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# **ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, GENERAL ELECTIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY**

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**PROGRAM STUDI  
PEMIKIRAN POLITIK ISLAM  
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# THE NASAKOM DILEMMA AND THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS

*(NU and Muhammadiyah Organizational Politics during the Guided Democracy Period [1959-1966])*

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## Abstract

*The political opinions of Islamic organizations throughout the Guided Democracy (1959-66) era are diverse. For some, this is a dismal period. The rest saw this era as an opportunity to preserve Islamic dominance. Cooperative and non-cooperative politics with power are strategic options for the long-term / ., y political power of Islamic mass groups like Nahdhatul 'Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. This study seeks to understand the political perspectives of Indonesia's two largest Islamic organizations in the face of the imposition of Nasakom (religious nationalist and communist) ideology during the Soekarno era. This study takes a qualitative descriptive comparative method. The study's findings suggest that, in terms of character, numerous NU figures found theological grounds to reconcile with Nasakom politics. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah, whose members include numerous senior Masyumi officials, leans toward the opposition. An accommodating mindset helps the organization to breathe for longer. Meanwhile, the opposition faces the possibility of political stunting. In terms of impact, the two Islamic mass organizations failed to arrest the flow of authoritarianism. They attempted to survive by honoring the Great Leader of the Revolution.*

**Key word: Political Organization, NU, Muhammadiyah, Guided Democracy, Nasakom**

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## A. Introduction

In the 2019 election, Joko Widodo decided on Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) as vice president to face Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno. This choice is accurate because NU's voter base is a factor in the incumbent's victory in the 2019 presidential election.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Endri Kurniawati, "Indicators: NU Voters Determine Jokowi's Victory - Ma'ruf," May 30, 2019, <https://pemilu.tempo.co/read/1210723/indikator-pemilih-nu-penentu-kemenangan-jokowi-maruf>.



Likewise in the 2024 Election. When NU figures with a high mass base such as Habib Luthfi, Gus Idham, and Khofifah joined the Prabowo-Gibran camp, this was an indication of an effort to gain votes for election victory.<sup>2</sup> In contrast to Muhammadiyah with a mass voter base that is not too significant. So that it is not a preference of voters.

However, both Muhammadiyah and NU in the 2024 election declared "neutral", in the sense that they did not give affiliation to certain candidates. Therefore, several NU figures who became the National Campaign Team (TKN) of certain candidates were deactivated from the management of PBNU. Such as Habib Luthfi who became TKN Prabowo Gibran,<sup>3</sup> Khofifah Indar Parawansa,<sup>4</sup> and Yenny Wahid after supporting Ganjar-Mahfud.<sup>5</sup> This emphasizes the statement of the Chairman of the NU Executive Board (PB), Yahya Cholil Staquf, about NU's neutrality.<sup>6</sup> Likewise, Muhammadiyah declared neutral as stated by the chairman of its Central Executive, Haedar Nashir.<sup>7</sup>

The political orientation of Islamic organizations and their post-reform interests changed. NU and Muhammadiyah which have more than 100 million followers among them. Since the 1920s, it has helped national political stability and constructed the democratic process in this country. By creating peace while promoting moderate Islam.<sup>8</sup> Since the fall of the Suharto regime, the orientation of the political struggle of NU and

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<sup>2</sup> Nashih Nashrullah, "Researchers Say Kiai NU Support Thickens Prabowo-Gibran's Chances of Winning," November 01, 2023, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/s3fv48320/peneliti-sebut-dukungan-kiai-nu-pertebal-peluang-prabowogibran-menang>.

<sup>3</sup> Tiara Sutan, "PBNU Deactivates Habib Luthfi After Joining Prabowo-Gibran TKN," January 22, 2024, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240122064610-617-1052639/pbnu-nonaktifkan-habib-luthfi-usai-gabung-tnk-prabowo-gibran>.

<sup>4</sup> Khaira Ummah, "Khofifah: I Deactivated PBNU on January 21 When I Officially Joined Prabowo TKN," January 19, 2024, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240119125410-617-1051704/khofifah-saya-nonaktif-pbnu-21-januari-saat-resmi-gabung-tnk-prabowo>.

<sup>5</sup> A.D. Krisiandi, "Yenny Wahid Leaves PBNU After Supporting Ganjar-Mahfud in the 2024 Presidential Election," January 11, 2023, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/11/01/15132581/yenny-wahid-cuti-dari-pbnu-usai-dukung-ganjar-mahfud-pada-pilpres-2024>.

<sup>6</sup> N.A. Wibowo, "Gus Yahya Emphasizes NU Neutrality in the 2024 Elections, Invite If Political Parties Recruit Cadres," June 09, 2023, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1735374/gus-yahya-tegaskan-nu-netral-di-pemilu-2024-persilakan-jika-parpol-usung-kader>.

<sup>7</sup> J.R. Dewantara, "Muhammadiyah Emphasizes Neutrality, Give This Message to the 2024 Election Contestants," January 07, 2024, <https://www.detik.com/jogja/berita/d-7128873/muhammadiyah-tegaskan-netral-beri-pesan-ini-ke-kontestan-pemilu-2024>.

<sup>8</sup> Hamzah Fansuri, "Why NU and Muhammadiyah Play Dwindling Roles in Indonesia's Urban Communities," February 11, 2022, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2022/02/11/why-nu-and-muhammadiyah-play-dwindling-roles-in-indonesias-urban-communities.html>.

Muhammadiyah has thickened. In order to re-establish the expression of Islam that was restrained during the New Order regime. Both fought for democracy, religious moderation, and religious tolerance.<sup>9</sup>The closeness between NU and Muhammadiyah with politicians is still going on until now. NU, as claimed by Greg Fealy, enjoys good relations with the current government, Joko Widodo. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah seems shy in facing power. It can be seen from the lack of criticism of government policies.<sup>10</sup>

The political orientation of Islamic organizations and their post-reform interests changed. NU and Muhammadiyah which have more than 100 million followers among them. Since the 1920s, it has helped national political stability and constructed the democratic process in this country. By creating peace while promoting moderate Islam.<sup>11</sup> Since the fall of the Suharto regime, the orientation of the political struggle of NU and Muhammadiyah has thickened. In order to re-establish the expression of Islam that was restrained during the New Order regime. Both fought for democracy, religious moderation, and religious tolerance.<sup>12</sup>The closeness between NU and Muhammadiyah with politicians is still going on until now. NU, as claimed by Greg Fealy, enjoys good relations with the current government, Joko Widodo. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah seems shy in facing power. It can be seen from the lack of criticism of government policies.<sup>13</sup>

Against this background, NU and Muhammadiyah as two major Islamic organizations, play a major role as political forces in Indonesia. Where several figures and institutions play a role in political life, as well as influencing the process of political decision-making in the political system.<sup>14</sup> Formally, PKB is close to NU, while PAN has a

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<sup>9</sup> Fansuri.

<sup>10</sup> Fansuri.

<sup>11</sup> Hamzah Fansuri, "Why NU and Muhammadiyah Play Dwindling Roles in Indonesia's Urban Communities," February 11, 2022, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2022/02/11/why-nu-and-muhammadiyah-play-dwindling-roles-in-indonesias-urban-communities.html>.

<sup>12</sup> Fansuri.

<sup>13</sup> Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, "Is Jokowi Paving the Way for an Indonesian Political Dynasty?," January 16, 2024, <https://www.sydney.edu.au/news-opinion/news/2024/01/16/is-jokowi-paving-the-way-for-an-indonesian-political-dynasty.html>.

<sup>14</sup> Mirriam Budiardjo, *Participation and Political Parties* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1988), p. 52.

Muhammadiyah base. In 2020. Amien Rais, the founder of PAN, is opposite to the political direction of PAN chairman, Zulkifli Hasan, where he wants to form a coalition with the rulers, a move that Amien considers wrong. Amien then founded the Ummat Party in 2021.<sup>15</sup> Although they do not represent their respective mass organizations, the figures of Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais in PKB, PAN and the Ummat Party are manifestations of political power both formally (through PKB, PAN, and the Ummat Party) and informally in the form of *civil society* (NU and Muhammadiyah as Islamic organizations).<sup>16</sup>

NU and Muhammadiyah once sat together under the umbrella of Masyumi. But in 1952, the more traditionalist NU broke away and declared itself as a party. NU's exit from Masyumi was more due to internal political disharmony between the modernists who dominated Masyumi against NU leaders who were actually clerics.<sup>17</sup> In the period of guided democracy, the political forces of Islam that are in the camp of the regime, inevitably have to accommodate various policies of the rulers. One of them is the Nasakom concept. NU as a political force bases its theological arguments in accepting the ideas of Nasakom Soekarno.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah, because its political expression space was stalled by the suppression of Masyumi, had no choice but to compromise.

Since the portrait of the political role of NU and Muhammadiyah today is inseparable from the initial map from Masyumi's body, this paper seeks to see the genealogy of similarities and differences between the two. So that it transforms the political attitudes and behaviors of the two socio-religious institutions to grow and develop.

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<sup>15</sup> Ardhito Ramadhan and Icha Rastika, "The Journey of the Ummat Party Initiated by Amien Rais, from the Breaking of the Coalition After the PAN Congress, to Today's Declaration," April 04, 2021, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/04/29/07455791/perjalanan-partai-ummat-yang-digagas-amien-rais-dari-pecah-kongsi-setelah?page=all>.

<sup>16</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State; Transformation of Islamic Political Thought and Practice in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), p. 197.

<sup>17</sup> Aboebakar Atjeh, *The Living Sedjarah of K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim and Karangan Tersiar* (Jakarta: Warning Book Committee, 1957), p. 509.

<sup>18</sup> Asep Achmad Hidayat et al., "Nahdlatul Ulama in Facing The Guided Democracy 1959-1965: An Overview of Social and Political Factors," *Jurnal Lektur Keagamaan* 20, no. 2 (2022): 567–98, <https://doi.org/10.31291/jlka.v20.i2.1069>, h. 571.

The position of Muhammadiyah and NU in the context of Indonesian politics is very dynamic. In a comparative study of Islamic mass organizations, Putri (2016), stated that The Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM) in Malaysia has similarities with NU and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia. In the role of civil society and political society. Affiliate involvement with political parties, directly or indirectly, is volatile and dynamic.<sup>19</sup> Meanwhile, Suwarno (2020) strengthens the argument for the identity of Muhammadiyah and Masyumi in the Parliamentary Democracy period. That they have a common goal, namely the modernist movement. Although Muhammadiyah's expression focuses on the development of social, religious, and educational fields, while Masyumi seeks to develop political parties.<sup>20</sup> In addition, there is also a study of NU's political position during the Guided Democracy period. Where these Islamic organizations are looking for theological postulates of fiqh and ushul fiqh to legitimize their support for the ruling regime. An effort to bridge guided democracy and Islam.<sup>21</sup>

In contrast to the previous study, this study tries to see the comparison of the political behavior of NU and Muhammadiyah in the era of Guided Democracy in the context of political organization. Thus, a complete understanding will be obtained regarding the phenomenon of strong political pressure in suppressing religious community institutions so that political compromises arise, even though their legitimacy is sought in religious narratives.

## B. Method

This research uses a qualitative approach. Qualitative methods seek to fill this gap by providing a set of tools that allow data collection, analysis, organization, and presentation. This approach is very significant in political science.<sup>22</sup> With the method of

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<sup>19</sup> Aisah Putri, "The Rules of Islamic Organizations in Civil Society and Political Society: Malaysia and Indonesia Compared," *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* 6, no. 2 (2016): 29–42.

<sup>20</sup> Suwarno, "Relationship between Muhammadiyah and Politics in Parliamentary Democracy Period ( A Case Study in Banyumas )," *IHiS (Indonesian Historical Studies)* 4, no. 2 (2020): 12–21, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14710/ihis.v4i1.6598>.

<sup>21</sup> Andri Nurjaman, Muhamad Yusuf, and Doli Witro, "Nahdlatul Ulama Theological Basis in Accepting the Concept of Guided Democracy 1959-1965," *Fitrah Jurnal Kajian Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 8, no. 2 (2022): 345–62, <https://doi.org/10.24952/fitrah.v8i2.5964>.

<sup>22</sup> Joachim Blatter, Merlijn van Hulst, and Markus Haverland, *Qualitative Research in Political Science* (SAGE Publications Ltd, 2016).

comparative political organization. This study includes literature studies. Both NU and Muhammadiyah are two Islamic mass organizations with different political roles both as formal political forces and in the context of civil society. The primary data source is literature about the political work of NU and Muhammadiyah in the early period. When Masyumi was formed. Furthermore, these various data are analyzed based on the concept of political organization. Qualitative methods require a set of tools to explain political phenomena that are not numerical or statistical in nature and do not attempt to calculate or measure data. In contrast, the qualitative approach uses non-numerical data descriptions and observations to draw conclusions.<sup>23</sup>

### **C. Result**

#### **Political Behavior and Political Organization**

Political behavior in a democracy has different prospects and problems than personal activities. Political actions can force all citizens to abide by the decisions made by their elected representatives. Since this political decision is supposed to be for the benefit of all, the support of all is ordered. But because there are no decisive citizen ballots, voters are not very effective in monitoring the intention and efficiency of political action. Turnout numbers are often low, and even highly intelligent voters are notoriously uninformed about policy issues.<sup>24</sup>

The political behavior of this nation has not changed. Starting from the independence revolution, parliamentary democracy, directed authoritarian democracy, the new regime, the reform regime, to the post-reform. For about 54 years, the trend of democracy has not improved, but has fallen freely. The social structure of society has not yet moved from the patron-client system that has existed since the time of the archipelago kingdom. Instead of shifting, the pattern of the post-reform power structure remains unchanged. The oligarchic network turned out to be able to adapt to the era of

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<sup>23</sup> Jay Steinmetz, "Politics, Power, and Purpose: An Orientation to Political Science," 2019, <https://fhsu.pressbooks.pub/orientationpolisci/chapter/chapter-10-methods/>.

<sup>24</sup> Richard Stroup, "Political Behavior," February 05, 2018, <https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PoliticalBehavior.html>.



regional autonomy and the dynamics of government and democracy. Traditional charismatic power is an effective way to maintain a sponsor-client relationship.<sup>25</sup>

Patronage starts from economic interests. Involving two actors, the state – individuals, government officials – non-government, working together in isolated conditions from the outside, resulting in very significant economic growth. These relationships are uniform and clientelistic, and these relationships occur in a personal nature with clear differences in status. Historically, its growth revolved around commercial relations between the state and officials or businessmen, and then developed into power relations.<sup>26</sup> The ruler becomes a patron and the community as a political actor becomes a client. Both are organized in the country's economic institutions for the sake of economic growth significance.

Meanwhile, the perspective of political organization provides three tendencies.<sup>27</sup> Among them are the involvement of individual interests outside the needs of the organization, the facilities of excellence of individual entities and certain organizations, the influence of power. This construct will then be used in this study.

### **NU and Muhammadiyah in National Politics**

NU, especially since leaving Masyumi in 1952, has transformed into a force in the national political map. Due to his political majority, often some of his followers have a tendency to reinforce mainstream thinking. Although it is known as a supporter of religious tolerance and pluralism. However, this happens at the surface (structural) level. A study from Mietzner and Muhtadi (2020) shows differences in attitudes or assumptions in grassroots communities. There is a significant gap between the self-perception of the NU leadership and the actual views of the NU community. NU people in general, do not have tolerance for religious minorities as well as other Muslim


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<sup>25</sup> Muhammad Ali Azhar, "Ormas in the Circle of Brokerage Clientelism: Ormas Brokerage Clientelism Model in Bali General and Local Elections," *Journal of Politics and Policy* 2, no. 1 (2019): 33–54. H. 38

<sup>26</sup> Richar F Doner and Ansil Ramsay, "Competitive Clientelism, and Economic Governance: The Case of Thailand, In Sylvia Maxfield, and Ben Scheneider," in *Bussines and State in Development Countries* (Itacha: Cornel University, 1997).

<sup>27</sup> Rauf Ahmad, "Direct and Interactive Effects of Organizational Justice and Perceptions of Politics on Personal and Organizational Outcomes" (International Islamic University, Islamabad, 2010). H. 35-36.

communities in Indonesia. In some cases it is even more intolerant. Politically, this happened as a result of the NU's long-term efforts to combat rival Islamist organizations (which were perceived as a threat to their interests) while advancing a campaign of substantive tolerance capable of changing the religious and political positions of its supporters.<sup>28</sup>



**Figure 01. Disparity in the Attitude of Tolerance of Leaders and Grassroots of NU** (Mietzner dan Muhtadi, 2020)

Since 2014, NU's dominance has begun to appear in influencing Islamic discourse in Indonesia, after fighting hardline and conservative elements. However, the conservative group remains an important opposition, and sharp ideological differences will perpetuate tensions. The "traditional shift" marks a pivotal point in Islamic discourse in Indonesia as traditional Muslims regain their position over conservatives. This crystallization occurred when NU joined the first government of Joko Widodo in 2014. The religious moderation campaign echoed by NU, with the approval of the government, succeeded in limiting the influence of conservatives. This political victory was seen in the dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in 2017 and 2020 respectively.

NU has always been politically active. This can be seen from its mode of existence as a response to the development of modernist Islam in Indonesia. Although the policy of returning to the 1926 Khittah was a sincere withdrawal from politics to focus on social and religious activities, NU remained politically active during the New Order period. The

<sup>28</sup> Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "The Myth of Pluralism : Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics of Religious Tolerance in Indonesia," *Jurnal Internasional Contemporary Southeast Asia* 42, no. 1 (2020): 58–84, <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs42-1c>.

return of Khittah 1926 and the increasingly wide space for political maneuvers resulted in the emergence of civil society discourse within NU which strengthened in three aspects: state autonomy, opposition to Islamic politics, as well as religious tolerance and pluralism. In the reform era (1998-2001), despite campaigning to keep NU away from formal politics, Abdurrahman Wahid and his NU colleagues formed a political party, the National Awakening Party (PKB). Wahana which then succeeded in getting elected as the president of Indonesia. At the beginning of the post-New Order reforms, tensions between modernist Muslims and traditionalist groups in Indonesia were not resolved. This can be seen from Wahid's reluctance in January 1998 to join Amin Rais in the unified Reformasi movement. His attitude was relatively conciliatory towards Suharto.<sup>29</sup>

In Muhammadiyah, there are those who think that the Jokowi Widodo Government, especially in the second period, is not agile in overcoming religious problems. These religious problems are solved more politically than legally. The dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is one example. In addition to not solving the problem, many members of the two dissolved mass organizations are still carrying out their activities as usual. Quite a lot of them have received the sympathy of the community.<sup>30</sup>

Compared to Muhammadiyah as the second largest Islamic group in Indonesia, although it also rejects the idea of HT, resistance to the idea of HT does not seem to be the main agenda of this group in Indonesia. On the Muhammadiyah website, for example, there is not a single article that specifically discusses the idea of the caliphate, and opposes hizb ut-tahrir. Muhammadiyah's response to HT is mostly the news of Muhammadiyah's activities as in the remarks of its executive leaders. It can also be seen on Muhammadiyah social media accounts, youtube, twitter, facebook and instagram.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Robin Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). H, 142.

<sup>30</sup> E. P. Putra, "Muhammadiyah: Pembubaran HTI Dan FPI Tak Selesaikan Masalah," October 19, 2021, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/r16jrt484/muhammadiyah-pembubaran-hti-dan-fpi-tak-selesaikan-masalah>.

<sup>31</sup> Hasbi Aswar, Rohana Binti, and Abdul Hamid, "Conflict Between Hizb Ut-Tahrir And Islamic Civil Society In Indonesia : A Countermovement Approach," *Jurnal Al-Adalah : Jurnal Hukum Dan Politik Islam* 5, no. 2 (2020): 183–203. H, 198.

