

THE NASAKOM DILEMMA AND THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS

(NU and Muhammadiyah Organizational Politics during the Guided Democracy Period [1959-1966])

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Abstract

The political opinions of Islamic organizations throughout the Guided Democracy (1959-66) era are diverse. For some, this is a dismal period. The rest saw this era as an opportunity to preserve Islamic dominance. Cooperative and non-cooperative politics with power are strategic options for the long-term political power of Islamic mass groups like Nahdhatul 'Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. This study seeks to understand the political perspectives of Indonesia's two largest Islamic organizations in the face of the imposition of Nasakom (religious nationalist and communist) ideology during the Soekarno era. This study takes a qualitative descriptive comparative method. The study's findings suggest that, in terms of character, numerous NU figures found theological grounds to reconcile with Nasakom politics. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah, whose members include numerous senior Masyumi officials, leans toward the opposition. An accommodating mindset helps the organization to breathe for longer. Meanwhile, the opposition faces the possibility of political stunting. In terms of impact, the two Islamic mass organizations failed to arrest the flow of authoritarianism. They attempted to survive by honoring the Great Leader of the Revolution.

Key word: Political Organization, NU, Muhammadiyah, Guided Democracy, Nasakom

A. Introduction

In the 2019 election, Joko Widodo decided on Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) as vice president to face Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno. This choice is accurate because NU's voter base is a factor in the incumbent's victory in the 2019 presidential election.¹

¹ Endri Kurniawati, "Indicators: NU Voters Determine Jokowi's Victory - Ma'ruf," May 30, 2019, <https://pemilu.tempo.co/read/1210723/indikator-pemilih-nu-penentu-kemenangan-jokowi-maruf>.



Likewise in the 2024 Election. When NU figures with a high mass base such as Habib Luthfi, Gus Idham, and Khofifah joined the Prabowo-Gibran camp, this was an indication of an effort to gain votes for election victory.² In contrast to Muhammadiyah with a mass voter base that is not too significant. So that it is not a preference of voters.

However, both Muhammadiyah and NU in the 2024 election declared "neutral", in the sense that they did not give affiliation to certain candidates. Therefore, several NU figures who became the National Campaign Team (TKN) of certain candidates were deactivated from the management of PBNU. Such as Habib Luthfi who became TKN Prabowo Gibran,³ Khofifah Indar Parawansa,⁴ and Yenny Wahid after supporting Ganjar-Mahfud.⁵ This emphasizes the statement of the Chairman of the NU Executive Board (PB), Yahya Cholil Staquf, about NU's neutrality.⁶ Likewise, Muhammadiyah declared neutral as stated by the chairman of its Central Executive, Haedar Nashir.⁷

The political orientation of Islamic organizations and their post-reform interests changed. NU and Muhammadiyah which have more than 100 million followers among them. Since the 1920s, it has helped national political stability and constructed the democratic process in this country. By creating peace while promoting moderate Islam.⁸ Since the fall of the Suharto regime, the orientation of the political struggle of NU and

² Nashih Nashrullah, "Researchers Say Kiai NU Support Thickens Prabowo-Gibran's Chances of Winning," November 01, 2023, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/s3fv48320/peneliti-sebut-dukungan-kiai-nu-pertebal-peluang-prabowogibran-menang>.

³ Tiara Sutan, "PBNU Deactivates Habib Luthfi After Joining Prabowo-Gibran TKN," January 22, 2024, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240122064610-617-1052639/pbnu-nonaktifkan-habib-luthfi-usai-gabung-tnk-prabowo-gibran>.

⁴ Khaira Ummah, "Khofifah: I Deactivated PBNU on January 21 When I Officially Joined Prabowo TKN," January 19, 2024, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240119125410-617-1051704/khofifah-saya-nonaktif-pbnu-21-januari-saat-resmi-gabung-tnk-prabowo>.

⁵ A.D. Krisiandi, "Yenny Wahid Leaves PBNU After Supporting Ganjar-Mahfud in the 2024 Presidential Election," January 11, 2023, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/11/01/15132581/yenny-wahid-cuti-dari-pbnu-usai-dukung-ganjar-mahfud-pada-pilpres-2024>.

⁶ N.A. Wibowo, "Gus Yahya Emphasizes NU Neutrality in the 2024 Elections, Invite If Political Parties Recruit Cadres," June 09, 2023, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1735374/gus-yahya-tegaskan-nu-netral-di-pemilu-2024-persilakan-jika-parpol-usung-kader>.

⁷ J.R. Dewantara, "Muhammadiyah Emphasizes Neutrality, Give This Message to the 2024 Election Contestants," January 07, 2024, <https://www.detik.com/jogja/berita/d-7128873/muhammadiyah-tegaskan-netral-beri-pesan-ini-ke-kontestan-pemilu-2024>.

⁸ Hamzah Fansuri, "Why NU and Muhammadiyah Play Dwindling Roles in Indonesia's Urban Communities," February 11, 2022, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2022/02/11/why-nu-and-muhammadiyah-play-dwindling-roles-in-indonesias-urban-communities.html>.

Muhammadiyah has thickened. In order to re-establish the expression of Islam that was restrained during the New Order regime. Both fought for democracy, religious moderation, and religious tolerance.⁹The closeness between NU and Muhammadiyah with politicians is still going on until now. NU, as claimed by Greg Fealy, enjoys good relations with the current government, Joko Widodo. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah seems shy in facing power. It can be seen from the lack of criticism of government policies.¹⁰

The political orientation of Islamic organizations and their post-reform interests changed. NU and Muhammadiyah which have more than 100 million followers among them. Since the 1920s, it has helped national political stability and constructed the democratic process in this country. By creating peace while promoting moderate Islam.¹¹ Since the fall of the Suharto regime, the orientation of the political struggle of NU and Muhammadiyah has thickened. In order to re-establish the expression of Islam that was restrained during the New Order regime. Both fought for democracy, religious moderation, and religious tolerance.¹²The closeness between NU and Muhammadiyah with politicians is still going on until now. NU, as claimed by Greg Fealy, enjoys good relations with the current government, Joko Widodo. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah seems shy in facing power. It can be seen from the lack of criticism of government policies.¹³

Against this background, NU and Muhammadiyah as two major Islamic organizations, play a major role as political forces in Indonesia. Where several figures and institutions play a role in political life, as well as influencing the process of political decision-making in the political system.¹⁴ Formally, PKB is close to NU, while PAN has a

⁹ Fansuri.

¹⁰ Fansuri.

¹¹ Hamzah Fansuri, "Why NU and Muhammadiyah Play Dwindling Roles in Indonesia's Urban Communities," February 11, 2022, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2022/02/11/why-nu-and-muhammadiyah-play-dwindling-roles-in-indonesias-urban-communities.html>.

¹² Fansuri.

¹³ Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, "Is Jokowi Paving the Way for an Indonesian Political Dynasty?," January 16, 2024, <https://www.sydney.edu.au/news-opinion/news/2024/01/16/is-jokowi-paving-the-way-for-an-indonesian-political-dynasty.html>.

¹⁴ Mirriam Budiardjo, *Participation and Political Parties* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1988), p. 52.

