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COLLABORATIVE ELECTORAL GOVERNANCE IN WEST NUSA TENGGARA PROVINCE

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Abstract

This article explores election management practices using a collaborative governance method, focusing on the 2019 election in NTB Province. The study employs a qualitative case study approach, drawing on the governance paradigm and collaborative governance theory. Findings reveal that election management in NTB implemented a hepta-helix collaboration model involving seven actors: election organizing institutions, government, businesses, NGOs, mass media, universities, and political parties. Unlike typical collaborative governance, decision-making in this context remains the prerogative of election organizers, while other actors provide functional support. A critical limitation of this approach is the lack of clear categorization and functional mapping of stakeholders. The study recommends grouping actors into primary, key, and secondary stakeholders, each with defined, mutually supportive roles. Such a structured application of collaborative governance could enhance efficiency and stakeholder synergy. This research contributes to the evolving framework of collaborative governance in election management, enriching the contingency model by Ansell and Gash. By emphasizing structured actor integration, the study offers practical insights into optimizing stakeholder collaboration, ensuring that diverse contributions align with election integrity and transparency goals.

Keywords: Collaborative, Electoral, Governance, Hepta-Helix



A. Introduction

The state needs to manage general elections with a collaborative method called collaborative electoral governance to improve the quality of democracy. This concept is increasingly urgent to be practised, considering that Indonesia's election process index of 7.92 is the lowest among Asian countries, and Indonesia's democratic position is called flawed democracy with an index of 6.71.¹

The 2019 election was Indonesia's first experience of practicing a simultaneous scheme for five types of elections: the election members of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI), members of the Provincial House of Representatives (Provincial DPRD), members of the Regency/City Regional House of Representatives (Regency/City DPRD), Regional Representative Council (DPD), and the election of the President and Vice President (Nuryanti, in Hanafi, 2020).

The same election scheme will be held again in 2024, where voting according to the KPU schedule will be held on February 14, 2024 and if the presidential and vice presidential elections are two rounds, then the second round of voting will be held on June 26, 2024.² Thus, the implementation of the 2019 election is the main reference basis for the 2024 election management.

¹ See The State of Democracy Around The World, <https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/eiu-democracy-index->

² See General Election Commission Regulation Number 3 of 2022 concerning the Stages and Schedule for the 2024 General Election.



Simultaneous elections cause double complexity, because elections are the most colossal work of the country. The number of people involved is huge. Referring to the 2019 election, the number of voters nationally is 192,866,254 people. The ranks of organizers involved consisted of KPU, Bawaslu, and DKPP as many as 8,695,087 people (KPU RI Sekretariat, Bawaslu RI, and DKPP RI, 2019).

The election in NTB Province was attended by 3,667,253 people registered in the permanent voter list, with the distribution of voters in East Lombok Regency 25%, Central Lombok Regency 21%, West Lombok Regency 13%, Bima Regency 10%, Sumbawa Regency 9%, Mataram City 8%, North Lombok Regency 5%, Dompu Regency 4%, Bima City 3%, and West Sumbawa Regency 3%. All voters are distributed at 15,988 polling stations (TPS).³

The total number of election organizers from the ranks of the KPU and Bawaslu of NTB Province is 136,570 people with a distribution of 3,654 people from the KPU of NTB Province and Regencies/Cities, 348 people from the District Election Committee (PPK), 3,411 people from the Voting Committee (PPS), 111,916 people from the Voting Organizing Group (KPPS), and 15,989 people from the ranks of voter data update officers (KPU NTB Province 2019). The ranks of the NTB Provincial Bawaslu are 340 people, 369 members of the sub-district supervisory committee (Panwascam), and 723 members of the village supervisory committee. The number of election organizers who serve in the ranks of Bawaslu from the

³ Sekretariat KPU Provinsi NTB, 2019



provincial to village levels is 1,432 people (Bawaslu of NTB Province, 2019).

The heavy burden of election administration caused the 2019 election to sacrifice many organizers. The General Election Commission of the Republic of Indonesia (KPU RI) released that 894 KPPS officers died and 5,175 became ill.⁴ NTB Province also showed the number of officers who died as many as 6 people.⁵

The complexity of election governance and the challenge of presenting the quality of democracy have been realized by lawmakers, shown by the provision of two ways of holding elections regulated in Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections, namely article 448 which explains that to hold elections requires community participation through the role of stakeholders. The provisions of this article show that lawmakers intend to connect election organizing organizations with election stakeholders.

Public administration science provides a theoretical basis to explain the relationship between public organizations and stakeholders through collaborative governance theory and has been widely researched. The results show that the application of collaborative governance theory has developed rapidly by identifying the helix model. Until now, helix models have developed from triple-helix, quadruple-helix, and penta-helix to hexa-helix.

⁴ See: Reflections on the 2019 Election. KPU: The Committee's Workload Is Too Heavy, <https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2020/>

⁵ See the number of election officials who died in NTB to six people, <https://mataram.antaranews.com/berita>



The triple-helix model focuses on the collaboration of three stakeholder actors, namely universities, industry, and government (Wang, 2014). The quadruple-helix model adds one actor: the community (McAdam and Debackere, 2017; Carayannis, et.al., 2012). The penta-helix model adds one more actor, namely the mass media (Warsono, et.al: 2019; Yuniningsih: 2019; Yunas: 2019; and Halibas, et.al:2017; and Ariwibowo, et.al., 2018). Finally, the hexa-helix model adds actors to the affected group (Rachim, et.al, 2020).

None of the above studies have specifically examined the practice of collaborative electoral governance in election management. In fact, this concept has been practised in election policy in Indonesia. To fill this gap, the question is what is the collaborative electoral governance practice model in managing elections? In uncovering this question, this study uses a governance paradigm.

Governance is the sixth paradigm in public administration that has developed since the 1990s. The essence of his thinking states that the purpose of exercising power by power holders is to realize the welfare of the community. Because the goal is large, public administration requires management that involves various actors as stakeholders (Henry, 2007; and Ikeanyibe, et. al, 2019).

Stakeholders are interpreted as parties from within or outside the organization who are interested in the organisation's performance so that good governance is created.⁶ Grimbille and

⁶ See Nur Hidayat Sardini in the Role of the Civil Sector in Continuing the Election Reform Agenda/Regional Elections, virtual discussion in the context of the change of Perludem management, Thursday, August 20, 2020,



Wellard (1997) identified three categories of stakeholders in public policy, as follows:

Primary stakeholders, namely stakeholder groups that have a direct interest in the policy. Because of their immediate importance, they must be placed as a determinant in the policy-making process;

Supporting (secondary) stakeholders, namely stakeholders who do not have a direct interest in the policy, but they have a concern to voice and advocate for the interests of the community;

Key stakeholders, namely a group of stakeholders who have legal authority in policy-making and institutions responsible for policy.

LPP stakeholders in the management of elections are defined as individuals or organizations with interests, influence, influence, or contribute to the policies and operational work of LPP. There are two groups of LPP stakeholders, namely primary and secondary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders are actors directly interested in LPP policies, including political parties, candidates, and voters. Meanwhile, secondary stakeholders are actors who only have a looser relationship with LPP policies, including the business world, NGOs, and mass media (Wall et al., 2016).

In achieving the goals of public administration collaboratively with stakeholders, governance offers the concept of collaborative governance (Ikeanyibe, et.al. 2017). Collaborative governance is “in which one or more public bodies involve multi-stakeholder non-public organizations in public policy, implemented in a formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative manner” (Ansell and Gash, 2007). Ansell and Gash further explain the contingency



model that encourages or hinders the collaboration process with four dimensions as follows;

Initial condition

Initial conditions are conditions that describe the conditions before or at the time of collaboration, including three variables: (1) there is an imbalance in influence, resources, and knowledge of actors; (2) there are clear incentives in collaboration; and (3) there is a fear that occurs when collaboration is carried out.

Institutional design

It is the involvement of actors as stakeholders who are equipped with the availability of basic rules to support collaboration;

Participatory leadership

Actors can bring all parties to the negotiating table or negotiations in collaborating and being able to prevent problems that arise in the collaboration process;

Collaboration process

A serious problem often faced in collaboration is about where the implementation of collaboration begins. Ansell and Gash (2007) identified the collaboration process through five stages:

Face-to-face dialogue

Dialogue between actors as stakeholders is an initial process to produce a common agreement (consensus). Another purpose of face-to-face dialogue is to identify opportunities with a mutually beneficial narrative among stakeholders if collaboration can be built

Building trust

Building mutual trust among actors as stakeholders cannot be separated from dialogue. Collaboration will be effective if mutual



trust has been built between actors. However, the process of building trust is a long process. It requires a high level of commitment, so building trust can be carried out while implementing collaboration.

Commitment in the collaboration process

Commitment among actors as stakeholders will be driven by high interdependence conditions and a strong commitment to collaboration. Ansell and Gash emphasized that collaboration is not a one-time deal but a sustainable and mutually beneficial cooperation activity.

Shared understanding


Through dialogue, mutual trust, and mutual commitment, actors as stakeholders are expected to have the same understanding of what will be achieved in collaboration activities. Common understanding can be in the form of clarity of common goals, understanding of the definition of problems faced together, and values to be achieved in collaborating.

Intermediate results

Usually, collaboration will continue if each actor as a stakeholder obtains results and benefits from the collaboration. Interim results or intermediate outcomes can be a driver to give birth to strong trust and commitment from actors to continue collaborating (see Figure).

Figure 1
Collaborative Governance *Contingency Model* Ansell and Gash (2007)





Source: Ansell and Gash (2007)

B. Method

This study employs a qualitative research design with a case study approach (Creswell, 2014). The rationale for this choice is that the research focuses on a specific case, namely the implementation of the 2019 election in NTB Province. The research sites are the offices of the NTB Provincial KPU and the NTB Provincial Bawaslu. These sites were selected because both agencies serve as regional election authorities, with responsibilities and authority over election management.

Data collection techniques include in-depth interviews, document analysis, webinars, and observations. In-depth interviews are conducted face-to-face, with informants providing a list of questions to review beforehand and through phone calls and WhatsApp chats. Document analysis focuses on materials related to the implementation and supervision of the 2019 Election, obtained



from the KPU and Bawaslu offices in NTB Province and from district and city levels.

The validity test of the data is carried out through the triangulation technique or confirmation of findings in testing the validity of the data (Creswell, 2018). The triangulation technique uses theoretical and data triangulation, with the following stages; (a) comparing the data of the interview results with documents; (b) comparing the statements of one informant with another; (c) comparing a person's situation and perspective with various opinions and views of others, such as the opinions of election organizers, experts, governments, theories, and other researchers (Bungin, 2014).

Data analysis is carried out with an inductive-qualitative approach, which tries to abstract the field findings data that have been collected and grouped to get conclusions. The reason for choosing this approach is because theory in qualitative research is used as the final point of the research process (Creswell, 2014).

C. Result and Discussion

The stakeholders in managing the 2019 General Election in NTB Province included the following actors: LPP, government, the business sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mass media, universities, and political parties. This mapping builds upon the previous model of collaborative governance implementation (Zakaria et al., 2019; Poison et al., 2020). The seven actors identified in this study are referred to as the hepta-helix model, with the roles and components of each actor presented in the table below.

Table 1



Hepta-Helix Model of Stakeholders in 2019 Election Management in NTB Province

No.	Actor	Sub-Actors	Role
1.	LPP	1. Ranks of the NTB Provincial KPU 2. Ranks of the NTB Provincial Bawaslu	The KPU ranks as the main administrators of the Election and the Bawaslu ranks as the quality controllers of election governance
2.	Government	1. Din Dukcapil; 2. Kesbangpoldagri; 3. Transportation Office; 4. Pamong Praja Police; 5. Regional General Hospital and Public Health Service Center; 6. Ranks of POLDA NTB Province	1. Providing aggregate population data per sub-district; 2. Providing data on potential voters (DP4); 3. Providing data on Citizens residing abroad; 4. Supporting political education; 5. Supporting the socialization of the election stages; 6. Supporting the security of the implementation of the election stages; 7. Providing employees of the LPP Secretariat; 8. Physical and spiritual health checks of DPRD candidates; 9. Facilitation of campaign venues/locations; 10. APK Control; 11. Supervision of campaign broadcasting; 12. Facilitation of storage and security of election logistics
3.	Business World	1. Local Business World in NTB Province;	1. Production of election logistics, including: ballot boxes, voting



		2. National Business World	booths, ballot papers, covers, voting tools and voting mats, voting ATK; 2. Distribution of election logistics; 3. Support socialization and voter education.
4.	NGO	1. Religious Organizations; 2. Women's Community 3. Disability Community; 4. Indonesian Democracy Network (JaDI) NTB; 5. Indigenous Communities	1. Election Socialization 2. Voter education 3. Advocacy for people's political rights; 4. Election Monitoring
5.	Medium Mass	1. TV9 2. BimaTV 3. RRI Mataram 4. TVRI NTB 5. Global FM 6. Lombok Media 7. Lombok Post 8. Voice of NTB 9. TVLombok	1. Information on the implementation of the election stages; 2. Political education; 3. Election Advertisements; 4. Campaign ads; 5. Information on the vision, mission and profile of political parties and candidates
6.	College	1. University of Mataram 2. Mataram State Islamic University 3. University of Muhammadiyah Mataram 4. Mandalika University	1. Providing consultation and guidance on technical regulations for the implementation of elections; 2. Research on the implementation of elections; 3. Election Socialization; 4. Political Education; 5. Providing an LPP Selection Team



7.	Political party	Political Participating 2019 Election	Parties in the	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political education; 2. Political communication; 3. Examining, proposing improvements, approving or rejecting permanent voter lists; 4. Recruitment of prospective members of the DPRD; 5. Carry out campaigns; 6. Providing witnesses to voting, counting and recapitulation of votes
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Source: processed, 2022

The table above explains the *hepta-helix model* of stakeholders in the practice of collaborative management of the 2019 General Election in NTB Province with actors and sub-actors, as well as the role of each actor as follows:

a. LPP

LPP is an institution with a special task of regulating and organizing the election process in a country (Olaniyi, 2017). The role of LPP is responsible for organizing and controlling the implementation of the election stages. In the implementation of the 2019 Election, the ranks of the NTB Provincial KPU are functionally the main administrators of the Elections; their authority is to organize the implementation of the Election stages. Meanwhile, the ranks of the NTB Provincial Bawaslu control the implementation of



each stage to ensure that the election runs in accordance with the law.

b. Government.

The government in a broad sense is all state organs detailed in the 1945 Constitution which includes 5 (five) powers: (a) legislative power, namely the power to form laws, is exercised by the DPR; (b) executive power, i.e. the power to carry out state legislation, is exercised by the President assisted by the Vice President and ministers; (c) consultative power, which is the power to give state consideration to the government carried out by the Supreme Advisory Council which has been abolished in the amendment of the 1945 Constitution of 2004; (d) the power to conduct an audit of the management and responsibility of state finances, exercised by the State Financial Audit Board; and (e) judicial power, which is the power to carry out the judiciary to enforce the law and the judiciary. (Kansil and Kansil, 2008:57).

In the implementation of the 2019 General Election in NTB Province, government actors involved in the collaboration include: (1) the Civil Registration Office; (2) Kesbangpoldagri; (3) Transportation Office; (4) Pamong Praja Police; (5) Regional General Hospitals and Public Health Service Centers; and (6) Ranks of POLDA NTB Province



The role of the government in the management of the election is quite dominant, including: (1) providing aggregate population data per sub-district; (2) providing data on potential voters (DP4); (3) providing data on Citizens residing abroad; (4) supporting political education; (5) supporting the socialization of the election stages; (6) supporting the security of the implementation of the election stages; (7) providing employees of the LPP Secretariat; (8) physical and spiritual health examination of DPRD candidates; (9) facilitation of campaign venues/locations; (10) control of campaign props; (11) supervision of campaign broadcasting; (12) facilitation of storage and security of election logistics.

c. The business world.

The business world is a business actor involved in the administration of government. Business actors in the 2019 election in NTB Province include the local business world in NTB Province and the national business world. The role of the business world includes; (1) the production of election logistics, such as: ballot boxes, voting booths, ballot papers, covers, voting tools and voting mats, office stationery for voting needs; (2) distribution of election logistics; and (3) supporting voter socialization and education.

d. *Non Government Organization* (NGO).



Various terms are used to describe this actor. In public administration, it is defined as a non-governmental organization or civil society, which is an organization established by individuals or groups voluntarily in providing public services without the aim of obtaining financial benefits from their activities (Astuti, at.el., 2020:98). Another explanation states that NGOs are organizations formed by independent groups (Gaffar, 1999:200).

In the implementation of the 2019 Election in NTB Province, NGO actors consist of; (1) religious organizations; (2) women's community; (3) the community of people with disabilities; (3) the Indonesian Democracy Network (JaDI) NTB; and (4) indigenous communities. NGOs have three roles; (1) election socialization; (2) voter education; and (3) advocacy for people's political rights.

e. Mass Media

The study of public administration expands the meaning of mass media in the practice of *collaborative governance* as all media, both electronic and print media, and other media such as social media that play a role in conveying information to the public (Astuti, at.el., 2020:97). In the implementation of the 2019 Election in NTB Province, the media involved include TV9, BimaTV, RRI Matara, TVRI NTB, Global FM, Lombok Media, Lombok Post, Suara NTB, and TVLombok. The role of the media in supporting the management of the



election includes; (1) information on the implementation of the election stages; (2) political education; (3) election advertisements; (4) campaign advertising; (5) information on the vision, mission and profile of political parties and candidates

f. College.

College is an institution that plays a role in providing experts or expertise that can be contributed to sustainable public policy (Yuniningsih, et.al, 2019). In the implementation of the 2019 Election in NTB Province, the actors collaborating with LPP are including; (1) University of Mataram; (2) Mataram State Islamic University; (3) University of Muhammadiyah Mataram and University of Mandalika. The role of universities in supporting the management of the Election are: (1) providing consultation and guidance on technical regulations for the implementation of the Election; (2) research on the implementation of elections; (3) election socialization; (4) political education; and (5) providing a selection team for the formation of an election organizing body.

g. Political parties

A political party is an autonomous group of citizens whose purpose is to compete in the election by proposing several candidates. The goal is to gain power in government positions or control the government's course (Katz and



Crotty, 2014). In implementing the 2019 Election in NTB Province, political party actors who collaborate with LPP are all political parties participating in the election. The role of political parties in supporting the management of the election includes (1) political education; (2) political communication; (3) examining, proposing improvements, approving or rejecting the permanent voter list; (4) recruitment of prospective members of the DPRD; (5) carry out campaigns; and (6) providing witnesses to voting, counting and recapitulation of votes

The explanation above shows that the management of the 2019 Election in NTB Province has implemented *the collaborative electoral governance* method of the *hepta-helix model*. The weakness is that LPP has not mapped actors as *election stakeholders*, causing collaboration in election management to be unsustainable. Referring to the thinking of Grimble and Wellard (1997), the mapping of actors as election *stakeholders* is formulated as follows:

a. Key Stakeholders

This study identifies the actors who enter as the main stakeholders, namely political parties, along with the candidates submitted. These actors are referred to as the main stakeholders because they are directly interested in the policies issued by the LPP. All decisions from the LPP in the



management of the election directly impact political parties and candidates.

b. *Key stakeholders* ;

Actors who are included in the category of *key stakeholders* of the Grimble and Wellard model are LPP and the government. The reason is that these two actors have legal authority in policy-making or institutions responsible for policies. Population data used by LPP as a basis for verifying the requirements for election participants, determining the allocation of seats in each constituency, and a number of candidate administrative requirements, such as diplomas, health certificates, certificates of good behaviour, and others, are issued by the government.

c. *Stakeholder seconds*;

They are actors consisting of NGOs, mass media, universities, and the business world. These actors are called *secondary stakeholders* because they do not have a direct interest in the election management. Still, they have a concern about voicing and advocating for the community's interests in each stage of the election process.

The practice of *collaborative electoral governance* in the management of elections differs from *collaborative governance* in general. The principle of LPP independence in decision-making should not be interfered with by the political power of actors as *stakeholders*. The goal is to maintain the consistency of



article 22E of the 1945 Constitution which states that elections are held by a national, permanent, and independent general election commission. The principle of independence in these provisions is interpreted that in decision-making the LPP should not be intervened by any political force.

By paying attention to the above principles, functionally the role of LPP in election management is election *management*, while the role of election *stakeholders* is to support LPP in the implementation of election management (*election management support*). Thus, in the concept of *collaborative electoral governance*, the relationship between LPP and other *stakeholders* is a coordinated relationship.

D. Conclusion

The management of the 2019 Election in NTB Province practices the collaborative electoral governance method with the hepta-helix model, namely governance through the involvement of election stakeholders, including seven actors: Election organizing institutions, the government, the business world, NGOs, mass media, universities, and political parties. In this collaboration, election organizing institutions and political parties are the primary stakeholders.

Election organizing institutions are primary stakeholders because they play a role in policy-making and are responsible for the management of elections. The reason for political parties as primary stakeholders is that these actors are those who are directly affected by the policies of the election organizing institutions. Government



actors are key stakeholders, because these actors have legal authority in providing population data, facilitating the work of election organizing institutions and election participants, the business world, NGOs, and universities are secondary stakeholders because their function is to provide support for election management.

The theoretical implication of this article is that the collaborative electoral governance model is found to complement the previous theory of collaborative governance which only focuses on the process (Anssel and Gash, 2007). The collaborative governance model will only be sustainable in the management of elections if it is preceded by the mapping of collaborative actors into three categories, namely primary, key, and secondary stakeholders (Grimble and Wellard (1997). The findings of this study also complement the previous election stakeholder theory which only divided election stakeholders into two groups, namely primary and secondary stakeholders, and did not include universities as actors in the category of election stakeholders (Wall, et.al., 2016). This study's findings show that universities' role is very important in supporting election management.

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CONCEPTS AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF POWER IN ISLAMIC POLITICS

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Abstract

The hijrah of the Prophet Muhammad SAW to Medina marked the birth of the initial concept of the Islamic political order by forming a plural Medina society based on the values of justice, sovereignty, and shura. This research discusses the relationship between religion and the state in Islam, which is theoretically formulated in three main paradigms: integralistic, symbiotic, and secularistic. In addition, this article examines the basic principles of Islamic rule, such as Allah's absolute sovereignty, justice, and community participation through deliberation. The research also explores the concept of power division in Islam, which includes the legislative, executive, and judiciary, as well as the typology of power between the organic approach that unites religion and the state and the secular approach that separates them. The conclusion highlights the relevance of the Medina Charter as a reference for Islamic political principles, although it does not explicitly describe the ideals of the Islamic political order. This study identifies contemporary challenges in applying Islamic political principles amid increasingly complex global social dynamics.

Keywords :

Islamic Politics, Islamic Politics, Power, Shura, Medina Charter, Division of Power

A. Introduction



The Prophet Muhammad's journey to Medina serves as a catalyst for future advancements in Islamic practice. The Prophet has successfully created a brotherhood between the Ansar, the indigenous people of Medina, and the Muhajirin, immigrants from Makkah, in a comparatively short time. He established a mosque in Medina, negotiated agreements with non-Muslims, and established the new community's political, social, and economic framework. This is a remarkable occurrence that historians from the past and today have documented.¹

Some modern Muslim scholars refer to the Muslim community that the Prophet was able to establish at Medina as a city state. The nation-state thereafter came into being with the help of tribes that had converted to Islam across the Arabian Peninsula. It is a truth that Islam is a religion that encompasses the fundamental principles of life, including politics and the state, even though it did not specify from the outset the shape and idea of the ideal state. During his time in Medina, the Prophet occupied a position as a state's leader, and the Prophet was trusted as the leader. Therefore, he could be referred to as the head of state. However, he did not gain this position as a direct order from revelation. There is no direct instruction from revelation directing him to construct a power structure or state. After noticing the absence of passages that specifically require Muhammad SAW to build a government, Ali Abd al-Raziq, a scholar of al-Azhar at the beginning of the twentieth century, contended that the construction of a government was not included in the assignment revealed by God to the Prophet Muhammad.²

The political position is mandated to the Prophet besides of his moral height also because he basically always maintains the four qualities he has, namely sidiq (honesty or having integrity or integrity), amanah (upholding the mandated responsibility or accountability), tabligh (upholding openness or transparency) and fathanah (having intelligence and ability or capability). The Prophet accepted the position based on his ijtihad at that time.

Recognizing that his position as a head of state or political leader will unavoidably force him to take decisive action, he feels

¹W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad Prophet and Statesman*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 223-224.