In general, political attitudes towards various actual social and religious issues are seen in the following table:

**Tabel 01. Political Response of NU and Muhammadiyah in Actual Issues**

NU	Muhammadiyah
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The religious moderation campaign echoed by NU, with the approval of the government, succeeded in limiting the influence of conservatives.</li> </ol> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This political victory was seen in the dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in 2017 and 2020 respectively.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Resistance to HT's ideas does not seem to be the main agenda of this group in Indonesia.</li> <li>There are those who consider the Jokowi Widodo Government, especially in the second period, not agile in overcoming religious issues. These religious problems are solved more politically than legally.</li> </ul>

Source: Putra (2021), Aswar dkk (2020)

#### **Nasakom: *Move Politik Soekarno***

There are internal factors that affect Soekarno's political move to implement guided democracy. He was certainly disappointed with the Sutan Sjahrir movement which in mid-1945 succeeded in removing Soekarno-Hatta from the executive leadership by forming the first parliamentary cabinet. Although it is still under the 1945 Constitution which adheres to the presidential cabinet system. In short, he wants to directly lead the government. I no longer want to be a stamp maker, or a symbol president. As stipulated in the 1950 Constitution, as a constitutional basis for the implementation of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia.<sup>32</sup>

Guided democratic politics is one of Soekarno's controversial ideas. The spirit of revolutionary idealism and anti-oppression that had been present since he was young, faded when his regime was about to disappear. When he metamorphosed into a repressive thinker who was anti-democracy. He interpreted the design of democracy with the jargon 'the revolution is not finished'. Besar considered that Western Democracy was not in accordance with the noble values of the Indonesian nation which was thick with mutual cooperation and deliberation. Soekarno's anxiety seemed to find

<sup>32</sup> Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)* (Yogyakarta: IRCISoD, 2021). p. 78.

a justification, during the implementation of the Western-style parliamentary system when it was colored by political instability.<sup>33</sup>

A new thesis emerged in Soekarno's mind regarding the failure of the parliamentary system. He needs to reformat Indonesian-style democracy. The achievement of community welfare must be obtained through a political system that departs from a set of values that are firmly rooted in Indonesia's distinctive culture, this thought is also shared by Tan Malaka, as he wrote in "Madilog", about the indigenous culture of indigenous peoples. The difference is that Western rationality about the importance of unity among the ideological forces that were entrenched in the Dutch East Indies at that time inspired Tan more. He illustrated the unity of communist Russia and Islam in the past. Caucasus in October 1917. Soekarno was greatly influenced by the construction of traditional Javanese culture.<sup>34</sup>

The next controversy of Soekarno's thinking is the content of guided democracy. The unification of diverse ideologies: nationalist, religious and communist. There are two phenomena behind the emergence of this idea. First, in his youth after conducting various analyses, he concluded that the resistance that must be taken in dealing with Dutch colonialism must be in a non-cooperative way and unity among the movements spread across the three major political forces, namely nationalism, Islam and Marxism. Soekarno advocated the cooperation of the three for the sake of creating the independence of the Indonesian nation.<sup>35</sup> Next is the influence of the traditional Javanese concept of power. Namely the concept of harmony, a concept that contains the meaning of constantly trying to reconcile with each other, eliminating tensions in society and trying to eliminate elements that cause disputes and unrest. The philosophical concept of Javanese ethics prioritizes equality over differences.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Gili Argenti and D.S.I. Dias, "Soekarno's Political Thinking About Guided Democracy," *Jurnal Politikom Indonesiana* 3, no. 2 (2018): 46–63. H, 46.

<sup>34</sup> Harry Prabowo, *The Perspective of Marxism in Malaka: The Theory and Praxis of the Munuju Republic* (Yogyakarta: Jendela, 2002).

<sup>35</sup> Tempo, *Sukarno, The Paradox of the Indonesian Revolution* (Jakarta: KPG (Gramedia Popular Literature), 2022). H, 5.

<sup>36</sup> Frans Magnis Suseno, *Javanese Ethics: A Philosophical Analysis of Javanese Life Wisdom* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1984).

Muhammadiyah was originally established as a socio-religious movement. The initial intersection of this organization with the practical politics of its involvement in the Indonesian Muslim Syuro Council (Masyumi), the umbrella of an Islamic organization, which later transformed into a political party on November 7, 1945. The Masyumi Party was born in the Muhammadiyah Teachers' Building, Yogyakarta City. Muhammadiyah was placed together with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Muslim Ummah Alliance, and the Muslim Ummah Association as special members of Masyumi. Then followed by other Islamic organizations such as Al-Irshad, the Aceh Ulema Association (PUSA), Nahdhatul Wathan in Lombok, Mathlaul Anwar in Banten, Jami'ah Al-Wasliyyah and Al-Ittihadiyah in North Sumatra, and others.<sup>37</sup>

Deliar Noer confirmed that until the dissolution of Masyumi, Muhammadiyah members were generally classified as members of this party. At least his supporters. In fact, only his organization is bound, while Muhammadiyah members themselves do not automatically become supporters of Masyumi. In the history of Indonesian Muslim parties during the independence period, a person's attachment to a party was more often determined by the party's position in the midst of political upheavals in the country. When the party's position is strong, the party is a place where the masses gather. As the restraints faded, people moved away from them. Ideals, ukhuwah, loyalty, seem to depend on rewards, material or non-material (pride, self-security, etc.).<sup>38</sup>

Since its inception, Masyumi's body has not been solid. There were two factions, the conservative Soekiman Wirdjosandjojo, the party's first chairman and the moderate Mohammad Natsir, his successor since 1949. NU is close to the Sukiman faction while Muhammadiyah tends to be affiliated with Natsir. As the "45th batch", Soekiman was influenced by the nationalism movement of the 1920s and 1930s. An attitude that smoothed his relationship with the NU traditionalists and the PNI secular nationalists. During his leadership (1945-1949), the ulama were authorized to be involved in party political affairs.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Greg Fealy, *Ijtihad Politik Ulama: Sejarah Nu 1952 - 1967* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2009).

<sup>38</sup> Deliar Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965* (Jakarta: Graffiti Press, 1987). H, 49.

<sup>39</sup> Rémi Madinier, *Masyumi Party: Between the Temptation of Democracy & Integral Islam* (Jakarta: Mizan, 2013), p. 358.

The change in the role of the ulama and the structure of the Syuro Assembly in the Masyumi congress in 1949 became a source of dispute between the NU group and the group of M. Natsir, a Dutch-educated intellectual, who was elected as the general chairman at the congress. The function of the Syuro Assembly, which contains ulama and kyai, is only a place for consultation and does not have a significant effect on the direction of party policy. Since the internal political conflict in the 1949 Masyumi congress, the relationship between NU and Masyumi has never recovered.<sup>40</sup>

#### **D. Discussion**

Sukarno's political consolidation went quickly. All the forces began to unite in his hands. The military under A. H. Nasution, the Indonesian Communist Party, and a number of Islamic parties. In the era of Guided Democracy, there were only two political paths available. Pro-Revolution or Counter-Revolution. While Sukarno himself declared himself the Great Leader of the Revolution.

#### **NU and Muhammadiyah Figures in the Era of Guided Democracy**

Organizational politics involves individuals or groups acting in their own interests, and often contradicts the goals and objectives of the organization as a whole.<sup>41</sup> After the death of the first Rais 'Aam NU, KH. Hasyim Asy'ari in 1947, KH. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah appeared as the second Rais 'Aam until his death in 1971. The top leadership of PB NU itself is held by KH. Dr. Idham Chalid until the Situbondo Congress, December 1984, was shifted by Abdurrahman Wahid. These two key figures gave an extraordinary color to NU's political behavior during the Guided Democracy period. The Syuriah Council is the highest body in the NU organizational structure. Overseeing the Tanfidziyah Council (Executive/PB NU). Therefore, all political steps of PB NU must be with the blessing of the Syuriah Assembly. This means that all participation of NU in the political system of Guided Democracy through the approval of the Syuriah Council.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Fealy, *Ijtihad Politik Ulama: History of Nu 1952 - 1967*.

<sup>41</sup> S.B. Bacharach and E.J. Lawler, "Political Alignments in Organizations," in *Power and Influence in Organizations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), 75–77.

<sup>42</sup> Maarif, *Percaturan Islam Dan Politik, Teori Belah Bambu Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965)*. H, 125.

Kyai Wahab as Rais 'Aam was the one who gave the verdict until NU entered the gate of the Gotong Royong House of Representatives (DPRGR) freely. Every political step does not mean that there is no resistance. Initially, there was a number of frictions against Rais 'Aam's policy by several NU regional leaders. They are not happy with NU's political move against the DPRGR. However, this voice is getting dimmer over time. Swallowed by the glory of Kyai Wahab's authority who had given a "yes" decision to the Soekarno-style parliament. In NU, Syuriah has the right of veto that can overturn various decisions and political steps of Tanfidziyah.<sup>43</sup>

At the beginning of its establishment, the public did not know Tanfidziyah. They only know syuriah. Rais 'Aam at the beginning of PBNU was known as Rais Akbar, a term that was not used anymore. Especially for Hadratussyekh KH Hasyim Asy'ari. It was only at the ninth NU Congress in Banyuwangi in 1934 that there was a special meeting of tanfidziyah. In the previous era, until the 8th Congress in Jakarta (1933), although there was management, there was no special congress for tanfidziyah.<sup>44</sup>

Kyai Wahab from Syuriah is tasked with mainly seeking theological justification for NU's political decisions. Kyai Idham from Tanfidziyah practically implemented the decision.<sup>45</sup> In addition to Kyai Wahab and Kyai Idham, the figures who were loyal to Soekarno were KH. Saifuddin Zuhri (1919-1986) and KH. A. Sjaichu. Zuhri became minister of religion in 1962. Sjaichu became deputy chairman of the DPRGR as a minister in 1963.<sup>46</sup> Both Zuhri and Sjaichu graduated from Islamic boarding schools. By subduing the Tanfidziyah chairmen and the Syuriah Chairman, Soekarno succeeded in subduing NU as a whole. Moreover, there is also a doctrine that supports this position of exalting the high and loving the low.<sup>47</sup> Kyai in Syuriah and Tanfidziyah as the highest need to be glorified and respected in matters of religion and politik. ini strengthen the position of elders who are loyal to Sukarno.

<sup>43</sup> Mahrus Irsyam, "Nahdhatul Ulama, 1945-1952" (University of Indonesia, 1983). H, 126.

<sup>44</sup> Abah, "The Relationship between Syuriah and Tanfidziyah NU," February 17, 2018, <https://www.nu.or.id/fragmen/hubungan-syuriah-dan-tanfidziyah-nu-pEdJs>.

<sup>45</sup> Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)*. H, 129.

<sup>46</sup> Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H, 113.

<sup>47</sup> Honor for the great and mercy for the small.



Among those who disagreed with NU about developments during the Guided Democracy period included KH. M. Dahlan, the 2nd rais of NU, Vice Chairman of PB NU 1952 led by KH. Masjkur; and Imron Rosjadi, Chairman of Ansor Youth and Vice Chairman II of PBNU 1956 under Chairman H. Idham Chalid. They were both with several Masyumi people, the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), and independently founded the Democracy League on March 24, 1960. The goal is to defend the country, religion, and society. This institution is not an organization that seeks membership much. But it is more of a meeting body of a group of people with the same aspirations. Therefore, its activities are in the form of publications, lectures and political actions in upholding democracy.

Muhammad Dahlan was elected as the Chairman of Tanfidziah at the 20th NU congress in Surabaya, 1954. Through the NU party he became a constituent member until 1959. In 1960, when the DPRGR was formed, he was appointed as a member. However, he refused on the grounds that the formation of the DPRGR did not give an opportunity to the opposition.<sup>48</sup> During the New Order period, he was the minister of Religion (1961-1971). In his youth, after studying at the Siwalan Panji Sidoarjo and Tebu Ireng Jombang Islamic boarding schools, he went to Mecca. Active in recitation around the Al-Harrsm mosque in Mecca. Not only learning religious knowledge but also about the outside world. This experience in Mecca is what forged him into a critical figure.

Imron Rosjadi is classified as a free-thinking person. He graduated from MULO in 1934 and the Faculty of Law in Baghdad in 1948. In his youth he was involved in the national Indonesia Muda, as well as the Indonesian Muslim Youth, a PSII cadre organization. This freedom of thought made him stay away from the vortex of power of the NU Executive Board. Especially when he held the status of secretary of the League for Democracy (1960-1962), an organization that opposed Guided Democracy, and then sank into prison (1962-1966) as a political prisoner of the Old Order.<sup>49</sup>

The Democracy League managed to gain the support of a number of figures and military officers, when Soekarno was still abroad. When he returned home, the League

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<sup>48</sup> Editorial, "KH Muhammad Dahlan, Supporter of the Birth of NU Cadres," October 21, 2022, <https://jurnal9.tv/peristiwa/kh-muhammad-dahlan-pendukung-lahirnya-kader-kader-nu/>.

<sup>49</sup> Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H, 113.

was dissolved without a single person or party defending him. The League is hostile to many parties, especially those who support Guided Democracy. Some of his figures such as Imron Rosjadi (NU) and Anwar Harjono (Masyumi) had received threats when carrying out their activities.<sup>50</sup>

The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), a regional protest movement against the arbitrariness of the central government, became the demarcation line of political direction at that time. For Soekarno and his supporters, the event became a momentum to hit the opposing forces. They were labeled as counter-revolutionary. Anyone directly and "indirectly" involved is immediately arrested. This political line was deployed to those who before the PRRI incident were suspected to be opposite to the direction of the "Revolution" and Nasakom. Imron Rosjadi, for example, NU figures, as well as several Masyumi figures who are not involved in PRRI are languishing in prison. Likewise Sjahrir, Anak Agung Gde Agung, and others.<sup>51</sup> NU South Kalimantan also had time to request that the DPRGR be canceled during the preparation of the 1960 class of parelements. However, these opposing voices gradually evaporated.

### **Political Organizations of NU and Muhammadiyah in the Era of Guided Democracy**

Organizational politics is often facilitated by the distinct individual and organizational advantages possessed by one entity over another, such as power, influence, expertise, and authority.<sup>52</sup> Traditional and modernist circles do have different attitudes. In the face of guided democracy, traditionalists try to find theological arguments as the basis for organizational politics. Among Islamic boarding schools, for example, there is a postulate: "what cannot be achieved completely, do not let go of part of what can be achieved".<sup>53</sup> This principle, which is popular among Islamic boarding

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<sup>50</sup> Noer. H, 402.

<sup>51</sup> Noer. H. 406;

<sup>52</sup> R.S. Cropanzano, K.M. Kacmar, and D.P. Bozeman, "Organizational Politics, Justice, and Support: Their Differences and Similarities," in *Organizational Politics. Justice and Support: Managing Social Climate at Work* (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1995), 1–18.

<sup>53</sup> What is not fully realized does not leave the whole.

schools, brought NU into a guided democratic system. Even if the profit is small, it can be achieved.<sup>54</sup>

Perti and PSII emerged as parties during the revolution. NU was only formed in 1952, after withdrawing from Masyumi. According to Noer, the emergence of PSII and NU is more due to the ministerial seats that the figures want to occupy. Perti emerged as a party because of a less harmonious relationship with the High Islamic Council, an Islamic party in Sumatra that later transformed itself into Masyumi.<sup>55</sup>

At least, there are three factors that make NU leave Masyumi. First, because of the ministerial allotment. Masyumi received an allocation of five ministers. Four ministers have taken other elements. NU, as an element in Masyumi, asked for an allocation of one minister, namely the minister of religion. This allotment was also not given to NU. However, the attitude of the Masyumi management actually has a basis as well. Hamka, from Muhammadiyah stated that the issue of ministerial seats is a matter of the party, not the affairs of member organizations. NU, he continued, should let go of its demands - asking for the allotment of the minister of religion - because it has held the seat of minister of religion three times in a row. This allocation should be transferred to Muhammadiyah, so that there is a refreshment in the ministry.<sup>56</sup>

Second, the conflict after the Masyumi congress in Yogyakarta in December 1949. According to some NU circles, at that time there were participants who began to show no respect for the ulama. This participant argued that Dutch school graduates are superior to religious school graduates.<sup>57</sup> Another factor occurred after the handover of sovereignty, the change of party leadership from Sukiman to Natsir. Natsir and his circle, in addition to receiving a Dutch school education, also received religious education specifically outside of school with modern understanding. Sukiman himself was

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<sup>54</sup> Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)*. H, 86.

<sup>55</sup> Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H, 72.

<sup>56</sup> Noer. H, 222.

<sup>57</sup> Amak Fadhali, ed., *The NU Party with Aqidah and Its Development* (Semarang: Toha Ma'ruf, 1969).

educated in the West, but was weak in religious understanding. So it depends more on the ulama, both traditional and modern.<sup>58</sup>

Meanwhile, among the factors that weakened Masyumi's power was the political intrigue played by Ali Sastroamidjojo's cabinet. At that time, a cabinet formation format had been formed. Masyumi rejected the formator's suggestion about the cabinet because he received a guarantee from NU that he would not join the cabinet if Masyumi was outside. Natsir received a guarantee from the NU on July 30, 1953, a few hours before the announcement of the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet (formed by Wongsonegoro). In fact, the Indonesian Muslim League gets an allocation of 5 seats. NU three, including deputy prime minister II), and PSII two. These five seats are considered more than the two parties should get. There are indications that this is a bait to separate them from Masyumi. Politically, this bait is successful. The political gimmick in the style of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet started an unexpected political intrigue in the era of struggle and movement until the revolutionary period. This political game is more based on personal interests.<sup>59</sup>

### **Authoritarianism, Martyrdom Ideology, and Political Realism**

Organizational politics is a "neutral" behavior, which occurs through the use of power and influence, while others describe organizational politics as a zero-sum game in which influential members gain an advantage, often at the expense of the organization and its members who are less influential or politically inclined.<sup>60</sup>

The guided democracy movement has divided the direction of the political vision of Islamic parties in two. This difference in vision gave different fates to both of them in the future. First, Masyumi views participation in the authoritarian political system as a deviation from the teachings of Islam. The second group is the strength of the political community that resides in the Muslim League (NU, PSII [Indonesian Islamic Company

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<sup>58</sup> Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H, 89.

<sup>59</sup> Noer. H, 236.

<sup>60</sup> J. Gandz and V. Murray, "The Experience of Workplace Politics," *Academy of Management Journal* 23 (1980): 237–51.

Party], and Perti [Indonesian Tarbiyah Association]). They are of the view that participation in the ongoing political system is a realistic and pragmatic attitude.

The Muslim League was founded by three Islamic political parties, NU, Perti, and PSII on August 30, 1952. This power later became a representation of the political power of Islam that was included in the Guided Democracy system. Some who are not satisfied make the Democracy League. The dissatisfaction of the regional military with the absence of autonomy in the regions crystallized with the eruption of the PRRI. The PRRI and Permesta events received the support of the United States and Australia. They were worried about the influence of the communists in Indonesia and were threatened by the improvement in the quality and quantity of the ABRI's weaponry.<sup>61</sup>

### **Policy on Stream Politics**

In the Soekarno era, mainstream politics was tried not to come to the surface. With the concept of Nasakom, he tries to apply supra-flow. Suharto also had the same policy. through the Golongan Karya machine, the government is hegemonic. The two regimes, although they have different political styles, apply the same policies. Suppressing stream politics and prioritizing ideology and nationalism over stream politics. This is not owned by Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) after the reform. Gus Dur's government contains structural weaknesses in the presidential institution. The president came from a minority party in parliament and came in fourth place in the 1999 general election.<sup>62</sup>

NU is quite mature in political upheaval. Since entering Masyumi, he founded his own party after leaving Masyumi (1952), received the most votes after Golkar (1971), fusion in the United Development Party (1973-1984), and returned to khittah in 1926 to become a socio-religious organization (1984). By abandoning practical political fights, NU frees its citizens to channel their political aspirations to any political organization. This can be seen as a political education.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Soebadio Hadi, *Australia's Involvement in the PRRI/PERMESTA Rebellion* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2022). H, 189.

<sup>62</sup> Soetrisno Hadi, *Islamic Political Thought in Post-Suharto Indonesia 1998-2008* (Magelang: PKBM Ngudi Ilmu, 2014). p. 278.

<sup>63</sup> Gaffar Karim, *Metamorphosis: NU and the Politicization of Indonesian Islam* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1995). H, 42.