Muhammadiyah base. In 2020. Amien Rais, the founder of PAN, is opposite to the political direction of PAN chairman, Zulkifli Hasan, where he wants to form a coalition with the rulers, a move that Amien considers wrong. Amien then founded the Ummat Party in 2021.¹⁵ Although they do not represent their respective mass organizations, the figures of Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais in PKB, PAN and the Ummat Party are manifestations of political power both formally (through PKB, PAN, and the Ummat Party) and informally in the form of *civil society* (NU and Muhammadiyah as Islamic organizations).¹⁶

NU and Muhammadiyah once sat together under the umbrella of Masyumi. But in 1952, the more traditionalist NU broke away and declared itself as a party. NU's exit from Masyumi was more due to internal political disharmony between the modernists who dominated Masyumi against NU leaders who were actually clerics.¹⁷ In the period of guided democracy, the political forces of Islam that are in the camp of the regime, inevitably have to accommodate various policies of the rulers. One of them is the Nasakom concept. NU as a political force bases its theological arguments in accepting the ideas of Nasakom Soekarno.¹⁸ Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah, because its political expression space was stalled by the suppression of Masyumi, had no choice but to compromise.

Since the portrait of the political role of NU and Muhammadiyah today is inseparable from the initial map from Masyumi's body, this paper seeks to see the genealogy of similarities and differences between the two. So that it transforms the political attitudes and behaviors of the two socio-religious institutions to grow and develop.

¹⁵ Ardhito Ramadhan and Icha Rastika, "The Journey of the Ummat Party Initiated by Amien Rais, from the Breaking of the Coalition After the PAN Congress, to Today's Declaration," April 04, 2021, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/04/29/07455791/perjalanan-partai-ummat-yang-digagas-amien-rais-dari-pecah-kongsi-setelah?page=all>.

¹⁶ Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State; Transformation of Islamic Political Thought and Practice in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), p. 197.

¹⁷ Aboebakar Atjeh, *The Living Sedjarah of K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim and Karangan Tersiar* (Jakarta: Warning Book Committee, 1957), p. 509.

¹⁸ Asep Achmad Hidayat et al., "Nahdlatul Ulama in Facing The Guided Democracy 1959-1965: An Overview of Social and Political Factors," *Jurnal Lektur Keagamaan* 20, no. 2 (2022): 567–98, <https://doi.org/10.31291/jlka.v20.i2.1069>, h. 571.

The position of Muhammadiyah and NU in the context of Indonesian politics is very dynamic. In a comparative study of Islamic mass organizations, Putri (2016), stated that The Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM) in Malaysia has similarities with NU and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia. In the role of civil society and political society. Affiliate involvement with political parties, directly or indirectly, is volatile and dynamic.¹⁹ Meanwhile, Suwarno (2020) strengthens the argument for the identity of Muhammadiyah and Masyumi in the Parliamentary Democracy period. That they have a common goal, namely the modernist movement. Although Muhammadiyah's expression focuses on the development of social, religious, and educational fields, while Masyumi seeks to develop political parties.²⁰ In addition, there is also a study of NU's political position during the Guided Democracy period. Where these Islamic organizations are looking for theological postulates of fiqh and ushul fiqh to legitimize their support for the ruling regime. An effort to bridge guided democracy and Islam.²¹

In contrast to the previous study, this study tries to see the comparison of the political behavior of NU and Muhammadiyah in the era of Guided Democracy in the context of political organization. Thus, a complete understanding will be obtained regarding the phenomenon of strong political pressure in suppressing religious community institutions so that political compromises arise, even though their legitimacy is sought in religious narratives.

B. Method

This research uses a qualitative approach. Qualitative methods seek to fill this gap by providing a set of tools that allow data collection, analysis, organization, and presentation. This approach is very significant in political science.²² With the method of

¹⁹ Aisah Putri, "The Rules of Islamic Organizations in Civil Society and Political Society: Malaysia and Indonesia Compared," *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* 6, no. 2 (2016): 29–42.

²⁰ Suwarno, "Relationship between Muhammadiyah and Politics in Parliamentary Democracy Period (A Case Study in Banyumas)," *IHiS (Indonesian Historical Studies)* 4, no. 2 (2020): 12–21, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14710/ihis.v4i1.6598>.

²¹ Andri Nurjaman, Muhamad Yusuf, and Doli Witro, "Nahdlatul Ulama Theological Basis in Accepting the Concept of Guided Democracy 1959-1965," *Fitrah Jurnal Kajian Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 8, no. 2 (2022): 345–62, <https://doi.org/10.24952/fitrah.v8i2.5964>.

²² Joachim Blatter, Merlijn van Hulst, and Markus Haverland, *Qualitative Research in Political Science* (SAGE Publications Ltd, 2016).

comparative political organization. This study includes literature studies. Both NU and Muhammadiyah are two Islamic mass organizations with different political roles both as formal political forces and in the context of civil society. The primary data source is literature about the political work of NU and Muhammadiyah in the early period. When Masyumi was formed. Furthermore, these various data are analyzed based on the concept of political organization. Qualitative methods require a set of tools to explain political phenomena that are not numerical or statistical in nature and do not attempt to calculate or measure data. In contrast, the qualitative approach uses non-numerical data descriptions and observations to draw conclusions.²³

C. Result

Political Behavior and Political Organization

Political behavior in a democracy has different prospects and problems than personal activities. Political actions can force all citizens to abide by the decisions made by their elected representatives. Since this political decision is supposed to be for the benefit of all, the support of all is ordered. But because there are no decisive citizen ballots, voters are not very effective in monitoring the intention and efficiency of political action. Turnout numbers are often low, and even highly intelligent voters are notoriously uninformed about policy issues.²⁴

The political behavior of this nation has not changed. Starting from the independence revolution, parliamentary democracy, directed authoritarian democracy, the new regime, the reform regime, to the post-reform. For about 54 years, the trend of democracy has not improved, but has fallen freely. The social structure of society has not yet moved from the patron-client system that has existed since the time of the archipelago kingdom. Instead of shifting, the pattern of the post-reform power structure remains unchanged. The oligarchic network turned out to be able to adapt to the era of

²³ Jay Steinmetz, "Politics, Power, and Purpose: An Orientation to Political Science," 2019, <https://fhsu.pressbooks.pub/orientationpolisci/chapter/chapter-10-methods/>.

²⁴ Richard Stroup, "Political Behavior," February 05, 2018, <https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PoliticalBehavior.html>.

regional autonomy and the dynamics of government and democracy. Traditional charismatic power is an effective way to maintain a sponsor-client relationship.²⁵

Patronage starts from economic interests. Involving two actors, the state – individuals, government officials – non-government, working together in isolated conditions from the outside, resulting in very significant economic growth. These relationships are uniform and clientelistic, and these relationships occur in a personal nature with clear differences in status. Historically, its growth revolved around commercial relations between the state and officials or businessmen, and then developed into power relations.²⁶ The ruler becomes a patron and the community as a political actor becomes a client. Both are organized in the country's economic institutions for the sake of economic growth significance.

Meanwhile, the perspective of political organization provides three tendencies.²⁷ Among them are the involvement of individual interests outside the needs of the organization, the facilities of excellence of individual entities and certain organizations, the influence of power. This construct will then be used in this study.