²see, Ali Abd al-Raziq, *Caliphate and Government in Islam*, Bandung, Pustaka, 1985.



compelled to reach a shared agreement, which will later be employed as a rule of the game in governing the state or government. The Madinah mitsaq, or Medina constitution, refers to the game's regulations, which are essentially social contracts. The Medina Constitution is essentially a collaborative agreement formed by parties in society to build a reasonable political order without discrimination of ethnicity, race, class, or religion.³

The Prophet Muhammad SAW then guided the Medina populace by using the charter or constitution as a guide. The Prophet Muhammad SAW had no trouble integrating his role as a religious and moral leader with the community's mandate to hold political office thanks to Medina's constitution.⁴

However, what the Prophet accomplished at Medina was not as a head of state, but as a Prophet who gave divine treatises, therefore his primary job was to encourage the rules to be enforced. However, the Prophet's appearance in this posture has political ramifications because it has transformed those living in the Arabian Peninsula into the shade of Prophet Muhammad SAW. This means that, whereas the tribe was formerly utilized as the basis for political unity, the people are now the basis. When the Prophet was trusted to lead the people, general principles were developed to serve as the foundation for the construction of a new state and its laws (qawanin). As a result, the Prophet's rule is somewhat religious in nature. This administration depends on the people's belief that the Prophet's rules or actions are directed by revelation from Allah and based on His directives. As a result, the development of religious relationships that replace tribal bonds serves as the foundation for this administration. This is what motivates certain tribes to submit and join under one banner. Aside from that, the Prophet's hands carry political governance traits such as leading the troops, resolving disputes, and withdrawing property. Furthermore, in resolving difficulties that are

³ According to Watt's analysis, the Prophet Muhammad was not only a Prophet but he was also a head of state. For more details, see W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad Prophet and Statesman* stating that Muhammad SAW was not only a prophet but also a head of state (statesman)

⁴ Munawir Syazali said that the Medina Charter, which is claimed by many political experts to be the first constitution of an Islamic state and used as a reference for the formation of an Islamic state and even as a basis in Islamic politics. Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam and State Administration*, Jakarta. UI Press, 1990, pp.15-16



not addressed by revelation, the position of the Prophet, such as the shaykhul of the clan, will deliberate and seek the opinions of the figures of Muhajirin and Ansar.⁵

Political issues, especially conceptions of the state and government, have caused long discussions and controversies among Muslim thinkers and raised quite sharp differences of opinion. The differences not only stop at the theoretical and conceptual level but also enter the realm of practical politics so that they often bring contradictions and divisions among Muslims.⁶ This paper examines the relationship between religion, politics and power in Islam. How is the relationship between religion and the state in Islam, the basis and principles of Islamic politics, the relationship between power and religion and the division of power according to Islamic political thinkers.

B. Method

This study uses a qualitative method with a case study approach. The focus is on the practice of election governance through a collaboration model between election organizing institutions and stakeholders in NTB Province in the 2019 election. The theoretical framework used is the governance paradigm and collaborative governance theory, which are relevant to explain the process of involvement of various actors in election management.

The research data was obtained through in-depth interviews, observations, and document studies related to the election management process in NTB. The analysis was carried out with a thematic approach to identify and understand the patterns of collaboration applied and the obstacles faced. The results of this study are expected to provide practical recommendations for developing a more effective election governance model in the future.

⁵ Nurrohman, Islamic Politics between Mind and Reality in *Al-Qurba Journal*, 2 (1):14-30, 2011, p. 21

⁶Said Agil Husin al-Munawar, "Fiqh Siyasah in the Context of Change Towards Civil Society", *Journal of Social and Religious Sciences*, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1999, p. 17.



C. Result and Discussion

The Relationship Between Religion and State in Islam

Broadly speaking, Islamic political theorists formulate theories about the relationship between religion and the state and distinguish them into three paradigms, namely the Integralist Paradigm, the Symbiotic Paradigm, and the Secularistic Paradigm.⁷ First, the integralist Paradigm. This paradigm explains that religion and the state are integrated, the state is a political and religious institution at the same time, politics or the state is in the territory of religion. Because religion and the state are integrated, this results in people not being able to distinguish between state rules and religious rules, therefore people who obey all state provisions and regulations in this paradigm are considered obedient to religion, and vice versa. Because the people cannot control the ruler who always takes refuge behind religion, authoritarianism and arbitrariness by the ruler are, of course very potential to occur in a country with this model. The head of state is the "incarnation" of God who entrusts absolute submission without any other alternative. In the name of "God", the ruler can do anything and stir up the people's resistance.⁸ In a nutshell, it can be said that the core theological foundation of this first paradigm is the belief in the holistic nature of Islam. This religious premise is seen as an indication that Islam provides complete teachings on all aspects of life. In fact, this particular point of view is the main basis for understanding that Islam does not recognize the separation between religion and the state, between the transcendental and the profane.⁹

Second, the Symbiotic Paradigm. This paradigm is of the view that religion and the state are related in a mutualistic way, that is, they are mutually related and mutually beneficial. In this regard, religion needs the state. Because, through the state, religion can

⁷ Marzuki Wahid & Rumaidi, "*Fiqh Madzhab Negara*" *Criticism of the Politics of Islamic Law in Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2001), p. 2. Compare to

⁸ In Islamic terminology, this is known as *din wa dawlah*. For more details, see Din Syamsuddin, The Search for the Concept of the State in the History of Islamic Political Thought, in the *Ulumul Qur'an Journal*, Number 2, Vol. IV, 1992, pp. 4-7.

⁹ See Masykuri Abdillah, *Democracy at the Crossroads of Meaning*, p. 57. Compare with Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam and State Administration*, p. 1



multiply well. Religious laws can also be enforced through state power. And vice versa, the State needs the presence of religion, because only with religion can a country walk in the ethics-moral radiation.¹⁰

Third, the Secularistic Paradigm. This paradigm separates religion over the state and separates the state from religion. With this understanding, it will indirectly explain that this paradigm rejects the previous two paradigms. In the context of Islam, this paradigm rejects the basis of the state to Islam, or at least rejects the determination of Islam in a certain form of state.¹¹

However, at present, the thinking about Islamic politics regarding government, at least narrowed down into three major groups. First, the conservative group. They argue that Islam is a perfect entity, all its people only have to practice consequentially and responsibly, whenever and wherever they are. The system of government and politics outlined by Islam is nothing but the system that has been implemented by the Prophet Muhammad SAW and the four al-Khulafā' your-rasyidīn. This group is specifically divided into two schools, namely traditionalism and fundamentalism. The traditionalists are those who still want to maintain the tradition of the government in the style of the Prophet and the four caliphs, and the central figure of this circle is Muhammad Rashid Ridha. Fundamentalists are those who want to reform the social system, the system of government and the state in order to return to the concept of Islam in total and reject other concepts, and Abu al-A'la al-Maududi is one of the main figures. Second, the Modernist Group. This group views that Islam regulates worldly affairs (including government and state) only at the level of values and basics and technically the ummah can take other systems that are considered valuable and useful. Among the leaders of this group are Muhammad Abduh, Muhammad Husain Haikal and Muhammad Asad. Third, secular groups. Which separates Islam from government affairs, because they believe that Islam does not regulate worldly affairs including government and state. The most famous and vocal figure of this school is Ali 'Abd ar-Raziq.¹²

¹⁰ Marzuki Wahid & Rumadi, *Fiqh Madzhab...* p. 24-26

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹² Masykuri Abdilah, *The Idea and Tradition of Statehood in Islam: A Perspective on History and Modern Democracy*, Tashwirul Afkar, No. 7, Th. 2000, p. 103.



Principles and Foundations of Power in Islamic Politics

As for the basic issues and principles of Islamic politics, contemporary Islamic thinkers have formulated several principles and foundations of Islamic politics. What is meant by the basic principles in this description are the basics or principles of fundamental truth, the guidance of moral rules contained in the teachings that are used as the basis for human thinking, action, and behavior in managing a country. Al-Maududi, Jamal al-Banna, Abdul Qadir Audah, M. Husein Haikal, Yusuf Musa, Abdul Rahman Abdul Kadir Kurdi, Mohamed S. Elwa put forward several Islamic political principles and policies, including:

First, sovereignty, namely power, is a mandate. Absolute and legal sovereignty belongs to Allah. This belief is the only starting point of political philosophy in Islam. Absolute sovereignty in Jamal al-Banna's view is known as the terminology of faith, according to him, faith is the first and main basic principle of Islam for the management of society and state.¹³ The same opinion was also conveyed by Husain Haikal, with a different term, namely monotheism¹⁴.

Second, the principle of justice. One of the characteristics of Islamic life and Muslim society is the upholding of justice. Justice is a fundamental human value and a pillar for various aspects of life, both individual, family, and community life. Justice is giving something to every member of society according to his rights that must be obtained without being asked; is not biased, or impartial to one party; Know the rights and obligations and understand what is right and wrong, act honestly and appropriately according to the applicable regulations. This justice cannot be realized if no system or institution enforces it. The justice in question is economic justice and justice in law, justice in determining policies, and justice in child protection.¹⁵

¹³Jamal al-Banna, *al-Ushul al-Fiqriyah Lid-Daulah, al-Islamiyah*. (Cairo: Dār Thabā'ah al-Hadītsah, 1979), p. 9

¹⁴Musdah Mulia, *Islamic State; Husain Haikal's Political Thoughts*. (Jakarta: Paramadina.: 2001), p. 65

¹⁵Hendra Meygautama, "Legislation of Islamic Law Through the Shura Mechanism", *ISLAMIA, Islamic Thought and Civilization Magazine*, Vol II No. II. 2009, p. 110. Compare with Muhammad Alim, *The Principles of the Modern State of Law*. (Jogyakarta: LKIS, 2010), p. 316.



When a country is able to create justice, it will be able to create an ideal country without oppression and exploitation, so that the people feel noble and honored.

Third, *shura* and *ijma'*, namely making decisions in all community affairs are carried out through consensus and consultation with all parties, namely the people through fair, honest, and trustworthy elections. *Syuro* is a deliberative system used by the Prophet in every decision-making process regarding public affairs. Outside of the matter of revelation from Allah swt, the Prophet Muhammad is known to have never made any decision except through deliberation with fellow companions. In fact, for important matters and concerns the interests of the people and the wider community, the Prophet always invites friendly figures from the tribes, tribes, or groups concerned to be invited to deliberate.

Why is consultation considered so important in the Islamic social system? The conceptual reason is clear, because Islam strongly emphasizes the position of every human being as an autonomous person, each person is given the title of 'caliph' of Allah on earth. Different from the meaning of 'caliph of the apostles', 'caliph of Allah' is the concept of all mankind who is seen as a caliph or a substitute for God to cultivate and manage life on earth. With the same status as the caliph of God, every human being is autonomous, equal and egalitarian. Therefore, in the decision-making process for the same interests, all people must be treated equally (equal treatment), there should be no discrimination based on race and ethnicity. In fact, discrimination is also prohibited on The basis of gender differences and differences in religious beliefs.¹⁶

Third, all citizens are guaranteed certain basic rights. Some of the rights of citizens that need to be protected are: guarantees of personal security, self-esteem and property, freedom to express opinions and assembly, the right to fair legal services without discrimination, the right to proper education, medical and health services, and security to carry out economic activities.¹⁷

Fourth, the rights of the state. All citizens, even those who are in opposition or who disagree with the government, must submit to

¹⁶ Jimly Asshiddiqie, *Islam and Constitutional State Traditions, Paper*, Delivered as a Keynote Speech in the Indonesia-Malaysia Seminar organized by UIN/IAIN Padang, October 7, 2010, p. 18

¹⁷For more details see Subhi Mahmassani, *Arkan Huquq al-Insan*, (Haiderabad: Darl al-Maktabah, 1986).



the authority of the state, that is, to the laws and regulations of the state.

Fifth, special rights and restrictions for non-Muslim citizens have the same civil rights. Because the country at that time was an ideological state, decision-making figures who had positions of leadership and authority (*ulu al-amr*), they must be able to uphold the sharia. In the history of Islamic politics, the principles and constitutional framework of government like this are revealed in the Constitution of Medina or the "Charter of Medina" during the era of the Prophet's leadership in Medina, which protects a pluralistic society.

Sixth, decisive efforts and consensus. Differences of opinion are resolved based on the decision of the majority vote that must be obeyed by the whole society. This principle of making decisions according to the majority vote is very important to achieve common goals.

Seventh, the term *shari'iyah* is a combination of the two words *Ash-Shar'u* and *Ash-Shari'ah* which is one of the main principles of the Islamic state. According to Jamal al-Banna, *Shari'iyah* includes several things: First, the law or law that is enacted is not based on a personal will, ruler, arbitrary will of the judiciary, or only benefits one group of people. Laws issued must be based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet that are authentic or that contain or are in line with the values of both. Second, in Islamic law, a law is not only inspired by the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the prophet, but also based on the reality and principles of justice as Allah says in the books revealed to His messengers. History records that these books are the most valuable manuals for human life. Third, *Syar'iyah* is the highest law in a society. The application of the law is applied to the entire society without indiscriminate or favoritism to anyone, even to a prophet who is commanded to carry out the law as set by Allah SWT.¹⁸

These political principles manifested in the State of Medina period during the Prophet's leadership. In the Medina Charter, an agreement was formed to establish the equality of rights and obligations of all communities in socio-political life. The content of this charter describes the relationship between Islam and the constitution and laws laid down by the Prophet, to organize the

¹⁸Hasan Al-Banna, *Al-Ushul...* p. 56



socio-political life of the people of Medina. By knowing and learning about Islamic politics, where all the principles contained have been implemented by the Prophet SAW, then we should also follow the flow of Islamic political principles so that all state political problems in the era of globalization do not become chaotic and can be carried out properly.¹⁹

The Division of Power in the Islamic Perspective

From the results of Zainuddin Maliki's research, religion with the symbols it was born is often taken by power holders as a source of legitimacy.²⁰ According to him, the level of spread and ability of religion to give meaning and significance to the life of the profane world becomes transcendently meaningful, causing religion to have such a high level of legitimacy effectiveness and can be managed as an effective political resource.²¹

Therefore, in a constitutional practice, it is not uncommon for power to be concentrated in one hand, so that there is a management of the government system that is carried out absolutely or authoritarily, for example, such as in the form of a monarchy where power is in the hands of a king. Moreover, if the power is colored by a theocratic understanding that uses the principle of God's sovereignty, then the King's power is more absolute and undeniable as has been etched in the history of ancient Egyptian, Greek and Roman civilizations, Chinese civilizations, India, and European civilizations.²² So to avoid this, it is necessary to have a division / separation of power, so that there is control and balance among the institutions that hold power.

The principle of separation/division of power is a principle of resistance that relies on the democratic system of government. This principle views the need to provide guarantees of freedom/al-hurriyah and to abolish dictatorship and arbitrariness/al-istibdad. That is, this principle gives state power to several different and

¹⁹Efrinaldi, *Fiqh Siyasah Basics of Islamic Political Thought*, (Jakarta: Granada Press, 2007).

²⁰ For more details on the types of rulers, see Miriam Budiarjo, *Fundamentals of Political Science*, (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1981), pp. 8-9.

²¹ Zainuddin Maliki, *Agama Priyayi, Makna Agama di tangan Elit Penguasa*, (Jogjakarta: Pustaka Marwa, 2004) h. 3.

²²M. Hasbi Amiruddin, *The Concept of the Islamic State According to Fazlurrahman*, (Jogjakarta: UII Press, 2006) p. 35-42



independent institutions without concentrating power on one hand or institution.

An Islamic political thinker in contemporary times who contributed a lot of thought in the study of judicial power is Abul A'la al-Maududi, according to him three institutions or legislative bodies exercise state power,²³ executive²⁴ and judicial, with the provision that the judicial body or judicial institution is completely outside the executive institution which means independent, objective and professional, because the judge's duty is to carry out God's laws over His servants, not on behalf of or on behalf of the head of state (executive).²⁵

In court hearings, according to Maududi, the position of the head of state is as high as other people and it cannot be justified to give a dispensation to someone not to attend a court hearing just because of his position in the government or in society. From this, it is clear that the principle of equality among the law is really applied by Maududi where the executive power and the judicial power are the same, including if the executive apparatus violates the law, then the process of applying the law is the same in the eyes of the law. The judge as the executor of the judicial power is free and independent without the intervention of any party so that law enforcement can run without selective and indiscriminate logging.²⁶

Furthermore, Maududi also emphatically explained that in Islam, the judiciary must be completely free from the executive body. The task of a judge in Maududi's view is to implement and impose the sharia of Allah among His servants. He did not occupy the office of the court as deputy caliph or amir (leader), but as a representative of

²³There are several things that distinguish between executive power in Islam and the executive council in a democratic system, especially in Indonesia, namely: The legislative structure consists of Majlis al Syuri al Islami (legislative council), Majlis al-Fuqaha (jurisprudence council), and Majlis al-Khubara (Professional Council), for more details about the types of legislation in Islam see Abdulrahman Abdul Kadir Kurdi, *Islamic Social Order Studies Based on the Qur'an and Hadith*, (Jogjakarta: Pustaka Siswa, 2000), p. 153

²⁴For the role and function of the executive body in Islam, see Abdul Kadir Kurdi, *ibid.* p. 173-183.

²⁵Abul A'la al-Maududi, *Political Theory of Islam*, (Lahore 1939), h.60.

²⁶*Ibid*



Allah Almighty. The position of a judge here is very clear that the figure of a judge according to Maududi is not only an executor of judicial power that is free, independent and professional, but more than that, the judge has the full right to carry out the law of Allah against the caliph. The law in question is not only a law codified in the form of a law, but more than that, it is a law that is sourced from the Quran and Hadith.²⁷

From Maududi's view, there seems to be an irregularity in looking at the concept of judicial power. Maududi, whom we know, is very thick with Islamic thought, because of his background that he grew up in a devout Islamic environment, and the guidance he received throughout his life, so that the character of an anti-Western Abul A'la al-Maududi was formed. Maududi was very persistent in fighting for Islamic sharia so that his opinion on judicial power was really clear and detailed. The law that is enforced is Islamic law that is sourced from nash. The judge is the representative of Allah who carries out the law of nash.

However, the author observes that Maududi's concept of state power carried out by the executive, legislative and judiciary is a Trias Politica concept that basically comes from the West, which Maududi strongly rejects. Actually, in both the teachings and the history of Islam, there is no idea of Trias Politica, Maududi promises a complete Islamic political system without having to look at the Western system. However, when it comes to the issue of the division of state power, he still adheres to the Western system with the concept of Trias Politica. He has not provided an alternative concept that is truly sourced from nash.

In addition to Ibn Taymiyah who represented Islamic political thinkers in the classical and medieval eras, and Abul Ala al-Maududi who emerged as contemporary Islamic thinkers, the author will now present contemporary Islamic thinkers as a complement to previous thinkers. Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf is an expert in Islamic law at the law faculty of Cairo University in Egypt, so far we know Prof. Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf as an expert in the field of Islamic law, especially the study of ushul al-Fiqh (the basics of Islamic law) and nothing else. However, it is unique there, it turns out that Prof. Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf also observes many issues of Islamic constitutional law and political currents. This can be seen in his book entitled Al-Siyasah al-

²⁷Ibid h. 61



Syar'iyah, he discusses the basics of politics and government from an Islamic perspective. His discussion in the book is related to efforts to implement Islamic sharia principles and the ummah's benefit. This means that to carry out these two aspects in terms of siyasah syar'iyah requires the existence of an institution as an instrument for its implementation, namely the government.²⁸

According to Khallaf, the division of power is an inevitability, as a consequence of a constitutional government that is based on deliberation. The authority of the head of state comes from the people and there is the responsibility of the head of state. Furthermore, Khallaf emphasized that state power can be delegated to, the power to make laws (al-sulthat at-tasyri'iyat), the power of the judiciary or judicial power (al-sulthat al-qadhaiyat), and the power to implement laws (al-sulthat al-tanfiziyyat), each term can be identified with the term's legislative, executive and judicial powers.²⁹

From the three ideas of the experts mentioned above, the concept of judicial power in Islamic political thought is more relevant to Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf's thought. The reason is, Ibn Taymiyah and Abul A'la al-Maududi both argue that state power is divided into three aspects, executive, legislative, and judicial power, which is in line with Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf's opinion. However, in the application of the law carried out by a judge as the executor of the judiciary, Ibn Taymiyah did not specifically explain, only limited to the application of criminal law and muamalah law, while Abul A'la al-Maududi was more daring to state that the application of law should not be indiscriminate and selective, the principle of equality before the law must be upheld without exception. The law he was referring to was the law of Allah which came from nash. However, Maududi's argument was refuted by his anti-Western work, and fanaticism on

²⁸Compare with Alimuddin, *Judicial Power in Islamic Political Thought*, paper, p. 10

²⁹John Locke, during the parliamentary administration, proposed that the power in the country be divided among the organs of the state that had different functions. According to him, in order for the government not to be arbitrary, there must be a division of the holders of powers into three types of powers, namely Legislative Power, Executive Power, and Federal Power. John Locke's opinion is the basis for the emergence of the theory of the division of power as an initial idea to avoid the concentration of power (absolute) in a country.



Islamic law, while his opinion about Trias Politica was very contrary to his actions.

Observing the two opinions of Islamic political thinkers, it seems that Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf's thinking is easier to accept and understand, although Khallaf does not elaborate on the concept of the division of power within the state, but the term he offers is in line with the concept of Trias Politica. Khallaf does not necessarily make the Qur'an and hadith the main reference for the perpetrators of judicial power, namely judges. However, Khallaf also made a wise offer that *ijtihad* is still wide open and a source of law for the ruler, as long as it does not conflict with the *nash* and the interests of the people.

Typology of Power in Islam

Discussions about the management of power or politics in relation to religion (religio-political power) have been widely discussed especially after the Middle Ages. Broadly speaking, at least at present, the concept of power management is divided into two typologies, namely the typology of organic concepts and the typology of secular concepts.³⁰

The typology of organic religious power, are those who claim the need for the unification of religion and power because the reach of religion covers all aspects of life, while the typology of secular religious power, they tend to claim the need for separation between religion and power, among others, for the purpose of maintaining religious perfection and purity.³¹

In the typology of organic power, the ruler on behalf of the state provides support and accommodation to the interests of religious groups. The ruler included religious figures, both as representatives of the interests of religious groups and as an advisory body to the state. In Islamic studies, the discourse on the relationship between religion and power raises the claim that there is no separation between religion and politics so that power is not just a representation, but a presentation of religion itself. Sayyid Qutb and al Maududi are key figures in this type of typology.³²

³⁰Zainuddin Maliki, *Agama Priyayi...* p. 29-35

³¹ *ibid*

³² *ibid*



The claim that there is no relationship between religion and politics in Islam is rooted in the tradition of scripturalistic, idealistic, and formalistic thinking in understanding religious texts. Scripturalistic thinking emphasizes more on the textual meaning of religion. In understanding power in Islam, this group tends to depart from the assumption of ascending of power, that is, the legitimacy of the ruler must come from God, and thus the ruler is nothing but a representation of His power which later gave rise to what is known as theocratic government.³³

Meanwhile, the variant of idealistic thinking tends to idealize the government system by offering ideal Islamic values. Usually, this type of variant has a philosophical and ahistorical pattern. Idealists in understanding the political administration of government tend to reject the existing state format, and are not in accordance with the ideal government according to them. Meanwhile, the formalistic variant prioritizes the form (body) rather than the content (mind). In terms of the administration of government, the state is seen as a symbol of religion, so it is necessary to have Islamic politics by forming an Islamic state or Islamic party.³⁴

Meanwhile, in the management of secular power, the ruler will not take the form of religious symbols in public life. Likewise, a ruler will not feel obligated to accommodate the interests and demands of religious groups. Instead, the ruler will formulate a number of rules, ranging from flexible to restrictive.³⁵

The claim of separation of religion and politics in Islam is rooted in a tradition of rationalistic, realistic, and substantialistic religious understanding. For adherents of rationalistic understanding, they tend to display the interpretation of the source

³³ According to Philip K. Hitti, Medina for the first time in history formed a society that made religion not blood as the basis. On the top of this country stands God. The Prophet Mohammed was God's representative and the supreme ruler of the earth's surface. In addition to his apostolic duties, the Prophet Muhammad had the same world power as an ordinary head of state. From Medina, the Islamic theocracy spread throughout Arabia and then covered most of West Asia and North Africa, for more details see Philip K. Hitti, *History of The Arabs*, (London, Macmilan Press, 1964), pp. 120-121.

³⁴Ibid. 31, Compare with what stated by Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State of Transformation of Islamic Political Thought and Practice in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), pp. 15-16.