Muhammadiyah should remain a socio-religious institution. It must not be a political party. nor does it need to officially establish a political party or subordinate itself to a particular political force. Just like in NU, involvement in political parties is left to play and become the responsibility of Muhammadiyah people.<sup>64</sup>

### **The Ideology of the Opposition Martyrs**

In the face of the octopus power movement, few political forces choose the opposition. In the future, usually the power tries to kill this resistance with all available political resources. In the Nasakom era, whoever the person is, if judged counter-revolution by the rulers, especially those who are anti-Nasakom, will be arrested. Before warding off his political opponents, Soekarno emphasized that Nasakom is the embodiment of Pancasila and the '45 Constitution in politics. Those who agree with Pancasila must agree to Nasakom. Those who disagree with Nasakom actually disagree with Pancasila. The same applies to the '45 Constitution.<sup>65</sup>

This political formula benefited the PKI, because it received very strong protection from Sukarno. Therefore, Islamic parties that still existed at that time had to formally support Nasakom, even though they had to ignore the ukhuwah of the ummah. Because Muhammadiyah is a special member, in the past, several Muhammadiyah figures who became members of the Masyumi party experienced political upheaval. Hamka, for example, was imprisoned for two years. Without entering the court first.

Masyumi took an opposition stance. Therefore, it is considered a martyr's ideology. When the PRRI incident erupted, Soekarno was angry. The Masyumi management followed the instructions of the Great Leader of the Revolution. Masyumi disbanded on September 13, 1960. Prisons are the most torture tools, physical and mental. Hamka, almost committed suicide when he was not strong enough by torture. He even did self-healing to overcome his bitterness. By reading his own work, *Tasauf Modern*. It is said:

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<sup>64</sup> M. Amien Rais, "High Politics," in *Muhammadiyah Intellectualism Welcomes the New Era*, ed. Kuntowijoyo (Bandung: Mizan, 1995). H, 24.

<sup>65</sup> Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)*. P. 149.

*"For almost an hour there was a great war in my mind, between Satan's deception and the faith that had been cultivated for decades. To the point that I have made a will that will be delivered to my children at home. But Alhamdulillah: My faith won."*<sup>66</sup>

Stories of suffering in detention were also experienced by Ghazali Sjahlan, Jusuf Wibisono, Kasman Singodimedjo, Yunan Nasution, and Soemarsono. Hamka was supposed to be electrocuted. But the Gestapu incident divided the concentration of the apparatus. Ghazali Sjahlan received more severe treatment. He was told to squat dozens of times. At its peak, he was electrocuted by an electric current, in his mouth, hands, and vital organs.<sup>67</sup>

Hamka bases his line of thought on the fact that the philosophical basis of this country is Islam. This contradicts Soekarno's claim that Pancasila already existed among the Indonesian people thousands of years ago, then rediscovered by him in modern times. On the other hand, for Hamka, Pancasila has no historical basis in Indonesia. At the time of the proclamation, only a few people knew Pancasila, most of the people were actually integrated with the original policy, Islam. In the revolution that echoes is the cry of "Allahu Akbar" instead of "Pancasila".<sup>68</sup>

Masyumi was further displaced from power in February 1958 when three of its senior leaders, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Burhanuddin Harahap, and Muhammad Natsir, joined a violent protest in Sumatra. Triggered by major changes in the Soekarno government and the absorption of income from oil and produce outside Java by Java. Masyumi officially did not support the rebellion. But the disclosure of US secrets to the rebels, provided carelessly by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has tarnished Masyumi's reputation.<sup>69</sup>

Although not involved with PRRI, Hamka sees the root cause. Among them is Indonesia's "Jawanization". Starting from history, language, and culture. Javanese bureaucrats spread throughout Indonesia and behaved like arrogant Dutch-era officials,

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<sup>66</sup> Hamka, *Tasauf Moderen* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1998). H. 7.

<sup>67</sup> Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H, 418.

<sup>68</sup> Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of Buya Hamka Committee, *Memorabilia of 70 Years of Buya Hamka*, ed. Solichin Salam, 3rd ed. (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1983). P. 184.

<sup>69</sup> James R. Rush, *Adicerita Hamka* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2017). H, 155.

ignoring local customs and customs. Hamka was indeed annoyed by the voices of politicians who said that the Majapahit kingdom had a place outside Central and East Java. Hamka actually saw Gajah Mada, Patih Majapahit, as a looter to various corners of the archipelago. It is likened to Bismarck. An ancient model, running a despotic politics. Bismarck himself was the Chancellor of Germany in the 19th century who succeeded in uniting Germany, with an iron fist.<sup>70</sup>

In the Constituent, he denounced Guided Democracy as "totalitarianism" and considered the National Council formed by Sukarno as a "State Party". When his struggle in the Constituent Assembly was defeated, he declared that all those who rejected his views were brothers.<sup>71</sup> In August 1960, Sukarno declared Masyumi a banned party and excommunicated its leaders.<sup>72</sup>

As democracy faded, several figures initiated the establishment of the Democracy League. One of the figures is Muhammad Hatta, the former first vice president of Indonesia who stepped down in 1956. Because it is contrary to Soekarno's idea. Hamka, who at that time led the *Panji Masyarakat* magazine, included an article by Hatta entitled "Our Democracy". the content completely stripped of Soekarno's dictatorship under the guise of democracy. The act of dissolving the constituent and the Presidential Decree was, in Hatta's eyes, a *coup d'etat*. *The People's Banner* is getting more and more in demand. Hatta's essay was used as a brochure. Soekarno was angry with the writing. Masyumi was disbanded, the *Community Banner* was closed. Together with the anti-Soekarno mass media such as *Pedoman Rosihan Anwar*, *Abadi Masyumi*, and *Indonesia Raya* Mochtar Lubis.<sup>73</sup>

### Political Realism

Making peace with power is sometimes bitter. But it needs to be done. The combination of religion and politics usually gives rise to attempts to legitimize political practice with theological arguments.

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<sup>70</sup> Committee, *Buya Hamka's 70th Anniversary Commemoration*. H, 179.

<sup>71</sup> Rush, *Adicerita Hamka*. P. 155.

<sup>72</sup> Rush. H, 156.

<sup>73</sup> Rush. H, 164.



NU has formally been categorized as a revolutionary group in the Nasakom formula. When there are arrests of those who are opposed to authoritarianism in Guided Democracy, they are just silent. Even though one of those arrested was a wing figure of the Islamic boarding school, Imron Rosyadi. When Imron was imprisoned, no one stood up for him.<sup>74</sup> As Saifuddin Zuhri explained to Ahmad Syafii Maarif (1978), quoting al-Baqarah verse 286: "Allah does not burden a person except to the extent of his ability." NU, continued Zuhri, is still steadfast in fighting in the way of God. Maarif questioned whether to enter Nasakom or openly oppose it which belongs to the *istiqamah* category. What is clear is that the climate of *ukhuwah* of the people at that time had collapsed. Meanwhile, their ideological opponents rejoiced at the split in the ranks of Islamic parties.<sup>75</sup>

In 1953, NU and Perti scholars awarded the title of *waliyyul 'amri* to President Soekarno. This is a religious legitimacy of the president's position. This indicates that Soekarno is strong as president constitutionally and spiritually-religiously. Therefore, Muslims are obliged to obey him. This justification continued when the MPRS, on May 18, 1963, appointed Sukarno as president for life. A decree that is contrary to the 1945 Constitution. Islamic parties under the leadership of NU with spokesman Achmad Sjaichu postulating justification. There are at least three considerations: political, revolutionary, and religious. As seen in the table.

**Tabel 02. Three Motives for Justifying the President for Life**

Motif	Reason
Politics	Karno's services in the struggle for independence began in the 1920s. In 1962, West Irian was able to return to the lap of the Republic of Indonesia.
Revolutionary	Soekarno's revolutionary movements are compared to the Prophet Muhammad Saw who led the revolution in Arabia 13 centuries ago. Just like the Prophet Saw in the past faced obstacles. At that time, there were also efforts from within the country and abroad to destroy the revolution by inciting hatred against Karno so that he would not lead Indonesia again.

<sup>74</sup> Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)*. P. 149.

<sup>75</sup> Marif. H, 150.

Religion	Throughout the history of Islam, there has never been an election of a head of state with a time limit of five years or ten years. As long as the head of state meets the leadership requirements. And Karno met those conditions.
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Source: Maarif (2021: 153-154).

Similarly, this acceptance, according to Idham Chalid, is because the concept of guided democracy is in line with Islamic teachings, namely Shura or deliberation. NU politics is like the Sunni political school in general. They are flexible and accommodating and tend to be cooperative with the rulers.<sup>76</sup> Not to forget, this is also strengthened by theological arguments taken from fiqh and ushl fiqh. Like:


*ma la yudraku kulluh la yutraku kulluh, dar'ul mafasid muqoddamun ala jalbil mashalih, maslahah dan mudarat, amar ma'ruf nahyil munkar, Al-muhafadthu ala qodim al-shahih wa al-akhdzu bi al-jadid al-ashlah.*<sup>77</sup>

The roots of NU's closeness and several other Islamic organizations such as PSII and Perti who continue to express their support for Soekarno's policies have been rooted for quite a long time. Although Guided Democracy causes divisions in the people's environment, a decline in the economic field and the absence of democracy – one of which is due to the absence of general elections. On average, because of their disharmonious relationship with Masyumi. Perti started in 1945/1946 when it changed into a political party. PSII after being revived in 1947. NU after they became a political party in 1952. Because there was competition with Masyumi, gradually their dependence on Sukarno became so real. Especially since Masyumi was very opposed to Soekarno's idea.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Andri Nurjaman et al., "Islamic Political Figures in the Indonesian Old Order Era: A Study of KH Idham Chalid's Thought in Accepting the Concept of Guided Democracy in 1965," *Ishlah: Journal of Ushuluddin Science, Adab and Da'wah* 4, no. 1 (2022): 53–74, <https://jurnalfuad.org/index.php/ishlah/index>. h, 53.

<sup>77</sup> Nurjaman, Yusuf, and Witro, "Nahdlatul Ulama Theological Basis in Accepting the Concept of Guided Democracy 1959-1965." H, 345.

<sup>78</sup> Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. H. 404.



**Picture 02. Estrangement of the Relationship between Three Islamic Organizations and Masyumi**

PSII could not be separated from Tjokroaminoto, who had been Soekarno's father-in-law in 1920. So that its leaders, Anwar and Harsono, were brothers-in-law that year. NU and Perti then used religious considerations to strengthen their closeness to the President. Long before Guided Democracy, Soekarno in 1953 had been promoted in his position as head of state with the title *wali al-amri dharuri bi al-syaukah*. Actually, for NU and Perti, these titles and positions are more related to the issue of marriage, but other parties such as the Islamic Union are worried about using them for political purposes. During the Guided Democracy period, PSII finally also disagreed with this title and position. Although in the end it was also silent along with their loyalty to Bung Besar.<sup>79</sup>

Muhammadiyah, along with the loss of Masyumi's strength, was also forced to make adjustments. In 1962, under the leadership of KH. A. Badawi, the Central Executive of Muhammadiyah as a result of the 35th Congress in Jakarta was inaugurated at the Bogor Palace by President Soekarno. Something that has not happened in the history of Muhammadiyah. The central leadership also dubbed Soekarno as a loyal member. It was not enough to stop there, two months before the destruction of the Guided Democracy system, the University of Muhammadiyah Jakarta under the rector Sutjipto awarded Soekarno the title of Doctorate Honoris Causa in the Philosophy of Monotheism. This

<sup>79</sup> Noer. H. 404.

Great is considered to have a truly high level of understanding, feelings, and expertise in the field of the Philosophy of Monotheism".

Of course, there are those who are silent with the attitude of the Central leadership of Muhammadiyah. When Muhammadiyah is allowed to be involved in practical political events even though it is not a political party. Several Muhammadiyah figures were included in the DPRGR. Among them are H.M. Junus Anies, Djarnawi Hadikusumo, Lukman Harun, and Muhammad Djazman al-Kindi. Generally from Yogyakarta and Jakarta. This is a paradox, because Muhammadiyah was a special member of Masyumi until the party was dissolved. A number of his great figures such as A.R. Sutan Mansur, Malik Ahmad, Prawiranegara, and Burhanuddin Harapah, were the central figures of Masyumi in his heyday.<sup>80</sup>

Nevertheless, there is also an appreciative side in the Guided Democracy period. Namely the success of Karno's political ambition to reclaim Irian Jaya into the lap of the motherland. As well as the establishment of the State Islamic Institute (IAIN), during the time when NU collaborated with Soekarno. IAIN was established on August 24, 1960 with Yogyakarta as its center. In the following year, IAIN expanded with the presence of branches or stand-alone in a number of major cities in Indonesia.

The political reality in favor of Soekarno made several NU figures who were initially able to restrain themselves, eventually join the situation. KH. Masjkur, for example, finally also stated that "Nasakom my soul" is by Islamic teachings that oppose sucking, oppression, and slavery. "Nasakom Jiwaku" is also the title of a song that was famous during the Guided Democracy period. At that time, people presented themselves as lovers of Nasakom.<sup>81</sup>

### **Synergy of Islamic Forces**

Occasionally, NU and Masyumi synergize in politics. Because the character of Islam is universal.<sup>82</sup> When Jusuf Wibisono served as Minister of Finance, Sjafruddin

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<sup>80</sup> Maarif, *Islamic and Political Rules, Bamboo Splitting Theory in the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)*. H, 159.

<sup>81</sup> Noer, *the Islamic Party on the National Stage 1945-1965*. P. 405.

<sup>82</sup> Hasan Mustapa, "Book Review: What Is Religious Authority?: Cultivating Islamic Communities in Indonesia," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no. 2 (2023): 939–42.

Prawiranegara's term as Governor of Bank Indonesia had expired. Two candidates appeared, Mr. Lukman Hakim from PNI and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara from Masyumi.<sup>83</sup> Syafruddin and Lukman were close friends when leading the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (1949-1950). Jusuf was originally going to propose Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, from the Indonesian Socialist Party, but Hatta refused. Jusuf also heard that NU will choose a PNI candidate. He immediately lobbied Kyai Wahab, the Rais 'Aam. By offering halal assistance, it is not binding. In connection with several NU leaders, including Kyai Wahab, owned the company. During the election, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara won his second term as Governor of BI. Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo was angry. He did not realize that the significant victory of Sjafruddin's vote was due to the synergy of Masyumi and NU.<sup>84</sup>

Meanwhile, in the post-reform era, Muhammadiyah strongly supports the title of National Hero for Sjafruddin. The central executive of Muhammadiyah is of the opinion that the accusation of treason against Sjafruddin is not appropriate. This is just the pettiness of the ruling regime that negatively stigmatizes Pal Sjaf. Doesn't history record this figure as the President/Chairman of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI).<sup>85</sup>

## E. Conclusion

From the above explanation, it can be seen that the pattern of Islamic organizations in Indonesia is varied. Starting from social religious movements, then they dissolved in the direction of the national movement. Starting from the era of the struggle for independence, to the revolution. Initially, Muhammadiyah and NU were both affiliated with Masyumi. When NU left Masyumi due to the friction of modernism and traditionalism in 1952, Muhammadiyah remained in Masyumi. The difference is, that in

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<sup>83</sup> Hasan Mustapa and Andi Faisal Bakti, "Inclusive Islamic Communication in the Da'wah Politics of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911-1988)," *Journal of Islamic Communication* 11, no. 02 (2021): 324–54, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15642/jki.2021.11.2.324-354>.

<sup>84</sup> Muhammad Subarkah, "NU and Masyumi: Separated but Still Compact," February 04, 2021, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/qnycw9385/nu-dan-masyumi-berpisah-tetapi-tetap-kompak-part4>.

<sup>85</sup> Chaerul Achmad, "Muhammadiyah Supports the Title of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Hero," November 08, 2011, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/luc7mp/muhammadiyah-dukung-gelar-pahlawan-sjafruddin-prawiranegara>.

1952, NU established the NU party. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah does not become a party. This means that the figures involved do not represent the Muhammadiyah organization. Although Muhammadiyah is a special member of Masyumi.

When the era of Guided Democracy began, where Nasakom was introduced. NU and Muhammadiyah both rejected the PKI elements to be included in the cabinet initiated by Soekarno. But NU chose to stay inside, while Muhammadiyah, as Masyumi's political power weakened, was outside the circle of power. Nevertheless, Muhammadiyah is welcome to enter practical politics even though it is not a political party. The attitude of Muhammadiyah leaders at this stage is accommodating to the government. By mentioning Soekarno as a loyal member of Muhammadiyah and the conferral of the Honorary Causa Doctorate by the University of Muhammadiyah to Sang Besar in the science of Tawhid Philosophy.

Guided democracy is indeed not ideal. Even betrayed the '45 Constitution. However, there are still positive sides of this era, including the process of West Irian's return to Indonesia's lap in 1963. NU's collaboration with the Soekarno government also produced a positive side. Namely the presence of IAIN in the middle of the world of education which has benefited to this day.

In addition, it was also found that the differences between Muhammadiyah and NU in political organizations have a historical genealogy. Especially in the position of modernist and traditional claims. Political attitudes do not have to be uniform. The inconsistency actually provides a lesson. The rigidity of the opposition's attitude will lead to the destruction by the power system. Steps like this are generally tracked by those who dare to stick to principles. Generally statesmen. The Democracy League is a crystallization among the opposition currents against Soekarno's authoritarianism.

Meanwhile, the attitude of politicians usually tries to accommodate various interests, especially when dealing with the rulers. Choosing the first one, be prepared with the risk of being abandoned and the story is finished. Based on the second one, it will be surrounded by friends who are interested in a relatively longer lifespan. In the record of history won.

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# COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE 2022 REGIONAL ELECTIONS IN BANDAR SETIA VILLAGE, PERCUT SEI TUAN DISTRICT, DELI SERDANG REGENCY, NORTH SUMATRA PROVINCE

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## Abstract

The election of regional heads in Indonesia is a direct mandate of the reform movement in 1998. The election of regional heads is part of local democracy, which to realize good democracy, the implementation that can be carried out is the election of regional heads. This aims to channel the aspirations of the community to exercise their voting rights. The election of Regional Heads that is carried out directly can increase the participation of the community. However, it is not uncommon for many people to not care about the election of regional heads. Most of them are apathetic and do not find out about the future leader they will choose. This can happen because the prospective leaders promise a lot of things that can attract the attention of the public but are not implemented correctly. So that the community is disappointed and does not want to know anymore about how the leader will lead them in the future. This analysis is to find out the participation of the community in carrying out local democracy through the election of regional heads. This study uses a qualitative descriptive method. Qualitative research is an approach used to understand the phenomena experienced by the research subject, for example motivation, perception, action, and so on.

**Keywords:** Regional Head Elections, Local Democracy, Results



## A. Introduction

Elections are an important part of democracy, because elections are a means used by the community to convey their participation. One example of local democracy carried out by the community is the Election to the Region. In this study, the author researches the participation of the people of Bandar Setia Village in conducting Village Elections in 2022. The purpose of this study is to evaluate how community participation in local democracy is implemented. The result of the participation carried out by the community in Bandar Setia Village is only a mere formality without knowing and seeing the vision and mission of the prospective leaders to be elected.

Democracy emphasizes the importance of elections as the main tool in the implementation of state life, elections are used in the process of changing rulers in an orderly and civilized<sup>86</sup> manner. The change of rulers through a democratic process will create better constitutional stability compared to the change that occurs through revolution or violence. In addition, general elections give broad expectations to the public to elect leaders according to their criteria. The holding of elections is also an indicator of the extent to which state life runs in accordance with the principles of people's sovereignty and democracy<sup>87</sup>

The regional elections in Indonesia are a direct impact of the 1998 reforms. Considering the importance of community participation in choosing their leaders, the Regional Elections are a very important democratic moment in Indonesian society. As a method to uphold democratic principles, the regional elections not only aim to replace the old mechanism of electoral government and community participation, but also to achieve the long-term goal of comprehensively upholding the principles of participation, responsibility, and accountability<sup>88</sup>.

