of self-confidence will cause social struggle to get recognition or restoration of dignity.16 For this reason, Honneth's concept offers a form of intersubjective relation based on three areas of recognition: (a). Love (b). Self-confidence, (c). Self-respect, (d). Solidarity. According to Honneth, these three things are a form of practical relation to the self. These three things are not purely as a belief in a person or emotional region but rather a dynamic process in which individuals experience that they have a particular site the details are as follows:

a. Love and self cofidence

As already explained that Honneth emphasizes recognition as a precondition for self-actualization to be able to self-actualize a person first needs to have confidence. According to Honneth confidence can be built in love relationships. Honneth describes the love relationship between mother and daughter. Love relationships are the basis or basis for self-confidence, in the relationship between Mother and Child. The figure of a mother tries to read and interpret the unarticulated signals of the baby, in this case the mother must have the intuition and sensitivity to capture what the baby needs as much as possible not what she thinks is good.

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16 Supriyadi,"Kajian Rekognisi Hak Masyrakat", *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Pendidikan*,(Vol, 15. No, 9. Thn: 2021), hlm, 18.

b. Self respect

What Honneth meant as self-respect is a sense of belonging to the universal dignity of man that what we have for others is recognition and respect for his status as an agent capable of acting on reason and as an autonomous author of the moral and political laws therein, he himself as a subject thus has self-respect. As a person, a morally responsible agent or as someone capable of engaging in this type of consideration.

c. Solidarity

While self-respect speaks of dignity, how all people are viewed equally human beings self-esteem instead speaks of what makes a person uniquely particular which in Hegel's language is called particular. Furthermore, what makes a special person irreplaceable is not based on negative or trivial characteristics but rather on something of value if a person does not have a special thing to offer him physical deficiencies in the formation of his identity. To explain this issue Honneth took Mead's idea of personal identity that distinguishing one person from another as a person is a matter of what we need better than others. There is an impression that Mead wants everyone to strive beyond the others, but this impression of superiority is focused on the issue of the division of labours in the modern industrial community that by allowing each individual to discover the role of their respective functional figures which is not for the benefit of others but for the benefit of everyone.

D. Conclusion

The liberated democracy echoed by Habermas still leaves problems. The problem in deliberative democracies hints at rational communication, yet everyone does not have the same knowledge of rationality. For the

educated person he has communication and knowledge rationally, but for the unlearned person does not have it, so they must represent his voice. Thus, deliberative democracy in this regard found a dead end, so it was criticised by Honneth as its successor. Recognition theory aims at the one hand to further develop critical theory and at the same time re-examine how structures and institutions are interrelated. The central discovery in Habermas's idea that human development can only be achieved through the process of intersubjectivity (subjects) but was extended by Honneth by adding the central role of love, self-confidence, self-respect, solidarity.

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