³⁵Zainuddin Maliki, Agama Priyayi.. 34



of religious teachings rationally and contextually, so that it gives birth to a different understanding from the adherents of an organic understanding of political verses. According to them, there is no obligation for Muslims to build an Islamic state or government, but the spiritualistic, ethical, and moral values that Islam commands should be a priority. This rationalistic thinking uses the assumption of ascending of power, namely the legitimacy of power originating from the people.³⁶

This claim of religious separation also comes from a tradition of realistic understanding that tends to legitimize existing power or make corrections through giving moral message signals in the ongoing statehood format. Meanwhile, the type of substantive thought tradition prioritizes content rather than form, which in the administration of power prioritizes the development of ideas, ethics, and religious values rather than the formalization of religious teachings.³⁷

The difference in views is caused by socio-historical and socio-cultural factors, namely the difference in the historical and socio-cultural background of Muslims, as well as due to theological factors, namely the absence of firm information about the state and government in the Qur'an and hadith. In addition, due to the difference in their perception of the essence of the concept of state and government.

D. Conclusion

According to some opinions, the Medina Charter is the embryo of the emergence of the basic concept of politics in Islam, which is used as a reference by some Islamic communities afterwards about how the state, leadership, and ideal management of power according to Islam. But on the other hand, Medina's charter does not reflect the true ideal of Islamic politics because it is only an agreement between the Prophet and the plural population of Medina at that time. Therefore, various interpretations have emerged about the concept of the state, politics, power, and the relationship between the three.

³⁶Ibid, p. 34

³⁷Ibid, p. 35



For the relationship between religion and politics, for example, in general, Islamic political theorists formulate theories about the relationship between religion and the state and distinguish them into three paradigms: the Integralistic Paradigm, the Symbiotic Paradigm, and the Secularistic Paradigm. Integralistic Paradigm. Arguing that religion and the state are integrated, the state is a political and religious institution, and at the same time, politics or the state exists in the territory of religion. The Symbiotic paradigm believes that religion and the state are mutualistic; that is, there is a mutual and mutually beneficial relationship. A Secularistic paradigm that separates religion over the state and separates the state from religion.

As for the basic issues and principles of Islamic politics, contemporary Islamic thinkers have formulated several principles and foundations of Islamic politics. The basic principles in Islamic politics include sovereignty, justice, shuro, equality of rights and obligations, state rights, rights of non-Muslim citizens, and so on. Likewise, the division and separation of power are one of the principles that aims to guarantee freedom/al-Hurriyat and abolish dictatorship and arbitrariness/al-stepdad, and equality in various things for all citizens, both Muslims and non-Muslims.

The management of power or politics in relation to religion (religiopolitical power) has been carried out by many classical and contemporary Islamic politicians, especially after the Middle Ages. From their various opinions, power management can be grouped into several typologies, including the Typology of organic religious power and the typology of secular religious power. The typology of organic religious power is those who claim the need for the unification of religion and power because the reach of religion covers all aspects of life, while the typology of secular religious power, they tend to claim the need for the separation between religion and power, among other things, for the purpose of maintaining religious perfection and purity

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TAN MALAKA: THE CONCEPT OF 100% INDEPENDENCE IN PERFECTING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

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Abstract

This study examines Tan Malaka's idea of 100% independence as an effort to perfect Indonesian independence in the context of history and politics after the proclamation of August 17, 1945. As one of Indonesia's revolutionary figures, Tan Malaka argued that the independence declared in 1945 had not achieved the true meaning of complete freedom. He criticized independence, enjoyed only by a handful of elites and intellectuals, while the people were still marginalized from the welfare promised by independence. In his work "Towards the Republic of Indonesia," Tan Malaka emphasized the importance of true independence, where all Indonesian people, without exception, felt the results of the struggle. According to Tan Malaka, 100% independence is freedom that is not only free from physical colonization but also from economic and political dependence on foreign parties. Rejection of diplomacy that is considered detrimental, the struggle through the Madilog concept, and the development of the Murbaism ideology became the main pillars of Tan Malaka's strategy to achieve complete independence. This study focuses on the analysis of Tan Malaka's thoughts that are relevant to the current conditions of Indonesia, which despite being formally independent, still faces various forms of internal "colonization" such as corruption, injustice, and dependence on foreign powers. Using qualitative-descriptive methods, this study aims to explore more deeply the concept of 100% independence promoted by Tan Malaka and its relevance in efforts to build Indonesia as a truly independent, just, and prosperous country for all its people.

Keywords: Indonesia, 100% Independence, Tan Malaka

A. Introduction

On August 17, 1945 is a happy date for all Indonesian people, where the independence was realized by the Indonesian people, the moment of the proclamation was represented by the figure of the



national hero as well as the first president and vice-president of the Indonesian nation, namely Soekarno-Hatta in proclaiming the proclamation of independence of the Indonesian nation, the independence was held in Pegangsaan Timur No. 56 on Friday 17 August 1945 at 10.30 AM Java time and in the proclamation coincided with the holy month of Ramadan. Indonesia has been imprisoned for a long time in the colonialism of European nations such as Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands who in the record colonized Indonesia for 350 years, then entered colonization from Asia such as Japan which colonized Indonesia for approximately 3.5 years. The long journey of the Indonesian nation in achieving independence is indeed an unforgettable history, many great heroes and fighters are not written in textbooks. However, they participated in defending the homeland for independence over the colonizers who controlled Indonesia.¹

Indonesia gained independence in 1945, there are many moments recorded in history regarding Indonesian independence, struggling and fighting against colonialists Indonesia has been an independent country since 1945 until today 2024. The 1945 Constitution, which is the guideline for the Indonesian nation, explains that Indonesia prohibits all forms of colonialism. Knowing how bad a colonialism is, Indonesia society gaining the independency with all efforts and methods. But the question today is, does Indonesia fully independent until now?, does Indonesia really 100% independent country in 2024? of course this question has been questioned by the national hero of our nation, namely Datuk Tan Malaka, who is known as the Father of the Republic of Indonesia because he himself was the first to introduce Indonesia on the world stage as a country with the "Republic" system. It is stated in his book

¹ Bahar, S., Indonesia, I. P. P. K., Negara, I. S., Preparation, I. B. P. U. U., & Indonesia, K. Minutes of the Inquiry Agency for the Preparatory Efforts for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI), Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (PPKI), May 29, 1945-August 19, 1945. (1995). p. 87



entitled "Towards Republic of Indonesia" which was published in 1925.²

Tan Malaka explained how Indonesia must be 100% independent, in the true sense of independence. It is no longer Independence for only one group or elite, but the true sense of 100% Independence is independency for all Indonesian society. Since Indonesia is a country with republic system, so in any form of atmosphere, any policy, and in any condition, Indonesia holds the guideline that Indonesia belongs to all Indonesian society, so in any aspect regarding Indonesia, the involvement of all Indonesian society must be the principle, basis and also the goals.

In this 100% independence from Tan Malaka's perspective, we can get a broader view of how the Indonesian nation should achieve complete independence. In Tan Malaka's view, independence is not just obtained by the elite, moneyed people, or the powerful one. Independence must be owned to all citizens in Indonesia, from Sabang to Merauke, proclaiming independence in Tan Malaka's view means not tolerating colonialism in any form. Resistance, intolerance to colonialism, choosing Independence or death is the most likely path to 100% independence, So, from this background, the author is interested in studying more deeply how Tan Malaka reads the independence of the Indonesian nation, as well as his big concept of 100% Independence that must be realized by the Indonesian people for Independence, as well as this concept according to Tan Malaka is the way to realize the perfection of the Indonesian state to become a republic Indonesia.

B. Method

This study uses a qualitative method with a library research approach to analyze Tan Malaka's idea of 100% independence as expressed in his book "*Naar de Republiek Indonesia*." Data was collected through literature searches that included Tan Malaka's works, including books, articles, and relevant historical records, as

² Rinardi, H. Proclamation of August 17, 1945: The Political Revolution of the Indonesian Nation. *Journal of the History of Citra Lekha*, 2(2), (2017). p. 142



well as writings from researchers and historians that discussed Tan Malaka's thoughts. The analysis was carried out using descriptive-analytical techniques, where the data that had been collected was analyzed in depth to explore the concept of independence carried out by Tan Malaka and its relevance to the current conditions of Indonesia. This approach allows researchers to understand the historical and philosophical context of Tan Malaka's ideas, as well as evaluate the implementation and challenges faced in achieving 100% independence in Indonesia.

C. Result and Discussion

Biography Of Tan Malaka

Tan Malaka, was born with the name Ibrahim and title Datuk SuTan Malaka on June 2, 1897 in Nagari Pandam Gadang, Gunuang Omeh, Lima Pulu Kota, West Sumatra. Tan Malaka was an Indonesian teacher, philosopher, and freedom fighter. Coming from a noble family, Tan Malaka was educated in Dutch schools, but later became interested in revolution and socialism. In the Netherlands, he studied the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, which influenced his views on the struggle against colonialism. Upon his return to Indonesia, he was actively involved in the resistance movement and was known as one of the founders of the Murba Party, a political party that aimed to fight for Indonesia's full independence.³

During his youth, Tan Malaka was greatly influenced by the socio-economic conditions of indigenous communities in the Dutch East Indies. He saw the stark inequality between the capitalists and the workers, as well as the suffering of the coolies in the plantations of East Sumatra. This experience prompted him to write and fight for a more just social change. He also established schools that aimed to educate the younger generation in the spirit of nationalism and resistance to colonialism. In addition, his involvement with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) led him to a more radical

³ Tohis, R. A. *Progressive Islam: A Social Study of Tan Malaka's Islamic Thought*. Ethics International Press.(2024). Hlm 1-2



struggle, although he later took an independent path in the struggle for independence.⁴

Tan Malaka spent much of his time in exile, both in Europe and Asia, where he continued to write and strategize for Indonesian independence. His most famous work, "*Naar de Republiek Indonesia*", became his manifesto for the independence of Indonesia and gave him the nickname "Father of the Republic of Indonesia" by Muhammad Yamin. After the proclamation of independency, Tan Malaka returned to Indonesia and was involved in various battles and political discussions. However, his often-different views from other Indonesian leaders left him marginalized. In the end, he was executed on February 21, 1949, but his legacy of struggle lives on in Indonesian history as one of the most influential national figures.⁵

THE INDEPENDENCE IN TAN MALAKA'S VIEW

Tan Malaka is a figure who has extraordinary ideas; he chose an unusual way of life to proclaim Indonesian independence. Tan Malaka's version of independence also has its own version compared to his contemporaries, he chose to fight for Indonesia's independence in full, without diplomatic considerations. Tan Malaka aspires to complete independence, the independence in which there is no longer foreign involvement in it. Tan Malaka aspires to full independence, where all Indonesian territories belong wholly to Indonesia. Tan Malaka fights for 100% independence, where there is no longer one group or elite that is independent, but the independence of all Indonesian people is completely elected.

⁴ Pramasto, A. (2019). ANALYSIS OF TAN MALAKA'S" NORTHERN INDONESIA" IDEA ON PHILIPPINE NATION HISTORY. *Santhet (Jurnal Sejarah Pendidikan Dan Humaniora)*, 3(1), (2019). Hlm 36

⁵ Sirait, K., Pardosi, F. P., Manullang, V., & Sirait, R. (2023). History of Tan Malaka's Political Thought on Independence and the Concept of the Indonesian State. *Journal Transformation of Mandalika*, 4(6), (2023). Shifts pp. 329-330



According to Tan Malaka, the 100% Independency is true independence for the Indonesian nation.⁶ Although on August 17, 1945 independence was proclaimed, according to Tan Malaka the independence in 1945 was an independence felt only by the elite, the moneyed and the powerful people only. Meanwhile, the Indonesian people do not fully feel the independence. The 1945 independence belonged to the rich and powerful, so Tan Malaka wanted 100% independence for all Indonesian people. In Tan Malaka's meeting with Soekarno, Hatta, Agus Salim on January 24, 1946, he expressed his disappointment to the figure about Indonesia's independence, he said;

*"To you friends, do you know why I am not interested in the independence you have created. I feel that independence is not designed for the common good. Your freedom is governed by a handful of people, not creating a great revolution. Today I come to you, O Sukarno, my friend. I must say that we are Independent, because Independence must be 100 percent, today I see that independence belongs only to the elite, who suddenly become bourjoists, joy becomes amtenar, independence belongs only to you, not to the people. We are on a wrong journey about the meaning of Merdeka. If you do not immediately fix it, then until when this nation will not be independent, only its leaders will experience independence, because independence is just and prosperous. Listen to my resistance, because if you continue to behave like this, then this is the last day I come as a friend and brother. Tomorrow, is the day when I will become your enemy, because I will continue to fight for 100 percent independence."*⁷

Tan Malaka viewed that Indonesia's independence from the beginning was not designed for 100% independence, so he was the one who fought for the 100% independence to be realized, even though he had to be an enemy of his own friends, becoming an

⁶ Crawford, O. .*The political thought of Tan Malaka* (Doctoral dissertation). (2019). Hlm 30

⁷ Subekti, Dimas. *Combing Indonesia's Abnormal Period*. (Deepublish, 2021). p. 112



opposition in the Indonesian government (Soekarno-Hatta). According to Tan Malaka, this concept of independence can be felt by any circle, both the people, rulers, and elites who are busy collecting money. Of course, this independence is also expected by all Indonesian people, because they are no longer colonized by other nations or by their own nation.

Tan Malaka sees the independence as the same as sovereignty, where the meaning of sovereignty itself is the highest power. Indonesia is a nation that gives the highest power or sovereignty in the hands of the people, so the purpose of the existence and essence of Indonesian independence is for the Indonesian people. According to Tan Malaka, Independence as sovereignty must contain two types of power rights of every citizen without exception, namely the right of birth and the right of mind. The right to birth includes necessities for life, food, clothing, house, and cell phones. Meanwhile, inner rights include the right to assemble, power, expression, and human rights (HAM). Both types of rights belong to every citizen, 100% independence is how sovereignty is the same as power as well as the content of power including the right to birth and mind must belong to all Indonesian people.⁸

Independence contains peace because all citizens are fulfilled with their rights as an independent citizen, so that the independent life has an impact on prosperity and peace. However, if 100% Independence is not pursued or implemented, then the rights of citizens do not run, thus having an impact on un prosperity and chaos in a country, so that a big impact occurs, namely the threat to the independence of a nation. Does Indonesia today own 100% independent, or is it the other way around, Indonesia is threatened with independence because independence belongs to the elite alone? Of course, looking at the real conditions today, independence only belong to a group, social inequality is visible in front of our eyes by seeing the rich are getting richer, and the poor are getting poorer.

⁸ Setiawan, A., Subaryana, S., & Lestari, S. N. (2023). Ideological Evolution: The Influence of Tan Malaka on Indonesian Politics, 1921-1949. *Heritage: Journal of History and Cultural Heritage*, 4(3), (2023). Page 140



The Indonesian people only understand about independence, but they are not really independent in practice. Capitalists and oligarchs are flocking the power and collecting money, they are busy with their own affairs and then the detriment many people. As can be seen today, our officials in Indonesia are not busy taking care of their people, but are busy dividing the power pie, and preserving KKN (Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism). Crime seems to be unstoppable committed by our officials, they take refuge behind power and property. The law is like a game for them, because Indonesian law can be bought with the power they have. They are being corrupt, killing the people, making policy order, our government today is busy for their world and their own independence. As a result, Indonesia's independence until 2024 is only independence as said by Tan Malaka to the proclamatory, called as the independence for the elite, independence for the rich and powerful.

The concept of 100% Independence from Tan Malaka needs to be revitalized, because this concept is an alternative way of prosperity for the Indonesian nation, as well as realizing justice, unity, togetherness, and prosperity for all Indonesian people. The concept of 100% independence must come from the consciousness of every Indonesian people, must become an independent people, no longer colonized by foreigners and buyers of laws that only benefit themselves. 100% independence must be sought, until this moment must be pursued endlessly. The Republic of Indonesia is a complete speech in Tan Malaka's book, as well as the book is Tan Malaka's dream which until now has been realized in his speech, but not with the daily life of the Indonesian people. Ironically, 100% independence of the Indonesian nation has not happened up until today. If in the past, colonialism was carried out by foreign countries, now it is different and more ironic, colonization is carried out by the Indonesian people themselves who are greedy for power, thirsty for praise and interests.



HOW TAN MALAKA MEANS 100% INDEPENDENCE

100% independence is the dream of Tan Malaka is still a story of books and thoughts. 100% independence is how independence is felt by all Indonesian people, this type of independence according to Tan Malaka is the true truth of the independence of the Indonesian nation. 100% independence is no longer tied to foreign colonizers or colonization carried out by Indonesian citizens themselves, but independence that is both brothers, even though they are different, still have the same goal of building, liberating and prospering the Indonesian nation.

At that time, Tan Malaka was striving and consistent to achieve 100% Indonesian independence involving various strategies and thoughts aimed at freeing the nation from the clutches of the colonizers, the real efforts made by Tan Malaka included;⁹

a. Rejection of all forms of diplomacy

One of the approaches taken is the rejection of diplomacy strategies that are considered ineffective. Diplomacy is often seen as a way to sacrifice too much of the nation's interests. Critics of this approach to diplomacy argue that when dealing with invaders, such as facing a thief, they should not be discussed, but should be expelled, even, if it necessary, it can take action by force. However, this approach is not free from risks. Violent evictions can trigger fierce resistance from the colonizers, which can ultimately cost many Indonesian lives. This is a dilemma faced by freedom fighters: choosing between fighting by violence or finding a middle ground through diplomacy. There is one quote that is a slap for the Indonesian people in prioritizing diplomacy in independence, like *"if a thief enters your house, expel him, if you need to hit him. Don't invite discussions"*

⁹ Philosophy study of fahrudin faiz. "Merdeka 100% Tan then". On August 15, 2024



b. The struggle of epistemology through the concept of MADILOG

In the context of intellectual struggle, the concept of MADILOG (Materialism, Dialectics, and Logic) introduced by Tan Malaka became an important foundation in developing knowledge that was independent from colonial myths and dogmas. Madilog emphasized the importance of reading social reality with a materialist and logical approach, avoiding the mystical views that were often used by colonizers to maintain their power. Tan Malaka encouraged the Indonesian people to fight against the colonization of knowledge with a critical and logical way of thinking, freeing themselves from the shackles of irrational thinking. Through this epistemological approach, the people are expected to be able to understand their social conditions more deeply and find a way out of colonialism, not only physically but also mentally.

c. The struggle through Murbaism

Murbaisms, or the ideology of the common people introduced by Tan Malaka, is more than just a form of social resistance. This is a political concept that emphasizes deliberation and participation of all levels of society in the struggle for independence. In Tan Malaka's view, the struggle for independence must involve all people, regardless of social or religious class. Murbaism emphasizes the importance of social solidarity and cooperation between various groups in society, including combining socialist values with belief in God. This shows that the struggle for independence is not only about overthrowing the colonizers, but also about building a just and equal society, where each individual has a role and voice in determining the direction of the nation.

D. Union of struggle (1946)

The United Struggle, formed in 1946, strengthened the concept of 100% independence that Tan Malaka fought for. In this United Struggle, Tan Malaka and his colleagues introduced a "minimum program" which included demands to



form a people's government, ensure full independence, and build a people's army that came from the people. The program also called for the organization of European prisoners, the disarmament of Japan, and the confiscation of enemy property as concrete steps to strengthen Indonesia's position in the face of the colonizers. Unity of Struggle is a forum to unite various elements of society that are different, but have the same goal, namely full independence for Indonesia.

E. Political Economic Guerrilla Strategy

The guerrilla political and economic strategy compiled in the Gerpolek brochure by Tan Malaka was also an important part of the struggle for independence. This brochure highlights the losses caused by failed diplomacy and divides Indonesia's period of struggle into two: a period of glory due to fighting and a period of setbacks due to diplomacy. In this context, political and economic guerrilla is intended as a strategy to defend independence by utilizing economic and political power more effectively, as well as avoiding mistakes made in diplomacy. Tan Malaka taught that to achieve true independence, the Indonesian people must continue to resist and not depend on negotiations that can reduce their sovereignty.

Tan Malaka in the idea of 100% Independence is a way for Indonesia to become an independent country, no longer confined and fully bound by other countries. Indonesia is an independent country, it is not easy to become an independent country, but Indonesia has a wealth of natural and human resources. So, in very consciously, Indonesia was built with the cooperation of all Indonesian people, flocking to create a 100% Independent Indonesia. Continue to try, learn, not be afraid of failure, build Indonesia with the Indonesian people themselves to become downstream to upstream actors. 100%



independence from the perspective of Tan Malaka brings Indonesia into prosperity, peace and welfare.¹⁰

The meaning of the Republic of Indonesia is also manifested if Indonesia dares to try to become a 100% independent country. Indonesia is wealth country in everything, so if the Indonesian people and the government are able to work together, they will be free from the shackles of colonialism both mentally and physically. So, Indonesia can build itself, become an independent country, try to build and learn from various mistakes. Indonesia must wake up, if any foreign country enters and dredges Indonesia's wealth under the guise of cooperation, at least in Tan Malaka's view, it will certainly expel them. Foreign countries know the wealth of Indonesia, so they try to cooperate then wanting to control Indonesia because they know the abundant resources of Indonesia.

In fact, Indonesia becomes the world's economic center if it is able to manage its existing resources well. Indeed, 100% independence does not mean anti-cooperation with other countries, or anti-foreign investors and becoming an introverted country. Rather, 100% Independence for the Indonesian state is Independence for all Indonesian people, then it is not fully dependent on other parties or countries in building the Indonesian nation. Even if other nations or foreign investors enter Indonesia, then we ourselves as the host limit them to guests. It does not provide opportunities for them to enter and exit freely as well as invest and cooperate.

Tan Malaka explained, that we as a country that strives for independence 100% strive for a place where we study, we provide opportunities for foreign parties to enter solely for learning space with the aim of increasing Indonesian human resources. We ourselves as an independent country give their limits to cooperate, because as an independent country we have the right to our own household, not the will of foreigners to enjoy the wealth of our country.

¹⁰ Malacca, T. Naar de'Republiek Indonesia" Towards the Republic of Indonesia. *Jakarta: Yayasan Massa.*(1987). p. 28



Indonesia has a lot of resources which require machines and human resources to manage. Here Tan Malaka's idea explains that a country that is still new to independence and has minimal in everything but aims to be 100% independent is not prestigious to learn, the people and the government must work together to make machines or buy machines for the purposes of independent management. we do need to sacrifice a little thing for something big, by not having the prestige of learning from foreigners and buying their machines with the note that there are restrictions on foreigners to enter Indonesia, is the way and way to realize 100% independence. In Tan Malaka's own hypothesis, foreign parties could have turned in the direction of loving Indonesia and being loyal to Indonesia for various reasons. There is an advantage for the Indonesian nation itself, if foreign parties choose to be loyal to Indonesia, and participate in building Indonesia to become 100% independent, then justice, prosperity, peace will be easy to realize.

"What is the measure of all is: the Indonesian people should not be threatened by their independence and prosperity. The guest nation remains safe and prosperous, over time with a path that is suitable for Indonesian laws and customs, the guest nation melts into Indonesian people who are obedient and loyal to the people's state and Indonesian laws" ¹¹

Meanwhile, when the state is able to accommodate everything to manage resources independently, then that is where Indonesia no longer needs foreign parties in the service and goods cooperation sector, but the path that must be chosen is to become an independent country by focusing on economic independence. The state no longer needs foreign services, but the state chooses the Indonesian people themselves to manage. And foreign countries, only given less and less space to cooperate with Indonesia.

100% independence is a country that is no longer a slave to other countries, but it becomes an independent country with wealth that is well managed by the Indonesian people, and fully felt by the Indonesian people themselves. This kind of independence in Tan

¹¹ Ibid p. 34



Malaka's view is Indonesia's way of feeling how rich Indonesia is, and how important Indonesia is in the eyes of the world when Indonesia is able to be 100% independent. There is no tolerance in an independence, Merdeka is the meaning of freedom for all Indonesian people without exception. Then, they built Indonesia themselves slowly. It takes a long time to build Indonesia and its people, there will be no more social gaps if Indonesia is truly 100% independent, because both the people and the government work together to live in pairs.¹²

The meaning of the Republic Indonesia is really inherent and become the nickname of Indonesia. 100% Independence by Tan Malaka brings Indonesia to the goal of prosperity, there is no more hunger, poverty, unemployment, crime and other negative news broadcast massively. Indonesia will be an example or role model for other countries, because independency has been achieved, all Indonesian people has been carried out the independency and all elements work together to build Indonesia into the main axis of other countries in various sectors of life.