Local democracy during the Old Order period was divided into two periods: parliamentary democracy and prime ministerial democracy. Both of these periods were

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<sup>86</sup> Miriam Budiardjo, *Fundamentals of Political Science (Revised Edition)*, (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2008)

<sup>87</sup> Ahmad Yani, "Structuring the Election of Village Heads in the Constitutional System in Indonesia", *Constitutional Journal*, Volume 19 Number 2, (June, 2022), 457

<sup>88</sup> Suyanto, "Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada) dan Tantangan Demokrasi Lokal di Indonesia", *Jurnal Politik Indonesia Political Science Review*, 1(2), 2016, 212-230.

undermined by political parties and power holders<sup>89</sup>. Eliseo Rocamora explained that the election of regional heads during the Old Order, especially between 1945 and 1959, was characterized by a centralized government, while the general public was influenced by the political process.<sup>90</sup>

The application of regional heads in the provisions of the central government contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 and Law No. 18 of 1965, regional heads during the Old Order period were centralistic. Public participation in a democratic country is very important because it can determine the survival of a country, and people have the power to make political decisions, either directly or indirectly, which are constitutionally protected. Because democracy comes from the people, by the people, and for the people. To enable democracy to be carried out by the people, elections are a means for people to convey their aspirations and meet the needs of the people.

## **B. Method**

The research conducted uses a qualitative descriptive methodology. Qualitative research is a type of qualitative research that is used to find out the phenomena carried out by the research subject, for example motivation, perception, action, and the like<sup>91</sup>. The type of data that this research is primary data in the form of in-depth questions and answers, and this research uses secondary data, namely documents from the research.

Where in collecting the population data we selected was the participation of the people of Bandar Setia Village in choosing the village head, while for the sample, namely the Bandar Setia Village Community that we interviewed with different professions, ages, and genders regarding their participation and criteria in choosing a candidate for village head. Our research was conducted in Bandar Setia Village, Hamlets II, II, V, and VI, Percut Sei Tuan District, Deli Serdang Regency, North Sumatra Province.

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<sup>89</sup> Nuruddin Hady, "Reconstruction of the Local Democratic System in Indonesia", *Scientific Journal of Pancasila and Citizenship Education*, Volume 7 Number 2, (July 2022), 360.

<sup>90</sup> Lutfi Wahyudi, "Demokrasi Orde Baru Sebuah Catatan Bagi Masa Depan Demokrasi Di Indonesia", *Jurnal Sosial-Politika*, Volume 6 Nomor 11, (Juli 2005), 23-38.

<sup>91</sup> Haris Herdiansyah, *Qualitative Research Methodology for Social Sciences*, (Jakarta: Salemba Humanika, 2010)

### C. Result and Discussion

In the research we conducted, there were 20 people we interviewed about the Pilkades in Bandar Setia Village, Percut Sei Tuan District, Deli Serdang Regency which we will use as a sample of our research. We have attached the 20 communities in the table.

No	Name	Age	Job
1.	Nuraidah	62 Tahun	Pedagang
2.	Gustina	53 Tahun	Pedagang
3.	Rizky Iskandar	45 Tahun	Petugas PLN
4.	Nursalamah	44 Tahun	Penjahit
5.	Supriani	37 Tahun	Ibu Rumah Tangga
6.	Wahono	55 Tahun	Tukang Bubut
7.	ZainaL Arifin	50 Tahun	Tukang Bangunan
8.	Saipul Azhar	45 Tahun	Satpam
9.	Ridho Anshori	29 Tahun	Guru
10.	Rahma Yani	39 Tahun	Asisten Rumah Tangga
11.	Sudarman	50 Tahun	Pekerja Bengkel Las
12.	Abdul Aziz	21 Tahun	Pekerja Doorsmer
13.	Ramlan	57 Tahun	Supir Angkot
14.	Figi Prasetyo	25 Tahun	Tukang Bengkel
15.	Indra	35 Tahun	Wirausaha
16.	Galuh	21 Tahun	Karyawan Apotik
17.	Hendra	23 Tahun	Tukang Pangkas
18.	Sri Sumiyati	43 Tahun	Pedagang
19.	Jaki	19 Tahun	Teknisi Elektronik
20.	Isma Ulusna	22 Tahun	Wirausaha

**Tabel 1.1** Sample Data Table of Bandar Setia Village Community

The table above is data from the people we interviewed as our sample. The 20 samples are people in Bandar setia Village, Percut Sei Tuan District, Deli Serdang Regency, North Sumatra. The 20 community samples consisted of a wide range of occupations and also consisted of different age levels, and we interviewed the community based on their readiness and volunteerism towards us.

Politically, the village is considered a power structure that has certain authority because it is an element of state government. In the political context, the village is always explained as a legal entity by having the power to manage its own government<sup>92</sup>. By considering the concept of democracy and autonomy owned by villages in the political realm, people's participation in politics is realized through involvement in general elections. In accordance with Article 31 paragraphs (1) and (2), after the enactment of Law No. 6 of 2014 concerning Villages which replaced Law No. 32 of 2004. Now, the Pilkades are carried out jointly in all districts and cities.

According to the story, the process of electing the village head has been going on for quite a long time and has characteristics related to the democratic party of the local community with the principle of Luber Jurdil<sup>93</sup>. Literally, participation means engagement. In a political situation, participation can be interpreted as community involvement in various political mechanisms<sup>94</sup>. Community participation has a major role in the implementation of elections. In general, the public's interest in participating in the Pilkades is high because half of them do not feel intimidated or pressured by any party. However, for some residents, there is influence from a candidate and his support

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<sup>92</sup> Mashuri Maschab, *Village Government Politics in Indonesia*, (Yogyakarta: PolGov, 2013).

<sup>93</sup> Rudiadi, "Simultaneous Village Head Election in the Perspective of Village Autonomy (Case Study of the Implementation of the 2016 Simultaneous Village Head Election in Rokan Hilir Regency, Riau Province", *Law Reform Journal*, Volume 13 Number 1 (2017), 137.

<sup>94</sup> Irwan Nasution, "Analysis of the Level of Community Participation in the Election of the Head of Orahili Village, Pulau Batu District, South Nias Regency", *Journal of Government Science, Public Administration, Communication Sciences (JIPIKOM)*, 2(1) 2020, 46-52.



group by distributing clothes and stickers, and there is coercion from voters that can be seen during the election process <sup>95</sup>.

The election of the Village Head (pilkades), as one of the democratic mechanisms, is a starting point for the people of Bandar Setia in looking for leaders who are expected to bring progress in the village in various sectors. However, the attitude of the majority of the people of Bandar Setia towards the election shows an apathetic attitude, where they are indifferent to the process. This is due to various factors, including public disappointment with the political elite who failed to fulfill their promises during the campaign, lack of socialization about themselves and the programs they offer, therefore, citizens become hesitant to cast their votes and ultimately do not participate in the election process.

According to the results of the research conducted, the level of community participation in the village head election is not so high. Residents in Bandar Setia tend to consider the Pilkades as a mere formality, without paying attention to the candidates, visions, or programs offered to the local population. So far, the village head candidates have been less active and rarely interact in introducing themselves to the people of Bandar Setia, so the relationship between the village head candidates and the community is considered less close. As a result, some of the people of Bandar Setia do not participate in the Pilkades because of their lack of understanding of the village head candidates which makes them feel apathetic to the election process.

After collecting data on the people of Bandar Setia Village, it can be concluded that we took a sample of 20 people from different professions. Where the Pilkades held in the village ran well and smoothly, and many people participated in the Pilkades. However, there are some people who do not vote or are apathetic. And based on the results of the interviews we conducted, the community said that the candidates who want to serve as village heads are honest (not cheating) where they do not carry out dawn attacks in the form of distribution of basic necessities or money politics. And the vision and mission conveyed by the village head candidate who has now become the

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<sup>95</sup> Agus Sofyan, "Partisipasi Masyarakat Dalam Pelaksanaan Pemilihan Kepala Desa (Pilkades) Di Desa Suka Mulya Kecamatan Rumpin Kabupaten Bogor Tahun 2019", *Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Administrasi Negara*, Volume 8 Nomor 1.

village head has been carried out well. Where the village head accommodates the aspirations of the community who want road repairs and the construction of ditches. However, there are some hamlets in Bandar Setia Village that have not been realized from the promised vision and mission.

#### **D. Conclusion**

From a political perspective, the non-participation of the community in the Pilkades as voters is considered a decrease in the role in democracy. However, from the community's point of view, refusing to participate in the village head election is considered a failure of the Medan City Government's policy towards the people of Bandar Setia Village. The Pilkades are seen as a component in political dynamics that aim to increase community involvement, with the hope that important changes will occur in rural areas. Through the Regional Elections, it is hoped that the community will be trained to care for their leaders, and become more aware of the identity, personality, and leadership qualities of the candidates they will choose for the future.

As a comparison and reference source for this study, previous studies that have relevance to the same topic are used. For example, a study entitled "Political Strategy in Village Management (Case Study of Village Heads in Pinggir District, Bengkalis Regency, Riau Province)" was conducted in 2017 at Universal Southeast Asia University. This study outlines Rumbin Sito's strategy to achieve success in the Tenggana Village Regional Election in 2017 successfully achieved its goals. The vision and mission conveyed by Rumbin Sito to the community is a good political tool for the empowerment of the people of Tenggana Village. The similarity between our research and the research received is the exploration of political strategies applied by village heads in facing the Pilkades. However, the difference lies in the location or region that is the focus of the research.

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# **EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SMART INDONESIA CARD PROGRAM ( KIP ) ON STUDENT LEARNING ACHIEVEMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DIGITAL BUSINESS, STATE UNIVERSITY OF MEDAN**

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## **Abstract**

This study aims to ascertain what factors contribute to the ineffectiveness of Smart Indonesia at Medan State University and how well the program is implemented based on Ministerial Regulation No. 10 of 2020 for digital business majors in achieving access to education. This study employed a qualitative technique. Through the use of questionnaires, primary and secondary data sources provided the information that was employed. According to Soerjono Soekamto's assessment of effectiveness, the implementation of the Minister of Education and Culture Regulation No. 10 of 2020 regarding the Smart Indonesia Program at Medan State University, which offers a major in digital business, has not yet reached the anticipated level of effectiveness. This is supported by the study's findings. Aspects of law enforcement, legal considerations, facility and infrastructural conditions, as well as societal and cultural dynamics, are some of the variables that affect it. The challenges faced include problems related to target accuracy, the process of disbursing funds, and the lack of data related to students who are entitled to KIP.

**Keywords:** *Keyword: Effectiveness, Tuition KIP, Achievement*

## **A. Introduction**

Education has great significance because it serves as a tool to determine the contribution to the progress of a country. A person's level of intelligence can be reflected in the extent to which he has gone through education. It is expected that education will transmit important concepts, values, information, and skills from one generation to the next. (Rahayu & Syahputra, 2022).

Basic education is an essential need for every citizen of the country. Law Number 20 of 2003 concerning the National Education System, which defines the purpose of



education, states that efforts to improve the quality of education are very important to improve the quality of Indonesian human resources (Nahdiyyah, 2023).

According to Law No. 20 of 2003 concerning the National Education System, which defines the objectives of education as follows in article 1 paragraph (1): "Education is a conscious and planned effort to create a learning atmosphere and learning process so that students actively develop their potential to have religious spiritual strength, self-control, personality, intelligence, noble character, self-control, and the skills they need, society, nation and state." After completing secondary education, students have the option of getting into a university. Other options include going back to school, getting a job, or starting a new life with a family. Students should go to college because the education they get there can help their personal growth and provide a foundation for a successful future (Montanesa & Ahmad, 2023).

In Indonesia, education is a staple that must be cared for and continue to be developed. Various efforts have been deployed to overcome various educational problems that are considered to be able to hinder the progress process of the Indonesian state itself, one of the many things that have been developed for the advancement of education in Indonesia to enter higher education is through the Indonesia Smart Lecture Card (KIP-K) (Iswanto, Aliy, & Al-Amin, 2024).

The KIP Lecture Program is one of the social assistance initiatives launched by the Indonesian government to assist students from low-income families in completing their higher education. The goal of this program is to make it easier for children from low-income families to pursue higher education by providing additional options. KIP Lecture was first introduced as a response to the gap in access to higher education that occurs between both those in need and those who have better financial conditions. The program aims to close this gap and provide equal access to higher education to every segment of society (Zainal, Joesyiana, Zainal, Wahyuni, & Adriyani, 2023).

To start this initiative, the government collaborated with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology (Kemdikbudristek) to develop a number of policies, one of which is to help children with their school fees that meet certain requirements. KIP Lectures are available to students in four categories. First, they are

holders of the Smart Indonesia Card (KIP) who graduated from high school, vocational school, or similar institutions this year and two years earlier. Second, students from underprivileged families who have a Prosperous Family Card (KKS), are registered in the Family Hope Program (PKH), and are registered in the Prosperous Family Integrated Fund (DTKS). Third, students who come from areas affected by natural disasters, hostilities, or other circumstances. Fourth, students from 3T areas or those who have limited access (Puspita, Rahayu, & Wahyuningtyas, 2023).

The main factors that affect this condition are infrastructure and facilities, regulatory considerations, and law enforcement. Setting program goals, processing payments, and ensuring that all PIP recipient student data is accurate also poses difficulties. Other obstacles faced include unclear eligibility limits for PIP recipients, data mismatches that impact targeting, and lack of monitoring of program implementation (Yogatama, Syafingi, Dewi, & Noviasari, 2024). These programs are created in such a way that policies are implemented through projects, programs, and activities, all of which are handled by the government. Public policy implementation is one of the stages in the public policy process that determines whether a policy is consistent with existing policies and can be approved by the community (Karmila, 2019).

The KIP-K program is a government scholarship program designed to enable individuals with outstanding academic credentials but limited financial resources to pursue higher education. This program has been running since 2010 with the initial program, namely Bidikmisi, then changed to the Indonesia Smart Lecture Card (KIP-K) program in 2020 until now (Sariri & Prabawati, 2024). In this case, the researcher wants to see how effective KIP-K is in helping students complete their studies, as well as what factors can affect the achievement of KIP-K students in the Department of Digital Business, State University of Medan.

## **B. Method**

This type of research involves a qualitative approach where the main emphasis is on the natural exploration of phenomena that occur in all their complexity. This research does not depend on statistical procedures or other mathematical calculations, but rather on understanding and interpreting the meaning of human behavior interactions

in certain contexts, according to the researcher's point of view. (Abdussamad & Sik, 2021).

Qualitative descriptive research method is the method used in this study, according to Sugiyono (2016) "Qualitative research method is an approach used to investigate the natural state of a particular object, with the researcher as the main instrument." According to Nazir (2014), "Descriptive research aims to observe and explain the state of a human group, object, condition, thought system, or current event in a systematic, factual, and accurate manner." According to Nana Syaodih Sukmadinata (2011: 73), "Qualitative descriptive research aims to describe and describe existing phenomena, both natural and man-made, with an emphasis on the characteristics, qualities, and relationships between activities." (Utami, Melliani, Maolana, Marliyanti, & Hidayat, 2021).

### **C. Result and Discussion**

Basically, the KIP-K initiative has enabled many young Indonesians to fulfill their aspirations to get free higher education. The aim of this central government initiative is to end the cycle of poverty and close the educational achievement gap that prevents economically disadvantaged young people from receiving higher education.

To be able to register as a KIP Lecture recipient, students must meet several requirements, including: 1) KIP Lecture recipients are graduates of Senior High School (SMA) or equivalent, who can graduate as early as two years before, but are prioritized for this year's graduates. 2) Recipients who have passed the university entrance selection process of Arsandy, Karolin, Sinuhaji, Lubis, Rumaharbo, and Gultom Opportunity Journals KIP Lecture recipients must go through all higher education admission pathways and have been accepted into an accredited PTN or PTS degree program and registered in the National Accreditation System for Higher Education. 3) KIP recipients have good academic potential but have financial limitations or come from underprivileged families who have special considerations supported by valid documentation.

Likewise at Medan State University, the KIP Lecture program has been implemented and has implemented the KIP Lecture program. Students who receive KIP Lecture assistance at Medan State University have received the assistance in the form of cash. This KIP Lecture assistance is very helpful for underprivileged students in carrying out their lectures while at Medan State University.

From the results of the research conducted by the researcher regarding the effectiveness of the KIP Lecture program on the learning achievement of students in the

Department of Business and Digital at the State University of Medan, the KIP Lecture program is very helpful for them in the cost of fees during lectures which are quite heavy, with the help of KIP Lectures students get ease in paying payments related to lectures such as book money, money to buy college needs such as laptops to also be helped in needs daily. According to Digital Business students, the existence of KIP Lecture also makes learning motivation increase, because the existence of this assistance makes students more active in learning because of the opportunity for the assistance to be given, especially if there is a consecutive decrease in GPA the KIP Lecture program will be revoked, therefore every student who receives KIP Lecture must maintain their GPA while holding lectures at Medan State University.

At Medan State University, the ease of access to the use of KIP Lecture assistance is quite young. According to Digital Business Study Program students, they are always facilitated in managing KIP Lecture assistance until the end and disbursing funds to students. This KIP Lecture assistance is very helpful for students in their daily lives in reducing student living expenses. The government provides ukt assistance and living expenses to students who are lucky enough to get this KIP Lecture assistance. The improvement in the quality of life felt by students helps students in completing their studies without thinking about the cost of living which is sometimes constrained. So according to students, the encouragement to complete their studies on time is getting higher. Because this KIP Lecture assistance will end if the semester within reasonable limits has been completed, usually the semester that will be covered by KIP Lecture assistance will be covered for up to 8 semesters. If it is more than 8 semesters, the cost of living and education fees will be revoked. That is the reason KIP Lecture students have encouragement and motivation in completing their studies on time.

Bantuan KIP Kuliah ini juga mendorong mahasiswa untuk menjadi mahasiswa yang kreatif dan berprestasi. Di Universitas Negeri Medan ada organisasi yang mendorong mahasiswa penerima Bantuan KIP Kuliah untuk menjadi mahasiswa yang berprestasi, kreatif dan memiliki pengalaman yang luas. Organisasi tersebut adalah PERMABIMED atau Persatuan Mahasiswa Bidikmisi KIP Kuliah Universitas Negeri Medan. Walaupun belum semua mahasiswa penerima bantuan KIP Kuliah masuk kedalam organisasi tersebut. Tetapi banyak mahasiswa yang bergabung dan meningkatkan prestasinya dalam organisasi tersebut. Selain IPK yang harus dipertahankan Mahasiswa KIP-K juga sangat diharapkan memiliki prestasi yang baik yang diharapkan agar menunjukkan bahwa mahasiswa penerima KIP Kuliah layak menerima bantuan tersebut untuk mengejar cita-citanya karena seorang mahasiswa yang berprestasi.

#### **D. Conclusion**

The Smart Indonesia Card (KIP) program has a significant impact on student learning achievement, so it has proven to be effective in improving their academic results. Various studies show that KIP not only improves academic success but also learning motivation, especially for students from lower-middle to lower middle families



and those with financial limitations. This program helps them to continue their education to higher education and improve the quality of education by providing financial assistance in the form of scholarships. These findings also show that KIP has a positive influence on learning independence, allowing students to regulate and inspire themselves in learning, and improving independent learning skills that are important for good learning outcomes.

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Undang-Undang nomor 20 Tahun 2003 tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional mengamanatkan bahwa setiap peserta didik berhak mendapatkan biaya pendidikan bagi mereka yang orang tuanya tidak mampu. Sebagai Implementasi

# THE ROLE OF THE VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN DISTRIBUTING SOCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMUNITY IN MEDAN ESTATE VILLAGE, PERCUT SEI TUAN DISTRICT

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## Abstract

The purpose of this study is to find out the role of the village government in distributing social assistance, the obstacles faced and the efforts made by the Medan Estate village government in distributing social assistance to villagers. The method used in this study is a qualitative method with a descriptive type of research. The collected data is then grouped and analyzed based on the similarity of the data type with the aim of drawing conclusions from the data obtained. From this study, it can be concluded that the role of the Medan Estate Village government in distributing social assistance is to collaborate with all village officials and the obstacle in distributing this assistance is the many envy of fellow residents and the efforts made by the village community. The goal of the village government in distributing social assistance is to establish good communication with the community so that programs at the village level can run smoothly.

**Keywords:** *Role, Of Village Government, Social Assistance*

## A. Introduction

Nowadays Indonesia is one of the countries and has a wide regional area, in which there are various cities, regencies and villages. As regulated by Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages in Article 1 paragraph (1) states that it is a legal community unit that has territorial boundaries that have the authority to regulate and manage government affairs, the interests of local communities based on community initiatives, rights of origin, and/or traditional rights that are recognized and respected in the government system of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

In other words, a village is a legal community unit based on laws and customs, residing in a certain boundary area, having very strong physical and spiritual ties, both because of hereditary factors, and because of political, economic, social, and political



similarities. Interests and peace, etc., have a jointly elected management structure, have a certain amount of wealth and have joint rights, have a certain amount of wealth and have the right to manage their own household.