NU and Muhammadiyah in National Politics

NU, especially since leaving Masyumi in 1952, has transformed into a force in the national political map. Due to his political majority, often some of his followers have a tendency to reinforce mainstream thinking. Although it is known as a supporter of religious tolerance and pluralism. However, this happens at the surface (structural) level. A study from Mietzner and Muhtadi (2020) shows differences in attitudes or assumptions in grassroots communities. There is a significant gap between the self-perception of the NU leadership and the actual views of the NU community. NU people in general, do not have tolerance for religious minorities as well as other Muslim

²⁵ Muhammad Ali Azhar, "Ormas in the Circle of Brokerage Clientelism: Ormas Brokerage Clientelism Model in Bali General and Local Elections," *Journal of Politics and Policy* 2, no. 1 (2019): 33–54. H. 38

²⁶ Richar F Doner and Ansil Ramsay, "Competitive Clientelism, and Economic Governance: The Case of Thailand, In Sylvia Maxfield, and Ben Scheneider," in *Bussines and State in Development Countries* (Itacha: Cornel University, 1997).

²⁷ Rauf Ahmad, "Direct and Interactive Effects of Organizational Justice and Perceptions of Politics on Personal and Organizational Outcomes" (International Islamic University, Islamabad, 2010). H. 35-36.

communities in Indonesia. In some cases it is even more intolerant. Politically, this happened as a result of the NU's long-term efforts to combat rival Islamist organizations (which were perceived as a threat to their interests) while advancing a campaign of substantive tolerance capable of changing the religious and political positions of its supporters.²⁸




Figure 01. Disparity in the Attitude of Tolerance of Leaders and Grassroots of NU (Mietzner dan Muhtadi, 2020)

Since 2014, NU's dominance has begun to appear in influencing Islamic discourse in Indonesia, after fighting hardline and conservative elements. However, the conservative group remains an important opposition, and sharp ideological differences will perpetuate tensions. The "traditional shift" marks a pivotal point in Islamic discourse in Indonesia as traditional Muslims regain their position over conservatives. This crystallization occurred when NU joined the first government of Joko Widodo in 2014. The religious moderation campaign echoed by NU, with the approval of the government, succeeded in limiting the influence of conservatives. This political victory was seen in the dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in 2017 and 2020 respectively.

NU has always been politically active. This can be seen from its mode of existence as a response to the development of modernist Islam in Indonesia. Although the policy of returning to the 1926 Khittah was a sincere withdrawal from politics to focus on social and religious activities, NU remained politically active during the New Order period. The

²⁸ Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "The Myth of Pluralism : Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics of Religious Tolerance in Indonesia," *Jurnal Internasional Contemporary Southeast Asia* 42, no. 1 (2020): 58–84, <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs42-1c>.

return of Khittah 1926 and the increasingly wide space for political maneuvers resulted in the emergence of civil society discourse within NU which strengthened in three aspects: state autonomy, opposition to Islamic politics, as well as religious tolerance and pluralism. In the reform era (1998-2001), despite campaigning to keep NU away from formal politics, Abdurrahman Wahid and his NU colleagues formed a political party, the National Awakening Party (PKB). Wahana which then succeeded in getting elected as the president of Indonesia. At the beginning of the post-New Order reforms, tensions between modernist Muslims and traditionalist groups in Indonesia were not resolved. This can be seen from Wahid's reluctance in January 1998 to join Amin Rais in the unified Reformasi movement. His attitude was relatively conciliatory towards Suharto.²⁹

In Muhammadiyah, there are those who think that the Jokowi Widodo Government, especially in the second period, is not agile in overcoming religious problems. These religious problems are solved more politically than legally. The dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is one example. In addition to not solving the problem, many members of the two dissolved mass organizations are still carrying out their activities as usual. Quite a lot of them have received the sympathy of the community.³⁰

Compared to Muhammadiyah as the second largest Islamic group in Indonesia, although it also rejects the idea of HT, resistance to the idea of HT does not seem to be the main agenda of this group in Indonesia. On the Muhammadiyah website, for example, there is not a single article that specifically discusses the idea of the caliphate, and opposes hizb ut-tahrir. Muhammadiyah's response to HT is mostly the news of Muhammadiyah's activities as in the remarks of its executive leaders. It can also be seen on Muhammadiyah social media accounts, youtube, twitter, facebook and instagram.³¹

²⁹ Robin Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). H, 142.

³⁰ E. P. Putra, "Muhammadiyah: Pembubaran HTI Dan FPI Tak Selesaikan Masalah," October 19, 2021, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/r16jrt484/muhammadiyah-pembubaran-hti-dan-fpi-tak-selesaikan-masalah>.

³¹ Hasbi Aswar, Rohana Binti, and Abdul Hamid, "Conflict Between Hizb Ut-Tahrir And Islamic Civil Society In Indonesia : A Countermovement Approach," *Jurnal Al-Adalah : Jurnal Hukum Dan Politik Islam* 5, no. 2 (2020): 183–203. H, 198.

In general, political attitudes towards various actual social and religious issues are seen in the following table:

Tabel 01. Political Response of NU and Muhammadiyah in Actual Issues

NU	Muhammadiyah
- The religious moderation campaign echoed by NU, with the approval of the government, succeeded in limiting the influence of conservatives. - This political victory was seen in the dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in 2017 and 2020 respectively.	- Resistance to HT's ideas does not seem to be the main agenda of this group in Indonesia. - There are those who consider the Jokowi Widodo Government, especially in the second period, not agile in overcoming religious issues. These religious problems are solved more politically than legally.

Source: Putra (2021), Aswar dkk (2020)

Nasakom: *Move Politik Soekarno*

There are internal factors that affect Soekarno's political move to implement guided democracy. He was certainly disappointed with the Sutan Sjahrir movement which in mid-1945 succeeded in removing Soekarno-Hatta from the executive leadership by forming the first parliamentary cabinet. Although it is still under the 1945 Constitution which adheres to the presidential cabinet system. In short, he wants to directly lead the government. I no longer want to be a stamp maker, or a symbol president. As stipulated in the 1950 Constitution, as a constitutional basis for the implementation of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia.³²

Guided democratic politics is one of Soekarno's controversial ideas. The spirit of revolutionary idealism and anti-oppression that had been present since he was young, faded when his regime was about to disappear. When he metamorphosed into a repressive thinker who was anti-democracy. He interpreted the design of democracy with the jargon 'the revolution is not finished'. Besar considered that Western Democracy was not in accordance with the noble values of the Indonesian nation which was thick with mutual cooperation and deliberation. Soekarno's anxiety seemed to find

³² Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)* (Yogyakarta: IRCISoD, 2021). p. 78.

a justification, during the implementation of the Western-style parliamentary system when it was colored by political instability.³³