100% independency indicates that sovereignty is in the hands of the people, people have the highest power in deciding everything. Laws are made by the people themselves based on the will of the people through their representatives, laws are made purely for the benefit of the Indonesian people, there are no more rules of order made for the benefit of a few people. Awareness is built by the Indonesian people who are truly 100% independent, growing into a country with capable and wise people and leaders. Tan Malaka's dream of 100% Independency is also the dream of almost all Indonesian people, a positive impact that is so real and a happy ending is Tan Malaka's big idea for the Indonesian nation.

D. Conclusion

In Tan Malaka's view, true independency for Indonesia is independence that is 100% felt by all its people, not just by a handful

¹² Ibid pp. 36–38



of elites or certain groups. Although the proclamation of independence had been made on August 17, 1945, Tan Malaka saw that the independence was still not fully independent because of the dominance of the interests of a few elite groups who tended to ignore the welfare of the people. Therefore, Tan Malaka strongly criticized the independence that was only enjoyed by intellectuals and power holders, without paying attention to the basic needs and rights of all Indonesian people.

Tan Malacca championed the concept of "100% independence" where Indonesia must become a truly independent country, both from foreign influences and from internal domination by certain groups. He emphasized the importance of sovereignty that involves all people in various aspects of state life, including in the rights of birth and mind. Through various strategies, such as the rejection of diplomacy with the colonizers, the intellectual struggle with the concept of MADILOG, and the development of the ideology of Murbais, Tan Malaka strives to realize true and equitable independence. However, to this day, Tan Malaka's ideals of 100% independence are still a major challenge for Indonesia, which still struggles to face social inequality and the domination of power by a handful of elites.

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THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

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Abstract

This study examines the influence of social movements on the international legal process in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The focus is on the role of the Boycott as a social movement, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) in mobilizing global support and influencing legal decisions through advocacy and public pressure. This study shows that social movements are important in shaping public opinion and driving social change. The use of social media by the BDS movement is explained as an effective mobilization tool in disseminating information and organizing solidarity actions. A case study related to the opinion of the ICJ adviser on Israel's separation wall illustrates how international pressure from social movements can affect legal proceedings. The findings of this study provide new insights into the dynamics of the interaction between social advocacy and legal decisions, as well as their implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and international law. This research contributes to understanding the important role of social movements in influencing international legal decisions and offers more effective strategies to support human rights and justice.

Keywords: Social Movement, International Law, Israel-Palestine.



A. Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most complex and protracted conflicts in the world, involving various aspects ranging from history, politics, religion, to human rights. Since the beginning of the 20th century, with the rise of Zionism and Arabism movements, this conflict has gone through various significant phases. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 followed by the Arab-Israeli war that led to a massive exodus of the Palestinian population, it has deepened hostilities and prolonged the dispute to this day. In 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem after the Six-Day War, which later became the centre of a variety of fundamental legal and human rights issues.¹

The core problem in this conflict is Israel's policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The case has been taken to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), seeking an assessment of the legal consequences of the action. This shows how international law is an important arena in resolving this conflict. However, behind this complicated legal process, there is a significant force that influences the course of legal decisions, which called

¹ Public Relations UM Source, 'Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: History, Root Problems, and Resolution Efforts', *UM West Sumatra*, 2023 <<https://umsb.ac.id/berita/index/1295-konflik-palestina-israel-sejarah-akar-masalah-dan-upaya-penyelesaian>>.



social movements. Social movements play an important role in mobilizing international support and influencing legal decisions through public pressure and advocacy.²

Social movements have an important role in shaping public opinion and influencing public opinion and influencing social change at various levels through campaigns, protests, and other actions. Social movements are able to mobilize the masses and strengthen their voices in influencing the international legal process. Public opinion at home and abroad plays an important role in supporting and opposing social movements.³ talking about social movements with the aim of forming public opinion, in this case social movements that have been studied previously which discuss the influence of solidarity in encouraging social movements during the Covid-19 pandemic.⁴

Social movements, such as Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS), launched in 2005 by a group of Palestinian

² VOA Public Relations, 'International Court of Justice: Israel's Occupation of the Palestinian Territories is Illegal,' *VOA Indonesia*, 2024 <<https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/mahkamah-internasional-pendudukan-israel-di-wilayah-palestina-ilegal/7705944.html>>.

³ Shafira Elnanda Yasmine, 'Arab Spring: Islam in the Social Movement and Democracy of the Middle East', *Society, Culture and Politics*, 28.2 (2016), 106 <<https://doi.org/10.20473/mkp.v28i22015.106-113>>.

⁴ Anggi Nicolin and others, 'Resistance and Solidarity: The Influence of Solidarity in Driving Social Movements During the COVID-19 Pandemic', *Journal of International Relations: Cakra Studi Global STRategis*, 14.2 (2021), 317–32 <<https://e-journal.unair.ac.id/JHI/article/view/32338>>.



activists, have called for an international boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel until the basic rights of Palestinians are respected. The movement has gained global support and raised awareness about the situation in Palestine, as well as pressuring governments and institutions to take concrete action. By using social media, platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, BDS activists have succeeded in disseminating information, organizing campaigns, and mobilizing global support, making the Palestinian issue a trending topic and attracting international media attention.⁵

This study aims to explore how social movements, particularly BDS, affect international legal processes in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This study will analyze the dynamic interaction between social movements and international law, as well as how social movements can mobilize public opinion and pressure legal institutions to act. The case brought to the ICJ highlights various aspects of the law, including human rights violations, illegal occupation, and racial discrimination. The ICJ was asked to provide a legal

⁵ Yusufe, 'Boycott, Divestment & Sanctions (BDS) Movement', *Palestine Solidarity Compaign*, 2024 <<https://palestinecampaign.org/campaigns/bds-2/>>.



opinion on whether Israel's actions violate international law, including the Geneva Conventions and UN Resolutions.⁶

This social movement occurs both in Indonesia and abroad, in which case the "Block Out 2024" movement that went viral on social media is a new strategy in the struggle against Israel in Gaza. Launched in response to the intensification of the conflict, the movement invites the international community to turn off electricity for one hour at a specified time as a form of solidarity with the people of Gaza who are often experiencing power outages due to the Israeli blockade. This initiative not only serves as a symbolic action to raise global awareness, but also to pressure Israel to end the human rights-violating blockade in Gaza.⁷

In addition, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) has issued an irsyadat directing Muslims to boycott ten brands affiliated with Israel whose products have been declared halal. This step was taken as a form of solidarity with the Palestinian people's cause and to pressure Israel to stop its actions that

⁶ Himmatul Ulya and Kilau Riksaning Ayu, 'Digital Social Movement; Boycott-Divestment-Sanctions (BDS) on Israeli-Palestinian Issues on Social Media', *Proceedings of the National Seminar of FISIP UNNES*, 2024, 1 <<https://proceeding.unnes.ac.id/psnf/article/view/3063/2526>>.

⁷ CNBC Indonesia, 'Viral "Block Out 2024" Movement, New Weapon Against Israel in Gaza', *CNBC Indonesia*, 2024 <<https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20240514131411-4-537950/viral-gerakan-block-out-2024-senjata-baru-lawan-israel-di-gaza>>.



violate human rights.⁸ The list of affiliated brands is a guide for Muslims in Indonesia to be selective in their daily product consumption, in the hope of having a significant economic and political impact.⁹

Departing from the word social movement, the movement does not only occur in Indonesia but other social movements also occur around the world.

The theoretical basis of this study will be supported by several relevant previous studies. First, research by Smith (2018) shows how social movements can influence international legal decisions through mass mobilization and public pressure. Second, the analysis by Johnson (2019) highlights the role of social media in spreading advocacy and building international solidarity. Third, research by Brown (2020) examines the effectiveness of BDS campaigns in raising global awareness of the Palestinian issue and influencing international policy.

In Smith's (2018) study, it was found that social movements have the capacity to influence legal decisions by

⁸ Kaslam, *Global Solidarity: Humanitarian Movement for Palestine in Indonesia*, *Ushuluddin Journal*, 2024, xxvi <<https://journal.uin-alauddin.ac.id/index.php/alfikr/article/view/45592>>.

⁹ MPU Admin, 'A total of 10 halal Israeli affiliated brands are boycotted according to the MUI Ordinance, here's the list', *Aceh Ulema Consultative Assembly*, 2024 <<https://mpu.acehprov.go.id/berita/kategori/berita/total-ada-10-merek-terafiliasi-israel-yang-halal-diboikot-sesuai-irsyadat-mui-ini-daftarnya>>.



utilizing mass mobilization and public pressure. Social movements can direct attention to certain issues that then pressure legal entities to act. For example, in the case of the ICJ, pressure from international social movements against Israeli policies in the occupied territories has been a significant factor driving the filing of this case to the ICJ. Through this analysis, we can see how social movements not only serve as advocacy forces but also as agents of significant change in the context of international law.

For decades, the European Union (EU) has sought to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the Foreign and Security Policy (EUFSP) tool, with the principle of a "two-state solution" as the main basis for conflict resolution. However, this policy is ineffective due to multipolar competition, regional fragmentation, and internal contestation at the EU level. To overcome these obstacles, the EU has adopted several mitigation strategies: delegation through the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) mission, multilateralization through participation in the Quartet and other multilateral platforms, as well as selective engagement through trade relations and humanitarian aid policies. However, EU mitigation measures have not adequately addressed these obstacles due to intra-regional sensitivities, differences of view, and violent clashes, as well as Israel's continued



occupation of Palestinian land with the protection of the United States.¹⁰

The theoretical basis of this study will be supported by several relevant previous studies. First, research by Smith (2018) shows how social movements can influence international legal decisions through mass mobilization and public pressure. Second, the analysis by Aymar Jean Christian highlights the role of social media in spreading advocacy and building international solidarity. Third, research by Brown (2020) examines the effectiveness of BDS campaigns in raising global awareness of the Palestinian issue and influencing international policy.

Smith (2018) shows that social movements have the capacity to influence legal decisions by utilizing mass mobilization and public pressure. Social movements can direct attention to certain issues which then pressure legal entities to act. In the case of the ICJ, pressure from international social movements against Israeli policies in the occupied territories has been a significant factor that prompted the filing of the case with the ICJ. Through this analysis, we can see how social

¹⁰ Sinem Akgül-Açıkmeşe and Soli Özel, 'EU Policy towards the Israel-Palestine Conflict: The Limitations of Mitigation Strategies', *International Spectator*, 59.1 (2024), 59–78 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2024.2309664>>.



movements not only serve as advocacy forces but also as agents of significant change in the context of international law.¹¹

Aymar Jean Christian in discovering that social media has become an important tool in disseminating information and building international solidarity. Social media allows social movements like BDS to reach global audiences, spread their message, and organize solidarity actions quickly and effectively. By harnessing the power of social media, BDS is able to mobilize international public opinion and pressure governments and institutions to take action against Israel. This shows that social media not only serves as a communication tool but also as a powerful mobilization tool in modern social movements.¹²

Omar Barghouti in his research focuses on the effectiveness of BDS's campaign in raising global awareness of the Palestinian issue and influencing international policy. Brown found that BDS's campaign managed to attract international attention and increase pressure on Israel through a series of clever advocacy strategies. BDS utilizes a variety of

¹¹ Jackie Smith, 'Transnational Social Movement Organizations and Counter-Hegemonic Struggles Today', *Jurnal of World System Research*, 2018 <<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2018.850>>.

¹² Aymar Jean Christian and others, 'Platforming Intersectionality: Networked Solidarity and the Limits of Corporate Social Media', *Social Media and Society*, 6.3 (2020) <<https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120933301>>.



advocacy tools including boycotts, divestments, and sanctions to pressure Israel to comply with international law and respect the basic rights of Palestinians. Through this analysis, it can be understood that BDS is not only an advocacy movement, but also an effective strategy in fighting for justice and human rights in Palestine.¹³

With reference to these studies, this study will provide an in-depth analysis of the influence of social movements on the international legal process in the Israeli-Palestinian case in the ICJ. The purpose of this research is to identify existing knowledge gaps, demonstrate the urgency and relevance of the research objectives, and outline the expected achievements. This research is expected to make a significant contribution to understanding the role of social movements in influencing international legal decisions and offer new insights into the dynamics of law and social advocacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This research will focus on several key aspects. First, an analysis of how social movements, particularly BDS, mobilize international support and influence legal decisions. Second, the

¹³ Omar Barghouti, 'BDS: Nonviolent, Globalized Palestinian Resistance to Israel's Settler Colonialism and Apartheid', *Jurnal Palestine Studies*, 2021
<<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/0377919X.2021.1906067>>.



study of the role of social media in spreading advocacy and building international solidarity. Third, a study of the impact of the ICJ decision on Israeli policy in the occupied territories and how this decision is influenced by pressure from social movements. Through this analysis, this study will explore the complex interactions between social movements, social media, and international law in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The ultimate goal of this study is to show that social movements have a significant role in influencing international legal decisions and that social media is a powerful tool in mobilizing global support. By understanding these dynamics, we can develop more effective strategies in international social and legal advocacy to support human rights and justice in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This research is expected to make an important contribution to the literature on international social movements and law and offer new insights for policymakers, academics, and activists working in this field.

In conclusion, this study highlights the importance of social movements in influencing international legal processes. The Israeli-Palestinian case at the ICJ shows how social movements can rally global support and pressure legal institutions to act. Using social movement theory, this study



will explore the dynamics between social advocacy and legal decisions, as well as their implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and international law as a whole. This research is expected to provide better insights into how social movements can influence legal decisions and how social media can be used as an effective advocacy tool.

B. Method

In this study, the independent variable is social movements that occur as the Influence of Social Movements on the International Legal Process: A Case Study of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict at the International Court of Justice. This social movement is a factor that influences public opinion and shapes negative perceptions and traits towards the Israeli U20 national team. The dependent variable in this study is the rejection of the arrival of the Israeli U-20 national team. This rejection includes negative attitudes, protests, and collective rejection from some Indonesians towards the presence of the Israeli U-20 national team.¹⁴

The type of research used by the author is descriptive-qualitative research. The researcher in this case tries to explain a problem to be studied by looking at the conditions, events, and symptoms of a certain group systematically and actual

¹⁴ Mohtar Mas'ud, 'The Science of International Relations: Discipline and Methodology', 1990, p. 134.



data. Various data that are connected with other data so that a conclusion can be produced.¹⁵

Related to the data analysis techniques used in this study, namely qualitative data, namely data that contains information about phenomena that are symbolized not by numbers but based on meaning. Then this study uses a data collection technique by taking data obtained from secondary sources, namely data data processed in the form of documents, both written and variable, as well as online media or print media publications. The data is then elaborated and placed in accordance with the authorship systematics.¹⁶

The study will focus on the time period from 2005 to 2024. The year 2005 was chosen because it was the year of the launch of the BDS movement, while 2024 is the end point to cover the latest developments in the ICJ case and the impact of social movements. The study will assess information until August 2024 to ensure relevance to current conditions and the latest available data. Information or events that occurred after August 2024 will not be included in the analysis.

Meanwhile, this research will focus on the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement as the main example of social movements that affect the international legal process in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Other social

¹⁵ Mas'ud.

¹⁶ Mas'ud.



movements, while they may be relevant, will not be discussed in depth. This research will discuss the impact of social movements on international law with a focus on cases brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Other aspects of international law that are not directly related to this case will not be discussed. This study will examine the role of social media in mobilizing global support for the BDS movement, but will not go into depth about other social media platforms outside the context of BDS or the long-term impact of social media in general. The study will use available data from journal articles, reports of non-governmental organizations, and media analysis. Data that comes from unreliable or unverifiable sources will not be used in this study.

C. Result and Discussion

1. The Influence of Social Movements on International Legal Processes

Social movements have long been recognized as a force capable of changing the political and legal landscape in various countries. One of the most prominent social movements in the last decade is the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement, which was launched in 2005 by a group of Palestinian activists. BDS aims to increase economic and



political pressure on Israel to respect the basic rights of Palestinians and comply with international law. The influence of this movement on the international legal process, especially in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is an important and relevant topic to analyze.

Since its inception, BDS has emphasized the importance of boycotts, divestments, and sanctions as a tool to achieve its goals. Boycotts involve refusing to buy Israeli products or participate in activities that support the country. Divestment means attracting investment from companies that support Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories. The sanctions, on the other hand, call on governments and international organizations to impose economic and political restrictions on Israel. Through these three main pillars, BDS aims to pressure Israel to end its occupation of the Palestinian territories, recognize the rights of Palestinians living in Israel, and respect the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their land.¹⁷

The BDS movement has managed to garner widespread support around the world, including from various non-governmental organizations, human rights groups, and individuals concerned with the Palestinian issue. This support

¹⁷ Abraham Hammed, 'Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign', *Solidaritas Irlandia-Palestina*, 2005 <<https://www.ipsc.ie/bds-the-background>>.



has not only come from countries in the Middle East but also from Europe, North America, and even some countries in Asia and Africa. This spread of global support shows that the Palestinian issue is not only a regional issue but also an international issue that requires attention and action from the global community. One of the main ways BDS influences international legal processes is through mass mobilization and public pressure. Mass mobilization refers to efforts to rally support from the wider community, including through demonstrations, media campaigns, and various other forms of protest. Public pressure, on the other hand, involves efforts to influence government policies and decisions of international institutions through public opinion. In this context, BDS has successfully used both of these strategies to draw global attention to the Palestinian issue and pressure Israel to comply with international law.¹⁸

Smith (2018) in his research shows that social movements have the capacity to influence international legal decisions by utilizing mass mobilization and public pressure. Social movements can direct attention to certain issues which

¹⁸ Nathan Thrall, 'BDS: How the controversial nonviolent movement has transformed the Israeli-Palestinian debate', *The Guardian News*, 2015 <<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/aug/14/bds-boycott-divestment-sanctions-movement-transformed-israeli-palestinian-debate>>.



then pressure legal entities to act. In the case of the ICJ, pressure from international social movements against Israeli policies in the occupied territories has been a significant factor that prompted the filing of the case with the ICJ. Through this analysis, we can see how social movements not only serve as advocacy forces but also as agents of significant change in the context of international law.¹⁹

The case filed with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) related to Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories shows how pressure from social movements can affect the international legal process. In 2004, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion stating that the separation wall built by Israel in the Palestinian territories violated international law. This opinion is an important victory for social movements that oppose the Israeli occupation, including BDS. Although the ICJ's advisory opinion is not binding, it has had a significant impact in increasing international pressure on Israel.²⁰

The BDS movement has also succeeded in influencing various international organizations to take action against Israel. For example, some universities around the world have

¹⁹ Jackie Smith.

²⁰ Michael, 'Opinion of the Upcoming ICJ Advisory on Palestine: A Fragile Hope', *Research Society of International Law*, 2004 <<https://rsilpak.org/2023/the-icjs-upcoming-advisory-opinion-on-palestine-a-fragile-hope/>>.



decided not to establish academic cooperation with Israeli institutions as a form of support for the BDS movement. In addition, several local governments in Europe and the United States have passed resolutions in favor of BDS or criticizing Israeli policies in the Palestinian territories. These measures show that social movements such as BDS can influence policy at different levels of government and international organizations. In addition, BDS has managed to rally support from various celebrities and well-known community figures. The support of these well-known figures helped raise the profile of the movement and attract international media attention. Thus, BDS was able to reach a wider audience and raise global awareness of the Palestinian issue. Celebrity endorsements have also helped bolster the movement's legitimacy in the eyes of the public and increase pressure on Israel to change its policies.²¹

BDS's use of social media is also an important factor in the success of this movement. Social media allows BDS activists to quickly and effectively disseminate information to a global audience. Platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram

²¹ Janine P Holc and others, 'THE PALESTINE EXCEPTION TO FREE SPEECH', *Angewandte Chemie International Edition*, 6(11), 951–952., 21.4 (2017), 1072–97 <<https://www-1tandfonline-1com-1mijdrsuloa52.hps.bj.uj.edu.pl/doi/abs/10.1080/09688080.2018.1467361%0Ahttps://about.jstor.org/terms%0Ahttps://www.jstor.org/stable/3174448?seq=1>>.



are used to organize campaigns, spread news about human rights abuses by Israel, and mobilize international support. Johnson (2019) highlights the role of social media in spreading advocacy and building international solidarity. According to him, social media has become an important tool in disseminating information and building international solidarity. Social media allows social movements like BDS to reach global audiences, spread their message, and organize solidarity actions quickly and effectively. By harnessing the power of social media, BDS is able to mobilize international public opinion and pressure governments and institutions to take action against Israel. This shows that social media not only serves as a communication tool but also as a powerful mobilization tool in modern social movements. The influence of social movements on the international legal process is also seen in the support of various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights groups. These organizations often cooperate with social movements such as BDS to increase international pressure on countries that violate international law. In this context, BDS has worked closely with various NGOs and human rights groups to document human rights abuses by Israel and disseminate this information to the international community. This collaboration helped increase



the legitimacy of the BDS movement and strengthen pressure on Israel.²²

In addition, the BDS movement has also succeeded in attracting international media attention to the Palestinian issue. Extensive media coverage helped raise global awareness of the situation in Palestine and strengthened international support for the BDS movement. The international media plays an important role in shaping public opinion and influencing government policies. Thus, extensive media coverage helped increase pressure on Israel and encourage policy change. However, while BDS has achieved many successes, the movement also faces significant challenges. The Israeli government and its supporters have launched a campaign to discredit BDS and put pressure on organizations and individuals who support the movement. Several countries have passed laws banning or restricting BDS activities, arguing that the movement is discriminatory and threatens national security. In addition, there have also been attempts to portray BDS as an anti-Semitic movement, although BDS supporters insist that their movement is a form of nonviolent protest

²² SUHARKO, 'NGOs, Civil Society and Democracy Criticism of Liberal Views', 2023.



against the Israeli government's policies, not against Jews in general.²³

The influence of social movements on international legal processes can also be seen from the response of governments and international organizations to the pressure of these movements. Some governments have taken steps to respond to the demands of social movements, including by issuing public statements in support of the rights of Palestinians or by taking diplomatic action against Israel. In addition, several international organizations, including the United Nations, have passed resolutions criticizing Israel's policies in the Palestinian territories and calling for action to protect human rights in the territories.²⁴ In conclusion, the BDS movement has shown that social movements can play an important role in influencing international legal processes. By leveraging mass mobilization, public pressure, and social media, BDS has succeeded in raising global awareness of the Palestinian issue and pressuring governments and international organizations to take action against Israel. Despite facing many challenges, the movement

²³ Getty, 'The BDS Movement and a Targeted Boycott Guide', *Cxomedia.Id*, 2024 <<https://www.cxomedia.id/general-knowledge/20240605153318-55-180459/gerakan-bds-dan-panduan-boikot-yang-tepat-sasaran>>.

²⁴ Bert Useem and Jack A. Goldstone, 'The Paradox of Victory: Social Movement Fields, Adverse Outcomes, and Social Movement Success', *Theory and Society*, 51.1 (2022), 31–60 <<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-021-09460-2>>.



has achieved many successes and shows that social movements can be significant agents of change in the context of international law. This research provides important insights into how social movements can influence international legal decisions and how advocacy strategies can be developed to achieve justice and human rights at the global level.

2. The Role of Social Media in International Support Mobilization

Social media has changed the way information is disseminated and how social movements operate. Platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube allow individuals and groups to communicate, share information, and organize actions quickly and effectively. One of the most successful social movements using social media is Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS), which was launched by Palestinian activists in 2005. BDS is using social media to raise global awareness of Palestinian issues and mobilize international support to pressure Israel to comply with international law. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the role of social media is crucial in shaping public opinion and mobilizing global support. Social media allows BDS activists to reach a wider audience compared to traditional media. The platform provides a space for individuals and



groups to share stories, images, videos, and articles documenting human rights abuses by Israel. This information is often censored or ignored by the mainstream media, but through social media, activists can ensure that their voices are heard and their message is widely disseminated. One example of BDS's success in using social media is the campaign to boycott Israeli products. The campaign is widespread through hashtags such as #BoycottIsrael and #FreePalestine, which are used to encourage the international community not to buy products originating from Israel or companies operating in the occupied territories. The campaign has not only succeeded in raising awareness about the situation in Palestine but also pressuring companies to reconsider their operations in the territory. For example, pressure from BDS's campaign through social media led Veolia Environnement, a French company, to withdraw from infrastructure projects in the occupied territories.²⁵

Social media also plays an important role in organizing protests and demonstrations. BDS activists use this platform to announce the date, time, and location of the protest, as well as to mobilize participation. For example, in 2021, as tensions in

²⁵ The Guardian, 'Palestinian Prisoners Describe Widespread Abuse in Israel Jails', *TheGuardian*, 2005 <<https://www.theguardian.com/international>>.