In accordance with the Regulation of the Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Resettlement Number 6 of 2020 concerning the Priority Use of Village Funds in 2020 which is the legal umbrella for the implementation of direct cash assistance (BLT) to poor villagers. The Village Fund Direct Cash Assistance is a Village Fund assistance designed to help the poor and disadvantaged, especially those affected during the Covid-19 period. Assistance is given only to poor and vulnerable groups who do not receive assistance from other social welfare programs such as Non-Cash Food Assistance (BPNT), Candidate Hope Program (PKH) and Pre-Employment Cards<sup>96</sup>.

The BLT scheme is also a scheme that aims to reduce the number of poor people. When registering prospective BLT recipients in the village, please pay attention to the Ministry of Social Affairs' Comprehensive Social Data Collection Regulations. The mechanism for collecting, identifying recipient data, and implementing BLT at the village level will be implemented according to the provisions. The PDTT Village Fund BLT provided by the village head is a priority program that must be budgeted by the government. The implementation includes the data collection stage of prospective recipients which also includes comprehensive social information (DTKS), the poor (regent regulation), the unemployed poor, or family members suffering from chronic diseases. Compared to the unemployed poor. The Ministry of Social Affairs' Comprehensive Social Welfare Data (DTKS) is also taken into account in the data collection of prospective BLT recipients in villages.<sup>97</sup>

In Medan Estate Village, Percut Sei Tuan District, Deli Serdang Regency is one of the villages that receives a village assistance program from the government to support the welfare of its community. This is as stipulated in the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia (Permenkeu) Number 201/PMK.07/2022 in article 36 paragraphs (1) and (2) which reads that prospective families of beneficiaries of the Village Fund BLT as referred to above (poor) are poor families who are domiciled in the village concerned and registered in decile 1 data targeting the acceleration of the elimination of extreme poverty as intended in paragraphs (1) and (2).<sup>98</sup> If there are no

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<sup>96</sup> Fitri Yul Dewi Marta dan Ramadiyanti Nurlitasari, "Implementasi Penyaluran Bantuan Langsung Tunai Dana Desa di Era Pandemi Covid-19 di Kabupaten Sigi 2020," *Jurnal Terapan Pemerintahan Minangkabau*, 1.1 (2021), 47–59 <<https://doi.org/10.33701/jtpm.v1i1.1870>>.

<sup>97</sup> Fika Nurahmawati, "Implementasi Kebijakan Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) Terhadap Warga Terdampak Covid-19 di Desa Cibadak," *Pkm-P*, 4.2 (2020), 166 <<https://doi.org/10.32832/pkm-p.v4i2.733>>.

<sup>98</sup> Republic of Indonesia, *Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia Number 201/PMK.07/2022 concerning Village Fund Management*, 2022.

poor residents as referred to above, it is registered in decile 1, therefore the Village Government can determine prospective beneficiary families of the 2023 Village Fund BLT from the data (poor families registered in decile 2) to (poor families registered in decile 4). However, the receipt of the assistance has several main ideas that must be received:

Loss of livelihood has family members who are vulnerable to chronic/chronic/or disabled illness Do not receive social assistance from the family hope program Households with elderly single household members <sup>99</sup>

By providing Social Assistance, it is hoped that there will be progress because the government reminds that these villages in Indonesia will no longer be left behind. As stipulated in Government Regulation No. 8 of 2016, village funds are funds sourced from the State Budget intended for villages which will later be transferred through the district/city APBD and village funds are used to finance the administration of government, the implementation of development, community development, and community empowerment.

## **B. Method**

In this study, the method used is qualitative. Qualitative research is research that focuses on describing the nature or essence of the value of a particular object or representation. Qualitative research methods emerged because of a paradigm shift in the way we perceive reality/phenomena/phenomena. This research was conducted in Medan Estate Village, Percut Sei Tuan District. This research focuses on the role of the village government in distributing social assistance to the community in Medan Estate Village, Percut Sei Tuan District. The data collection techniques we use are observation, documentation and interviews. <sup>100</sup>

## **C. Result and Discussion**

Village Government leadership is entrusted to the Village Head who is supported by the Village Apparatus as part of the Village Government Organizer. In accordance with Law Number 6 of 2014 which focuses on villages, it is expressly stated that the village government in its role as an administrative body is responsible for carrying out development initiatives, encouraging community growth, and rallying unity based on

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<sup>99</sup> *peraturan Pemerintahan Republik Indonesia Nomor 11 Tahun 2021 Tentang Badan Usaha Milik Desa ( BUMDes ).*

<sup>100</sup> M.Si Dr.HZuchri Abdussamad, S.I.L., *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif* (Syakir Media Press, 2021).

the principles outlined. in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the philosophy of "Binneka Tunggal Ika".<sup>101</sup>

BLT social assistance recipients target the poor and families at risk of economic needs by meeting the requirements, but PKH, BPNT, and pre-employment are eligible, the condition is not to receive other social assistance such as card credit. The discussion of community welfare cannot be separated from the poverty situation in the community. Happiness is a feeling of peace that relates to the fulfillment of physical and mental life needs, universal standards that affect human health, clothing, nutrition, shelter, mental and spiritual well-being. Welfare means a state that shows that the community is able to meet its material and social needs.<sup>102</sup>

The problem of poverty is becoming more complex and cannot be solved by just one country. In general, poverty is the inability of a person or a group of people to try to fulfill their basic rights in order to maintain and develop a decent life and get a job that generates enough income to cover their living expenses, which is considered the responsibility of the state. Poverty refers to the situation of not having material possessions, having low income, and lacking all the necessities of daily life. Based on these basic principles, poverty alleviation aims to reduce the burden of poor people's spending, improve their skills and income, ensure the development and sustainability of micro enterprises, and address poverty strategies and problems through the synergy of poverty reduction programs.<sup>103</sup>

The requirements to become a recipient of the 2024 Village Fund BLT are as follows: recorded in the Integrated Social Welfare Data (DTKS) or not recorded in it, including poor families, not receiving PKH assistance or basic food assistance, people affected by unemployment and not having enough savings for the next three months of living expenses, as well as families with one of its members suffering from chronic or long-term diseases and living alone. Of course, based on the existing conditions, the village government prioritizes people who are in accordance with these conditions.<sup>104</sup>

There was also a previous study, namely with the title "The Role of the Village Government in Distributing Social Assistance in Teluk Sialang Village, Tungkal Ilir,

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<sup>101</sup> M Ansar, J Usman, dan N Wahid, "Peran Pemerintah PERAN PEMERINTAH DESA DALAM MENDISTRIBUSIKAN BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI (BLT) PADA MASA PANDEMI COVID 19," *Kajian Ilmiah Mahasiswa ...*, 4 (2023).

<sup>102</sup> Y Yuliana et al., "Distribusi Dana Bansos (Blt) Masyarakat Ranto Panyang Barat Kecamatan Meurebo Kabupaten Aceh Barat," *Jurnal Society: Pengamat ...*, 2.1 (2022), 20–29.

<sup>103</sup> Masri Arfandi dan Muh Darwan, "Bantuan Langsung Tunai Kepada Masyarakat Penerima Manfaat (Studi Kasus Desa Tende Kecamatan Galang Kabupaten Tolitoli)," 1.3 (2022), 191–202.

<sup>104</sup> Nurul Fadilah "BLT Dana Desa 2024: Panduan Lengkap Untuk Mendapatkan Tunjangan Bulanan 300 Ribu" <https://digitaldesa.id/artikel/blt-dana-des-2024-panduan-lengkap-untuk-mendapatkan-tunjangan-bulanan-rp-300-ribu> diakses pada 27 April 2024

Tanjung Jabung Barat" by Riana Pratiwi et al. explained that to overcome the controversial problems surrounding the distribution of social assistance, the village government took proactive steps to ensure transparency and accuracy. The process began with socialization to village officials through the Kasi Kesra, which was then forwarded to the local regent. From there, it is forwarded to the head of the hamlet who then notifies the head of the RT and then conveys the information to residents who are entitled to receive social assistance.

In addition, the village government also uses social media platforms such as WhatsApp to get a list of recipients directly so that the community is still aware of the situation. In Teluk Sialang Village, Tungka Ilir, Tanjung Jabung Barat, the role of the village government is very important in distributing social assistance. Their role is to verify information and communicate it to related parties, including hamlets, post offices and RT heads. This ensures that community members who receive assistance are immediately informed. If there are obstacles, the village government works with all village heads to overcome and solve them effectively. To ensure effective communication with the community, the village government conducts continuous dialogue with local residents, such as the head of the hamlet and the head of the RT. Their main goal is to provide information and clarification to individuals who have not yet been registered as beneficiaries. Additionally, they consistently refine and revise the available data to ensure its accuracy and relevance.<sup>105</sup>

After conducting an interview in Medan Estate Village, it can be seen that the village government faces challenges in distributing social assistance effectively, especially the BLT program. Many people are jealous of the provision of BLT. The provision of BLT already has predetermined criteria. In the distribution of BLT, the community received around 86 families, according to the State Budget, a maximum of 25% was distributed 300 thousand per month. Of course, people who get the BLT have met the requirements that have been made. Examples of social assistance (bansos) from the government, namely from the central government, district governments, provincial governments, and village governments. Examples of social assistance from the central government, such as health (bpjs), layoffs, rice, oil, etc. For assistance from the village itself, it provides BLT directly to the poor.

Furthermore, in the village there are MSMEs but they are not running well because there is no budget given by the village because MSMEs are not included in the category of BLT provision. From the budget assistance provided by the government, which is distributed every time, the Village Government only provides trainings to the

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<sup>105</sup> W Riana Pratiwi, Abd Muiz, "Peran Pemerintah Desa Dalam Mendistribusikan Bantuan Sosial Di Desa Teluk Sialang Tungkal Ilir Tanjung Jabung Barat", *Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan*, 12.II (2022), 36–46.

community, such as one of them making trinkets or creating for women to use or develop. In these activities, there is coaching, namely creating groups, funding, but hierarchically in the village has not made it. But if the mother's group wants to develop themselves, cooperation can be carried out.

#### **D. Conclusion**

The BLT program is also one of the programs that aims to reduce the number of poor people. In collecting data on prospective BLT recipients in villages, pay attention to the integrated social data collection rules of the Ministry of Social Affairs. From the discussion that has been conveyed, the village government has an important role in the implementation of social assistance to improve the welfare of rural communities. Village governments must be careful in determining recipients of assistance and preventing the misuse of social assistance. The recipient's data must be stored and managed properly to facilitate data collection and monitoring. Village heads have an important role in the management of social assistance, including recording prospective recipients and collaborating with other village officials to ensure effective financial management of social assistance. The performance of Medan Estate village government agencies in distributing social assistance through socialization activities involving community leaders and village government agencies to the head of Medan Estate village itself.

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# THE HEGEMONY OF NADHLATUL ULAMA ON POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN INDONESIA

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## Abstract

*This study discusses the hegemony of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in Indonesian political dynamics by using a descriptive qualitative approach through the library research method using a sharia normative approach. Nadhalatul Ulama has strong historical roots, having a significant influence on Indonesian politics. The broad support of the community, especially Nahdliyin, allowed him to influence political policy at both the local and national levels. Through participation in the policy-making process such as the Islamic Boarding School Bill, NU brings agendas that are relevant to the interests of the community, especially in the fields of religion and education. In addition, NU plays a role in socializing democratic values through Islamic boarding schools, reflecting its contribution to strengthening the foundation of democracy at the local level. NU also acts as a counterweight in government oversight, ensuring policies are in line with people's aspirations. The implications of this research include a better understanding of Indonesia's political dynamics and the importance of considering the role of non-state actors such as NU in the political process. It is recommended that in-depth research be conducted to broaden insights into the role of NU in Indonesian politics and society.*

**Keywords:** Hegemony, Nadhlatul Ulama, Dynamics, Politics

## A. Introduction

Leadership circulation is one of the essential mechanisms in a democratic country. In the context of local politics, the process of electing regional heads is one of the instruments to create constitutional leadership change. The election of regional heads, also known as regional elections, has a significant impact on political dynamics at the regional level. Societies, which act as political subjects and objects, undergo marked changes, as they often experience fragmentation based on their political affiliation with

a particular organization.<sup>106</sup> Post-reform, changes in the political constellation opened up public space for the entry of political interests based on organizational or group affiliation, as well as certain ethnic aspects. In this situation, primordialism is no longer considered something to be avoided, but can be an effective symbol and political language to gain legitimacy and support in gaining power.<sup>107</sup> This shows the complexity of political dynamics at the local level that also shape the political identity of the local community.

The role and history of community organizations that have fought with sincerity and voluntariness hold a very important historical value for the journey of the Nation and State. This is because, indirectly, these organizations were the pioneers of the founding of this country.<sup>108</sup> On a national scale, NU is one of the organizations that played a role in the establishment of this country. NU was born as a forum for struggle for the Republic of Indonesia which always upholds its spirit of nationalism and nationalism.<sup>109</sup>

NU was established 95 years ago, precisely on January 31, 1926. The birth of NU in 1926 arose from concern for efforts to eliminate local traditions in the community's religion. At the international level, the Hijaz Committee was formed as an effort to protect the common interests of Muslims from the Wahhabism movement in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, NU as a social movement seeks to "save" local religious traditions that are a way of religious life in Indonesia. NU has a vision to develop and maintain Islam Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah which is embraced by most Islamic scholars in

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<sup>106</sup> Irwan Abdu Nugraha and Muhammad Noor Ifansyah, "Dynamics of Islamic Social Organizations in the Election of Central Java Governors," *Asketik: Journal of Religion and Social Change* 3, no. 2 (2019): 151.

<sup>107</sup> Widya Setyanto and Halomoan Palungan, *Identity Politics: Religion, Ethnicity, and Space in Political Dynamics in Indonesia and Southeast Asia* (Salatiga: Percik, 2009), 38.

<sup>108</sup> Nurlira Goncing and Muh. Abdi Goncing, "The Politics of the Nahdlatul Ulama Elite in the Legislative Elections in Makassar City in 2014 and 2019," *Vox Populi* 5, no. 2 (2022): 125, <https://doi.org/10.24252/vp.v5i2.30556>.

<sup>109</sup> Muhammad Nurdiansyah, "Political Communication of NU Patronage in the 2020 Purbalingga Regency Elections," *DIALECTIQUE KOMUNIKA: Journal of Communication and Regional Development Studies* 9, no. 2 (2021): 85, <https://doi.org/10.33592/dk.v9i2.1783>.

Indonesia. In daily religious practice, NU refers more to Imam Shafi'i.<sup>110</sup> Although NU exists as a religious organization, it is inseparable from political involvement. This is because NU has followers spread throughout Indonesia, so its influence can be felt in decision-making in the public sphere.<sup>111</sup>

The role of ulama, especially from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) ulema in various election contests, be it legislative, executive, or regional head elections, has a significant impact. As religious figures respected by most of society, scholars are not only involved in religious affairs, but also play an important role in the social aspects of society. Within NU, the ulama have strong support from the Nahdliyin people who are loyal to them.

The Nahdliyin community is known for its obedience and loyalty to ulama, starting from the local level such as villages and sub-districts, to the national level. Nahdlatul Ulama, a large and influential Islamic organization, has a long history of influencing Indonesian politics from the pre-independence period to the present day. With millions of members and networks spread across the archipelago, NU is not only a religious organization, but also a great political power. Based on the facts on the ground, NU has a strong mass base among Indonesian people, especially in rural and urban areas.

NU's physical and social presence in society forms a close connection between this organization and the daily life of the Indonesian people. In addition, NU has a long history of political participation, ranging from the struggle for independence to the reform era. During this period, NU has been involved in a variety of political issues, ranging from public policy to political power struggles. This research also considers the important role of NU in shaping the nation's political identity. As a moderate and inclusive Islamic organization, NU has a significant influence in determining the political narrative that supports diversity and tolerance in Indonesia.

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<sup>110</sup> Abdul Haris and Abdulloh Dardum, "Kiai NU and Politics (Kiai NU Jember's Involvement in the 2019 Presidential Election Contest)," *Phenomenon* 20, no. 1 (2021): 92, <https://doi.org/10.35719/fenomena.v20i1.51>.

<sup>111</sup> Akhmad Sayuti, Wasino Wasino, and Ibnu Sodik, "Dinamika Politik Partai Nahdlatul Ulama Di Semarang Tahun 1952-1979," *Journal of Indonesian History* 7, no. 1 (2018): 2.

## B. Method

This study uses a type of *library research* using a sharia normative approach. Primary data sources are obtained from various literature sources such as books, classical literature, scientific journals, and other sources. The secondary sources of this study include all references relevant to the topics discussed in this study. Through the analysis of books, classic books, and scientific journals, this research seeks to compile a comprehensive synthesis of information to make a significant contribution to the understanding of the concept or phenomenon being researched. The study also attempts to identify existing knowledge gaps in the existing literature and propose directions for future research in relevant domains.

## C. Result and Discussion

### 1. The Influence of Nahdlatul Ulama on Political Dynamics in Indonesia

The relationship between Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and practical politics and bureaucratic structures in Indonesia, both on a national and local scale, has been going on for a long time. This link can be seen when NU scholars occupy high positions in the Legislative and Executive institutions. KH A. Wahid Hasyim and KH Masykur, for example, served as the Minister of Religious Affairs in the Parliamentary Cabinet. During the administration of President Soekarno, KH Muhammad Ilyas, KH Wahib Wahab, and KH Saifuddin Zuhri also alternately served as the Minister of Religion.<sup>112</sup>

Nahdlatul Ulama in carrying out its role as a community organization has basic values that are its guide, including in organizing political education for the community. These basic values are known as *tawasuth*, *tasamuh*, *tawazun*, and *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar*, which reflect the principles of the middle, tolerance, balance, and the invitation to do good and reject bad things in society.<sup>113</sup> In practice, NU residents are sometimes still greatly influenced by the way charismatic scholars in NU instill these basic values. In the context of political education, NU as an Islamic organization decided

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<sup>112</sup> Wasisto Raharjo Jati, "Ulama Dan Pesantren Dalam Dinamika Politik Dan Kultur Nahdlatul Ulama," *ULUL ALBAB Jurnal Studi Islam* 13, no. 1 (2013): 100, <https://doi.org/10.18860/ua.voio.2377>.

<sup>113</sup> Muhammad Farhanuddin, "The Role of Nahdlatul Ulama in Political Education in Majene Regency," *JPP (Prophetic Political Journal)* 5, no. 2 (2017): 158, <http://journal.uin-alauddin.ac.id/index.php/jpp/article/view/4342>.

not to be directly involved in politics, because it saw that the benefits obtained were less than the potential losses that might arise. This political stance is known as "return to khittah", which describes NU's political stance that is not institutionally tied to political parties or other community organizations.<sup>114</sup> The long-standing relationship between Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and practical politics and bureaucratic structures in Indonesia shows the important role of NU in national and local political dynamics.

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is a religious organization that previously played the role of a political party and had considerable influence in the development of Indonesian politics after colonialism. However, NU underwent a reorganization with a policy of "return to khittah" in 1926, which formally ended its relationship with the PPP as an Islamic political platform in the New Order era. This prompted NU to look for alternative formats and models of movements in affirming its existence as the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia.<sup>115</sup> In the context of national politics, the presence of NU figures and cadres has made a significant contribution to the dynamics of democratization in Indonesia.

In almost every high institution of the state, we can find NU cadres who occupy strategic positions, both in the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. As part of civil society, NU has many roles in the democratization process in Indonesia. Historically, from the pre-independence era to the Reformasi era, NU has adopted an approach oriented towards accepting democratic principles as a commitment, because the values fought for by NU are in principle in line with the basic concept of democracy.

Within the city of Makassar, PKB and PPP, two parties that have cultural ties with NU, have not succeeded in attracting public sympathy. Even though NU cadres elected as legislative members in the city come from different parties, they will still advocate for NU's agenda and da'wah message in the legislature. The presence and success of NU cadres in winning the 2014 Makassar DPRD election through parties that

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<sup>114</sup> Abdul Muchith Muzadi, *fifteen years old returned to Khittah; Critical Reflection and Evaluation 1984-1999* (Jakarta: Committee of the XXX Nahdlatul Ulama Congress, 1999), 51-59.