A new thesis emerged in Soekarno's mind regarding the failure of the parliamentary system. He needs to reformat Indonesian-style democracy. The achievement of community welfare must be obtained through a political system that departs from a set of values that are firmly rooted in Indonesia's distinctive culture, this thought is also shared by Tan Malaka, as he wrote in "Madilog", about the indigenous culture of indigenous peoples. The difference is that Western rationality about the importance of unity among the ideological forces that were entrenched in the Dutch East Indies at that time inspired Tan more. He illustrated the unity of communist Russia and Islam in the past. Caucasus in October 1917. Soekarno was greatly influenced by the construction of traditional Javanese culture.³⁴

The next controversy of Soekarno's thinking is the content of guided democracy. The unification of diverse ideologies: nationalist, religious and communist. There are two phenomena behind the emergence of this idea. First, in his youth after conducting various analyses, he concluded that the resistance that must be taken in dealing with Dutch colonialism must be in a non-cooperative way and unity among the movements spread across the three major political forces, namely nationalism, Islam and Marxism. Soekarno advocated the cooperation of the three for the sake of creating the independence of the Indonesian nation.³⁵ Next is the influence of the traditional Javanese concept of power. Namely the concept of harmony, a concept that contains the meaning of constantly trying to reconcile with each other, eliminating tensions in society and trying to eliminate elements that cause disputes and unrest. The philosophical concept of Javanese ethics prioritizes equality over differences.³⁶

³³ Gili Argenti and D.S.I. Dias, "Soekarno's Political Thinking About Guided Democracy," *Jurnal Politikom Indonesiana* 3, no. 2 (2018): 46–63. H, 46.

³⁴ Harry Prabowo, *The Perspective of Marxism in Malaka: The Theory and Praxis of the Munuju Republic* (Yogyakarta: Jendela, 2002).

³⁵ Tempo, *Sukarno, The Paradox of the Indonesian Revolution* (Jakarta: KPG (Gramedia Popular Literature), 2022). H, 5.

³⁶ Frans Magnis Suseno, *Javanese Ethics: A Philosophical Analysis of Javanese Life Wisdom* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1984).

Muhammadiyah was originally established as a socio-religious movement. The initial intersection of this organization with the practical politics of its involvement in the Indonesian Muslim Syuro Council (Masyumi), the umbrella of an Islamic organization, which later transformed into a political party on November 7, 1945. The Masyumi Party was born in the Muhammadiyah Teachers' Building, Yogyakarta City. Muhammadiyah was placed together with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Muslim Ummah Alliance, and the Muslim Ummah Association as special members of Masyumi. Then followed by other Islamic organizations such as Al-Irshad, the Aceh Ulema Association (PUSA), Nahdhatul Wathan in Lombok, Mathlaul Anwar in Banten, Jami'ah Al-Wasliyyah and Al-Ittihadiyah in North Sumatra, and others.³⁷

Deliar Noer confirmed that until the dissolution of Masyumi, Muhammadiyah members were generally classified as members of this party. At least his supporters. In fact, only his organization is bound, while Muhammadiyah members themselves do not automatically become supporters of Masyumi. In the history of Indonesian Muslim parties during the independence period, a person's attachment to a party was more often determined by the party's position in the midst of political upheavals in the country. When the party's position is strong, the party is a place where the masses gather. As the restraints faded, people moved away from them. Ideals, ukhuwah, loyalty, seem to depend on rewards, material or non-material (pride, self-security, etc.).³⁸

Since its inception, Masyumi's body has not been solid. There were two factions, the conservative Soekiman Wirdjosandjojo, the party's first chairman and the moderate Mohammad Natsir, his successor since 1949. NU is close to the Sukiman faction while Muhammadiyah tends to be affiliated with Natsir. As the "45th batch", Soekiman was influenced by the nationalism movement of the 1920s and 1930s. An attitude that smoothed his relationship with the NU traditionalists and the PNI secular nationalists. During his leadership (1945-1949), the ulama were authorized to be involved in party political affairs.³⁹

³⁷ Greg Fealy, *Ijtihad Politik Ulama: Sejarah Nu 1952 - 1967* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2009).

³⁸ Deliar Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965* (Jakarta: Graffiti Press, 1987). H, 49.

³⁹ Rémi Madinier, *Masyumi Party: Between the Temptation of Democracy & Integral Islam* (Jakarta: Mizan, 2013), p. 358.

The change in the role of the ulama and the structure of the Syuro Assembly in the Masyumi congress in 1949 became a source of dispute between the NU group and the group of M. Natsir, a Dutch-educated intellectual, who was elected as the general chairman at the congress. The function of the Syuro Assembly, which contains ulama and kyai, is only a place for consultation and does not have a significant effect on the direction of party policy. Since the internal political conflict in the 1949 Masyumi congress, the relationship between NU and Masyumi has never recovered.⁴⁰

D. Discussion

Sukarno's political consolidation went quickly. All the forces began to unite in his hands. The military under A. H. Nasution, the Indonesian Communist Party, and a number of Islamic parties. In the era of Guided Democracy, there were only two political paths available. Pro-Revolution or Counter-Revolution. While Sukarno himself declared himself the Great Leader of the Revolution.

NU and Muhammadiyah Figures in the Era of Guided Democracy

Organizational politics involves individuals or groups acting in their own interests, and often contradicts the goals and objectives of the organization as a whole.⁴¹

After the death of the first Rais 'Aam NU, KH. Hasyim Asy'ari in 1947, KH. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah appeared as the second Rais 'Aam until his death in 1971. The top leadership of PB NU itself is held by KH. Dr. Idham Chalid until the Situbondo Congress, December 1984, was shifted by Abdurrahman Wahid. These two key figures gave an extraordinary color to NU's political behavior during the Guided Democracy period. The Syuriah Council is the highest body in the NU organizational structure. Overseeing the Tanfidziyah Council (Executive/PB NU). Therefore, all political steps of PB NU must be with the blessing of the Syuriah Assembly. This means that all participation of NU in the political system of Guided Democracy through the approval of the Syuriah Council.⁴²

⁴⁰ Fealy, *Ijtihad Politik Ulama: History of Nu 1952 - 1967*.

⁴¹ S.B. Bacharach and E.J. Lawler, "Political Alignments in Organizations," in *Power and Influence in Organizations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), 75–77.

⁴² Maarif, *Percaturan Islam Dan Politik, Teori Belah Bambu Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965)*. H, 125.

Kyai Wahab as Rais 'Aam was the one who gave the verdict until NU entered the gate of the Gotong Royong House of Representatives (DPRGR) freely. Every political step does not mean that there is no resistance. Initially, there was a number of frictions against Rais 'Aam's policy by several NU regional leaders. They are not happy with NU's political move against the DPRGR. However, this voice is getting dimmer over time. Swallowed by the glory of Kyai Wahab's authority who had given a "yes" decision to the Soekarno-style parliament. In NU, Syuriah has the right of veto that can overturn various decisions and political steps of Tanfidziyah.⁴³

At the beginning of its establishment, the public did not know Tanfidziyah. They only know syuriah. Rais 'Aam at the beginning of PBNU was known as Rais Akbar, a term that was not used anymore. Especially for Hadratussyekh KH Hasyim Asy'ari. It was only at the ninth NU Congress in Banyuwangi in 1934 that there was a special meeting of tanfidziyah. In the previous era, until the 8th Congress in Jakarta (1933), although there was management, there was no special congress for tanfidziyah.⁴⁴

Kyai Wahab from Syuriah is tasked with mainly seeking theological justification for NU's political decisions. Kyai Idham from Tanfidziyah practically implemented the decision.⁴⁵ In addition to Kyai Wahab and Kyai Idham, the figures who were loyal to Soekarno were KH. Saifuddin Zuhri (1919-1986) and KH. A. Sjaichu. Zuhri became minister of religion in 1962. Sjaichu became deputy chairman of the DPRGR as a minister in 1963.⁴⁶ Both Zuhri and Sjaichu graduated from Islamic boarding schools. By subduing the Tanfidziyah chairmen and the Syuriah Chairman, Soekarno succeeded in subduing NU as a whole. Moreover, there is also a doctrine that supports this position of exalting the high and loving the low.⁴⁷ Kyai in Syuriah and Tanfidziyah as the highest need to be glorified and respected in matters of religion and politik. ini strengthen the position of elders who are loyal to Sukarno.