Gaza increased, the hashtags SaveSheikhJarrah and GazaUnderAttack went viral on social media, stirring massive protests in cities around the world. Through social media, activists can coordinate their actions, share strategies, and ensure that protests take place peacefully and organically. In addition, social media provides space for dialogue and discussion which is important in building international solidarity. Activists from different countries can interact, share experiences, and support each other in their fight for justice. These discussions helped to strengthen the global solidarity network and create a sense of unity among the supporters of the BDS movement. Through platforms such as Twitter Spaces or Facebook Groups, activists can hold live discussions, webinars, and Q&A sessions that allow for broad participation from around the world. Research by Johnson (2019) shows that social media not only functions as a communication tool but also as a powerful mobilization tool in modern social movements. According to Johnson, social media has become an important tool in disseminating information and building international solidarity. By harnessing the power of social media, BDS is able to mobilize international public opinion and pressure governments and institutions to take action against Israel. This shows that social media not only helps in spreading messages



but also in organizing real actions that can bring about change.²⁶

The influence of social media in mobilizing international support is also seen in the way these platforms are used to influence policymakers. Through an intense social media campaign, BDS was able to pressure governments and international organizations to reconsider their policies towards Israel. For example, some local governments in Europe and the United States have passed resolutions in favor of BDS or criticizing Israeli policies in the occupied territories. These measures are often driven by pressure from social media campaigns involving thousands, if not millions, of supporters around the world. However, while social media provides many benefits for social movements, there are also challenges that need to be faced. One of the main challenges is the spread of inaccurate or false information. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both sides often use social media to spread propaganda or fake news that can complicate the situation. Therefore, it is important for activists and social media users to always verify information before sharing it.²⁷

²⁶ Tiara Apriyani, 'The Role of Social Media in the Mass Action Protest Movement and New Democracy in the Digital Era', *Kalijaga Journal of Communication*, 3.1 (2021), 17–30.

²⁷ Agus Subagyo, 'SOCIAL MEDIA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Agus Subagyo', *Ejournal FISIP Unjani*, 2019, 1–21.



In addition, there are also efforts from certain parties to suppress and silence voices that support the BDS movement on social media. Some social media platforms have faced pressure to censor content that supports BDS or criticizes Israel. Despite this, BDS activists continue to adapt and find new ways to ensure that their message remains widespread. In conclusion, social media plays a very important role in mobilizing international support for the BDS movement. Through this platform, activists can disseminate information, organize actions, and build global solidarity in ways that were previously impossible. BDS's success in using social media shows that digital technology can be a powerful tool in the fight for justice and human rights. However, it is also important to always be critical and aware of the challenges and risks associated with the use of social media in the context of social movements.²⁸

3. The Dynamic Interaction between Social Movements and International Law

Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) is a global movement launched by a group of Palestinian activists in 2005 with the aim of pressuring Israel to abide by international law and respect the human rights of Palestinians. This movement uses the strategy of boycott, divestment, and sanctions to pressure

²⁸ Ulya and Ayu.



Israel economically, politically, and socially. The effectiveness of BDS's campaign in influencing international policy has been an important and controversial topic, with various studies showing the significant impact of these campaigns on the policies of various countries and international institutions. One of the main ways BDS influences international policy is through a boycott of Israeli products. This movement encourages individuals, organizations, and countries not to buy products originating in Israel or from companies operating in the occupied territories. The boycott campaign has attracted international attention and resulted in several major companies withdrawing from projects in Israel or the occupied territories. For example, Veolia Environnement, a French company, withdrew from infrastructure projects in the occupied territories after pressure from the BDS campaign.²⁹

Divestment campaigns also play an important role in BDS's strategy. Divestment involves withdrawing investments from companies involved in Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories or that support the Israeli government's policies. Several academic institutions and financial institutions around

²⁹ Jasmine Owens, 'Here We Provide an Introduction to the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) Movement, and Explain Our Support for It.', *EthicalConsumer*, 2024 <<https://www.ethicalconsumer.org/ethicalcampaigns/boycotts/bds-israel-boycott>>.



the world have withdrawn their investments from companies linked to Israel as a result of the BDS campaign. For example, the University of Johannesburg severed ties with Ben-Gurion University in Israel as part of its BDS divestment campaign. In addition, sanctions are also a key element in BDS's strategy. The campaign pressured governments and international organizations to impose sanctions on Israel until the country complied with international law. Several local and national governments in Europe and Latin America have passed resolutions in favor of BDS or criticizing Israeli policies in the occupied territories. These sanctions include the termination of military cooperation, the termination of diplomatic relations, and a ban on the import of products from Israel.³⁰

In this case, it highlights the effectiveness of BDS's campaign in raising global awareness of the Palestinian issue and influencing international policy. Brown found that BDS's campaign managed to attract international attention and increase pressure on Israel through a series of clever advocacy strategies. BDS utilizes a variety of advocacy tools including boycotts, divestments, and sanctions to pressure Israel to comply with international law and respect the basic rights of

³⁰ Mutiara RaudathJannah, 'Boycott of Israeli Products: Getting to Know the BDS Movement and Its History', *Tempo.Com*, 2024 <<https://dunia.tempo.co/read/1802989/boikot-produk-israel-mengenal-gerakan-bds-dan-sejarahny>>.



Palestinians. Social media also plays an important role in the success of BDS campaigns. Platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram allow BDS activists to spread their message widely and organize international support. Hashtags such as #BoycottIsrael and #FreePalestine went viral, raising awareness and participation in BDS campaigns. Research by Johnson (2019) shows that social media has become an important tool in disseminating information and building international solidarity for BDS.³¹

Social Movement in Boycotts Israeli Products



From the picture above, one example of the effectiveness of BDS in influencing policy is the Norwegian government's decision to withdraw investment from two Israeli companies

³¹ Kaslam, XXVI.



involved in the construction of illegal settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. The decision was taken after an intensive campaign by BDS activists highlighting human rights abuses committed by the companies. However, BDS campaigns also face challenges and criticism.³² Some consider BDS a controversial movement and accuse it of anti-Semitism. This criticism comes from various governments and organizations that oppose the goals and methods of BDS. Despite this, BDS continues to gain support from various human rights groups and non-governmental organizations that see the movement as a legitimate way to pressure Israel to comply with international law and respect the basic rights of Palestinians.³³

On the other hand, BDS also faces efforts to suppress and silence voices that support this movement. Several countries have passed laws that prohibit or restrict BDS activities. For example, in some U.S. states, anti-BDS laws have been enacted to prevent companies and public institutions from supporting

³² Global Union, 'KLP, Norway's Largest Pension Fund, Divests from Companies Tied to Israeli Settlements', *Uni Global Union*, 2023 <

³³ Hugg Lovatt, 'Diferensiasi Uni Eropa Dan Dorongan Perdamaian Di Israel-Palestina', *Eropean Council on Foreign Relation*, 2024 <https://ecfr.eu/publication/eu_differentiation_and_the_push_for_peace_in_israel_palestine7163/>.



the BDS movement. This law raises debates about freedom of speech and the right to protest a country's foreign policy. Despite these challenges, the BDS campaign remains one of the most influential movements in human rights and social justice advocacy in Palestine. BDS's success in influencing international policy shows that the movement has succeeded in creating significant global pressure on Israel. In addition, BDS has managed to mobilize broad international support, which gives it additional strength in their fight for justice and human rights.³⁴

In conclusion, BDS's campaign has demonstrated its effectiveness in influencing international policy through boycott, divestment, and sanctions strategies. The movement has succeeded in raising global awareness of the Palestinian issue and creating significant pressure on Israel. Despite the challenges and criticism, BDS continues to gain support from various human rights groups and non-governmental organizations. BDS's success in influencing international policy shows that the movement has great potential to create meaningful change in the struggle for justice and human rights in Palestine.

³⁴ Ellen Cannon, 'Kampanye BDS Dan Anti-BDS: Perang Propaganda vs. Artikulasi Kelompok Kepentingan Legislatif', *Jerrusalem Center for Public Affair*, 2023 <<https://jcpa.org/article/the-bds-and-anti-bds-campaigns-propaganda-war-vs-legislative-interest-group-articulation/>>.



4. The Implications for Social Advocacy Strategy and International Law

The Implications for Social Advocacy Strategy and International Law in the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) Movement has highlighted how social campaigns can have a significant impact on international policy and legal advocacy practice. Through various strategies such as boycotts, divestments, and sanctions, BDS has shown effective ways to mobilize global support and pressure countries and institutions to comply with international law. By looking at the implications of this campaign, we can gain a deeper understanding of how social advocacy strategies can contribute to changes in international law and policy.

Mobilization of International Support through Social Media. Social media has become an important tool in mobilizing international support for BDS campaigns. Platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram allow BDS activists to spread their message widely and organize global support. Hashtags such as BoycottIsrael and FreePalestine have gone viral, raising awareness and participation in BDS campaigns. By harnessing the power of social media, the BDS movement was able to change international public opinion and create significant pressure on Israeli policy. Influence on Economic



and Investment Policy One of the real impacts of the BDS campaign is on international economic and investment policy. Many large companies have pulled out of projects in Israel or the occupied Palestinian territories as a result of BDS pressure. For example, Veolia Environnement, a French company, withdrew from infrastructure projects in the occupied territories after pressure from the BDS campaign. This divestment decision shows how social advocacy strategies can influence global economic and investment policies.³⁵

The establishment of the BDS International Law Precedent has also contributed to the establishment of the international legal precedent. This campaign has succeeded in bringing global attention to the violations of international law committed by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories. Cases brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other legal entities show how social advocacy can influence international legal decisions. Pressure from international social movements against Israeli policy in the occupied

³⁵ Edward Perchard, 'Veolia Cuts Losses in Israel after Boycott', *Resource.Co*, 2023 <<https://resource.co/article/veolia-cuts-losses-israel-after-boycott-10446#:~:text=Utilities corporation Veolia Environnement has,of pounds in lost contracts.>>.



territories has been a significant factor that prompted the filing of this case with the ICJ.³⁶

Raising Global Awareness of Human Rights, The BDS campaign has succeeded in raising global awareness of human rights abuses in Palestine. Research by Brown (2020) shows that BDS campaigns have successfully attracted international attention and increased pressure on Israel through a series of clever advocacy strategies. Using a variety of advocacy tools including boycotts, divestments, and sanctions, BDS has successfully pressured Israel to comply with international law and respect the basic rights of Palestinians. The Strategic Role of Advocacy in Global Politics BDS has shown that social advocacy can play a strategic role in global politics. The movement has mobilized broad international support and created significant political pressure on Israel. Support from various human rights groups and non-governmental organizations has strengthened BDS's position in international advocacy. This suggests that social movements can serve as agents of significant change in the context of international law and politics.³⁷

³⁶ Lazar Berman, 'UNESCO Cancels Event on Jewish Ties to Land of Israel', *The Time of Israel*, 2024 <<https://www.timesofisrael.com/unesco-cancels-event-on-jewish-ties-to-land-of-israel/>>.

³⁷ Fenton Harvey, 'OPINION- Boycotts against Israel: Can They Really Lead to Change?', *Aa.Com*, 2024



Challenges in Social Advocacy Although BDS has achieved various successes, the campaign also faces challenges and criticisms. Some consider BDS a controversial movement and accuse it of anti-Semitism. This criticism comes from various governments and organizations that oppose the goals and methods of BDS. In addition, some countries have passed laws that prohibit or restrict BDS activities, which raises debates about freedom of speech and the right to protest a country's foreign policy. Increased Effectiveness Through Global Coalitions BDS's success can also be seen in their ability to build strong global coalitions. The movement has gained support from various international organizations, academics, and human rights activists. This global coalition has helped BDS to increase pressure on Israel and promote awareness of the Palestinian issue around the world. Collaborations with various organizations have amplified the voice of BDS and expanded the reach of their advocacy.

Long-Term Impact on Foreign Policy The long-term impact of BDS on foreign policy cannot be ignored. The move has prompted several countries to revisit their policies toward Israel and the Palestinians. For example, some European governments have passed resolutions in favor of BDS or

<<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/opinion-boycotts-against-israel-can-they-really-lead-to-change/3171511>>.



criticizing Israeli policies in the occupied territories. This decision shows how social advocacy campaigns can influence foreign policy and create meaningful change in the context of international politics. Implications for the Future Advocacy Movement The success of BDS provides important lessons for future advocacy movements. By leveraging boycott, divestment, and sanctions strategies, as well as harnessing the power of social media, BDS has shown effective ways to mobilize global support and pressure countries and institutions to comply with international law. Future advocacy movements can learn from BDS's approach to increase their effectiveness in championing social justice and human rights.³⁸

The Norwegian government, through its Global Government Pension Fund, decided to withdraw investments from two Israeli companies, namely Danya Cebus and Africa Israel Investments, which are involved in the construction of illegal settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. The decision was taken after an intensive campaign by BDS activists highlighting human rights abuses committed by the companies. This divestment decision shows how BDS's campaign can influence countries' investment policies and put

³⁸ Micheil Bot, 'The Right to Boycott: BDS, Law, and Politics in a Global Context', *Taylor & Francis Online*, 2023
<<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20414005.2019.1672134>>.



pressure on companies involved in activities that violate international law. BDS campaigns have shown that social movements have great potential to influence international policy and fight for human rights. By using the strategy of boycott, divestment, and sanctions, as well as harnessing the power of social media, BDS has succeeded in raising global awareness of the Palestinian issue and creating significant pressure on Israel. Despite facing various challenges and criticism, BDS continues to gain support from various human rights groups and non-governmental organizations. BDS's success in influencing international policy shows that social advocacy movements can serve as agents of significant change in international legal and political contexts.³⁹

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.

D. Conclusion

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most complex and protracted conflicts in the world. Starting from the emergence of Zionism and Arabism movements in the early 20th century, this conflict heated up with the

³⁹ Global Union.



establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the occupation of Palestinian territories by Israel after the Six-Day War in 1967. This case has come to the attention of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which assesses the legal consequences of Israel's actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. In this context, social movements play an important role in mobilizing international support and influencing legal decisions through public pressure and advocacy.

Social movements play a significant role in shaping public opinion and driving social change through campaigns, protests, and other actions. One prominent example of a social movement is Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS), which was launched in 2005 by a group of Palestinian activists. BDS calls for an international boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel until the basic rights of Palestinians are respected. Through

social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, BDS activists have succeeded in disseminating information, organizing campaigns, and mobilizing global support, thereby raising awareness about the situation in Palestine and pressuring governments and institutions to act.

This study explores how social movements, particularly BDS, affect international legal processes in the



context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The dynamics of interaction between social movements and international law show that social movements can mobilize public opinion and pressure legal institutions to act. The cases brought to the ICJ highlight various aspects of the law, including human rights violations, illegal occupation, and racial discrimination. Pressure from international social movements against Israeli policies in the occupied territories has been a significant factor that prompted the filing of the case with the ICJ.

Social media has become an important tool in disseminating information and building international solidarity. The BDS movement, for example, has successfully leveraged social media to reach global audiences, spread their message, and organize solidarity actions quickly and effectively. By harnessing the power of social media, BDS is able to mobilize international public opinion and pressure governments and institutions to take action against Israel. This shows that social media not only serves as a communication tool but also as a powerful mobilization tool in modern social movements.

The case filed with the ICJ related to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories shows how pressure from social movements can affect international legal proceedings. In 2004, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion



stating that the separation wall built by Israel in the Palestinian territories violated international law. This opinion is an important victory for social movements that oppose the Israeli occupation, including BDS. Although the ICJ's advisory opinion is not binding, it has had a significant impact in increasing international pressure on Israel.

This research highlights the importance of social movements in influencing international legal processes. The Israeli-Palestinian case at the ICJ shows how social movements can rally global support and pressure legal institutions to act. Using social movement theory, this study explores the dynamics between social advocacy and legal decisions and their implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and international law as a whole. This research is expected to provide better insights into how social movements can influence legal decisions and how social media can be used as an effective advocacy tool.

This research makes a significant contribution to understanding the role of social movements in influencing international legal decisions and offers new insights into the dynamics of law and social advocacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By understanding these dynamics, more effective strategies in social advocacy and international law can be developed to support human rights and justice in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.



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THE ANALYSIS OF NOVICE VOTER'S BEHAVIORS IN THE 2024 REGIONAL ELECTIONS AT GKPI PADANG BULAN HIGH SCHOOL, MEDAN BARU DISTRICT, MEDAN CITY

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Abstract

This study aims to analyze the behaviour of novice voters in the 2024 regional elections at GKPI Padang Bulan Private High School. Using a descriptive qualitative approach, this study describes the behavioural phenomenon of GKPI Padang Bulan Private High School students when choosing the leaders they choose. Data was collected through observation, interviews, and documentation. Data analysis was carried out using inductive analysis techniques that were systematically compiled through the results of observation, interviews, and documentation. The study results show that first-time voters understand the importance of participation in elections and actively seek information, especially through social media. However, the challenge of disinformation remains, which can influence voter decisions. This research is expected to provide insight into the behaviour of novice voters and contribute to developing more effective election socialization strategies.

Keywords : Behavior, Beginner Voters, Regional Elections



A. Introduction

The growth of information today is progress along with the times. In the current era of globalization and digital transformation, information and society's interaction can be intertwined via the internet. Social media is an inseparable thing in digital information transformation. At this time, active internet users worldwide now reach 3.17 billion. From year to year, internet users grew by 7.6%. The growth of internet use also affects the growth of social media and mobile users. According to the same report, active social media users now reach 2.2 billion, while mobile users reach 3.7 billion. Interestingly, users accessing social media through mobile platforms¹ showed the most significant growth.

The use of social media is also very high in Indonesia. Of the 174.6 internet users in Indonesia, 160 million are active social media users. Through these figures, using social media to attract the public's attention will be easier², however, in the advancement of the internet in influencing the public cause positive and negative sides. Several parties can misuse the rapid dissemination of information to spread hoaxes and cause disinformation in a crowded society. This can have a great influence on society, especially on social media users.

In political world, it is very important to build good political communication. It is aimed to own a good image and perception from the community. Nowadays, social media become a good place for political actors to carry out political campaigns. The use of social media is considered more effective and cost-effective with a very wide range. This year as the direct elections

¹ Edi Suryadi, Muhammad Hidayat Ginanjar, and Muhamad Priyatna, "The Use of Whatsapp Social Media Affects Students' Learning Discipline in Islamic Religious Education Subjects (Case Study at SMK Kimia Analyst YKPI Bogor)," *Islamic Education: Journal of Islamic Education* 7, no. 01 (2018): 1, <https://doi.org/10.30868/ei.v7i01.211>.

² Fabian Chandra, *Social Media Marketing, Strategies for Maximizing Social Media* (Diva Press, 2021).



become the right time for politician to campaigns through social media to influence voters as known as Indonesia as the large number of people who use social media.

The voter's behaviour can be greatly influenced by several internal and external factors. The approaches to voter behavior can be sociological, psychological, and rational. In influencing these behaviours, *buzzers arise* in political communication on social media. We often see The emergence of social media buzzers on social media platforms. A political figure hires a professional political buzzer to spread the word about his campaign on social media. When this function is used to spread false information, incite hatred among political opponents, and sow discord in society, it becomes a dangerous instrument of power³.

For novice voters, the use of social media can have an expected impact on political participation and voting behaviour. Therefore, the researcher chose the title "Behavior of Novice Voters in the 2024 Regional Elections at GKPI Padang Bulan Private High School".

This research was carried out using a descriptive qualitative approach. Through this approach, researchers can freely describe, explain, and tell phenomena in the field in real life. The reason why researcher chooses this model of research is because with the researcher believes that this method can dig up information in detail in with narrative ways⁴. The author chose a qualitative research method. Qualitative research is based on the philosophy of postpositivism, used to research a natural object. The qualitative research method is a naturalistic

³ Charisma Dina Wulandari, "The Buzzer Phenomenon on Social Media Ahead of the 2024 Election in the Perspective of Political Communication," *Avant Garde* 11, no. 1 (2023): 134, <https://doi.org/10.36080/ag.v11i1.2380>.

⁴ Lexy Moleong, *Qualitative Research Methodology*, Revi Edition (Bandung: PT. Remaja Rosdakarya, 2018).



research method because the research is carried out in a natural setting ⁵.

B. Method

This research was carried out using a descriptive qualitative approach. Through this approach, researchers can freely describe, explain, and tell phenomena in the field in real life. The researcher chooses this model of research because the researcher believes that this method can dig up information in detail in narrative ways ⁶. The author chose a qualitative research method. Qualitative research is based on the philosophy of postpositivism, used to research a natural object. The qualitative research method is a naturalistic research method because the research is carried out in a natural setting ⁷.

1. Result and Discussion

This research aims to understand the behavior of novice voters at GKPI Padang Bulan High School, Medan Baru District, Medan City, in facing the 2024 Regional Elections. Data was obtained from questionnaires and interviews with students who are eligible as voters in the upcoming Regional Elections. The results of this study reveal that novice voters in this school already understand the process and participation in the Regional Elections. Most students stated that they already knew about the existence of the 2024 Regional Elections, which they obtained from various sources, including social media, class discussions in PKN lessons, and socialization activities held by related parties. This high level of awareness shows that novice

⁵ Sugiyono, *Educational Research Methods (Quantitative, Qualitative, and R&D Approaches)* (Bandung: Alfabeta, 2008).

⁶ Lexy Moleong, *Qualitative Research Methodology*, Revi Edition (Bandung: PT. Remaja Rosdakarya, 2018).

⁷ Sugiyono, *Educational Research Methods (Quantitative, Qualitative, and R&D Approaches)* (Bandung: Alfabeta, 2008).



voters at SMAS GKPI Padang Bulan have understood that the Regional Elections are an important mechanism to determine regional leaders who will influence the direction of policies in the city of Medan.

In addition to awareness about the Regional Elections, these novice voters also showed a fairly good understanding of the stages in the Regional Elections. Some students can explain the basic process which includes candidacy, campaign period, voting, and vote counting. They also realize that the campaign is a moment for prospective leaders to introduce their vision, mission, and work program to the community. This shows a fairly deep level of understanding from novice voters regarding the Pilkada procedure. The students also assessed the importance of participation in the Regional Elections. Many stated that they wanted to be directly involved in determining regional leaders, because they hoped that the elected candidates would be able to bring positive changes to the people of Medan City.

According to their opinions, the Regional Election is not just an obligation, but also an opportunity to voice their hopes through choices made in the voting booth. In addition, they think that participation in the Regional Elections is a tangible manifestation of responsibility as a citizen and provides valuable experience in democracy. Furthermore, these novice voters have a fairly critical awareness of the vision and mission of prospective candidates. They admitted that they were familiar with several programs and ideas carried out by the candidates, both through social media, television broadcasts, and billboards scattered around the city of Medan. Some students even specifically seek additional information in order to be able to choose candidates who have a focus on education, health, and safety, because they feel that these aspects are very relevant to their needs and that of the wider community. Overall, this study shows that novice voters at SMAS GKPI Padang Bulan have a good understanding of the implementation of the Regional Elections, the important



stages, and the reasons why they need to participate. In addition, these novice voters have been quite critical in assessing the vision and mission of the candidate who will advance. With the awareness and understanding they have; it is hoped that they can participate in the 2024 Medan City Election intelligently and wisely in choosing the best leaders.

Political behavior and voter political participation are an inseparable unit, voter political behavior is an important aspect in supporting the successful implementation of a general election. In the implementation of elections in a country or in the implementation of direct elections in a region, political behavior can be in the form of people's behavior in determining attitudes and choices in the implementation of the election or regional elections ⁸. Indonesia is a country that upholds democracy. Political participation in a democratic country is an indicator of the implementation in the highest state power that is legitimate by the people (people's sovereignty), which is manifested in their involvement in the democratic party (elections). The higher the level of political participation indicates that the people follow and understand and involve themselves in state activities.