<sup>115</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Repoliticization of Islam: Has Islam Ever Stopped Politics?* (Bandung: Mizan, 2000), 177.

are not PKB or PPP, actually benefits NU as a whole because they have a cadre base from various parties that are not exclusively affiliated with NU.<sup>116</sup> This strengthens NU's position and influence in the local political realm.

NU intellectuals use the term "civil society" as a translation for civil society, in contrast to the term "civil society" that is often used by modernists. AS Hikam stated that if civil society is translated as civil society, which refers to the phenomenon of Madinah society during the time of the Prophet Muhammad SAW, then it can raise concerns that Islam will be made an alternative vision for the concept of statehood.<sup>117</sup> For NU, Civil Society is not an alternative concept of a political system or an attempt to Islamize.

Although the civil society movement carried out by NU aims to integrate Islamic values in people's lives and present Islam as a value in resistance to an authoritarian state. Hikam emphasized that Islam in Indonesia is complementary, so the use of the term civil society opens up opportunities for cooperation with other groups that have a similar agenda, namely community empowerment against government authoritarianism.<sup>118</sup> This shows NU's inclusive approach in building cooperation with various groups for the same goal. Thus, this approach is a means to expand the support network and strengthen NU's role in advocating Islamic values in the public sphere.

NU as part of civil society participates in the policy-making process of a country by advocating for the interests of the community, as in the case of the Islamic boarding school bill.<sup>119</sup> One of the roles of NU as an element of civil society in Indonesia is through efforts to improve society through Islamic boarding schools, which are also used in a limited way to socialize democratic values. As an organization of Muslims, NU feels that

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<sup>116</sup> Goncing and Goncing, "The Politics of the Nahdlatul Ulama Elite in the Legislative Elections in Makassar City in 2014 and 2019," 132.

<sup>117</sup> Ahmad Baso, *Civil Society versus Civil Society; Archaeology of Civil Society Thought in Indonesian Islam* (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah and LAKPESDAM NU, 1999), 9–14.

<sup>118</sup> Ahmad Baso, *Civil Society and Civil Society* (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah and LAKPESDAM NU, 1999), 184.

<sup>119</sup> Esty Ekawati, "Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) as a Civil Society in Indonesia," *NUANSA: Journal of Islamic Social and Religious Science Research* 13, no. 2 (December 31, 2016): 244, <https://doi.org/10.19105/nuansa.v13i2.1098>.

it has sufficient social capital and is able to confidently position itself as a supervisory mechanism in the government.<sup>120</sup>

Based on this that has been explained earlier, the influence of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) on political dynamics in Indonesia, it needs to be understood that NU has strong historical roots in Indonesian politics. With broad support from the community, especially from the Nahdliyin circles, NU is able to influence political policies at the local and national levels. Through its role in the policy-making process, such as the Islamic boarding school bill, NU has brought agendas that are relevant to the interests of the community, especially in the context of religion and education.

The importance of NU's role in socializing democratic values through pesantren should also not be ignored. Although on a limited scale, these efforts reflect NU's contribution in strengthening the foundations of democracy at the local level. In addition, NU as an organization of Muslims feels a responsibility to ensure that Islamic values are not only narrowly understood, but also integrated within the broader framework of democracy.

In the context of government supervision, NU has an important role as a balancer. With its social capital, NU can confidently position itself as a supervisory mechanism for government policies, keeping these policies in line with the aspirations of the community. Thus, research related to the Influence of Nahdlatul Ulama on Political Dynamics in Indonesia needs to consider the complex and multifaceted role of NU in Indonesian politics, from the policy-making process to its role as a supervisory and balancing agent.

## **2. The Contribution of Nadhlatul Ulama in the Development and Application of Islamic Law in Indonesia**

Islam presents a comprehensive guide for the life of the world and the hereafter through the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon him).<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Suryani Suryani, "Kontribusi NU Sebagai Organisasi Civil Society Dalam Demokratisasi," *Dialog* 38, no. 1 (June 30, 2015): 58, <https://doi.org/10.47655/dialog.v38i1.34>.

<sup>121</sup> Rian Hidayat and Rahmatiah HL, 'Comparison of Islamic Criminal Law and National Law on the Crime of Rape Against Biological Children', *Shautuna: Comparative Student Scientific Journal of Schools and Law*, 3.2 (2022), p. 318 <<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24252/shautuna.vi.23605>>.



Today, the development of the times has brought great changes to the social strata<sup>122</sup>, but Islam affirms the principle of social equality, rejects stratification in society, and recognizes that every individual has the same value before God. Islam views humans as creatures that have multiple dimensions, whose activities develop over time.<sup>123</sup> Therefore, it is recommended that Muslims be able to sort and compare the values of modernity with Islamic teachings contained in the Qur'an and Sunnah.<sup>124</sup> The main texts of Islamic teachings have established the obligation to safeguard the benefits and pay attention to them when regulating various aspects of life.<sup>125</sup> Muslims can become advanced and further develop all the potentials that have been given by Allah, thus creating a more just and civilized society.

NU thinkers have developed a fundamental concept of ideal values in political education, which is intrinsically connected to the way Islam is applied in the political realm. There are three main perspectives that emerge from Islamic thinkers, both classical and modern. First, is the view that religion and politics are integrated entities; Second, is the view that religion and politics are interrelated and interact (symbiotic); Third, is the view that religion and politics should stand separately (secularistic).<sup>126</sup> NU thinkers believe that understanding and applying one of these paradigms in political education is the key to building a society based on the values of justice, truth, and equality.

Democracy in Indonesia promotes mutual respect in the midst of the diversity of society. NU, with this view, has principles that support pluralism, known as *tasamuh* (tolerance). This means that NU advocates a tolerance attitude towards differences of

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<sup>122</sup> Laela Safriani, Aisyah Kara, and Kurniati Kurniati, "The Role of UIN Alauddin Women Lecturers in Realizing the Sakinah Family from the Perspective of Islamic Law," *Journal of Islamic Discourse* 4, no. 2 (2016): 272.

<sup>123</sup> Kurniati, 'Fiqhi Cinta: A Wise Way of Islamic Law to Sow Love and Foster Family', *Al Daulah: Journal of Criminal Law and Governance*, 1.1 (2012), pp. 1–2.

<sup>124</sup> Zainuddin, Qadir Gassing, and Kurniati, "The Benefits and Implications of Modern Technology Perspective Maslahah," *UNES Law Review* 6, no. 2 (2024): 6748, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31933/unesrev.v6i2>.

<sup>125</sup> T Jamaluddin et al., "The Effectiveness of Child Protection Through Marriage Dispensation Policy in Maslāḥah Perspective," *American Journal of Society and Law* 2, no. 2 (2023): 21, <https://doi.org/10.54536/ajsl.v2i2.1395>.

<sup>126</sup> M Din Syamsuddin, "The Search for the Concept of the State in the History of Islamic Political Thought," *Ulumul Qur'an* 4, no. 2 (1993).

view, both in terms of religion, especially in matters related to sharia law, beliefs, and behavior, as well as in social and cultural issues.<sup>127</sup>

The basic principles of NU include first, *tawassut* (moderate), which is not to favor the extreme right or left. In the teachings of *Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah*, both in law, belief, and behavior, the middle principle is always upheld. This moderation is reflected in a law-making approach that not only relies on text, but also considers reason. This is an attempt to mediate between extreme viewpoints, such as between free will (*Qadariyah*) and destiny (*Jabariyah*), between salaf orthodoxy and Mu'tazilah rationalism, as well as between philosophical Sufism and orthodox Sufism.<sup>128</sup> The moderation approach that NU adheres to is not only a solution to overcome polarization, but also as a foundation to build awareness of the importance of dialogue and cooperation between various understandings and backgrounds in society.

The second principle is *tawazun*, which refers to maintaining a balance in all things, including between the interests of the world and the hereafter, the interests of the individual and the interests of society, as well as between the interests of the present and the future.<sup>129</sup> The third principle, *tasamuh*, teaches tolerance towards differences of view, especially in derivative matters, to prevent conflicts, disputes, or excessive ego prominence, and vice versa, promotes the creation of fraternal bonds based on Islamic values (*ukhuwwah Islamiyyah*).

The fourth principle is *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (inviting goodness and preventing evil). Strengthening efforts to prevent bad behavior is a starting point that must be instilled in every individual, so that good behavior can be realized in society.<sup>130</sup> These principles are a solid foundation for NU in building a harmonious and civilized

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<sup>127</sup> M. Masyhur Amin, *NU Dan Ijtihad Politik Kenegaraannya* (Yogyakarta: AlAmin Press, 1996), 86–88.

<sup>128</sup> Abdul Muchith Muzadi, *Getting to Know Nahdlatul Ulama* (Surabaya: Khalista, 2006), 28.

<sup>129</sup> Ahmad Rofi'i, "National Politics of Nahdlatul Ulama: The Perspective of KH. Abdul Muchith Muzadi," *Al-Daulah: Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence* 4, no. 2 (2015): 397, <https://doi.org/10.15642/ad.2014.4.02.388-409>.

<sup>130</sup> Abdul Muchith Muzadi, *NU in Historical and Doctrinal Perspectives: Reflections on 65 Years. Join NU* (Surabaya: Khalista, 2006), 159–161.

society, where the values of kindness and tolerance are the main foundation in social interaction.

In the political realm, *Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah* does not always approve of extreme approaches. However, when faced with a tyrannical ruler, they did not hesitate to keep their distance and form an alliance. This attitude shows flexibility, where they can be accommodating in one situation and more assertive in another, but remain within the boundaries of balance.<sup>131</sup> With this approach, NU remains a firm example and acts with honesty and strives to build up, avoiding all forms of extremism. These principles reflect the appreciation of human plurality in the Qur'an, which is an awareness of diversity in Indonesian society.<sup>132</sup> The dynamic and principled attitude shown by NU in dealing with various political situations is clear evidence of their commitment to the values of justice, tolerance, and peace in building a harmonious and inclusive society.

According to Hasyim Muzadi, pluralism and tolerance emphasize the importance of accommodating attitudes and awareness of the value of cultural diversity as the basis for mindsets, attitudes, and behaviors that are more sensitive to human values. This implies that all individuals must be treated humanely regardless of the religion they follow, because human values are the universal right of every individual.<sup>133</sup> This approach to life reflects the principles of democracy, tolerance, and pluralism. NU also develops principles such as equality (*al-musawah*) and justice (*al-'is*), which are in line with democratic principles, especially in law enforcement and the principle of equality before the law.<sup>134</sup> The approach not only emphasizes the importance of respecting cultural diversity, but also emphasizes that justice is the main foundation in building a just and equitable society for all individuals.

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<sup>131</sup> Muzadi, 59.

<sup>132</sup> Suryani, "The Contribution of NU as a Civil Society Organization in Democratization," 62.

<sup>133</sup> Hasyim Muzadi, *Nahdlatul Ulama Di Tengah Agenda Persoalan Bangsa* (Jakarta: Logos, 1999), 61.

<sup>134</sup> Suryani, "The Contribution of NU as a Civil Society Organization in Democratization," 62.

National politics for NU contains the importance of consistency in maintaining the Republic of Indonesia as the main foundation of the Indonesian state. Participatory politics also includes NU's responsibility to educate the public about their rights and obligations, as well as to protect them from authoritarian behavior that may arise from any party. NU also emphasizes the importance of political ethics for cadres and their members, as well as for society at large, to create a dignified and civilized political environment, in accordance with Aristotle's view of the importance of the common good as the basis of a country's political ethics, which can only be realized through the application of rules that lead to the common good for all its citizens.<sup>135</sup> With this approach, NU plays an active role in shaping and maintaining a healthy and responsible political consciousness among the Indonesian people, in accordance with the principles of morality and common good.

Allah swt revealed Islam with the banner of justice, which before the arrival of Islam was very difficult for the ignorant people to obtain. As a perfect religion, Islam regulates all aspects of human life<sup>136</sup> including political thought in Islam in essence related to the concept of fiqh siyasah, which is presented comprehensively by Imam Mawardi in his work, "Ahkam al-Sultaniyah".<sup>137</sup> Fiqh siyasah must be relevant to the context of the times and human social dynamics, so that it still has timeless relevance. This thinking is based on authentic Islamic teachings and has a strong foundation in the fiqh proposal, known as maqasid al-shari'ah, which reflects the essence of the holy teachings and prophetic messages in the hadith. Therefore, siyasah fiqh can not only be accounted for theologically, but also humanistically.<sup>138</sup> Thus, fiqh siyasah is not only a

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<sup>135</sup> A. Bakir Ihsan, *Ethics and Political Logic: A Critical Discourse on Political Ethics, Power and Democracy* (Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2009), 21.

<sup>136</sup> Muhammad Asykur Muchtar, Abd Qadir Gassing, and Sabri Samin, "The Value of Justice in the Customary Law of Inheritance of the Moi Tribe between Male Heirs and Female Heirs in Sorong City: The Perspective of Maslahah," in *Proceedings of the 1 ST International Conference on Science and Islamic Studies*, vol. 1 (Makassar: Program Pascasarjana, UIN Alauddin Makassar, 2023), 706.

<sup>137</sup> Imam Mawardi, *Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniyah: The Laws of Islamic Governance*, Terj. Asadullah Yate (London: Ta-Ha Publisher Ltd, n.d.), 7.

<sup>138</sup> Muhammad Solikhudin, "Political Ijtihad of Nahdlatul Ulama in the Configuration of Fiqh Siyasah KH MA Sahal Mahfudh," *Ahkam* 9, no. 2 (2021): 291, <https://ejournal.uinsatu.ac.id/index.php/ahkam/article/view/4626%0Ahttps://ejournal.uinsatu.ac.id/index.php/ahkam/article/view/4626/1727>.

legal and political instrument, but also a vehicle to apply moral and humanitarian values in a dynamic social order.

Viewed from the perspective of *siyasah fiqh*, the principles of good governance have been fulfilled with guarantees for the rights of citizens and state rights. These include the right to vote (*Haqq al-Intikhab*), the right to participate in deliberations (*Haqq al-Musyawarat*), the right to supervise (*Haqq al-Muraqabat*), the right to demote leaders (if needed) (*Haqq al-'Azl*), the right to nominate (*Haqq al-Tarsyih*), and the right to hold office in public positions (*Haqq Tawalliy al-Wazhaif al-'Ammat*), all of which are political rights in an Islamic country.<sup>139</sup> These principles, which are the basis of KH's national political thought. Muchith Muzadi, reflects the implementation of moderate Islamic values and is based on justice in all aspects of life, with the aim of creating a balance of power in society, nation, and state. In accordance with the NU paradigm of *tawasut*, *tawazun*, *ta'adul* and *tasamuh*, of course, a moderate middle way is chosen.

Based on what has been explained earlier, in terms of the contribution of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) in the development and application of Islamic law in Indonesia, it covers various aspects related to political views, principles of *fiqh siyasah*, and Islamic teaching values interpreted in a pluralistic Indonesian context. NU is not only an important voice in fighting for the political rights of citizens and state rights in accordance with Islamic principles, but also plays a role in shaping a discourse on a government system based on justice, equality, and balance of power.

NU's approach to the development and application of Islamic law also reflects a moderate and inclusive view that seeks to build a just and harmonious society. This is reflected in the approach of *tawasut* (moderation), *tawazun* (balance), *ta'adul* (justice), and *tasamuh* (tolerance), which are the basis for NU's activities in formulating policies and advocacy in the political and legal realms. In addition, NU also plays an important role in voicing moderate Islamic voices and promoting interfaith dialogue and cooperation between various groups in society. This is important in the context of Indonesia, which has cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity, where NU acts as an agent

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<sup>139</sup> A. Djazuli, *Fiqh Siyasah, Implementation of the Benefit of the Ummah in Sharia Signs* (Jakarta: Prenadamedia Group, 2003), 98–100.

who fights for diversity as a source of strength, not conflict. Thus, NU's contribution in the development and application of Islamic law in Indonesia is not only limited to the formal religious aspect, but also includes the political, social, and cultural dimensions that form the foundation for a just and civilized life of the nation and state.

#### **D. Conclusion**

The influence of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in Indonesia's political dynamics is very significant and diverse. With strong historical roots, NU has broad support from the community, especially Nahdliyin, so it is able to influence political policy at the local and national levels. Through participation in the policy-making process, such as the Islamic boarding school bill, NU presents agendas that are relevant to the interests of the community, especially in the realm of religion and education.

NU's role in socializing democratic values through pesantren also has an important impact, although on a limited scale, but reflects NU's contribution in strengthening the foundation of democracy at the local level. In addition, NU feels a responsibility to ensure that Islamic values are integrated within the broader framework of democracy, not just narrowly understood. In government supervision, NU plays an important role as a balancer with its social capital. This organization is able to position itself as a monitoring mechanism for government policies, ensuring that these policies are in accordance with the aspirations of the community. The influence of Nahdlatul Ulama in Political Dynamics in Indonesia takes into account the complex and multifaceted role of NU in Indonesian politics, from policy-making to its role as a supervisory and balancing agent. Meanwhile, in the context of NU's contribution to the development and application of Islamic law in Indonesia, NU plays an important role in forming the foundation for a just and civilized life of the nation and state, not only in the formal religious aspect, but also in the political, social, and cultural dimensions.

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**WOMEN AS A STRATEGIC GROUP:  
WOMEN'S STRATEGY IN POLITICAL NETWORKS THROUGH THE  
ECONOMIC AREA  
(IWAPI NTB CASE STUDY)**

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**Abstract**

Women's participation in economic field and politic is often viewed in a dichotomous manner, where the economy is referred as "low politics." Women's participation in economic organization is also seen as non-strategic activism, which interpreted as activities that are distant or excluded from electoral politics and has less influence on the decision-making process. This research aims to challenge the argument and suggests that women's roles in the economy are indeed interconnected with the political sector. The study argues that women use their institutional capital as members of IWAPI to build relationships and political networks, where the appropriation of interests which means securing access to specific resources is the main goal. This research utilizes the Strategic Group theory from Evans Dieter-Evers and finds that women affiliated with IWAPI adopt personal and corporate appropriation modes in pursuing their interests. Personal appropriation is closely related to strengthening political networks through political parties to drive institutional change, while corporate appropriation is carried out by IWAPI members through expanding business networks and forming resource alliances. Furthermore, women can be categorized as a strategic group with business types and often employ cooperative strategies with other strategic groups. IWAPI is ultimately referred to as an organization formed by strategic groups of women for the appropriation of specific interests.

**Keywords:** *Women, strategic groups, agency, appropriation of interests*

**A. Introduction**

In patriarchal culture, women and politics are the antithesis; a manifestation of latent contradiction, and denying the nature of creation. In the context of patriarchal culture, men are placed as leaders and placed in a dominant position so that patriarchy is also referred to as the culture of the rule of the father, or the rule of men. This concept



of 'male rule' then leads to the consequences of upholding a social and cultural system based on the norm of male power, where the pattern of social relations is characterized by the acceptance of men as rulers. In patriarchal culture, men are considered to have a natural right to power so that naturally, men are considered superior or dominant in all aspects and social relations. Thus, men are accepted as parties who have control, as decision makers, and become the center of social and private activities where men are the focus and agents of social development and invention (male centeredness).

In the political context, patriarchal culture has serious consequences for the recognition of women's political rights. Politics that is built up from patriarchal culture creates politics that is biased against men and oriented towards men (male-stream). Rhodiyah (2013:60) mentioned that the consequence of patriarchal culture in political life is the recognition of society that relies on men as the root in politics. A logic that focuses on men as the root in politics thus does not recognize women and their agency capacity in politics. Women in politics are considered complementary, and are seen as passive and fatalist actors. In fact, although women are currently involved in politics, this involvement often does not come from the genuine will of women, but is born from a situation of conditioning and external encouragement. This external impulse is biased from the male side; Not because of the recognition of women's equality but as a result of, for example, the encouragement of the women's political affirmation policy, which requires a quota of 30 percent of women in the legislature. This is in line with what Rhodiyah (Ibid.) revealed, the acceptance of men as the head of the family causes women's political aspirations to be often represented by men, be it fathers, brothers, husbands, uncles and so on; Even if they actively participate and occupy public positions or political parties, it is not seen as an achievement of women as political individuals but their participation in politics is seen as part of the power or position of their husbands or men (cf. Winarto, 2002:113).