⁴³ Mahrus Irsyam, "Nahdhatul Ulama, 1945-1952" (University of Indonesia, 1983). H, 126.

⁴⁴ Abah, "The Relationship between Syuriah and Tanfidziyah NU," February 17, 2018, <https://www.nu.or.id/fragmen/hubungan-syuriah-dan-tanfidziyah-nu-pEdJs>.

⁴⁵ Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)*. H, 129.

⁴⁶ Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H, 113.

⁴⁷ Honor for the great and mercy for the small.

Among those who disagreed with NU about developments during the Guided Democracy period included KH. M. Dahlan, the 2nd rais of NU, Vice Chairman of PB NU 1952 led by KH. Masjkur; and Imron Rosjadi, Chairman of Ansor Youth and Vice Chairman II of PBNU 1956 under Chairman H. Idham Chalid. They were both with several Masyumi people, the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), and independently founded the Democracy League on March 24, 1960. The goal is to defend the country, religion, and society. This institution is not an organization that seeks membership much. But it is more of a meeting body of a group of people with the same aspirations. Therefore, its activities are in the form of publications, lectures and political actions in upholding democracy.

Muhammad Dahlan was elected as the Chairman of Tanfidziah at the 20th NU congress in Surabaya, 1954. Through the NU party he became a constituent member until 1959. In 1960, when the DPRGR was formed, he was appointed as a member. However, he refused on the grounds that the formation of the DPRGR did not give an opportunity to the opposition.⁴⁸ During the New Order period, he was the minister of Religion (1961-1971). In his youth, after studying at the Siwalan Panji Sidoarjo and Tebu Ireng Jombang Islamic boarding schools, he went to Mecca. Active in recitation around the Al-Harrsm mosque in Mecca. Not only learning religious knowledge but also about the outside world. This experience in Mecca is what forged him into a critical figure.

Imron Rosjadi is classified as a free-thinking person. He graduated from MULO in 1934 and the Faculty of Law in Baghdad in 1948. In his youth he was involved in the national Indonesia Muda, as well as the Indonesian Muslim Youth, a PSII cadre organization. This freedom of thought made him stay away from the vortex of power of the NU Executive Board. Especially when he held the status of secretary of the League for Democracy (1960-1962), an organization that opposed Guided Democracy, and then sank into prison (1962-1966) as a political prisoner of the Old Order.⁴⁹

The Democracy League managed to gain the support of a number of figures and military officers, when Soekarno was still abroad. When he returned home, the League

⁴⁸ Editorial, "KH Muhammad Dahlan, Supporter of the Birth of NU Cadres," October 21, 2022, <https://jurnal9.tv/peristiwa/kh-muhammad-dahlan-pendukung-lahirnya-kader-kader-nu/>.

⁴⁹ Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H, 113.

was dissolved without a single person or party defending him. The League is hostile to many parties, especially those who support Guided Democracy. Some of his figures such as Imron Rosjadi (NU) and Anwar Harjono (Masyumi) had received threats when carrying out their activities.⁵⁰

The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), a regional protest movement against the arbitrariness of the central government, became the demarcation line of political direction at that time. For Soekarno and his supporters, the event became a momentum to hit the opposing forces. They were labeled as counter-revolutionary. Anyone directly and "indirectly" involved is immediately arrested. This political line was deployed to those who before the PRRI incident were suspected to be opposite to the direction of the "Revolution" and Nasakom. Imron Rosjadi, for example, NU figures, as well as several Masyumi figures who are not involved in PRRI are languishing in prison. Likewise Sjahrir, Anak Agung Gde Agung, and others.⁵¹ NU South Kalimantan also had time to request that the DPRGR be canceled during the preparation of the 1960 class of parelements. However, these opposing voices gradually evaporated.

Political Organizations of NU and Muhammadiyah in the Era of Guided Democracy

Organizational politics is often facilitated by the distinct individual and organizational advantages possessed by one entity over another, such as power, influence, expertise, and authority.⁵²

Traditional and modernist circles do have different attitudes. In the face of guided democracy, traditionalists try to find theological arguments as the basis for organizational politics. Among Islamic boarding schools, for example, there is a postulate: "what cannot be achieved completely, do not let go of part of what can be

⁵⁰ Noer. H, 402.

⁵¹ Noer. H. 406;

⁵² R.S. Cropanzano, K.M. Kacmar, and D.P. Bozeman, "Organizational Politics, Justice, and Support: Their Differences and Similarities," in *Organizational Politics. Justice and Support: Managing Social Climate at Work* (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1995), 1–18.

achieved".⁵³ This principle, which is popular among Islamic boarding schools, brought NU into a guided democratic system. Even if the profit is small, it can be achieved.⁵⁴

Perti and PSII emerged as parties during the revolution. NU was only formed in 1952, after withdrawing from Masyumi. According to Noer, the emergence of PSII and NU is more due to the ministerial seats that the figures want to occupy. Perti emerged as a party because of a less harmonious relationship with the High Islamic Council, an Islamic party in Sumatra that later transformed itself into Masyumi.⁵⁵

At least, there are three factors that make NU leave Masyumi. First, because of the ministerial allotment. Masyumi received an allocation of five ministers. Four ministers have taken other elements. NU, as an element in Masyumi, asked for an allocation of one minister, namely the minister of religion. This allotment was also not given to NU. However, the attitude of the Masyumi management actually has a basis as well. Hamka, from Muhammadiyah stated that the issue of ministerial seats is a matter of the party, not the affairs of member organizations. NU, he continued, should let go of its demands - asking for the allotment of the minister of religion - because it has held the seat of minister of religion three times in a row. This allocation should be transferred to Muhammadiyah, so that there is a refreshment in the ministry.⁵⁶

Second, the conflict after the Masyumi congress in Yogyakarta in December 1949. According to some NU circles, at that time there were participants who began to show no respect for the ulama. This participant argued that Dutch school graduates are superior to religious school graduates.⁵⁷ Another factor occurred after the handover of sovereignty, the change of party leadership from Sukiman to Natsir. Natsir and his circle, in addition to receiving a Dutch school education, also received religious education specifically outside of school with modern understanding. Sukiman himself was

⁵³ What is not fully realized does not leave the whole.

⁵⁴ Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)*. H, 86.