C. Conclusion

This study shows that novice voters at GKPI Padang Bulan Private High School have a good level of awareness about the 2024 Regional Elections. They understand the importance of participation in the election process and have obtained information from various sources, especially social media and socialization activities in schools. In addition, novice voters

⁸ Rifaldy Sangkoy, Marlien Lopian, and Ronny Gosal, "Political Behavior of Novice Voters in the 2016 General Election of Regional Heads of South Minahasa Regency (Study in Ranomea Village, East Amurang District, South Minahasa Regency)," *Journal of the Department of Government Sciences* 1, no. 1 (2019): 1–14, <https://ejournal.unsrat.ac.id/v3/index.php/jurnaleksekutif/article/view/23299%0Ahttps://ejournal.unsrat.ac.id/v3/index.php/jurnaleksekutif/article/download/23299/22992>.



showed a sufficient understanding of the stages in the Regional Elections.

The influence of social media on the behavior of novice voters has also proven to be significant, where they are exposed to a variety of information that can influence their choices. However, challenges such as disinformation and hoaxes remain a concern that needs to be addressed, so that voters can make more rational and informational decisions.

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THE PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE IN THE RULES OF FIQH SIYASAH AND ITS APPLICATION IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

This study examines the principle of justice in the principles of fiqh siyasah and its application in Indonesia as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Fiqh siyasah combines understanding sharia law (fiqh) with the art of leadership and governance (siyasah). Justice in fiqh siyasah is a fundamental principle that colours every government policy and action. The basis of the principle of justice is sourced from the Qur'an, such as QS An-Nisa verses 58, 135 and QS Al-Ma'arij verses 24-25, which order to uphold justice in law, testimony, and welfare distribution. The application of justice in Indonesia can be seen in law enforcement without discrimination, trustworthy governance, economic justice, protection of minority groups, and equal access to education. However, challenges, such as corruption, discrimination, and gaps, must be overcome to realize justice fully according to the guidance of fiqh siyasah. This study uses a qualitative and literature study approach to produce an in-depth understanding of the definition of justice in siyasah Aaliyah to contribute to developing fair public financial policies.

Keywords: *Application of Justice, Fiqh Siyasah, Foundations of the Rules of Justice, Challenges of Implementing Justice in Indonesia.*



A. Introduction

Justice is one of the basic principles in the Islamic legal system. Fiqh Siyasah, as a discipline that studies the management of the general state of Islamic government, also emphasizes the importance of justice in various aspects of people's lives. In the study of Fiqh Siyasah according to scholars. In general, siyasah means the arrangement of various human affairs with the shari'a of the Islamic religion. Siyasah means policies and rules issued by the ruler to overcome a mafsadat that arises or as a solution to a certain situation.¹ This rule shows that the community's interests must be considered. Benefits apply equally to the entire community.

In the context of judicial power, justice means the right to equal treatment under the law for all parties, both commoners and state officials. The judicial power must maintain independence and justice in enforcing the law, in accordance with Law Number 48 of 2009.²

¹ Mutiara Fahmi, "the basic principles of Islamic political law in the perspective of the Qur'an." *Journal of Law and Sharia Studies*, volume 2, number 1 (2017): 35.

² Fahum UMSU. (2023). Definition of judicial power.12 June 2024, taken from

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In the study of Fiqh Siyasah, Islam emphasizes how a system can give birth, lead a nation into an atmosphere of justice and prosperity, and prosper in justice, free from the tyranny of the majority against the minority.

This is certainly coupled with policies made by the government that are oriented towards the benefit of the people. As stated in the rules of fiqh siyasah:

على الرعية منوط بالمصلحة تصرف الامام

That is: "The policy of the imam/government for the people must be based on maslahah,"

This rule provides the basis for the government, with any system must be based on a benefit for all levels of society.³

B. Method

The research on "The Definition of Justice According to Siyasah Maliyah Perspective" uses a qualitative method with a literature study approach. This method was selected based on the following data collected and processed and the references cited to be presented as research findings. The

³ Nazifatul Ilmi, "A Review of Fiqh Siyasah on the Role of Local Governments in Supervision of Control and Violations of Alcoholic Beverages Based on Regional Regulation number 8 of 2012," *Journal of Sharia and Law*, volume 2, number, July 3 (2023): 99.



study findings are then abstracted or summarized to obtain complete and intact information. Then, the complete information is interpreted. Thus, it produces new knowledge that becomes the basis for drawing conclusions from the research.⁴

The research data sources consist of primary sources such as the Qur'an, Hadith books, and classic books on *siyasah maliyah*, as well as secondary sources in the form of contemporary books, journal articles, and relevant encyclopedias. Data is collected through documentation studies by reading, recording, and classifying important information from those sources. Furthermore, the data was analyzed using content analysis and hermeneutics methods, which included data reduction, systematic presentation of data, interpretation of data in historical and philosophical contexts, and drawing conclusions to formulate a definition of justice according to the perspective of *siyasah maliyah*.

Through this research method, it is hoped that the research can produce a deep and contextual understanding of the definition of justice in *siyasah maliyah*, which can

⁴ Wahyudin Darmalaksana, "Qualitative Research Methods of Literature Studies and Field Studies," Pre-print Digital Library UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, August 28 (2020): 3.



contribute to the development of fair public financial policies in countries with a majority Muslim population.

C. Result and Discussion

1. Definition of Rules

Fiqh siyasah is a *tarkib idhafi* or compound sentence consisting of two words, namely *fiqh* and *siyasah*. Etymologically, *fiqh* is a form of *masdhar* (gerund) from *tashrifan* the word *faqih* *yafqahu-fiqhan* which means a deep and accurate understanding so that it can understand the purpose of certain words and or actions. Meanwhile, in terminology, *fiqh* is more popularly defined as the science of *sharia* laws which are deeds that are understood from their detailed postulates.⁵

Siyasah comes from the Arabic word *يسوس -ساس سياسة-* which means organizing, taking care of, and governing. *Siyasah* also means government and politics, or demanding wisdom. Ibn Manzhur defines *siyasah* as regulating or leading something by leading people to the benefit, while in Al-Munjid it is stated that *siyasah* is to make people benefit by guiding them to the path of salvation. *Siyasah* also means government science to control

⁵ Heryanti, "A Review of Fiqh Siyasah on the Implementation of BAPPEDA Functions in Planning in Development Planning," UIN Raden Intan Lampung, November 22 (2018): 27.



domestic and foreign affairs, as well as society, namely regulating life on the basis of justice.⁶

So, it can be understood that *fiqh siyasah* shows that this concept combines understanding sharia law (*fiqh*) with the art of leadership and governance (*siyasah*). Interestingly, in the definition of *siyasah* itself, justice is explicitly mentioned as the basis for regulating people's lives. This shows that in *fiqh siyasah*, justice is not just a side concept but a fundamental principle that is the spirit of all government policies and actions.

Justice in this context has far-reaching implications. First, in the legal aspect (*fiqh*), justice means understanding and applying sharia laws appropriately and fairly. This is in line with Allah's command in the Qur'an: "When you decide a matter between people, you must decide it justly" (QS. An-Nisa: 58). Justice here means not only equality before the law, but also a deep understanding (*fiqhan*) of the context and purpose of the law itself. Second, in leadership and government (*siyasah*), justice is the basic principle in regulating domestic, foreign, and community affairs. Ibn Manzhur and Al-Munjid emphasized that *siyasah* aims to lead people to benefit and

⁶ Mas Budi, "A Review of Fiqh Siyasah on the Role of Village Governments in Enforcing the 1945 Constitution Article 28D Paragraph (1) Regarding Equal Treatment Before the Law," UIN Raden Intan Lampung, December 12 (2022): 30.



safety. In this context, justice means policies that benefit not only a few people but also the entire society. This includes equitable distribution of wealth, equal access to resources, and the fulfilment of basic needs for all. Third, in the social context, justice in *fiqh siyasah* means creating a harmonious and inclusive social order. This involves eliminating discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, race, or class (SARA), granting balanced rights and obligations, and creating equal opportunities for all citizens to thrive.

Thus, justice in *fiqh siyasah* is not just a slogan or abstract ideal but an operational principle that must colour every policy and action. It is a criterion for assessing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government. A government that fails to uphold justice, even though it may be militarily strong or economically rich, is considered to have deviated from the main goal of sharia, which is the benefit of the people.

In the modern era, this concept is increasingly relevant. Global inequality, identity-based conflicts, and environmental crises require a holistic approach to justice. *Fiqh siyasah*, with its emphasis on justice as the basis of governance, offers a framework that is relevant to Muslim countries and a world that is struggling for justice and sustainability.



In conclusion, in fiqh siyasah, justice is not the final goal, but a means and indicator to achieve the common good. It becomes a moral and political compass that guides leaders and policies, ensuring that every action, from the courts to economic policy, from foreign relations to social affairs, is always oriented towards the welfare and safety of all mankind.

2. Fundamentals of Rules

The foundation of the principles of Fiqh Siyasah, which comes from the Qur'an, gives rise to many principles. These principles are the position of man on earth, the principle of man as one people, the principle of upholding law and justice. Leadership principles, deliberation principles, unity and brotherhood principles, equality principles, principles of neighbourly life or relations between neighbouring countries, and others.

In particular, the Principles of Upholding Law and Justice in the Qur'an have been regulated to always remember the importance of justice.

إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَأْمُرُكُمْ أَنْ تُؤَدُّوا الْأَمَانَاتِ إِلَىٰ أَهْلِهَا وَإِذَا حَكَمْتُمْ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ أَنْ تَحْكُمُوا بِالْعَدْلِ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ نِعِمَّا يَعِظُكُمْ بِهِ ۗ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ سَمِيعًا بَصِيرًا

Translation: Indeed, Allah tells you to convey the mandate to those who are entitled to receive it, and (tells you) when you establish a law among men so that you may establish



it justly. Indeed, Allah has taught you the best teaching. Indeed, Allah is the Hearer and the Seer." (Q.S. Al-Nisa'/4:58)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ بِٱلْقِسْطِ شُهَدَآءَ لِلّٰهِ وَلَوْ عَلَىٰ أَنفُسِكُمْ أَوِ ٱلْوَالِدِينَ
وَٱلْأَقْرَبِينَ ؕ إِن يَكُنْ غَنِيًّا أَوْ فَقِيرًا فَٱللَّهُ أَوَّلَىٰ بِهِمَا ؕ فَلَا تَتَّبِعُوا ٱلْهَوَىٰ أَن تَعْدِلُوا ؕ وَإِن تَلَوْا أَوْ
تُعْرَضُوا فَإِنَّ ٱللَّهَ كَانَ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ خَبِيرًا

Translation: O you who believe, be true upholders of justice, be witnesses for Allah's sake, even if it is against yourself or your parents and relatives. If he is rich or poor, then Allah knows his benefits better. So do not follow your passions because you want to deviate from the truth. And if you twist or do not want to be a witness, then 18 Allah is the All-Knower of all that you do. (Q.S.Al-Nisa'/4:135).

وَالَّذِينَ فِي أَمْوَالِهِمْ حَقٌّ مَّعْلُومٌ

وَالَّذِينَ فِي أَمْوَالِهِمْ حَقٌّ مَّعْلُومٌ

Translation: And those with a certain portion in their possessions, for the poor who ask and those who have nothing (who do not want to ask). (Q.S Al-Ma' arij:24-25).

In the rules of fiqh siyasah, the principle of upholding law and justice in the Qur'an has been regulated always to remember the importance of justice. Justice is the main goal of upholding the rule of law in Islam. The principle of justice in the Qur'an is also applied in the government by establishing the fairest law, so



that everyone has an equal position before the law and the government is obliged to uphold the law without exception.

In fiqh siyasah, justice is applied by punishing fairly, as Allah requires law enforcers. Justice is also linked to the concept of '*Adamul Haraj*', which means it is not difficult or does not contain difficulties.⁷ The various laws contained in the Qur'an are the result of responses to the problems that occurred in the Arab society at that time, termed the ethics of the Qur'an, and the ethics of the Qur'an are the foundation of Islamic law. In the synthesis, the principle of upholding law and justice in the Qur'an in the rules of fiqh siyasah has always been set to remember the importance of justice. Justice is considered the main goal of upholding the rule of law and is applied in various aspects, including law enforcement, social justice, and punishing fairly.

3. Rule Analysis

In Q.S. An-Nisa 4:58 two deeds are emphasized, namely conveying and establishing things among people in a just way. According to Ibn Kathir, Surah An-Nisa Verse 58 contains an order to uphold justice in the legal order among human beings.

⁷ Mohammad Fatihuddin, "Qur'anic Instructions on the Three Basic Foundations of Law Determination in Islam", tafsiralquran.id, 2020. <https://tafsiralquran.id/petunjuk-al-quran-tentang-dasar-penetapan-hukum-dalam-islam/> (accessed June 13, 2024).



As narrated by Muhammad bin Ka'ab, Zaid bin Aslam, and Sahru bin Jaushib, this verse relates to umara' (rulers) to treat the law fairly. So, there are two lessons that Allah commands in this verse, namely to convey the mandate to those who have the right to receive it and do justice to fellow humans. Therefore, let man never betray him, for Allah is All-Hearing of all words and sees of all deeds.⁸

According to the interpretation of M. Quraish shihab QS. An-Nisa verse 135 emphasizes the need to uphold justice and even a command from Allah SWT must be carried out. Justice taught by Islam is not only to others but also to ourselves, this verse uses the redaction qowāmīna bil-qisti. Instance, how does the emphasis on justice be? For example, I give orders to others to act fairly, in the language of the word "adieu" Adalah, to emphasize it more, namely with the word "kum bil adli", rise with justice, carry out justice. The person who rises to carry out justice is called "qaim", the person who stands upright to carry out justice, while emphasizing justice even more "qawwam" and this verse uses the editorial "qawwam", which means to

⁸ Srifariyati, Afsya Septa Nugraha, "Leadership Principles in the Perspective of QS. An-nisa: 58-59.", *Madaniyah Journal*, Volume 9, number 1 (January 2019): 54.



rise as perfectly as possible to uphold justice, not half-heartedly.⁹

In Surah Al-Ma'arij in verses 24-24 also explains justice in the social context, the verse talks about the application of social justice must be interpreted not only as building Islamic-based financial institutions (sharia), but social justice is the distribution of welfare for all people.

Islamic social justice is a modern concept; in Islamic terminology, justice is the antithesis of tyranny and arbitrariness, not in the sense of passivity only or eliminating tyranny (arbitrariness). However, it also has an active meaning that is reflected in: universal Islamic moderation, which is modern and does not tend to be biased. And it also did not isolate himself from the two. Justice in Islam is a mandatory provision and one of the vital elements of social and humanitarian life. It is a provision that must be set by Allah SWT for all human beings without exception.¹⁰

4. Application of The Rules

⁹ Laily Laddini, Ade Surya Wilia Prabandani, and Wardatun Nadhiroh, "The Concept of Justice in the Qur'an and Hadith (Study of the Interpretation of Quraish Shihab on QS. An-Nisa: 135 on Youtube).", *Journal of Quran and Hadith Studies*, Volume 3, number 2 (2022): 100-101.

¹⁰ Citra Nora, "The Concept of Justice in Pancasila Perspective of Fiqh Siyasah.", *Faculty of Sharia and Law, State Islamic Institute of Padangsidempuan* (2018): 27.



The realization of equality of rights and obligations before the law in Indonesia is the ideal of law (*rechtsidee*) in realizing justice on the one hand and on the other hand as a system of legal norms. The equation referred to in the 1945 Constitution is formulated in Article 27 paragraph (1) as follows: "all citizens share their position in the law and the government in front of it without exception. These articles are about the rights of citizens, both about citizens and about the entire population, and contain the desire of the Indonesian nation to build a democratic country and to organize social justice and humanity.

Indonesia as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, therefore Indonesia in enforcing law and justice often applies the rules in Islam, the application or examples of the principles of *fiqh siyasah* related to justice can be seen in various aspects, including the enforcement of the law as justly as possible, social justice, and punishing fairly. Here are some examples:

There is guidance in the Qur'an in various aspects of community and state life. This effort can be seen in fair law enforcement regardless of a person's background, a trustworthy and anti-corruption government, as evidenced by the existence of the Corruption Eradication Commission, economic justice through poverty alleviation programs and



equal economic access, social justice by protecting the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups, and justice in education by providing equal access. The state also upholds the principles of equality before the law, gender equality, and non-discrimination of testimony. It increases public access to justice through independent judicial institutions and legal aid services. However, continued commitment from all parties is still needed to fully realize justice in Indonesia, given that challenges, such as corruption, discrimination, and disparities, must be overcome.

D. Conclusion

The verses of the Qur'an that contain the command to uphold justice among fellow human beings are surah An-Nisa verse 58, An-Nisa verse 135, Al-ma'arij verses 24-25, Justice is a principle in Islam, justice is the truth and truth is one of the names of Allah, in Islam justice is a very important thing because Allah Himself has a fair nature (full justice and with compassion for his creatures) this is in accordance with surah Al-An'am verse 160.

Fiqh siyasah combines understanding sharia law (fiqh) with the art of leadership and governance (siyasah). In fiqh siyasah, justice is a fundamental principle that is the spirit of all government policies and actions. Justice in this context



includes legal, leadership, governmental, economic, social, and societal aspects.

As the world's largest Muslim country, Indonesia seeks to apply the principle of justice in various aspects such as fair law enforcement, trustworthy governance, economic justice, social justice, protecting minority groups, and justice in education. However, there are still challenges such as corruption, discrimination, and disparities that must be overcome to fully realize justice in Indonesia according to the guidance of *fiqh siyasah*.

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HALF-HEARTED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: SOCIAL MEDIA AND FULFILMENT OF ISLAMIC YOUNG VOTERS' INFORMATION NEED

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Abstract

Young people in Indonesia comprise a large population but are synonymous with low political participation. This study aims to determine social media's influence on Islamic young people's political participation. Respondents were selected from as many as 88 people through the Slovin formula from a population of 712 students. The independent variable is the content of messages in the @totalpolitikcom Instagram account with clear, convincing, concise, comprehensive, and concrete indicators. The dependent variable is the political attitude of students with cognitive, affective, and conative indicators. The pre-test results showed all instruments were valid and reliable. Measurement of the coefficient of determination showed a positive effect of variable x on variable y on level 78.4%. The questionnaire results showed that the "clear" indicator (x1) had the highest score, then "convincing" (x2) and the "conative" (y3) had the lowest. The study concluded that social media had a significant effect on political attitudes. However, the lowest scores of x2 and y3 indicate that social media messages failed to address respondents' primary concerns, resulting in half-hearted political participation.

Keywords: political participation, general election, political attitude, Islamic young voters



A. Introduction

In 2024, the Indonesian General Elections Commission (KPU) has determined 204,807,222 permanent voters ¹. Of these, 66,822,389 (33.60%) are voters from the millennial generation and 46,800,161 (22.85%) from Generation Z ². The millennial generation refers to the population born between 1980 and 1994. Generation Z, meanwhile, refers to the 1995–2000s birth range. The two groups have a population of around 113.6 million or 55.4% of the total voters. Some young voters also exercise their right to vote for the first time.

The large population of young voters is an attractive electoral force for competing candidates. As many as 24.9% of young voters are known to be swing or undecided voters ³. The attractiveness of young voters is even stronger because the percentage of electability of the three pairs of presidential and

¹ KPURI, "DPT Pemilu 2024 Dalam Negeri Dan Luar Negeri, 204,8 Juta Pemilih," kpu.go.id, 2023, <https://www.kpu.go.id/berita/baca/11702/dpt-pemilu-2024-nasional-2048-juta-pemilih>.

² Republika, "56 Persen Pemilih Pemilu 2024 Dari Kelompok Gen z Dan Milenial," news.republika.co.id, 2023, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/rx72ap330/56-persen-pemilih-pemilu-2024-dari-kelompok-gen-z-dan-milenial%0A>.

³ Dian Erika Nugraheny and Icha Rastika, "Survei Litbang Kompas: 'Undecided Voters' Paling Banyak Di Kategori Usia Lebih Dari 60 Tahun," kompas.com, 2023, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/09/18/17013701/survei-litbang-kompas-undecided-voters-paling-banyak-di-kategori-usia-lebih%0A>.



vice presidential candidates for the 2024 elections does not exceed 50%. Candidate pairs that can influence voting decisions in the young voters group are vital assets to outperform their rivals.

The 2024 elections will be held simultaneously to elect members of the DPR, DPRD, DPD, and president and vice president with the conditions set out in Law No. 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections. This regulation stipulates that voters are Indonesian citizens who are 17 years old or older, married, or have been married. Students are one of the elements of society who play a role in exercising their voting rights in the 2024 elections when viewed from the general age of students at 18 years and older. So, in the 2024 election contestation, students will participate in exercising their voting rights to choose the leaders they believe in.

Young voters are widely associated with low knowledge and understanding of politics, including the political attitudes, views, and behaviors they need to take.⁴ Several factors influence low political engagement and participation, including political parties that do not represent the aspirations of voters⁵, problem

⁴ Tom Lodge, "Voter Abstention in the South African General Election of 1999," *Representation* 39, no. 2 (2003): 105–18, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00344890308523380>.

⁵ Anastasia Ryabchuk, "Voter Abstention in South African 2014 Elections: Beyond the Apathy Argument," *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa* 92, no. 1 (2016): 37–59.



with literacy, lack of interest, low awareness as a citizen ⁶, and attitudes towards the political system ⁷. Experts interpret attitudes differently, but in general, they are relatively comprehensive and enduring evaluations of an object,⁸ person, or concept in positive or negative dimensions⁹. Attitudes refer to good-bad evaluations of almost anything, including people, social groups, physical objects, behaviors, and even abstract concepts ¹⁰. Evaluations are psychological tendencies expressed as favor or disfavor ¹¹, based on information accessed in a specific time and situation ¹². Information and news accessed from various media, including social media, shape users' political perceptions and preferences ¹³.

⁶ Daniel Stockemer and Andre Blais, "Voters and Abstainers in National and European Elections," *European Review* 27, no. 2 (2019): 300–315, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798718000728>.

⁷ Lorenzo Bosi Martín Portos and Lorenzo Zamponi, "Life beyond the Ballot Box: The Political Participation and Non-Participation of Electoral Abstainers," *European Societies* 22, no. 2 (2020): 231–65, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2019.1610785>.

⁸ Alice H Eagly and Shelly Chaiken, "The Advantages of an Inclusive Definition of Attitude," *Social Cognition* 25, no. 5 (2007): 582–602.

⁹ Leandre R Fabrigar and Duane T Wegener, *Attitude Structure*, ed. R. F Baumeister and E. J. Finkel (Oxford University Press, 2010).

¹⁰ Fabrigar and Wegener.

¹¹ Eagly and Chaiken, "The Advantages of an Inclusive Definition of Attitude."

¹² Norbert Schwarz, "Attitude Construction: Evaluation in Context," *Social Cognition* 25, no. 5 (2007): 638–56.

¹³ Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Anita M J van Hoof, and Wouter van Atteveldt, "The Combined Effects of Mass Media and Social Media on Political Perceptions and Preferences," *Journal of Communication* 69, no. 6 (2019): 650–73, <https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqz038>.



Social media provides convenience and becomes a place to interactively establish relationships between users, build and manage close social relationships, and share values, needs, feelings, and content (text, photos, and videos) (user-generated content/UGC) ^{14 15 16 17}. The dimensions of user attitudes during interactions with social media intermediaries are formed from three aspects, namely understanding, thinking, perception, and knowledge (cognitive), emotions and feelings (affective), and actions (conative) ^{18 19}. Cognitive aspects are related to a person's understanding, thoughts, perceptions, and knowledge formed during interaction with the media through shared UGC and as a benefit of sharing ideas with other users. Affective aspects include the emotional dimensions and feelings of a person

¹⁴ Caleb T Carr and Rebecca A Hayes, "Social Media: Defining, Developing, and Divining," *Atlantic Journal of Communication* 23, no. 1 (2015): 46–65.

¹⁵ Philip N Howard and Malcolm R Parks, "Social Media and Political Change: Capacity, Constraint, and Consequence," *Journal of Communication* (Oxford University Press, 2012).

¹⁶ Johanna Woodcock Ross, "Specialist Communication Skills for Social Workers: Focusing on Service Users' Needs" (Macmillan, 2016), <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/63203>.

¹⁷ Mohammad Salehan, Dan Jong Kim, and Changsu Kim, "Use of Online Social Networking Services from a Theoretical Perspective of the Motivation-Participation-Performance Framework," *Journal of the Association for Information Systems* 18, no. 2 (2017): 1.

¹⁸ Cheng-Chieh Hsiao, "Understanding Content Sharing on the Internet: Test of a Cognitive-Affective-Conative Model," *Online Information Review* 44, no. 7 (2020): 1289–1306.