Fitriyah (2018:39-52) describes the obstacles faced by women in the process of political candidacy by the party. Women's obstacles to participating in politics can be read from any woman who enters and obtains political office. Widaryanto and Pramono (Djojosoekarto and Sandjaja 2008: 189-190 in Fitriyah, 2018: 39-52) classify them into three groups, namely: (1) obtaining political office because they have a certain relationship with men (legislative/executive officials); as a wife or child; (2) they have been freed from the task of raising their children; and (3) the young age group, which is generally activists. From this classification, it can be seen that there are groups of women who achieve power or political positions because they have a relationship with men, be it as wives (marriage bonds), children or brothers (blood relations). A study conducted by Fitriyah (2018: 39-52) also shows that the relationship factor with men provides a better or higher probability for women to enter or even pass the candidacy process within the party. In the context of actual politics, the influence of charisma or male power as a determinant of women's political power can be seen from the phenomenon of dynastic politics in Indonesia, where women are considered as an extension of male power (detik.com, 2017). In the data presented by Fitriyah (2018) in

the Central Java regional elections, the wives of incumbents emerged as candidates for regional heads, as well as the 2014 DPRD election in Central Java which showed a recurring pattern of female candidates who have relationships or are part of political dynasties.

Women's political candidacy that is closely related to dynastic politics, in the author's opinion, is caused by several things. First, female political candidates can become vote getters among certain circles, second, the incumbent's ambition to perpetuate power; In this context, women are seen as tools or extensions of incumbents or oligarchs. The choice of incumbent often falls on women who have close kinship relationships, such as wives and children. Third, because of the pragmatic choice of women who use the capital they have to achieve power. On the third cause, although considered controversial, this view highlights the capacity of women's agencies.

In the context of this agency, women can break away or choose not to rely on the role of men when knitting their work in politics. Perampuan can choose to take advantage of solidarity relationships with fellow women, whether they are involved in the same organization, association, institution or group. With this, women can organize and mobilize support without involving male influence or power. Of course, achieving certain interests in the world of politics does not always start from politics. Political interests can be considered as the main goal, which is achieved through various channels, one of which is the economy. And this is what women who are members of IWAPI do.

Thus, a perspective that perpetuates a skeptical view of the capacity of women's agencies such as in a male-biased political view is actually inappropriate and misleading. In fact, women are active political actors and often do not even depend on male power. In the perspective of the difference argument, gender experiences and differences shape different needs and perspectives as individuals between men and women. Women often use their nurturing character in strategizing and achieving their interests. In the context of leadership, women's experiences of social exclusion and their fluency in the nurturing domain of work make women more sensitive and empathetic to minority groups and their vision of just politics. In fact, many times, women use their gender roles to achieve their interests. Thus, this view shows that political actors cannot be seen as a homogeneous group that has a typical character objectively. In the context of women, women's political strategies can be different from those usually taken by men, which often show ambitious, dominant, manipulative characters and so on. Politics, in the hands of women, can show a more empathetic face and be sensitive to different experiences.

IWAPI itself is a forum for women entrepreneurs consisting of approximately 4 thousand women entrepreneurs, be it small entrepreneurs (85%), medium entrepreneurs (12%) and large entrepreneurs (3%). With up to 256 branches spread across 30 provinces, IWAPI is the largest organization of women entrepreneurs in Indonesia and in Southeast Asia. IWAPI was even appointed as the Chair Country of the ASEAN Women Entrepreneurs' Network (AWEN). IWAPI itself positions itself as a

government partner to achieve and implement policies for women's economic empowerment while being a forum for the aspirations and interests of women entrepreneur groups.

IWAPI's actions and roles provide an overview or representation of the role of women, not only in strengthening the women's economy but also in the public sphere in general. Looking at the number of IWAPI memberships that are not small, at least at a glance it can be seen that women's economic contribution is not small. Especially when viewed from its membership, IWAPI should be seen not only as an organization of women entrepreneurs, but also as part of a big business network or women's business group. Although in the context of membership, IWAPI is dominated by small and medium entrepreneurs, the leaders or think-tanks of this organization are women entrepreneurs of the medium and upper scale. In this case, the author wants to emphasize the strategic potential of this group of women entrepreneurs beyond their advocacy potential for the development of women's MSME businesses.

This study wants to see how women who are members of IWAPI use their institutional capital as members of IWAPI to build political relationships and networks, which of course their main goal is to achieve political interests; namely the appropriation of interests through policy changes. Thus, this research is expected to break the dichotomous view between the realm of economics and politics, where the economy is often referred to as an arena and an issue of low politics. So far, women's self-organizing in the economic, social and other non-political sectors has often been seen as a problem or non-strategic activism. This non-strategic problem is simply defined as activities that are confined or distant and do not have an impact on the decision-making process.

In this perspective, women are seen as a strategic group that has a certain appropriation goal with the aim of perpetuating or changing the scheme of resource appropriation, then women as a strategic group will be seen as an active group of individuals who have certain strategies and visions or missions that are not only related to efforts to maintain or increase access and control over economic resources. but also related to political influence and access to the process of policy-making and institutional change. Based on the presentation in the introduction, there are several questions asked, namely what is the strategy of women in building political networks through the economic area, namely as members of IWAPI and second, what is the strategy of interest exploitation used?

## **B. Method**

This research uses a critical research paradigm. The foundation of the critical paradigm is the emancipatory Marxist theory, which includes neo-Marxism (new left), and feminism. The development of critical theory as a paradigm cannot be separated from the role of the Frankfurt School fronted by Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and so on. The view of the critical paradigm is to emphasize that science is not based on standard laws and procedures, but to dismantle the ideologies that already exist in liberating human beings from all the shackles of

exploitation and oppression (Muslim, 2016: 80). This type of research is a descriptive-qualitative research that uses two types of data sources needed, namely: first, primary data and second, secondary data. Primary data were taken from interviews (in depth interviews) using the purposive sampling method.

### C. Result and Discussion

#### **IWAPI and Women's Economic Empowerment Goals**

The Indonesian Women Entrepreneurs Association, abbreviated as IWAPI, one of the unifying forums for women entrepreneurs in Indonesia, was originally named IPWI (Indonesian Women Entrepreneurs Association), officially formed on February 10, 1975, in Jakarta on the initiative of two women entrepreneurs, namely Kemala Motik Amongpradja and Dewi Motik Pramono along with several other entrepreneurs. The establishment of IWAPI basically started from concerns about the lack of solidity of women entrepreneurs. Although they are both active in the economic field, they run separately and separately from each other. This is due to the lack of a forum that gathers women entrepreneurs, even though if the women entrepreneurs are gathered in a forum, it will allow for coordinated cooperation in all fields, and ultimately create better synergy.

The idea of gathering Indonesian women entrepreneurs was also expressed to several other women entrepreneurs such as Mirta Kartohadiprodjo, Dotty Ibnu Sutowo, Linda Spiro, Linda Latief, Astari Harun Alrasyid, Astrid Soerjantono Soerjo, Ratih Dardo, and Niniek Soerjo Adiwsita which was then realized through the establishment of the Indonesian Women Entrepreneurs Association (IPWI) on February 10, 1975. At the 1st National Conference of IPWI which was held in 1978 and officially the name of IPWI was changed to IWAPI. The purpose of the establishment of this organization is, first, to foster the unity and cooperation of Indonesian women entrepreneurs in the field of economics and business or business. Second, increasing knowledge and skills as entrepreneurs, and third, increasing the participation of Indonesian women in development.

In the next stage, IWAPI moved quickly and expanded its work in empowering women's economy. In addition to expanding its scope through the establishment of branches throughout the archipelago, IWAPI also plays a role as a government partner in various women's economic development and empowerment programs, including collaborating with the Nusantara Export Development Agency (BPEN), as well as fostering relationships with government and private banks, as well as holding various trainings and cooperation with coaching institutions and even establishing the IWAPI Education Center (1979) to increase knowledge and skills of its members. Now IWAPI members have reached 30,000 spread across 36 provinces.

IWAPI realizes that despite having a significant contribution to national economic development, women entrepreneurs in fact face various obstacles and challenges, both in terms of access to capital, knowledge capacity for efforts to improve the quality of human resources and products, weak management capacity and market access.



Therefore, IWAPI not only gathers, fosters, facilitates, provides solutions and motivates its members but also actively provides input and becomes a partner of the government in efforts to strengthen capacity and equal economic access for women entrepreneurs.

The commitment and determination to help women entrepreneurs is also realized, among others, seeking structured, effective, creative and aggressive cooperation with third parties, including: the Government, banks, fellow Associations and the private sector both domestically and abroad. This is also in line with IWAPI's mission, namely 1) IWAPI empowers and strengthens women in SMEs through increasing the ability of members to manage member businesses, gain access to new technologies, marketing and financing. 2) IWAPI champions its membership in various ways, including advocacy, training (technical skills, management and human resources), and networking.

### **Women's Strategies for Building Political Networks through Business**

IWAPI as a forum for women entrepreneurs can be a target for politicians to gain support, but at the same time, IWAPI members who are involved in politics can use their membership to get support from politicians and members of other organizations outside IWAPI. Organizationally, IWAPI is a non-profit institution that has a mission to accommodate women entrepreneurs. IWAPI's main focus is advocacy and empowerment of women in the economic sector. Thus, organizationally, IWAPI has a firm attitude towards its relationship with politics or politicians.

IWAPI provides significant access to the expansion of its member network, both politically and in the context of individual business interests. However, the openness of this access is highly dependent on each individual, how he can use the network for his own interests.

Personally, IWAPI members are often approached by politicians, but in this context, relations with politicians, senators, and so on are limited to the context of strengthening cooperation in encouraging policies related to women's empowerment. In the context of formal communication, IWAPI talks as a forum for raising votes and support for other politicians are not carried out.

On the other hand, IWAPI members who are members of politics do not rely on IWAPI as a forum for gaining votes. This is because the political affiliation of IWAPI members is very diverse with different party choices. Thus, there are concerns that if the support is expressed in real form through the mobilization of IWAPI members, it will certainly cause injustice to IWAPI members, who may be affiliated with a different political party from the IWAPI members supported. As a result, IWAPI members who follow the political path rely on networks from outside IWAPI itself, such as family networks, or networks that are pursued through political activism independently.

However, IWAPI has not forgotten its role in the advocacy aspect. Several officials of the IWAPI DPC consider it necessary to create a forum for its members, where the forum focuses on the aspect of political education for its members. This forum is actually not part of the formal organizational structure of IWAPI, but rather a personal



initiative of several IWAPI members who have the view that women's work is not limited to the economic sector alone. Political education for women is not only related to political regeneration, but rather to the aspect of women's awareness or advocacy in overseeing state policies. Having political awareness is not always implemented in political contestation activism such as becoming a legislative candidate, but rather in the aspect of fostering a women's awareness base on political events and the policy-making process, which then fosters authentic, generic awareness to supervise the administration of the state and the decision-making process.

In the formal organizational context, IWAPI places itself neutrally in the midst of pluralism and political activism of its members. Thus, IWAPI cannot be said to be a formal voice and support machine, but in the personal context of IWAPI members can use their membership to form a support base from women's groups. In addition, IWAPI's efforts to complete its role in the aspect of political advocacy show the transformation of IWAPI's commitment, which previously only focused on economic empowerment, now also provides a political education platform that can be a space for exchanging ideas, or even socializing a political candidate's candidacy. In addition, although the political choices of IWAPI members are still influenced by their families' political choices, in certain contexts, IWAPI can build a fortress of solidarity and (political) support for women.

### **Exploitation of Women's Interests**

Evers and Gerke (2009: 5-9) state that the appropriation of interests by strategic groups is not always in the form of short-term gains or immediate benefits, but strategic groups track long-term strategies, such as changing or shaping a social, economic and political structure or institutional change to increase opportunities or access to certain resources. After all, these strategic groups are not elite groups or social classes, they are groups that cross hierarchies, are not formally affiliated with a particular organization, but they are bound by common values, ideologies, and interests. The non-attachment of members of a strategic group to a certain institution or organization causes a strategic group to be essentially a fragile group, but Evans and Gerke (2009:8) emphasized that the same values, ideologies and interests are actually a powerful binding force for the sustainability of this group.

From this definition, women can generally be said to be a strategic group, and women have a common interest; namely ensuring that the economic and political system provides space for the fulfillment of women's rights and interests in general. However, it needs to be emphasized that women are not a monopolitical group, which can be grouped under one identity and interests only; It is also necessary to recognize that women can join and be affiliated with other groups with different goals and interests. Evans and Gerke (2009:8) assert that this strategic group transcends social boundaries, class and social stratification, but sometimes, kinship can also be the binding force of this group. Evans (1990) also mentioned that there are several types of strategic groups, namely bureaucrats; military, professional, intellectual and business

groups. With this type of division, IWAPI can be grouped as a women's strategic group that comes from the business group (women). As an organization of women entrepreneurs, of course, their main interest is to ensure and encourage policies that are in favor of strengthening and empowering women's economy. However, from the studies conducted, researchers are of the view that it is good to distinguish between the interests of women as IWAPI organizations and the interests of women as political individuals.

In the organizational context, it has been mentioned that IWAPI can be said to be politically distant and does not show straightforward political affiliation with a particular political party. However, it does not mean that IWAPI is not political. First, if politics is interpreted as advocacy and not only as electoral work, then IWAPI's economic advocacy efforts are also interpreted as IWAPI's political work. On the other hand, IWAPI places its position as a government partner in the implementation of women's economic empowerment policies, which is basically an appropriation of the interests of IWAPI itself. As a government partner, IWAPI can access funding allocations for programs related to women's economic empowerment, or access information on government policies or programs. For example, in the New Order era (ahead of reform), it became the government's main partner in women's economic empowerment. The resource person stated that at that time, IWAPI had a basic food truck program, whose commodities were provided by the state. IWAPI is given access to cheaper commodity prices, and various allocations of funding and assistance for programs initiated by IWAPI.

Second, in an effort to achieve the exploitation of these interests or secure access to certain resources, the question of who or the main actors play a role is irrelevant; However, strategic groups do not hesitate to support certain actors; Whether it is an interest group or an elite that is considered to support or fight for the interests of this group. This means, as Evans has mentioned, that strategic groups can carry out strategies of cooperation, hybridization, competition or even rebellion with or against other strategic groups or even individuals. In this context, the interests of individuals or actors or other strategic groups can go hand in hand with the strategic group and form a mutually beneficial relationship.

IWAPI's connection with the government through partnership relationships not only provides IWAPI—as an organization—with access to resources; but also provides opportunities for individual members or IWAPI members to build a personal network with government members or government bureaucratic groups; This network can contribute to the business expansion of the members of the strategic group. It is basically connected to modes of appropriation consisting of the personal, corporate and collective (Evans & Gerke, 2009:9).

In the mode of personal appropriation, where a group earns its income through personal appropriation (e.g., lawyers or small traders), strategic groups tend to choose the path of the political system in which political parties play a role in achieving their interests. This means that this group could form a political party or be affiliated with a certain political party, in addition to forming other specific organizations. While the



mode of corporate exploitation (e.g. industrial groups, entrepreneurs or businessmen), one of their goals is to expand ownership and control over the means of production by means of organizational expansion (corporations) or even they can obtain political support through the patronage system, kinship, or resource network (resource network). In the mode of collective exploitation (usually a group of bureaucrats and the military), the exploitation of their interests tends to be power-base by maintaining or expanding their organization (state) to access control over resources.

From the explanation of the mode of interest appropriation, IWAPI can be categorized as a strategic group that adheres to the strategy of personal and corporate mode of appropriation. The author argues that the adoption of this mode of adaptation could be different, depending on the position and scale of the IWAPI member industry itself.

From the presentation of data, fighting through political channels, whether it is joining a political party and participating in electoral politics, becoming a legislative member is a pattern of personal fashion application. For information, the Chairperson of IWAPI NTB (Mrs. Baiq Diyah Ratu Ganefi) and the Chairperson of IWAPI (Mrs. Nita Yudhi or Dyah Anita Prihapsari) are running for candidates for DPD members and DPRD members, as well as other IWAPI members. Through political parties and becoming legislative members, women in IWAPI can fight for change or urge policies that ensure the fulfillment of women's rights and economic access.

However, on the other hand, this political space also provides personal interests to each IWAPI member, related to their role as political actors. The political path can open or strengthen the resource alliance of the actor with various other strategic groups, either with fellow businessmen or bureaucratic groups which ultimately paves the way for corporate fashion exhibition. However, on the one hand, corporate fashion application is also pursued by IWAPI members who have a large rank position and industrial scale. As large business owners, these strategic groups can rely on access to certain resources through the formation of alliances and resource networks. The formation of this alliance can be seen how IWAPI members are also part or members of other organizations such as HIPMI, although not all. However, the awareness of interests as a group of entrepreneurs provides space for the formation of an alliance of interests, it's just that the strategy carried out does not come to the form of hybridization, but only in the form of cooperation. On the other hand, establishing alliances with business groups also aims to expand the corporate of IWAPI members themselves. In this context, IWAPI is not a strategic group, but an organization formed by a strategic group, namely women, to achieve their interests.

#### **D. Conclusion**

Basically, the awareness of IWAPI women members regarding active participation in politics has been well built. This awareness is not only conditioned or transferred by IWAPI to its members, but IWAPI members who individually have a view of the importance of women's active role or participation in politics. However, it needs

to be emphasized that IWAPI members who have this awareness can be categorized into two groups, namely first, the group of members who have awareness and active political activities in politics. This member is not only a member of IWAPI but also a member of a certain political party. Second, the group of members who admit that politics is a strategic effort to encourage policies that favor women, but this group does not actively participate and even refuses to be actively involved in politics. The reluctance of IWAPI members to get involved in politics is caused, especially by cultural limitations, namely the role of domestic housewives. Guilt, or not getting permission from her husband is the reason that limits women's active participation in politics.

From the aspect of the strategy of building networks, as an organization, IWAPI focuses on building networks with social organizations engaged in the same field. However, IWAPI does not specifically target politicians, on the grounds that they do not have political goals. Closeness or relationships with several groups of politicians are considered as a forum for strengthening cooperation in the aspect of women's economic empowerment. Meanwhile, from the context of individual IWAPI members, taking advantage of the privilege of being a member of IWAPI to build a network to political groups is still not widely done. In addition, IWAPI members who are politically active basically have the opportunity to use IWAPI as a vote base by mobilizing their members, but IWAPI's policy that is strictly oriented towards non-profit institutions prevents this. Formally, IWAPI itself is not affiliated or formally connected with certain politicians or political parties; In fact, in IWAPI, its members are affiliated with various parties. Therefore, the mobilization of votes in IWAPI is ethically not allowed, to maintain a sense of justice and solidarity among its members.

In the discussion of strategic groups, IWAPI can be categorized as an organization formed by strategic groups to ensure access to certain resources, which can be said to be a strategic group here are women. As a strategic group, women through IWAPI seek to build alliances and resource networks. There are two modes of appropriation, namely personal and corporate appropriation modes. In the context of personal appropriation, IWAPI members choose the political path to secure access to resources. IWAPI as an organization can provide institutional legitimacy to IWAPI members, as well as provide access to information to IWAPI members as well as opportunities to build business and political networks. On the other hand, political access can provide space for the formation of alliances with strategic groups and other political groups. Meanwhile, the corporate exploitation mode is carried out through business expansion and network resources, be it through alliances with fellow women entrepreneurs or with other entrepreneurs by expanding the company to control access to production tools; Or by relying on kinship-based network resources or the closeness of identity and family.

However, utilizing kinship, building alliances and networking in the midst of the limitations of formal political affiliation of IWAPI actually shows the capacity of women's agencies independently in building political networks and determining strategies to achieve their interests. In this regard, it is necessary to remind that women's political participation and activism do not have to be limited in the context of electoral politics,

but advocacy efforts are also part of political work that builds awareness, partiality and control over women's own autonomy.