⁵⁵ Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H, 72.

⁵⁶ Noer. H, 222.

⁵⁷ Amak Fadhali, ed., *The NU Party with Aqidah and Its Development* (Semarang: Toha Ma'ruf, 1969).

educated in the West, but was weak in religious understanding. So it depends more on the ulama, both traditional and modern.⁵⁸

Meanwhile, among the factors that weakened Masyumi's power was the political intrigue played by Ali Sastroamidjojo's cabinet. At that time, a cabinet formation format had been formed. Masyumi rejected the formator's suggestion about the cabinet because he received a guarantee from NU that he would not join the cabinet if Masyumi was outside. Natsir received a guarantee from the NU on July 30, 1953, a few hours before the announcement of the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet (formed by Wongsonegoro). In fact, the Indonesian Muslim League gets an allocation of 5 seats. NU three, including deputy prime minister II), and PSII two. These five seats are considered more than the two parties should get. There are indications that this is a bait to separate them from Masyumi. Politically, this bait is successful. The political gimmick in the style of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet started an unexpected political intrigue in the era of struggle and movement until the revolutionary period. This political game is more based on personal interests.⁵⁹

Authoritarianism, Martyrdom Ideology, and Political Realism

Organizational politics is a "neutral" behavior, which occurs through the use of power and influence, while others describe organizational politics as a zero-sum game in which influential members gain an advantage, often at the expense of the organization and its members who are less influential or politically inclined.⁶⁰

The guided democracy movement has divided the direction of the political vision of Islamic parties in two. This difference in vision gave different fates to both of them in the future. First, Masyumi views participation in the authoritarian political system as a deviation from the teachings of Islam. The second group is the strength of the political community that resides in the Muslim League (NU, PSII [Indonesian Islamic Company

⁵⁸ Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H, 89.

⁵⁹ Noer. H, 236.

⁶⁰ J. Gandz and V. Murray, "The Experience of Workplace Politics," *Academy of Management Journal* 23 (1980): 237–51.

Party], and Perti [Indonesian Tarbiyah Association]). They are of the view that participation in the ongoing political system is a realistic and pragmatic attitude.

The Muslim League was founded by three Islamic political parties, NU, Perti, and PSII on August 30, 1952. This power later became a representation of the political power of Islam that was included in the Guided Democracy system. Some who are not satisfied make the Democracy League. The dissatisfaction of the regional military with the absence of autonomy in the regions crystallized with the eruption of the PRRI. The PRRI and Permesta events received the support of the United States and Australia. They were worried about the influence of the communists in Indonesia and were threatened by the improvement in the quality and quantity of the ABRI's weaponry.⁶¹

Policy on Stream Politics

In the Soekarno era, mainstream politics was tried not to come to the surface. With the concept of Nasakom, he tries to apply supra-flow. Suharto also had the same policy. through the Golongan Karya machine, the government is hegemonic. The two regimes, although they have different political styles, apply the same policies. Suppressing stream politics and prioritizing ideology and nationalism over stream politics. This is not owned by Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) after the reform. Gus Dur's government contains structural weaknesses in the presidential institution. The president came from a minority party in parliament and came in fourth place in the 1999 general election.⁶²

NU is quite mature in political upheaval. Since entering Masyumi, he founded his own party after leaving Masyumi (1952), received the most votes after Golkar (1971), fusion in the United Development Party (1973-1984), and returned to khittah in 1926 to become a socio-religious organization (1984). By abandoning practical political fights, NU frees its citizens to channel their political aspirations to any political organization. This can be seen as a political education.⁶³

⁶¹ Soebadio Hadi, *Australia's Involvement in the PRRI/PERMESTA Rebellion* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2022). H, 189.

⁶² Soetrisno Hadi, *Islamic Political Thought in Post-Suharto Indonesia 1998-2008* (Magelang: PKBM Ngudi Ilmu, 2014). p. 278.

⁶³ Gaffar Karim, *Metamorphosis: NU and the Politicization of Indonesian Islam* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1995). H, 42.

Muhammadiyah should remain a socio-religious institution. It must not be a political party. nor does it need to officially establish a political party or subordinate itself to a particular political force. Just like in NU, involvement in political parties is left to play and become the responsibility of Muhammadiyah people.⁶⁴

The Ideology of the Opposition Martyrs

In the face of the octopus power movement, few political forces choose the opposition. In the future, usually the power tries to kill this resistance with all available political resources. In the Nasakom era, whoever the person is, if judged counter-revolution by the rulers, especially those who are anti-Nasakom, will be arrested. Before warding off his political opponents, Soekarno emphasized that Nasakom is the embodiment of Pancasila and the '45 Constitution in politics. Those who agree with Pancasila must agree to Nasakom. Those who disagree with Nasakom actually disagree with Pancasila. The same applies to the '45 Constitution.⁶⁵

This political formula benefited the PKI, because it received very strong protection from Sukarno. Therefore, Islamic parties that still existed at that time had to formally support Nasakom, even though they had to ignore the ukhuwah of the ummah. Because Muhammadiyah is a special member, in the past, several Muhammadiyah figures who became members of the Masyumi party experienced political upheaval. Hamka, for example, was imprisoned for two years. Without entering the court first.

Masyumi took an opposition stance. Therefore, it is considered a martyr's ideology. When the PRRI incident erupted, Soekarno was angry. The Masyumi management followed the instructions of the Great Leader of the Revolution. Masyumi disbanded on September 13, 1960. Prisons are the most torture tools, physical and mental. Hamka, almost committed suicide when he was not strong enough by torture. He even did self-healing to overcome his bitterness. By reading his own work, *Tasauf Modern*. It is said:

⁶⁴ M. Amien Rais, "High Politics," in *Muhammadiyah Intellectualism Welcomes the New Era*, ed. Kuntowijoyo (Bandung: Mizan, 1995). H, 24.

⁶⁵ Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)*. P. 149.

*"For almost an hour there was a great war in my mind, between Satan's deception and the faith that had been cultivated for decades. To the point that I have made a will that will be delivered to my children at home. But Alhamdulillah: My faith won."*⁶⁶

Stories of suffering in detention were also experienced by Ghazali Sjahlan, Jusuf Wibisono, Kasman Singodimedjo, Yunan Nasution, and Soemarsono. Hamka was supposed to be electrocuted. But the Gestapu incident divided the concentration of the apparatus. Ghazali Sjahlan received more severe treatment. He was told to squat dozens of times. At its peak, he was electrocuted by an electric current, in his mouth, hands, and vital organs.⁶⁷

Hamka bases his line of thought on the fact that the philosophical basis of this country is Islam. This contradicts Soekarno's claim that Pancasila already existed among the Indonesian people thousands of years ago, then rediscovered by him in modern times. On the other hand, for Hamka, Pancasila has no historical basis in Indonesia. At the time of the proclamation, only a few people knew Pancasila, most of the people were actually integrated with the original policy, Islam. In the revolution that echoes is the cry of "Allahu Akbar" instead of "Pancasila".⁶⁸

Masyumi was further displaced from power in February 1958 when three of its senior leaders, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Burhanuddin Harahap, and Muhammad Natsir, joined a violent protest in Sumatra. Triggered by major changes in the Soekarno government and the absorption of income from oil and produce outside Java by Java. Masyumi officially did not support the rebellion. But the disclosure of US secrets to the rebels, provided carelessly by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has tarnished Masyumi's reputation.⁶⁹

Although not involved with PRRI, Hamka sees the root cause. Among them is Indonesia's "Jawanization". Starting from history, language, and culture. Javanese bureaucrats spread throughout Indonesia and behaved like arrogant Dutch-era officials,

⁶⁶ Hamka, *Tasauf Moderen* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1998). H. 7.