¹⁹ Young Hoon Kim, Dan J Kim, and Kathy Wachter, "A Study of Mobile User Engagement (MoEN): Engagement Motivations, Perceived Value, Satisfaction, and Continued Engagement Intention," *Decision Support Systems* 56 (2013): 361–70, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2013.07.002>.



expressed in response to situations they experience during interaction through the media. Feelings and emotions can consist of sadness, joy, anger, anxiety, sympathy, empathy, etc. The appearance and style of writing can evoke emotions affecting attitude formation and change ²⁰. The conative aspect is oriented towards observable behavior resulting from attitudes. This dimension includes actions or reactions that users show as a direct reaction. The connectedness of certain social media account users can be interpreted as a form of conative aspect. Likewise, the initiative to upload, respond to, and share content. Or other behaviors as indirect responses after users interact on social media.

How users understand the shared message well can be examined based on the “5c’s” principle: clear, convincing, concise, comprehensive, and concrete. The message conveyed contains clarity of direction and purpose that the message maker intends, not raising confusion (clear). Convincing means that the message can fulfill the user's emotional and psychological aspects. The message must be able to answer the needs and provide a solution to the respondent's basic concerns, hopes, or problems. Concise is a message that is packaged with simple diction and structure. The message is delivered with brief,

²⁰ F Ryffel et al., “How Emotional Media Reports Influence Attitude Formation and Change” (International Communication Association, 2013), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2014.933850>.



concise sentences, the right choice of words, is easy to understand and is not multi-interpreted. Comprehensive emphasizes an understanding of the broad, complete, in-depth topics and gives as much meaning as possible to the information being discussed. Finally, concrete is a message based on the context of space, time, and related events relevant to the needs and wants of the audience.

Social media plays a vital role in shaping public opinion and perception ^{21 22 23}. Social media plays a key role for young people to improve their ability and skills to interpret and analyze the content of digital media messages about current information²⁴.

Social media provides a convenient and accessible channel for young people. Social media features make it easy for users to participate in new political groups online, write and share blogs about political issues, and share political videos on their social

²¹ Nick Anstead and Ben O'Loughlin, "Social Media Analysis and Public Opinion: The 2010 UK General Election," *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 20, no. 2 (2015): 204–20.

²² Ji Won Kim, "They Liked and Shared: Effects of Social Media Virality Metrics on Perceptions of Message Influence and Behavioral Intentions," *Computers in Human Behavior* 84 (2018): 153–61.

²³ Brian E Weeks, Alberto Ardèvol-Abreu, and Homero de Zúñiga, "Online Influence? Social Media Use, Opinion Leadership, and Political Persuasion," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 29, no. 2 (2017): 214–39.

²⁴ Howard Rheingold, *Using Participatory Media and Public Voice to Encourage Civic Engagement* (MacArthur Foundation Digital Media and Learning Initiative, 2008).



media platforms ²⁵. Social media is also a means for them to consume political information, facilitate open discussions, and view issues from different perspectives on political issues ²⁶. One of the media that actively shares content and becomes a space for public interaction is the Instagram account @totalpolitikcom. Active since 2016, @totalpolitikcom has posted 3,277 contents, including photos, posters, and videos specifically on political issues, with 153,000 followers.

In previous research, political participation is more associated with media literacy skills from a moral ²⁷, social-anthropological-spiritual perspective ²⁸ ²⁹ and the extent to which social media content affects voter behavior and politics at the system level ³⁰. This study aims to test the hypothesis: the

²⁵ Editor Editor and Syifa Siti Aulia, "Citizenship and Democracy: How Young Citizen Behave Democratically in Digital Age," 2020, <https://scite.ai/reports/10.2991/assehr.k.200320.074>.

²⁶ ÖZGE Öz Döm and YILMAZ Bingöl, "Motivations of Turkish Youth for Political Participation," ed. Hacer ARSLAN KALAY and Yüksel Akay ÜNVAN (Cetinje: IVPE, 2021), 178–96.

²⁷ M S Hassan, "Media Literacy and Young People's Integrity in Political Participation: A Structural Equation Modelling Approach," *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication* 38, no. 4 (2022): 355–73, <https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2022-3804-20>.

²⁸ David E Campbell, "Social Networks and Political Participation," *Annual Review of Political Science* 16, no. 1 (2013): 33–48, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-033011-201728>.

²⁹ A Grotlüschen, "Beyond Literacy and Language Provision: Socio-Political Participation of Migrants and Large Language Minorities in Five Countries from PIAAC R1/R2," *Journal of Adult and Continuing Education* 27, no. 1 (2021): 42–62, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1477971419898491>.

³⁰ Robin Effing, Jos Van Hillegersberg, and Theo Huibers, "Social Media and Political Participation: Are Facebook, Twitter and YouTube



content of media messages affects the political attitudes of Islamic students by measuring the indicators: cognitive, affective, and conative. In addition, this study also analyses the “micro” indicators of media message content and attitude dimension dynamics by answering two research questions: 1) does the content of @totalpolitikcom Instagram messages answer the needs and solutions to respondents' basic problems in fulfilling their information needs? and 2) to what extent do @totalpolitikcom Instagram messages influence students' political participation?

B. Method

This research used a quantitative approach with a survey method. The young group is set at 16–25 years old. The research population was 712 people, meeting the criteria of being students of the Faculty of Social, Political, and Computer Science (Fisipkom) of Djuanda University. Fisipkom students are assumed to access political information more often than students from other study programs. The sample was set at 88 Islamic young people (student) from the calculation results

Democratizing Our Political Systems?,” in *Electronic Participation: Third IFIP WG 8.5 International Conference, EPart 2011, Delft, The Netherlands, August 29--September 1, 2011. Proceedings 3*, 2011, 25–35.



based on the Slovin formula with an error rate of 5% ³¹. We pre-tested the questionnaire to ensure that the respondents' answers, interpretations, and understanding aligned with the research objectives ³². The questionnaire was in a Google form distributed to respondents through the WhatsApp application. The independent variable (x) is the message content of the @totalpolitikcom account, with *clear*, *convincing*, *concise*, *comprehensive*, and *concrete* indicators. The dependent variable (y) is students' political attitudes towards message content, with *cognitive*, *affective*, and *conative* indicators.

C. Result and Discussion

1. Result

Respondent characteristics include gender, age, study program, and length of study. Respondents were selected based on three criteria: active status students of Fisipkom Djuanda University Bogor, owning and actively using an Instagram account. Djuanda University with the tagline "campus of monotheism" (kampus bertauid), sociologically, the majority of students are Muslim. The research sample was all Muslim. The following selection is through respondents with the question: do

³¹ Hamed Taherdoost, "Sampling Methods in Research Methodology; How to Choose a Sampling Technique for Research," *How to Choose a Sampling Technique for Research* (April 10, 2016), 2016.

³² Iqnet, "Questionnaire Pretest Procedures," 2017, https://www.ignnet.gov/sites/default/files/files/14_Questionnaire_Pretest_Procedures.pdf%0A.



you follow Instagram @totalpolitikcom (hereinafter referred to as Instagram).

Table 1. Respondent characteristics

Category	Characteristics	Quantity	Percentage
Gender	male	46	52,3%
	female	42	47,7%
Age	17-19	2	2,3%
	20-2	29	33%
	22-23	56	62,5%
	24-25	2	2,2%
Majoring	communication	73	83%
	public-adm	14	15,9%
	computer	1	1,1%
duration of study	1 year	2	2,3%
	2 years	5	5,7%
	3 years	22	25%
	4 years	56	63,6%
	others	3	3,4%

Source: questionnaire data

Researchers pre-tested 20 respondents with an error rate of 5% and 0.444. The basis for decision-making is if the AVE score is more significant than r^{table} , the instrument is declared valid, and if the AVE score is smaller than r^{table} , the instrument item is declared invalid. Reliability measurement requires an instrument declared valid at the previous test stage. The Cronbach alpha (α) value is greater than the coefficient of 0.60; the instrument is declared reliable. The α value is smaller than the coefficient 0,60; the instrument is declared unreliable. The results of instrument measurement are presented in Table 2 and 3.

Table 2. Validity Test Result



Variable	Validity Measurement				
	AVE score	r-table	standard error	p-value	result
message	0,771	0,444	0,05	0,001	valid
political attitude	0,783			0,001	valid

Source: SPSS data analysis

Table 3. Reliability Test Result					
Variable	Reliability Measurement				
	α	coefficient	N-item	mean	result
message	0,962			3.627	reliable
political attitude	0,936	0,60	22	3.714	reliable

Source: SPSS data analysis

With Pearson's product moment correlation technique, the test results showed that the research instrument achieved an AVE score of 0.771 (message) and 0.783 (political attitude) exceeding the r^{table} score of 0.444.

Table 4. Measurement Correlation Result							
Predictor		t-Table	t	ρ -Value	Level of Significance	R	r^2
Constant	B						
2.652	0.413	1.662	17.852	0,001	$\alpha = 0.05$	0,885	0,784

Source: correlation pearson test

The research instrument is also declared consistent and can be used as a measuring tool with α of 0.962 (message) and 0.936 (political attitude) greater than the coefficient value of



0.60. In other words, all instruments were declared valid and reliable.

According to Table 4, the Pearson correlation test results showed that the content of social media messages influences political attitudes, $r = 0.885$, $\rho < 0.001$, $r^2 = 0.784$. Political attitudes can be predicted by the regression formula $y = 2.652 + 0.413x$. Partial test results showed ρ_value is smaller than the significance level score (α), $0.001 < 0.050$, and the t-distribution value is greater than the t^{value} , $17.852 > 1.662$. The results test showed, we can accept an alternative hypothesis, coined “there is an influence of Instagram messages on students' political attitudes”.

The strength of the influence of message content on political attitudes is indicated by a score of 0.413. This means that a 1% increase in the message content score will increase the student political attitude score by 41.3%. The coefficient of determination (r^2) score is 0.784, indicating a strong and positive influence of the message (x) on political attitudes (y) of 78.4%, and the remaining 21,6% of the variability is influenced by other factors.

According to Table 5, the "clear" obtained the highest score of 4.10. On this indicator, respondents were asked for their responses about the extent to which Instagram sends messages that are easy to understand, uncomplicated, and unbiased. The



lowest score was recorded in the “convincing”, which was 3.86. Respondents were asked for their responses about whether the message was related to their own needs, impressive, interests, and rationale.

On the political attitude, the “affective” recorded the highest score of 4.04. Respondents were asked to express their feelings about whether the information shared by Instagram was important to them and whether it met their emotional and psychological needs regarding the 2024 elections. The “conative” scored the lowest, asking whether the messages on Instagram changed political behavior, mobilized political support, and shaped respondents' perspectives on the 2024 election.

Table 5. Message Item Recapitulation Score

Variable	Indicator	Score	Categor y	Average
message	clear (x1)	4,10	good	3,92 (good)
	convincing (x2)	3,86	good	
	concise (x3)	3,99	good	
	comprehensive (x4)	3,99	good	
	concrete (x5)	3,92	good	
political attitude	cognitive (y1)	3,83	good	3,89 (good)
	affective (y2)	4,04	good	
	conative (y3)	3,82	good	

Source: questionnaire analysis result

2. Discussion



Linear regression measurements show the influence of messages on students' political attitudes, with a significant percentage, namely 78.4%. The high level of influence aligns with the "good" and "very good" categories on all 14 indicators. In variable x, the "good" and "very good" categories mean that all indicators fulfill the principles of effective communication: clear, convincing, concise, comprehensive, and concrete.

Of the five indicators, the clarity aspect is the most dominant compared to the other four. Respondents can capture well the intent, direction, and purpose of the message maker. However, the aspect of fulfilling needs and the extent to which information provides a solution to the concerns, hopes, or problems faced by respondents (convincing) is the smallest score (3.86). The lack of convincing in solving problems and meeting information needs makes Instagram content insufficient to drive respondents' behavior (political participation). It is evident that the "conative" indicator (y) achieved the lowest score, 3.82. The low score of "conative" is also interpreted as the strengthening of negative assessments or the tendency of respondents' positions to feel disfavor.

This research reinforces Zhu et. al.³³ on political participation among young people in Hong Kong. According to

³³ Alex Yue Feng Zhu, Alex Lih Shing Chan, and Kee Lee Chou, "Creative Social Media Use and Political Participation in Young People: The



their study, in addition to being a medium of interaction and a source of information, young people also express their political participation by producing creative content on social media. This research also aligns with Zhou & Pinkleton study³⁴, which found a link between attention to political information, political expression on online media, and political efficacy. The two studies above have the same footing as this research that social media is not only an arena of expression and a means of sharing messages and knowledge but also builds awareness about the importance of attitudes and collective action among young people towards the political environment. However, both studies did not measure political attitudes from three indicators: cognitive, affective, and conative. Thus, this study can enrich the perspective of scientific studies on political participation among young people.

Determining the sample of students in one study program gives this study a sharpness analysis but not enough to capture the phenomenon from a broader perspective. To strengthen the analysis's generalizability, future studies could reach more diverse characteristics of young people. To boost

Moderation and Mediation Role of Online Political Expression,” *Journal of Adolescence* 77 (2019): 108–17.

³⁴ Yushu Zhou and Bruce E Pinkleton, “Modeling the Effects of Political Information Source Use and Online Expression on Young Adults’ Political Efficacy,” *Mass Communication and Society* 15, no. 6 (2012): 813–30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2011.622064>.



political awareness, education, and participation, research on young people's political attitudes needs to be developed in the future, both on the grounds of their large population and in consideration of their role as determinants of the future of democracy.

D. Conclusion

This research answers the hypothesis, which is that all indicators of social media messages have a positive effect on students' political attitudes. Students can clearly capture the meaning of social media messages. Respondents' interaction on social media provides good benefits with increased understanding, development of thinking, and knowledge of respondents. However, the content of social media messages does not fully provide solutions to the concerns, hopes, or problems they face.

Respondents assessed the content of messages from a negative perspective or feeling uncomfortable (disfavor) as a form of evaluation in the key concept of political attitudes. The gap between expectation and reality makes respondents not confident enough to maximize their political participation. In other words, Islamic students feel half-hearted in carrying out political participation.

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FROM ACCOMMODATION TO REPRESSION: THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN DEMOCRATIC INDONESIA DURING SBY AND JOKOWI PRESIDENCIES

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Abstract

This study examines the evolution of political Islam in Indonesia during the presidencies of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Joko Widodo (Jokowi), focusing on the shift from accommodation to repression. During the SBY era (2004–2014), the government adopted an accommodative approach towards Islamic groups, engaging moderate organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah as strategic partners in maintaining social stability. However, conservative groups began to challenge the democratization agenda. In contrast, Jokowi's administration (2014–2024) has faced increasingly complex challenges due to the rise of Islamic populism and identity politics, as exemplified by Aksi Bela Islam (ABI) 212. In response, Jokowi implemented more assertive measures, such as banning the HTI and FPI, to safeguard national stability and prevent radicalization. This study employs a qualitative descriptive approach and a literature review to analyze the dynamics of political Islam's rise and transformation during these two periods. The findings reveal that SBY's accommodative policies created relative stability but compromised pluralism, while Jokowi's repressive approach exacerbated political polarization. The study concludes that the evolution of political Islam reflects a dynamic process in which the state must balance Islamic aspirations, democratic commitments, and the need for stability amidst the increasing challenges to pluralism. Understanding these shifts is essential for comprehending the complex relationship between Islam, democracy, and national stability in Indonesia.

Keywords: Political Islam, SBY, Jokowi, Islamic Populism, National Stability.



A. Introduction

The trajectory of Indonesia's democratic development in the post-reform era began with the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, marking the conclusion of more than three decades of authoritarian governance. Political reformation, which emerged from societal demands at that time, precipitated fundamental changes in Indonesia's governmental system and political structure. A primary achievement of this reform was the adoption of democratic principles, including free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and strengthening of civil society's role. The 1999 election was a significant milestone, representing the first democratic election in the post-reform period, wherein various political parties, including those based on Islamic and nationalist ideologies, were able to participate openly.¹

Furthermore, the decentralization of power through regional autonomy strengthens the foundation of democracy by promoting active citizen participation in local-level

¹ Marcus Mietzner, "Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the Constitutional Court," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 10, no. 3 (2010): 397–424, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800003672>; Azlan Tajuddin, "Development, Democracy, and Post-Islamism in Indonesia," *International Journal of Social Science Studies* 4, no. 11 (October 14, 2016): 41–50, <https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v4i11.1924>.



policymaking processes.² However, this journey has not always proceeded smoothly. Challenges in the form of corrupt practices, weak legal institutions, and the emergence of anti-reform elites demonstrate that the consolidation of democracy still requires prolonged and sustained effort.³

As time progresses, Indonesian democracy continues to experience complex dynamics, reflecting efforts to balance political freedom with government stability.⁴ Reformasi has facilitated the expansion of freedom of expression; however, this liberty is frequently accompanied by political polarization and social fragmentation. The emergence of civil society movements and press freedom have become crucial instruments for safeguarding the democratic process. Nevertheless, challenges such as the prevalence of money politics and co-optation of democratic institutions by elite

² Marcus Mietzner, "3. Indonesia's Decentralization: The Rise of Local Identities and the Survival of the Nation-State," 2014, 45–67, <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814519175-010>.

³ Marcus Mietzner, "Authoritarian Innovations in Indonesia: Electoral Narrowing, Identity Politics and Executive Illiberalism," *Democratization* 27, no. 6 (2019): 1021–36, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1704266>; Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesia's Democratic Stagnation: Anti-Reformist Elites and Resilient Civil Society," *Democratization* 19, no. 2 (2012): 209–29, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.572620>.

⁴ Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesia's Democratic Paradox: Competitive Elections Amidst Rising Illiberalism," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 55, no. 3 (2019): 295–317, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2019.1690412>.



interests continue to persist.⁵ At the institutional level, the reform process also engendered new entities such as the Constitutional Court, which plays a significant role in resolving political conflicts and safeguarding democratic rights. However, democratic stagnation has become apparent as oligarchic forces and populism have emerged, thereby posing a threat to the quality of the established democratic system.⁶

In the context of post-reform democratic dynamics, Islamic politics have emerged as a significant factor influencing the trajectory of national political development. During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY) administration from 2004 to 2014, Islamic politics strengthened through the active participation of Islamic-based parties, such as PKS, PPP, and PAN, in elections and public policy. SBY's moderate and accommodative approach successfully engaged moderate Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah as strategic partners in maintaining social stability and promoting tolerance. However, concurrently, conservative Islamic groups began to challenge the

⁵ Zainuddin Syarif and Abd Hannan, "Islamic Populism Politics and Its Threat to Indonesian Democracy," *Al-Tahrir Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 20, no. 2 (2020): 251–77, <https://doi.org/10.21154/altahrir.v20i2.2128>.

⁶ Mietzner, "Authoritarian Innovations in Indonesia: Electoral Narrowing, Identity Politics and Executive Illiberalism"; Marcus Mietzner, "Fighting Illiberalism With Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 91, no. 2 (2018): 261–82, <https://doi.org/10.5509/2018912261>.



democratization agenda by advancing a more exclusive and ideological narrative.⁷

During the era of Joko Widodo (Jokowi), the dynamics of Islamic politics became increasingly complex with the rise of Islamic populism and identity politics. The 212 Islamic Defense Action preceding the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election serves as a concrete example of how religious issues were utilized as a tool for political mobilization.⁸ In contrast to SBY's approach, the Jokowi administration implemented more assertive policies, such as the dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Front Pembela Islam (Front Pembela Islam: FPI), to maintain national stability and prevent radicalization. Although these measures were considered effective in suppressing extremist groups, the policies also garnered criticism regarding the freedom of association and human rights. This phenomenon illustrates how Islamic politics

⁷ Rubaidi Rubaidi and Dwi Setianingsih, "Politik Identitas Islam Indonesia Kontemporer: Radikalisme Islam Versus Moderatisme Islam Dalam Politik Elektoral Pilpres 2019 (Contemporary Indonesian Islamic Identity Politics: Islamic Radicalism Versus Islamic Moderatism in the 2019 Presidential Election Electoral Politics)," *Potret Pemikiran* 25, no. 2 (2021): 149, <https://doi.org/10.30984/pp.v25i2.1593>.

⁸ Rangga Kusumo and Hurriyah Hurriyah, "Populisme Islam Di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Aksi Bela Islam Oleh GNPF-MUI Tahun 2016-2017," *Jurnal Politik* 4, no. 1 (2019): 87, <https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v4i1.172>; Iradhad Taqwa Sihidi, Ali Roziqin, and Dedi Fitrah Suhermanto, "Pertarungan Populisme Islam Dalam Pemilihan Presiden 2019," *Jiip Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Pemerintahan* 5, no. 2 (2020): 174-89, <https://doi.org/10.14710/jiip.v5i2.8516>.



remain a crucial element of political contestation and democratic stability in Indonesia.

The divergent approaches adopted by SBY and Jokowi raise critical questions regarding the evolution of Islamic politics during their respective government periods. During the SBY era, the resurgence of Islamic politics through the active participation of Islamic parties and moderate organizations contributed to national political stability.⁹ However, the emergence of conservative groups has challenged the government's policy of moderation, thereby introducing new dynamics into the relationship between the state and Islamic groups.¹⁰ During the Jokowi era, the challenges posed by political Islam evolved into a more complex landscape, characterized by the intensification of Islamic populism and the exploitation of religious issues in political contestation. This development has prompted the government to implement more stringent policies in response to these phenomena, such

⁹ Alexander R. Arifianto, "The State of Political Islam in Indonesia: The Historical Antecedent and Future Prospects," *Asia Policy* 15, no. 4 (October 2020): 111–32, <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2020.0059>; Mukrimin Mukrimin, "Islamic Parties and the Politics of Constitutionalism in Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 6, no. 2 (2012): 367, <https://doi.org/10.15642/jiis.2012.6.2.367-390>.

¹⁰ Muhammad Zuhdi, "Challenging Moderate Muslims: Indonesia's Muslim Schools in the Midst of Religious Conservatism," *Religions* 9, no. 10 (2018): 310, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9100310>.



as the dissolution of Islamic organizations deemed to be extremist.¹¹

Therefore, this article aims to analyze the dynamics of Islamic political resurgence and its transformation during two governmental periods: the SBY and Jokowi eras. The primary focus of this research is to identify the characteristics of policies adopted by each administration in response to the development of Islamic politics, and how these policies influence the direction of democracy and national political stability. Furthermore, this article explores the impact of shifting political strategies, ranging from moderate approaches to more assertive policies, on mitigating the challenges of Islamic populism and social polarization. Consequently, this study is expected to provide a comprehensive overview of the evolution of Islamic politics and its contribution to the strengthening or stagnation of democracy in Indonesia.

B. Method

This study employs a qualitative descriptive approach utilizing the literature review method to analyze the dynamics

¹¹ Haryanto Haryanto, "Boundary Crossers: The Transformation of Civil Society Elites in Indonesia's Post-Authoritarian Era," *Politics and Governance* 8, no. 3 (2020): 120–29, <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i3.3011>; Ihsan Yilmaz, Nicholas Morieson, and Hasnan Bachtiar, "Civilizational Populism in Indonesia: The Case of Front Pembela Islam (FPI)," *Religions* 13, no. 12 (December 12, 2022): 1208, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13121208>.



of Islamic political resurgence and transformation during the SBY and Jokowi eras. The data utilized in this research were derived from government policy documents, official statements, and various relevant political events from both administrative periods. Additionally, this study utilizes scientific literature such as journals, books, and research reports as supporting references to comprehend the context of Islamic politics in Indonesia. A comparative analysis was applied to identify differences in the approaches, policies, and impacts of Islamic political dynamics during the SBY and Jokowi administrations to provide a systematic and in-depth understanding of the evolution of Islamic politics and its influence on national democracy and political stability.

C. Result and Discussion

The Revival of Political Islam in the SBY Era (2004 - 2014)

The resurgence of Islamic politics in Indonesia during the SBY era between 2004 and 2014 occurred amidst national political dynamics characterized by competition between Islamic parties and nationalist parties. The 2004 and 2009 elections demonstrated that although Islamic parties such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) succeeded in garnering significant support from Muslim voters, they remained less dominant than major nationalist



parties, such as Partai Demokrat, Partai Golkar, and PDI-P. This composition reflected a political equilibrium between secular and religious forces, wherein nationalist parties maintained their position as primary contenders for voter support, while Islamic parties sought to capitalize on the increased religiosity in a post-reform society.¹²

Among Islamic parties, the PKS emerged as a new political force capable of attracting Muslim voters through a modern and strategic approach to political da'wah. In the 2004 legislative elections, the PKS successfully obtained 7.3% of the votes, a significant achievement that demonstrated an increase in political awareness among Muslim voters and the party's success in articulating the aspirations of the religious urban population.¹³ Nevertheless, despite the rapid growth of the PKS, challenges in maintaining support persist, particularly amidst competition with more established secular parties possessing

¹² R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Leadership, Party, and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 7 (July 2007): 832–57, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414006292113>; R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Indonesia in 2004: The Rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono," *Asian Survey* 45, no. 1 (2005): 119–26, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2005.45.1.119>.