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# DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE OR POLITICAL PERFORMANCE? ANALYZING ANIES' URGENCY THROUGH THE LENS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

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## Abstract

*Desak Anies, as a political initiative led by Governor Anies Baswedan, it is the focus of research within the conceptual framework of deliberative democracy, which emphasizes the importance of broad, independent, and critical public participation in the political decision-making process. Through a descriptive-analytical approach, This study investigates Desak Anies from the perspective of deliberative democracy. Data on public participation and active participation invitations from Anies Baswedan were analyzed to understand the extent to which Desak Anies reflects an independent and critical public space. Even though Desak Anies encouraging public participation, further evaluation is needed to ensure that available public spaces support open discussion, equitable inclusion of different segments of society, and in-depth consideration of diverse views. This research provides in-depth insight into the role of Desak Anies in strengthening the principles of deliberative democracy in the context of contemporary politics. In addition, the study provides a basis for further reflection and improvement in democratic public participation, affirming the importance of strengthening public spaces to support a healthy and inclusive democratic process.*

**Keywords:** Desak Anies, Deliberative Democracy, Public Participation

## A. Introduction

In the midst of Indonesia's political and social journey, the "Desak Anies" campaign emerged as a real effort to encourage political participation, especially among young people. Presented by Anies Baswedan, this campaign aims to create an open and inclusive discussion space on crucial issues faced by the Indonesian people. Behind these efforts, however, critical questions arise about the extent to which these campaigns reflect the principles of deliberative democracy.

Statistical data showing the projected demographic bonus of the population in 2045 provides a relevant context to understand the urgency and relevance of the "Desak Anies" campaign. Projections from the Central Statistics Agency in 2023 show that in 2045, the productive age population in the range of 15-64 years will dominate with a



figure of 70%. This highlights the importance of involving the young generation in the nation-building process, because they will be the backbone in realizing the vision of the nation's progress.<sup>140</sup>

In this context, the "Desak Anies" campaign is a relevant and important initiative. Through this campaign, Anies Baswedan invites young people to actively participate in the discussion of important issues related to the future of Indonesia. The prominent demographic bonus phenomenon in 2045 shows that young people will be a great force in shaping the direction of national development.<sup>141</sup>

However, in looking at the "Desak Anies" campaign from the perspective of deliberative democracy, several questions arise. Does this campaign really create an inclusive and meaningful discussion space for all levels of society, including vulnerable and marginalized groups? Is the participation of young people in this campaign really noticed and valued? And are the decisions taken in the discussion forum based on rational arguments and accurate data?

It is important to remember that political campaigns such as "Desak Anies" are not just a publicity event or a mere political show. They have great potential to encourage more active and inclusive political participation from different levels of society, especially young people who are the main agents of change in society.

However, to optimize this potential, it is important for initiatives such as "Urak Anies" to truly implement the principles of deliberative democracy. This means ensuring that the open discussion space is truly inclusive, where diverse voices and views are heard and valued.<sup>142</sup> It also means ensuring that young people's participation in the discussion process is truly taken care of and given the value it deserves. And most importantly, the decisions taken in such discussion forums should be based on rational arguments, not on political interests or other irrelevant considerations.

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<sup>140</sup> Ilham Febri Budiman, "Peran Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Negara Dalam Mewujudkan Indonesia Emas 2045" 2, no. 3 (2024): 47–54.

<sup>141</sup> Milda Nur et al., "Proyeksi Penduduk Menuju Indonesia Emas Tahun 2045 Melalui Penerapan Teori Malthus Milda Nur Risma Abdah Fatimah Aqilah Ichtiari dan filsuf Bangsa Jerman tidak setuju dengan Malthus . Karl Marx menyanggah Teori kesempatan kerja kala itu , dan bukan meneka" 2, no. 1 (2024).

<sup>142</sup> Kurniawan Arif Maspul, "Reimagining Democracy: An Exploration of Anies Baswedan's "Desak Anies" Program," *Indonesian Journal of Social Development* 1, no. 3 (2024): 13.

Thus, the analysis of the "Desak Anies" campaign through the lens of deliberative democracy is very important. It is not only about evaluating the success or failure of the campaign in achieving its political goals, but also about assessing the extent to which it reflects the fundamental principles of democracy that involve all citizens in the decision-making process that is essential to their future

## **B. Method**

The research method that will be used in this study is the literature study method. This approach aims to explore and analyze a variety of literature, documents, and other written sources relevant to the research topic. Data will be collected from various sources such as academic journals, books, research reports, official documents, and media articles that discuss deliberative democracy, political campaigns, community participation, and the "Desak Anies" campaign itself.

The data collection process will involve a comprehensive and selective search to identify the most relevant and reliable sources. Once the data is collected, the analysis will be carried out by examining and comparing the various perspectives and findings in the literature. The results of the analysis will be used to support the interpretation and evaluation of how the "Desak Anies" campaign reflects the principles of deliberative democracy. The conclusions of this literature study will be compiled in a research report that presents the key findings, interpretations, and implications of the results of the analysis to the broader context.

## **C. Result and Discussion**

### **Program Desak Anies**

Anies Baswedan's candidacy as an independent in the 2024 election is significant because it confirms the Nasdem party's support for him. This support is influenced by Anies Baswedan's performance in advancing Jakarta to become a collaborative city, which is in line with the concept of smart cities in the global sustainability discourse.<sup>143</sup> The Nasdem party's support also reflects confidence in Baswedan's ability to lead and implement creative policies that emphasize sustainability and diversity, in

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<sup>143</sup> R. D. Syalianda, S. I., & Kusumastuti, "Implementation of the smart city concept: The case of a smart city in Jakarta, Indonesia" (2021).

line with the theory of trust and political leadership.<sup>144</sup> This support is considered important to build trust among Indonesia's diverse population, which amounts to 280 million, highlighting the important role of Anies in mobilizing civic participation, especially among young people to create consensus.<sup>145</sup> Through Desak Anies, Baswedan hopes to overcome social disparities, facilitate dialogue, and form a common vision for the future of the nation, both through in-person and online forums.

Anies Baswedan, who is well-known in the world of Indonesian education and has recently ventured into politics, has become a supporter of democratic reform through his unique campaign, Desak Anies 2024. The campaign, which is based on grassroots participation and a participatory governance approach, marks a shift away from the traditional practice of top-down policymaking. Anies urged to highlight the values of inclusion and civic involvement by actively involving citizens in the decision-making process. Anies promotes direct engagement with citizens through various forums such as city hall meetings, community discussions, and internet platforms, to get feedback on policy goals and regional development efforts in 22 major cities in Indonesia.

Anies urged to support the bottom-up government model by decentralizing decisions and empowering local communities. This approach not only increases citizen participation, but also promotes accountability by ensuring that elected officials are attentive to the wants and preferences of their people.<sup>146</sup> In addition, Desak Anies serves as a means to discuss and exchange ideas about democracy, helping to grow a culture of political awareness and activism among Indonesian youth. Anies provides an opportunity for citizens to critically analyze government policies and shape the fate of the country's democracy by encouraging open debate and constructive dialogue.

The Desak Anies Program is the main campaign initiative that runs from November 28, 2023 to February 10, 2024, with the aim of directly interacting with the public and getting feedback related to Anies' vision and policy suggestions for the 2024

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<sup>144</sup> A. Bryman, "Mission accomplished?: Research methods in the first five years of Leadership." (2011).

<sup>145</sup> P. Norris, "Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing political activism." (2002).

<sup>146</sup> E. Baiocchi, G., & Ganuza, "Participatory budgeting seems as if emancipation is important. Politics & Society" (2014).



Presidential Election. The Anies Urging Event, which was held in various locations, provided an opportunity for Anies to meet with the community, listen to their input, and answer questions directly. The dialogical approach used in this event allowed participation from 500 to more than 13,000 participants, most of whom were young people, to interact directly with Anies and his team.

Through *Denak Anies*, Anies and his partner, Muhaimin Iskandar, aim to overcome urgent social challenges and propose solutions to realize a more just and prosperous Indonesia. Their strategic focus includes enhancing national defense and security, expanding Indonesia's role in global politics, and encouraging economic diplomacy. They are also committed to strengthening the Indonesian National Army and maintaining peace and security throughout Indonesia.

Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar's shared vision is "A Just and Prosperous Indonesia for All," which is realized through a trip from Aceh to Papua, which highlights several social issues along the way. Thus, they promise the necessary corrective measures. Anies and Cak Imin have set eight paths of change to realize this vision, which is the foundation of their goals. One of them is Mission 7, which involves strengthening the country's defense and security system and increasing Indonesia's role and leadership in global politics to achieve national goals and international peace.

The Anies Baswedan Urgak initiative reflects a reformed form of democracy, which is aligned with the main principles of democracy such as participation, accountability, and responsiveness. Through this approach, Anies aims to reduce the gap between the political elite and ordinary people by emphasizing the importance of citizen participation and empowering the community base, thereby creating a more inclusive and representative democracy. The alignment of this program with the values of Pancasila, Indonesia's national ideology, provides strong cultural and ideological legitimacy, and has received wide support from various levels of Indonesian society.<sup>147</sup> Anies also reflects a unique vision of Indonesian democracy that values diversity, pluralism, and shared prosperity. Thus, this initiative is the foundation for the development of a more democratic and inclusive society in Indonesia.

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<sup>147</sup> S. P. Huntington, "The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century" (1993).

From another perspective, the reciprocal relationship between Anies Baswedan's response to criticism and the level of public trust is closely related to democratic principles.<sup>148</sup> According to the theory of deliberative democracy, public discussion and participation are essential elements of an effective democratic process. Anies' openness in responding to criticism shows his commitment to deliberative principles, which allow citizens to express their concerns and hold elected officials accountable. This interactive approach not only improves the relationship between government and society, but also advances civic empowerment. When voters feel that their votes are cared for and valued, their confidence in the democratic system also grows. Thus, Anies' responsiveness to public input strengthens the quality of democracy practiced in the context of government administration.

### **Desak Anies In The Context Of Deliberative Democracy**

Derebellive democracy here is defined as a view that places public deliberative over free and equal citizens as the core of the legitimacy of political decision-making and self-government. Deliberation itself as a terminology comes from the Latin language, namely *deliberatio* which means to weigh, consult or deliberate.<sup>149</sup>

Hardiman emphasized that deliberative democracy places greater emphasis on the public decision-making process than on the end result. This means that whether public decisions are taken through public trials, public debates, and deliberative processes, or only by a small number of authorized individuals (such as governments) in a political structure without going through the previous stages of democratic deliberation, becomes the primary focus.<sup>150</sup>

On the other hand Habermas highlights that when the ability to create law is handed over through patterns of exchange in a network of social systems that operate independently, the reproduction of law will fall under the influence of an ambiguous duality of power, which separates the state from the social units of society. This opinion reflects a criticism of the representative democracy model that does not integrate

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<sup>148</sup> Maspul, "Reimagining Democracy: An Exploration of Anies Baswedan's" *Desak Anies* Program."

<sup>149</sup> Liza Farihah dan Sri Wahyuni, "Demokrasi Deliberatif dalam Proses Pembentukan Undang-Undang di Indonesia: Penerapan dan Tantangan ke Depan Oleh:" 3 (1998).

<sup>150</sup> F. Budi Hardiman, "Deliberative Democracy: A Model for Post-Suharto Indonesia?" (2004).

constituents thoroughly in the law-making process. In this context, the constituent is only given the political right to elect parliamentary representatives, which then ends his involvement constitutionally. This results in ambiguity in the law because the state can create a social system that does not fully reflect the will of the people.<sup>151</sup>

Deliberative democracy provides space for participation outside the administrative structure of the state, namely through public communication networks in civil society. There is a close relationship between the concept of democracy and deliberative democracy, which aims to empower the community in the process of legislation through the public space. It is evident that representative democracy is not a pure form of democracy, but rather a modification of the more fundamental principle of people's sovereignty.

According to Habermas, the public space must meet two essential conditions, namely independence and criticality.<sup>152</sup> Independent refers to the ability of any individual to speak, assemble, and engage in political discussions anywhere. Meanwhile, critical demonstrates readiness and ability to objectively and responsibly review decision-making processes that are open to the public. Habermas added that democracy must include a deliberative dimension, where public policy must go through the stage of public discourse before being passed. The concept of deliberative democracy aims to expand citizens' participation in the decision-making process, with the aim of creating laws that have strong legitimacy. This view emphasizes that legitimacy comes from the general will, so whatever the process is, if a legal product is declared as a general will, then the product is considered legitimate in terms of legitimacy.<sup>153</sup>

This practical translation of the concept of deliberative democracy becomes relevant in the evaluation of Anies' urgent programs, which raises questions about the extent to which these programs facilitate inclusive public participation and strengthen

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<sup>151</sup> Wimmy Haliim, "Demokrasi Deliberatif Indonesia : Konsep Partisipasi Masyarakat Dalam Membentuk Demokrasi dan Hukum yang Responsif," *Jurnal Masyarakat Indonesia* 42, no. 1 (2016): 19–30.

<sup>152</sup> Antonius Galih Prasetyo, "Towards Rational Democracy: Tracing Jürgen Habermas' Thoughts on Public Space," *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* 16, no. 2 (2012): 169–185.

<sup>153</sup> Haliim, "Demokrasi Deliberatif Indonesia : Konsep Partisipasi Masyarakat Dalam Membentuk Demokrasi dan Hukum yang Responsif."

the legitimacy of political decisions. There are several aspects, the first of which is important to pay attention to whether Anies' urgent program provides enough space for broad public participation. Furthermore, the public space provided for participation must be independent and critical. And the last is that the legitimacy of political decisions is based on agreements reached through an inclusive and fair public deliberation process.

The Desak Anies Program is a key campaign approach from November 28, 2023 to February 10, 2024, with the aim of engaging directly with people and gathering feedback on his vision and suggesting policies for the 2024 Presidential Election. The Desak Anies event, which was held in various venues, provided a calm environment for Anies to interact with the community, allowing them to express their concerns and ask questions directly. The event, which uses a dialogical approach, allowed participants ranging from 500 to more than 13000, most of whom were young people, to interact with Anies and his crew.

This is in line with the first aspect, where Anies' urging program is able to provide space for wide public participation. For example, based on information from *detikjatim*, Anies' urging program was held in Surabaya on February 9, 2024. The crowd that attended reached 13,500 people, which were dominated by students. Based on the participation data above, the significant number of masses shows that Anies' urgent program has succeeded in attracting the attention and involvement of Surabaya residents in the issues they are fighting for. The attendance of 13,500 people reflects a wide level of participation from different walks of life, which shows that the program is able to arouse interest and support from various groups and communities.<sup>154</sup>

The presence of such a large number of masses also reflects the wide access to information about Anies' urgent program in the people of Surabaya. Thus, it can be assumed that the program has succeeded in providing transparent and easily accessible information to the public, thus allowing for wide participation from various segments of society. However, it should be noted that the number of people attending the program

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<sup>154</sup> Fatichatun Nadhiroh, "Jostling During the Last Anies Urgency Held in Surabaya," *DetikJatim* (2024), <https://www.detik.com/jatim/berita/d-7185608/berdesak-desakan-di-desak-anies-terakhir-yang-digelar-di-surabaya>.

does not guarantee that the participation covers the entire spectrum of Surabaya society. It is possible that some groups or communities may not be well represented at the event, so further evaluation is needed to ensure that broad public participation is truly inclusive and reflects the interests and aspirations of the community as a whole.

The dominance of students in participating in Anies' urgent program in Surabaya on February 9, 2024 illustrates the unique dynamics in the public space provided. The large number of student involvement shows the high interest of this group in the issues discussed, as well as awareness of the active role in the political decision-making process. Students are often seen as agents of change in society, and their dominance in participation shows that they have a strong desire to contribute to the democratic process.

The large number of participants who expressed their aspirations also reflects the existence of an independent and critical public space. In an independent public space, each individual has the freedom to express their opinions and aspirations without fear of pressure or intervention from external parties. The extensive involvement of participants, especially among students, shows that there is an awareness of the importance of using public spaces to voice dissent and influence the decision-making process.

In addition, the invitation from Anies Baswedan for the public not to become passive participants emphasizes the importance of critical public participation. In the context of deliberative democracy, critical public participation refers to the ability of the public to objectively and responsibly review the decision-making process that is open to the public. The invitation reflects an urge to go beyond the role of spectator and take an active part in the political process.<sup>155</sup>

Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the dominance of students in participation also raises questions about the fair representation of different groups and communities in society. It is important to ensure that voices and perspectives from other segments of society are also well represented in the political decision-making process.

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

This underscores the importance of an independent and critical public space, where all voices can be heard and considered fairly.

The concept of public space is very important in assessing the legitimacy of political decisions. The public space is not only a place for people to voice their opinions and aspirations, but also an arena where political decisions are tested and debated openly. According to Habermas (1989), the public space plays the role of an intermediary between the state and bourgeois society. In the public sphere, the opinions and arguments presented have more important weight than the social status or power of the individual. (Prasetyo 2012) The legitimacy of political decisions is assessed based on agreements reached through an inclusive and fair public deliberation process. In this case, the public space serves as a tool to check the legitimacy of the power used by the government, by testing whether the public interest has been well represented in the policies taken.

In this case, Desak Anies emerged as a concrete example of how public participation can strengthen the principles of deliberative democracy at the local level. The success of Desak Anies in rallying mass participation from various segments of society, including students, activists, and the general public, shows great potential to change the dynamics of national politics. By providing an inclusive and open platform for the public to voice their aspirations and needs, Desak Anies illustrates that a responsive and participatory public space can be the foundation for the formation of more representative and democratic policies in Indonesia. Thus, Desak Anies is not only a brief political event that reflects public dissatisfaction with government policies, but also a starting point for the development of a more substantial and sustainable public deliberation model in the future.

Anies' potential to become a model for the public deliberation process in Indonesia lies in his ability to strengthen public involvement in the political decision-making process, as well as to strengthen the basis of public policy legitimacy through agreements reached through open dialogue and discussion. By continuing to encourage active and inclusive participation of the public in the political process, Desak Anies has the potential to become an important milestone in the development of deliberative democracy in Indonesia, which in turn can bring positive changes in governance and democratic development in the future.

#### **D. Conclusion**

In a political journey filled with dynamics and complexity, the Desak Anies program has emerged as a significant innovation in the context of deliberative democracy in Indonesia. Through an inclusive participatory approach, the program has provided a foundation for the development of a more democratic and responsive society to citizens' aspirations. An in-depth analysis of the program reveals various aspects that strengthen its legitimacy and relevance in Indonesia's diverse and evolving political context.

First of all, the Desak Anies program has succeeded in creating a large and open public space for public participation. By holding a series of events involving thousands of participants from all walks of life, including students, activists, and the general public, the program has managed to gather diverse voices and perspectives that reflect the diversity of Indonesian society. The active participation of the public in the political decision-making process has increased the legitimacy of the proposed policies and encouraged the creation of more representative and sustainable policies.

Second, the Desak Anies program has strengthened the principles of deliberative democracy through a responsive and dialogical approach. By paying attention to and responding to the aspirations of the community directly, Anies Baswedan and his team have succeeded in building a close relationship with citizens and increasing their sense of ownership of the political process. This approach not only strengthens people's involvement in decision-making, but also helps to address the gap between political elites and ordinary people, thus creating a more solid foundation for inclusive democratic development.

In addition, Desak Anies' success in gathering mass participation from various segments of society highlights the importance of developing an independent and critical public space. In a public space free from external pressure or intervention, people can objectively and responsibly review the political decision-making process and voice their aspirations without fear. This strengthens the legitimacy of political decisions and

strengthens the foundations of democracy that is responsive to the needs and interests of the community.

However, in evaluating the Desak Anies program, there are still challenges and opportunities that need to be considered. One of them is the importance of ensuring fair representation of various groups and communities in society in the political decision-making process. While the program has managed to attract widespread attention and engagement from different walks of life, further efforts are still needed to ensure that voices and perspectives from all segments of society are heard and considered fairly.

Thus, the Desak Anies program is not only an important step in developing deliberative democracy in Indonesia, but also offers a model that has the potential to be applied on a wider scale at the local and national levels. By continuing to encourage active and inclusive participation of the public in the political process, Desak Anies has the potential to become an important milestone in the transition towards more democratic governance and more sustainable democratic development in Indonesia. As future research, it will be interesting to look at the long-term impact of this program on political dynamics and governance in Indonesia as well as the potential to develop a more substantial and sustainable model of deliberative democracy in the future.

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