⁶⁷ Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H, 418.

⁶⁸ Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of Buya Hamka Committee, *Memorabilia of 70 Years of Buya Hamka*, ed. Solichin Salam, 3rd ed. (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1983). P. 184.

⁶⁹ James R. Rush, *Adicerita Hamka* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2017). H, 155.

ignoring local customs and customs. Hamka was indeed annoyed by the voices of politicians who said that the Majapahit kingdom had a place outside Central and East Java. Hamka actually saw Gajah Mada, Patih Majapahit, as a looter to various corners of the archipelago. It is likened to Bismarck. An ancient model, running a despotic politics. Bismarck himself was the Chancellor of Germany in the 19th century who succeeded in uniting Germany, with an iron fist.⁷⁰

In the Constituent, he denounced Guided Democracy as "totalitarianism" and considered the National Council formed by Sukarno as a "State Party". When his struggle in the Constituent Assembly was defeated, he declared that all those who rejected his views were brothers.⁷¹ In August 1960, Sukarno declared Masyumi a banned party and excommunicated its leaders.⁷²

As democracy faded, several figures initiated the establishment of the Democracy League. One of the figures is Muhammad Hatta, the former first vice president of Indonesia who stepped down in 1956. Because it is contrary to Soekarno's idea. Hamka, who at that time led the *Panji Masyarakat* magazine, included an article by Hatta entitled "Our Democracy". the content completely stripped of Soekarno's dictatorship under the guise of democracy. The act of dissolving the constituent and the Presidential Decree was, in Hatta's eyes, a *coup d'etat*. *The People's Banner* is getting more and more in demand. Hatta's essay was used as a brochure. Soekarno was angry with the writing. Masyumi was disbanded, the *Community Banner* was closed. Together with the anti-Soekarno mass media such as *Pedoman Rosihan Anwar*, *Abadi Masyumi*, and *Indonesia Raya* Mochtar Lubis.⁷³

Political Realism

Making peace with power is sometimes bitter. But it needs to be done. The combination of religion and politics usually gives rise to attempts to legitimize political practice with theological arguments.

⁷⁰ Committee, *Buya Hamka's 70th Anniversary Commemoration*. H, 179.

⁷¹ Rush, *Adicerita Hamka*. P. 155.

⁷² Rush. H, 156.

⁷³ Rush. H, 164.

NU has formally been categorized as a revolutionary group in the Nasakom formula. When there are arrests of those who are opposed to authoritarianism in Guided Democracy, they are just silent. Even though one of those arrested was a wing figure of the Islamic boarding school, Imron Rosyadi. When Imron was imprisoned, no one stood up for him.⁷⁴ As Saifuddin Zuhri explained to Ahmad Syafii Maarif (1978), quoting al-Baqarah verse 286: "Allah does not burden a person except to the extent of his ability." NU, continued Zuhri, is still steadfast in fighting in the way of God. Maarif questioned whether to enter Nasakom or openly oppose it which belongs to the *istiqamah* category. What is clear is that the climate of *ukhuwah* of the people at that time had collapsed. Meanwhile, their ideological opponents rejoiced at the split in the ranks of Islamic parties.⁷⁵

In 1953, NU and Perti scholars awarded the title of *waliyyul 'amri* to President Soekarno. This is a religious legitimacy of the president's position. This indicates that Soekarno is strong as president constitutionally and spiritually-religiously. Therefore, Muslims are obliged to obey him. This justification continued when the MPRS, on May 18, 1963, appointed Sukarno as president for life. A decree that is contrary to the 1945 Constitution. Islamic parties under the leadership of NU with spokesman Achmad Sjaichu postulating justification. There are at least three considerations: political, revolutionary, and religious. As seen in the table.

Tabel 02. Three Motives for Justifying the President for Life

Motif	Reason
Politics	Karno's services in the struggle for independence began in the 1920s. In 1962, West Irian was able to return to the lap of the Republic of Indonesia.
Revolutionary	Soekarno's revolutionary movements are compared to the Prophet Muhammad Saw who led the revolution in Arabia 13 centuries ago. Just like the Prophet Saw in the past faced obstacles. At that time, there were also efforts from within the country and abroad to destroy the revolution by inciting hatred against Karno so that he would not lead Indonesia again.

⁷⁴ Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)*. P. 149.

⁷⁵ Marif. H, 150.

Religion	Throughout the history of Islam, there has never been an election of a head of state with a time limit of five years or ten years. As long as the head of state meets the leadership requirements. And Karno met those conditions.
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Source: Maarif (2021: 153-154).

Similarly, this acceptance, according to Idham Chalid, is because the concept of guided democracy is in line with Islamic teachings, namely Shura or deliberation. NU politics is like the Sunni political school in general. They are flexible and accommodating and tend to be cooperative with the rulers.⁷⁶ Not to forget, this is also strengthened by theological arguments taken from fiqh and ushl fiqh. Like:


*ma la yudraku kulluh la yutraku kulluh, dar'ul mafasid muqoddamun ala jalbil mashalih, maslahah dan mudarat, amar ma'ruf nahyil munkar, Al-muhafadthu ala qodim al-shahih wa al-akhdzu bi al-jadid al-ashlah.*⁷⁷

The roots of NU's closeness and several other Islamic organizations such as PSII and Perti who continue to express their support for Soekarno's policies have been rooted for quite a long time. Although Guided Democracy causes divisions in the people's environment, a decline in the economic field and the absence of democracy – one of which is due to the absence of general elections. On average, because of their disharmonious relationship with Masyumi. Perti started in 1945/1946 when it changed into a political party. PSII after being revived in 1947. NU after they became a political party in 1952. Because there was competition with Masyumi, gradually their dependence on Sukarno became so real. Especially since Masyumi was very opposed to Soekarno's idea.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Andri Nurjaman et al., "Islamic Political Figures in the Indonesian Old Order Era: A Study of KH Idham Chalid's Thought in Accepting the Concept of Guided Democracy in 1965," *Ishlah: Journal of Ushuluddin Science, Adab and Da'wah* 4, no. 1 (2022): 53–74, <https://jurnalfuad.org/index.php/ishlah/index>. h, 53.

⁷⁷ Nurjaman, Yusuf, and Witro, "Nahdlatul Ulama Theological Basis in Accepting the Concept of Guided Democracy 1959-1965." H, 345.

⁷⁸ Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H. 404.