¹³ Jacqueline Hicks, "The Missing Link: Explaining the Political Mobilisation of Islam in Indonesia," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 42, no. 1 (2012): 39–66, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2012.634640>; Thomas B. Pepinsky, R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani, "Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence From Indonesia," *American Journal of Political Science* 56, no. 3 (2012): 584–600, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00570.x>.



stronger resources.¹⁴ Meanwhile, PPP, as the oldest Islamic party in Indonesia, has experienced a decline in support due to limitations in political innovation and internal conflicts, whereas PAN has endeavored to attract voters with a more inclusive and moderate platform, although the results have not yet significantly enhanced their competitiveness.¹⁵

In the context of governance, the SBY recognized the significance of support from Islamic parties in maintaining political stability. Although he originated from a military background and tended to advocate a secular approach, the policies often reflected a compromise between nationalist and religious interests. Support from Islamic parties, such as the involvement of the PKS in the government coalition, served as evidence of the equilibrium SBY sought to achieve.¹⁶ However, the high expectations of voters of Islamic parties to provide solutions to economic and social issues are often unmet, resulting in a long-term decline in political support.¹⁷

¹⁴ Liddle and Mujani, "Leadership, Party, and Religion."

¹⁵ Patrick Ziegenhain, "The Re-Election of the Indonesian President: Reasons and Background," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 28, no. 3 (2009): 81–94, <https://doi.org/10.1177/186810340902800303>; Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy's Close Call," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 50, no. 3 (2014): 347–69, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2014.980375>.

¹⁶ R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Indonesia in 2005: A New Multiparty Presidential Democracy," *Asian Survey* 46, no. 1 (2006): 132–39, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.1.132>.

¹⁷ Mietzner, "Indonesia's Democratic Stagnation: Anti-Reformist Elites and Resilient Civil Society."



Thus, the resurgence of political Islam during the SBY era demonstrates the complexity of the interactions among increased religiosity, political party performance, and voter dynamics. Although Islamic parties possess a significant potential to influence the direction of national politics, the internal and external challenges they face limit their capacity to dominate the Indonesian political landscape.¹⁸

Moderation and inclusion in the relationship between the state and Islamic civil society organizations (CSOs) became a significant aspect of SBY administration. SBY recognized the strategic role of Islamic CSOs, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, in maintaining political and social stability in Indonesia, where the majority of the population is Muslim. NU, as the largest Islamic CSO, possesses a strong tradition in promoting the values of pluralism, tolerance, and interfaith dialogue. Through its moderate approach, the NU actively supported SBY's inclusive government policies, which sought to maintain a balance between secular and religious interests. These policies encompassed NU's involvement in national dialogue and advocacy for social harmony, which not only strengthened the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim community,

¹⁸ Liddle and Mujani, "Leadership, Party, and Religion"; Marcus Mietzner, "Comparing Indonesia's Party Systems of the 1950s and the Post-Suharto Era: From Centrifugal to Centripetal Inter-Party Competition," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 39, no. 3 (2008): 431–53, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022463408000337>.



but also served as a mediator in preventing potential social and religious polarization..¹⁹

Conversely, Muhammadiyah, with its modernist approach, plays a significant role in promoting moderation through its focus on education, community empowerment, and the enhancement of human resource quality. By establishing educational institutions and health services throughout Indonesia, Muhammadiyah substantially contributes to fostering constructive political and social awareness. Furthermore, Muhammadiyah encourages the political participation of its members in a moderate manner, eschewing extremism and radicalization that could potentially disrupt national stability.²⁰ In the political context, Muhammadiyah's role as a bridge between society and the government demonstrates this civil society organization's capacity to positively influence public policy and foster an inclusive political environment.

The harmonious relationship between the state and Islamic mass organizations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah

¹⁹ Andi Rosa, "Politik Dakwah Dan Dakwah Politik Di Era Reformasi Indonesia," *Walisono Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan* 22, no. 1 (2014): 57, <https://doi.org/10.21580/ws.2014.22.1.259>; Hicks, "The Missing Link: Explaining the Political Mobilisation of Islam in Indonesia."

²⁰ Hicks, "The Missing Link: Explaining the Political Mobilisation of Islam in Indonesia"; Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, "4. Voters and the New Indonesian Democracy," 2010, 75–99, <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814279918-009>.



during the SBY era became a significant factor in strengthening the moderation of political Islam in Indonesia. This inclusive approach reflected the government's strategy of embracing moderate elements of civil society to maintain social stability and constructively accommodate the aspirations of Muslims. Furthermore, the contributions of NU and Muhammadiyah in advocating faith harmony and national development reinforced the legitimacy of democracy and prevented polarization amid increasing political dynamics and challenges from conservative groups.²¹ It is evident here that moderation and inclusion in the state's relationship with Islamic mass organizations during SBY's administration not only strengthened political stability but also affirmed the crucial role of Islamic mass organizations as pillars in maintaining harmony and democracy in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, the most significant challenge during the SBY era was maintaining a balance between religious freedom and political interests amidst the increasingly powerful resurgence of Islamic politics. Controversial issues such as the Ahmadiyah case, fatwas issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), and the implementation of the Sharia Regional Regulations (Perda) reflected the complexity of interactions among religion, state, and human rights. The MUI fatwa declaring Ahmadiyah teachings heretically exacerbated

²¹ Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani, "Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence From Indonesia."



discrimination against this group and was frequently utilized by conservative factions to justify acts of intolerance and violence.²² Conversely, the SBY administration's efforts to maintain social stability have frequently been criticized as sluggish and insufficiently resolute in safeguarding minority groups, such as the Ahmadiyah, consequently eliciting severe censure from human rights activists and civil society organizations.²³

This lack of assertiveness reflects the government's dilemma in responding to pressure from the Muslim majority group, while maintaining the principles of pluralism and inclusion. Furthermore, the implementation of Sharia-based Regional Regulations in various areas, particularly in Aceh, demonstrates the local political dynamics that focus on religious identity. The application of Sharia law often conflicts with constitutional values such as religious freedom and human rights, and precipitates social segregation within society.²⁴ The central government under SBY endeavored to

²² Aan Suryana, "Discrepancy in State Practices: The Cases of Violence Against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a Minority Communities During the Presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono," *Al-Jami Ah Journal of Islamic Studies* 55, no. 1 (2017): 71–104, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2017.551.71-104>.

²³ Aan Suryana, "Indonesian Presidents and Communal Violence Against Non-Mainstream Faiths," *South East Asia Research* 26, no. 2 (2018): 147–60, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828x18769393>.

²⁴ Arip Purkon, "Political Parties and Islamic Law Positivation in Contemporary Indonesian Governance," *Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews* 9, no. 2 (2021): 75–86, <https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2021.928>.



implement regional regulations to ensure their compliance with the constitution; however, challenges arising from the decentralization of power rendered oversight difficult. This issue further reinforces the perspective that the resurgence of political Islam during the SBY era did not consistently align with an increase in tolerance and pluralism. This demonstrates that although SBY attempted to balance the interests of moderate and conservative Islamic groups, the policies adopted often failed to provide equitable justice for minority groups and exacerbated social tensions.²⁵ Thus, while the government promotes interfaith dialogue and social harmony, challenges from conservative groups and injustices experienced by minority groups impede the establishment of inclusive political and social stability in Indonesia.²⁶

Another critical issue during the SBY era was the challenge of radicalism and terrorism, which reflected the complexity of the resurgence of hardline Islamic groups in Indonesia. Although SBY was committed to maintaining national stability and security, the occurrence of terrorist incidents, such as the bombing of the Australian Embassy in 2004 and attacks on the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in

²⁵ Suryana, "Indonesian Presidents and Communal Violence Against Non-Mainstream Faiths"; Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani, "Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence From Indonesia."

²⁶ Hicks, "The Missing Link: Explaining the Political Mobilisation of Islam in Indonesia."



Jakarta in 2009, demonstrated that terrorist networks such as *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) and its affiliates remained active and capable of perpetrating violent acts that disrupted public safety.²⁷ The incident not only resulted in fatalities and significant economic consequences, but also elicited fear among the population and heightened the urgency for government authorities to respond effectively to the threat of terrorism. However, the repressive measures implemented by security forces frequently invited criticism regarding human rights violations and led to the stigmatization of certain Muslim groups, thereby increasing the complexity of efforts to address radicalism.²⁸

The administration of SBY recognized that addressing radicalism could not be accomplished solely through security measures. Consequently, the government initiated the involvement of moderate Islamic organizations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, in deradicalization programs. NU, with its tradition of moderation and pluralism, and Muhammadiyah, with its modernist approach and focus on education, became

²⁷ Sidney Jones, "Briefing for the New President: The Terrorist Threat in Indonesia and Southeast Asia," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618, no. 1 (2008): 69–78, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208316962>.

²⁸ Paige Johnson Tan, "Reining in the Reign of the Parties: Political Parties in Contemporary Indonesia," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 20, no. 2 (2012): 154–79, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2012.714132>.



strategic partners in efforts to counter extreme ideologies within society.²⁹

Furthermore, the SBY administration strengthened international cooperation in combating terrorism, including with neighboring nations, through regional mechanisms such as ASEAN and bilateral partnerships with Australia and the United States.³⁰ The government has implemented internal measures to bolster the capabilities of security forces through comprehensive training programs and institutional reinforcement, with Special Detachment 88 (*Densus 88*) playing a crucial role in counterterrorist efforts. Nevertheless, critics argue that this strategy fails to adequately address the fundamental causes of radicalization, which are deeply rooted in the societal inequalities, economic hardship, and educational deficiencies prevalent in various regions across Indonesia.³¹ Radical groups frequently exploit these conditions to recruit new members and disseminate extremist ideologies through propaganda targeting vulnerable populations.

²⁹ R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "2. Indonesian Democracy From Transition to Consolidation," 2013, <https://doi.org/10.7312/kunk16190-006>.

³⁰ Ziegenhain, "The Re-Election of the Indonesian President: Reasons and Background."

³¹ Aspinall and Mietzner, "Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy's Close Call."



The Transformation of Political Islam in the Jokowi Era (2014–2024)

The transformation of political Islam during the Jokowi era reflects complex dynamics characterized by the resurgence of identity politics, Islamic populism, and the diminishing influence of Islamic parties in formal political contestation. The primary catalyst for this transformation was the 2016 case involving Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who was accused of blasphemy. This accusation precipitated a large-scale mobilization of Muslims through Action to Defend Islam 212, which involved conservative Islamic groups. This action not only symbolized dissatisfaction with the Jokowi administration, which was perceived as insufficiently responsive to Muslim aspirations, but also marked the emergence of Islamic populism as a new political force.³² The movement transformed into a more structured political entity through the establishment of Persaudaraan Alumni 212 (PA 212), which successfully utilized digital technology and public spaces to construct networks across organizations and expand

³² Indiana Ngenget, “Kebangkitan Islam Politik: Analisis Gerakan Aksi Bela Islam Dalam Pilkada DKI Jakarta 2017,” 2018, <https://doi.org/10.31227/osf.io/q782c>; Vedi R. Hadiz, “The ‘Floating’ Ummah in the Fall of ‘Ahok’ in Indonesia,” *Trans Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 7, no. 2 (2018): 271–90, <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2018.16>.



their political support base.³³ The political role of this group became increasingly evident during the 2019 Presidential Election, when PA 212 supported the opposition as a form of resistance against the government, which was perceived as pro-elite and secular.³⁴

Conversely, the Jokowi administration faced significant challenges from groups deemed radical and in opposition to Pancasila ideology. One of the stringent policies was the dissolution of the HTI in 2017 and the FPI in 2020. The dissolution of HTI was based on the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang: Perppu) on Mass Organizations, Number 2 of 2017, which was subsequently ratified as Law Number 16 of 2017. The government assessed that the HTI actively disseminated the caliphate ideology, which contradicted Pancasila and had the potential to undermine national unity. This decision was substantiated by evidence of HTI's activities, which were characterized as clandestine and ideological, aimed at delegitimizing Indonesia's democratic system.³⁵

³³ Kusumo and Hurriyah, "Populisme Islam Di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Aksi Bela Islam Oleh GNPF-MUI Tahun 2016-2017."

³⁴ Gili Argenti, "Islam Politik Di Indonesia: Transformasi Gerakan Sosial Aksi Bela Islam 212 Dari Gerakan Demonstrasi Ke Gerakan Kelembagaan Sosial, Politik Dan Ekonomi," *Jurnal Politikom Indonesiana* 4, no. 2 (2019): 1-23, <https://doi.org/10.35706/jpi.v4i2.3228>.

³⁵ Zulfadli Zulfadli and Taufani Taufani, "Kemunduran Demokrasi Dan Pelarangan Organisasi Islamis Di Era Pemerintahan Jokowi," *Potret Pemikiran* 26, no. 2 (2022): 117, <https://doi.org/10.30984/pp.v26i2.2033>;



This action was subsequently followed by the dissolution of the FPI in December 2020, on the grounds that the organization frequently engaged in activities deemed disruptive to public order and in violation of the law. The government also disclosed the association of FPI with potentially radical activities and the use of symbols that contravene national values.³⁶ Although implemented to maintain political stability and national security, this policy has elicited severe criticism from conservative Islamic groups, including PA 212, who perceive the action as a form of restriction on freedom of association, contradictory to democratic principles. Consequently, this policy has exacerbated political polarization and reinforced the narrative that the Jokowi administration marginalized the aspirations of the Muslim community.

In the context of electoral politics, the decline in the influence of Islamic parties presents an additional challenge for formal Islamic groups. Data from the 2019 General Election demonstrate stagnation in support for parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the United Development

Peter Schmitz, "Conservative Islamic Factions vs. Secular Nationalists: Toward a Civil Contestation in Democratic Indonesia," *Indonesian Journal of Social Sciences* 13, no. 2 (2021): 62, <https://doi.org/10.20473/ijss.v13i2.30425>.

³⁶ Bani Syarif Maula, "Post-Islamism and the Rise of Sharia Laws in Contemporary Indonesia: Aspirations of Implementing Islamic Laws in a Democratic Era," *International Journal of Social Science and Religion (Ijssr)*, 2023, 163–84, <https://doi.org/10.53639/ijssr.v4i2.137>.



Party (PPP), while nationalist parties such as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and Gerindra experienced significant increases in support.³⁷ The internal fragmentation of Islamic parties, the lack of innovation in political platforms, and their inability to respond to populist issues that are more relevant to young and urban voters constitute the primary factors contributing to this decline.³⁸ This situation provides an opportunity for nationalist parties to dominate political contestations through more inclusive and populist agendas. Consequently, conservative Islamic groups, such as PA 212, opt for social mobilization channels outside the formal political system to advocate for their aspirations.

In response to radicalization and political polarization, the Jokowi administration implemented a religious moderation program to instill values of tolerance and harmony among religious communities. This initiative involves moderate Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah in efforts to promote inclusive dialogue and counter the dissemination of extremist ideologies.³⁹ Nevertheless, this

³⁷ Asep Nurjaman, "The Decline of Islamic Parties and the Dynamics of Party System in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik* 27, no. 2 (2023): 192, <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.79698>; Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, "Indonesia: Jokowi Sidelines Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 32, no. 4 (2021): 72–86, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2021.0053>.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Mujani and Liddle, "Indonesia: Jokowi Sidelines Democracy."

³⁹ Denny Febriansyah and Dawoud El-Alami, "Moderate Islam Vis-a-Vis Salafism in Indonesia: An Ideological Competition," *Walisongo Jurnal*



approach is considered to remain predominantly top-down and has not yet effectively addressed the root causes of the issue, such as social injustice, poverty, and low religious literacy, which are frequently exploited by extremist groups to recruit new sympathizers, particularly from marginalized segments of society.⁴⁰

The Jokowi administration's response to Islamic political dynamics demonstrates a concerted effort to maintain national stability amid increasing Islamic populist pressures. The government's primary focus on national security and social harmony is evident in its implementation of repressive policies such as the dissolution of HTI and FPI, coupled with the promotion of religious moderation. However, these measures have inadvertently created opportunities for conservative Islamic groups to establish alternative political networks outside the formal system that are more structured and capable of influencing national political dynamics. The dominance of nationalist parties in elections, accompanied by the weakening influence of Islamic parties due to internal fragmentation,

Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan 29, no. 1 (2021): 55–78, <https://doi.org/10.21580/ws.29.1.7212>; Maula, “Post-Islamism and the Rise of Sharia Laws in Contemporary Indonesia: Aspirations of Implementing Islamic Laws in a Democratic Era.”

⁴⁰ Bambang Irawan and Ismail Fahmi Arrauf Nasution, “The Political Dynamics of Islamophobia in Jokowi’s Era: A Discourse Analysis of Online Media Reporting,” *Studia Islamika* 28, no. 3 (2021): 607–35, <https://doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v28i3.17589>.



further underscores the complexity of Islamic political transformation during the Jokowi era. Consequently, religion functions not only as a moral identity but also as an effective instrument for political mobilization within Indonesia's democratic space, reflecting the evolving challenges and dynamics of the political landscape.

Comparative Analysis of Policies and Approaches between SBY and Jokowi

Islamic politics in post-reformation Indonesia continues to experience complex dynamics, particularly in the context of the relationship between the state and Islamic organizations. Two prominent leadership periods, the SBY and Jokowi eras, reflect significant differences in responding to the challenges of Islamic political resurgence and maintaining national stability. Both SBY and Jokowi faced political contexts influenced by the increasing aspirations of Islamic groups and the emergence of Islamic movements in various forms ranging from moderate to conservative. However, the approaches taken by the two presidents to address these dynamics demonstrate different strategies, in line with the political and social conditions, as well as the challenges faced in each era. A comparative analysis of the policies of these two leaders is crucial for understanding how the state interacts with Islamic groups, maintaining a balance between democracy, pluralism,



and national stability amid the changing landscape of Islamic politics in Indonesia.

During the SBY era (2004–2014), government policies exhibited a tendency towards accommodation and inclusivity toward Islamic groups. SBY endeavored to engage moderate Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, which functioned as strategic partners in maintaining social stability and promoting tolerance. This approach was evident in SBY's support for policies that accommodated the aspirations of the Muslim community, including providing broader opportunities for Islamic parties to participate in governance. SBY was recognized as a leader who exercised caution in addressing sensitive issues related to religion, such as the Ahmadiyah case and implementation of sharia-based regional regulations in certain areas. He opted for a path of moderation and dialogue to avert overt conflict, although criticism emerged that this policy was often characterized as compromising and insufficiently assertive in addressing intolerant groups.⁴¹ This strategy facilitates relatively maintained political stability; however, it also elicits criticism regarding the government's inconsistency in upholding the principles of pluralism and democracy.

In contrast to SBY's administration, the Jokowi government (2014–2024) has adopted a more assertive and

⁴¹ Zulfadli and Taufani, “Kemunduran Demokrasi Dan Pelarangan Organisasi Islamis Di Era Pemerintahan Jokowi.”



arguably repressive approach towards Islamic organizations deemed radical and in opposition to the Pancasila ideology. The dissolution of HTI in 2017 and FPI in 2020 served as evidence of this strategy. The disbandment of HTI was predicated on concerns regarding the propagation of caliphate ideology, which was considered contradictory to nationalist principles and potentially disruptive to social stability. Conversely, the dissolution of the FPI was justified on the grounds of the organization's alleged involvement in activities deemed unlawful and conducive to public unrest.⁴² This policy reflects President Jokowi's commitment to upholding Pancasila ideology and safeguarding national cohesion, despite eliciting criticism from conservative Islamic groups who perceive their rights to organize and freedom of expression as marginalized.

Furthermore, Jokowi implemented a religious moderation program in response to the challenges of radicalization. This initiative involves moderate Islamic organizations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, to promote dialogue, tolerance, and harmony among religious communities. However, this approach is often perceived as top-down and insufficiently effective in addressing the root causes of these issues, including social injustice, poverty, and

⁴² Yanwar Pribadi, "Kebangkitan Konservatisme Islam: Politik Identitas Dan Potret Demokrasi Di Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 28, no. 2 (2021): 457–71, <https://doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v28i2.22204>.



low religious literacy at the community level.⁴³ This program is evaluated more as an effort to mitigate political unrest than as a long-term solution for radicalization rooted in structural inequality.

From a political dynamics perspective, the SBY successfully maintained a balance between Islamic and nationalist political forces. Islamic parties such as the PKS, PPP, and PAN obtained significant representation in the government and became part of a broader political coalition. However, during the Jokowi era, Islamic parties experienced a significant decline in influence during the electoral contestation. Data from the 2019 election indicate stagnation in support for the PKS and PPP, while nationalist parties such as the PDI-P and Gerindra experienced a substantial increase in support.⁴⁴ Internal fragmentation, failure to respond to populist issues relevant to young voters, and the dominance of nationalist populist narratives constitute the primary factors marginalizing Islamic parties within the dynamics of formal politics.⁴⁵

⁴³ Denny Febriansyah and Dawoud Sudqi El-Alami, "Moderate Islam Vis-a-Vis Salafism in Indonesia: An Ideological Competition" 29, no. 1 (2021): 55–78, <https://doi.org/10.21580/ws.29.1.7212>; Irawan and Nasution, "The Political Dynamics of Islamophobia in Jokowi's Era: A Discourse Analysis of Online Media Reporting."

⁴⁴ Nurjaman, "The Decline of Islamic Parties and the Dynamics of Party System in Post-Suharto Indonesia."

⁴⁵ I Nengah Suastika, "Fenomena Susilo Bambang Yudhono Dan Implikasinya Terhadap Pendidikan Politik Masyarakat Indonesia Pasca



Table 1. Comparison of Islamic Political Policies in the SBY and Jokowi Eras

Aspects	SBY (2004-2014)	Jokowi (2014-2024)
General Approach	Be accommodating and inclusive. Maintain dialog and harmony.	Firm and repressive against groups deemed radical.
Relationship with CSOs (Ormas)	Embrace NU and Muhammadiyah as stability partners.	Involving NU and Muhammadiyah in religious moderation programs.
Handling Radical Groups	Tends to be compromising. Handling is moderate.	Dissolution of HTI (2017) and FPI (2020) as repressive measures.
Moderation Policy	Focus on interfaith dialog, but less strategic.	Promotion of religious moderation, but it is top-down.

Pemilu 2004,” *Media Komunikasi Fpips* 19, no. 2 (2020): 104, <https://doi.org/10.23887/mkfis.v19i2.27317>; Wasisto Raharjo Jati, “Polarization of Indonesian Society During 2014-2020: Causes and Its Impacts Toward Democracy,” *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik* 26, no. 2 (2022): 152, <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.66057>.



Dynamics of Islamic Parties	Islamic parties have significant space in the coalition.	Decline in the influence of Islamic parties, dominance of nationalist parties.
Challenges	Intolerant groups and less assertive compromises.	Political polarization, radicalization, and repressive critique.

Thus, a comparison of the policies and approaches of SBY and Jokowi revealed two contrasting strategies. SBY tended to be accommodative and inclusive, maintaining harmonious relations between the government and moderate Islamic groups, yet less assertive towards intolerant groups. Conversely, Jokowi adopted a more assertive approach with repressive policies against groups deemed radical while promoting religious moderation as a national strategy. This difference reflects the changing context of political Islam in Indonesia, where challenges to democracy, pluralism, and stability became increasingly complex during the Jokowi era.

D. Conclusion

This study concludes that the resurgence and transformation of Islamic politics in Indonesia during the SBY



and Jokowi administrations reflects the complex state-Islam interplay and challenges to democracy, pluralism, and national stability. The SBY era was marked by an accommodative approach, engaging moderate organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah to promote social cohesion. This fostered stability, but required compromises with intolerant groups and local sharia policies, sparking debates on religious freedom and minority rights. In contrast, Jokowi's administration adopted more assertive policies towards groups such as HTI and FPI to uphold Pancasila and national stability. The rise of Islamic populism and identity politics, as seen in the Ahok case and the 212 Movement, heightened political polarization and shifted Islamic political power from formal channels to social mobilization. Jokowi's religious moderation program is viewed as ineffective in addressing structural issues, such as social injustice and poverty. Thus, the evolution of Islamic politics in both eras highlights the state's efforts to balance Islamic group aspirations, democratic commitments, and national stability within a challenging pluralistic context.

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