Picture 02. Estrangement of the Relationship between Three Islamic Organizations and Masyumi

PSII could not be separated from Tjokroaminoto, who had been Soekarno's father-in-law in 1920. So that its leaders, Anwar and Harsono, were brothers-in-law that year. NU and Perti then used religious considerations to strengthen their closeness to the President. Long before Guided Democracy, Soekarno in 1953 had been promoted in his position as head of state with the title *wali al-amri dharuri bi al-syaukah*. Actually, for NU and Perti, these titles and positions are more related to the issue of marriage, but other parties such as the Islamic Union are worried about using them for political purposes. During the Guided Democracy period, PSII finally also disagreed with this title and position. Although in the end it was also silent along with their loyalty to Bung Besar.⁷⁹

Muhammadiyah, along with the loss of Masyumi's strength, was also forced to make adjustments. In 1962, under the leadership of KH. A. Badawi, the Central Executive of Muhammadiyah as a result of the 35th Congress in Jakarta was inaugurated at the Bogor Palace by President Soekarno. Something that has not happened in the history of Muhammadiyah. The central leadership also dubbed Soekarno as a loyal member. It was not enough to stop there, two months before the destruction of the Guided Democracy system, the University of Muhammadiyah Jakarta under the rector Sutjipto awarded Soekarno the title of Doctorate Honoris Causa in the Philosophy of Monotheism. This

⁷⁹ Noer. H. 404.

Great is considered to have a truly high level of understanding, feelings, and expertise in the field of the Philosophy of Monotheism".

Of course, there are those who are silent with the attitude of the Central leadership of Muhammadiyah. When Muhammadiyah is allowed to be involved in practical political events even though it is not a political party. Several Muhammadiyah figures were included in the DPRGR. Among them are H.M. Junus Anies, Djarnawi Hadikusumo, Lukman Harun, and Muhammad Djazman al-Kindi. Generally from Yogyakarta and Jakarta. This is a paradox, because Muhammadiyah was a special member of Masyumi until the party was dissolved. A number of his great figures such as A.R. Sutan Mansur, Malik Ahmad, Prawiranegara, and Burhanuddin Harapah, were the central figures of Masyumi in his heyday.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, there is also an appreciative side in the Guided Democracy period. Namely the success of Karno's political ambition to reclaim Irian Jaya into the lap of the motherland. As well as the establishment of the State Islamic Institute (IAIN), during the time when NU collaborated with Soekarno. IAIN was established on August 24, 1960 with Yogyakarta as its center. In the following year, IAIN expanded with the presence of branches or stand-alone in a number of major cities in Indonesia.

The political reality in favor of Soekarno made several NU figures who were initially able to restrain themselves, eventually join the situation. KH. Masjkur, for example, finally also stated that "Nasakom my soul" is by Islamic teachings that oppose sucking, oppression, and slavery. "Nasakom Jiwaku" is also the title of a song that was famous during the Guided Democracy period. At that time, people presented themselves as lovers of Nasakom.⁸¹

Synergy of Islamic Forces

Occasionally, NU and Masyumi synergize in politics. Because the character of Islam is universal.⁸² When Jusuf Wibisono served as Minister of Finance, Sjafruddin

⁸⁰ Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)*. H, 159.

⁸¹ Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. P. 405.

⁸² Hasan Mustapa, "Book Review: What Is Religious Authority?: Cultivating Islamic Communities in Indonesia," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no. 2 (2023): 939–42.

Prawiranegara's term as Governor of Bank Indonesia had expired. Two candidates appeared, Mr. Lukman Hakim from PNI and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara from Masyumi.⁸³ Syafruddin and Lukman were close friends when leading the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (1949-1950). Jusuf was originally going to propose Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, from the Indonesian Socialist Party, but Hatta refused. Jusuf also heard that NU will choose a PNI candidate. He immediately lobbied Kyai Wahab, the Rais 'Aam. By offering halal assistance, it is not binding. In connection with several NU leaders, including Kyai Wahab, owned the company. During the election, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara won his second term as Governor of BI. Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo was angry. He did not realize that the significant victory of Sjafruddin's vote was due to the synergy of Masyumi and NU.⁸⁴

Meanwhile, in the post-reform era, Muhammadiyah strongly supports the title of National Hero for Sjafruddin. The central executive of Muhammadiyah is of the opinion that the accusation of treason against Sjafruddin is not appropriate. This is just the pettiness of the ruling regime that negatively stigmatizes Pal Sjaf. Doesn't history record this figure as the President/Chairman of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI).⁸⁵

E. Conclusion

From the above explanation, it can be seen that the pattern of Islamic organizations in Indonesia is varied. Starting from social religious movements, then they dissolved in the direction of the national movement. Starting from the era of the struggle for independence, to the revolution. Initially, Muhammadiyah and NU were both affiliated with Masyumi. When NU left Masyumi due to the friction of modernism and traditionalism in 1952, Muhammadiyah remained in Masyumi. The difference is, that in

⁸³ Hasan Mustapa and Andi Faisal Bakti, "Inclusive Islamic Communication in the Da'wah Politics of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911-1988)," *Journal of Islamic Communication* 11, no. 02 (2021): 324–54, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15642/jki.2021.11.2.324-354>.

⁸⁴ Muhammad Subarkah, "NU and Masyumi: Separated but Still Compact," February 04, 2021, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/qnycw9385/nu-dan-masyumi-berpisah-tetapi-tetap-kompak-part4>.

⁸⁵ Chaerul Achmad, "Muhammadiyah Supports the Title of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Hero," November 08, 2011, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/luc7mp/muhammadiyah-dukung-gelar-pahlawan-sjafruddin-prawiranegara>.

1952, NU established the NU party. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah does not become a party. This means that the figures involved do not represent the Muhammadiyah organization. Although Muhammadiyah is a special member of Masyumi.

When the era of Guided Democracy began, where Nasakom was introduced. NU and Muhammadiyah both rejected the PKI elements to be included in the cabinet initiated by Soekarno. But NU chose to stay inside, while Muhammadiyah, as Masyumi's political power weakened, was outside the circle of power. Nevertheless, Muhammadiyah is welcome to enter practical politics even though it is not a political party. The attitude of Muhammadiyah leaders at this stage is accommodating to the government. By mentioning Soekarno as a loyal member of Muhammadiyah and the conferral of the Honorary Causa Doctorate by the University of Muhammadiyah to Sang Besar in the science of Tawhid Philosophy.

Guided democracy is indeed not ideal. Even betrayed the '45 Constitution. However, there are still positive sides of this era, including the process of West Irian's return to Indonesia's lap in 1963. NU's collaboration with the Soekarno government also produced a positive side. Namely the presence of IAIN in the middle of the world of education which has benefited to this day.

In addition, it was also found that the differences between Muhammadiyah and NU in political organizations have a historical genealogy. Especially in the position of modernist and traditional claims. Political attitudes do not have to be uniform. The inconsistency actually provides a lesson. The rigidity of the opposition's attitude will lead to the destruction by the power system. Steps like this are generally tracked by those who dare to stick to principles. Generally statesmen. The Democracy League is a crystallization among the opposition currents against Soekarno's authoritarianism.

Meanwhile, the attitude of politicians usually tries to accommodate various interests, especially when dealing with the rulers. Choosing the first one, be prepared with the risk of being abandoned and the story is finished. Based on the second one, it will be surrounded by friends who are interested in a relatively longer lifespan. In the record of history won.

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