



STATE ISLAM AND OPPOSITIONAL ISLAM: The Rearticulation of Islamic Politics From Jokowi to Prabowo in Indonesia

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Keywords:

State Islam; Oppositional Islam; Political Islam; Democratic Regression; Identity Politics.

Abstract

This article examines the transformation of Islam-state relations in Indonesia through a comparative analysis of two periods of government: Joko Widodo's second term (2019-2024) and the early presidency of Prabowo Subianto (2024-present). Drawing on qualitative library research and critical discourse analysis, this article proposes the conceptual framework of "State Islam" and "Oppositional Islam" to capture dynamics that exceed the conventional secular-religious dichotomy. The findings indicate that political Islam has undergone structural rearticulation rather than depoliticisation. Under Jokowi, the state developed a defensive-combinative strategy that combined legal instruments, the technocratisation of religion through halal certification, and moderate religious discourse to neutralise ideological opposition. Under Prabowo, this strategy has shifted towards proactive co-optation, incorporating key Islamic actors into the governing coalition through institutional access and patronage, thereby blurring the boundary between state and opposition. Theoretically, this study contributes by explaining how religious authority is managed and integrated into state structures. Empirically, it demonstrates that elite co-optation produces internal fragmentation within "State Islam" and leaves a residual, value-based opposition within civil society, with significant implications for democracy and identity politics in Indonesia's compromised democratic landscape.

Vol. 9, No. 1, 2026

 [10.20414/sangkep.v2i2](https://doi.org/10.20414/sangkep.v2i2).

Submitted: Nov. 7th, 2025

Accepted: Dec. 21st, 2025



A. INTRODUCTION

After the Reformasi of 1998, Indonesia entered a new phase in religion-state relations, marked by the opening of electoral democratic space and the return of Islam as a political and symbolic force in the public sphere. Early literature on Islamic politics in Indonesia placed considerable emphasis on patterns of open ideological contestation between nationalist-secular forces and Islamist groups, whether through mass mobilisation, the articulation of religious identity, or formal electoral competition (Barton & Yilmaz, 2021, p. 2). Within this framework, political Islam was understood primarily as a civil society force confronting the state, namely as a form of state-society confrontation.

However, developments over the past decade reveal a more subtle and complex transformation. Political Islam is no longer manifested solely through street demonstrations or explicit ideological battles in public discourse. Rather, it increasingly penetrates the logic of public policy and state bureaucracy in a gradual manner. This change marks a shift from open contestation towards administrative negotiation, in which religious symbols, norms, and authority are processed into technocratic instruments within state governance.

The presidency of Joko Widodo, particularly during 2019-2024, represents a crucial point in the crystallisation of this pattern. Faced with the rise of Islamic identity politics after the 212 Movement, the state did not rely solely on security and legal approaches. It also developed a strategy of selective accommodation through economic and development policies. One paradigmatic example is the institutionalisation of the halal ecosystem through the Halal Product Assurance Organising Agency (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Produk Halal/BPJPH), which repositioned halal certification from a religious marker into an instrument of national economic growth. In official state discourse, halal is constructed as an engine of economic growth aligned with the agenda of global competitiveness and national industrialisation (BPJPH, 2026).

Through this mechanism, the state does not merely accommodate Islam. It actively defines, standardises, and administers religious diversity deemed legitimate and productive. Religion is integrated into governmental rationality, not as a counter-ideology, but as a source of policy legitimacy and stability. This pattern is

consistent with scholarly findings on the tendency towards inclusive authoritarianism in post-Reformasi Indonesia (Barton & Yilmaz, 2021, p. 12).

The transfer of power to President Prabowo Subianto in 2024 appears not to have reversed this logic, but rather to have accelerated and deepened it. Unlike the Jokowi era, which tended to manage political Islam from the outside through regulation and discursive depoliticisation, Prabowo has adopted a strategy of proactive co-optation and structural integration by forming a highly inclusive coalition cabinet, including Islamic parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS). This move marks a shift from conflict management towards the direct incorporation of Islamic actors into the centre of state decision-making.

This vision is consistent with the state's broader agenda, as expressed in various strategic forums between Bank Indonesia and the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI), to position Indonesia as a global centre of the sharia economy. Here, the sharia economy is no longer situated as an ideological alternative, but as an integral part of the national development project. The critical question, therefore, is whether such integration represents the depoliticisation of Islam, or instead transforms Islamic politics into a new form, in which contests over values and power move from the open public sphere into the internal corridors of bureaucracy and development planning.

Studies on Islamic politics in Indonesia have developed rapidly and richly. A number of important works have mapped the history of Islamic movements, the sociology of the Muslim community (*umat*), electoral dynamics, and the contestation among three main currents of Islamic thought - modernist, traditionalist, and neo-modernist - along with their respective relations with the state (Barton & Yilmaz, 2021, pp. 5-8). Nevertheless, the existing literature still leaves a significant analytical gap.

Most studies continue to understand Islamic politics as a phenomenon external to the state, whether as an oppositional force, a critical partner, or an electoral actor. Relatively few studies have systematically analysed how the state, within an increasingly technocratic mode of government, incorporates and administers religious discourse as part of the logic of public policy. Yet, as recent studies on the instrumentalisation of religion in environmental and development

policies suggest, the integration of religion into the state is often ambivalent and heavily shaped by power relations (Bagir, 2025, pp. 442-444; Wijisen, 2025, pp. 423-425).

Starting from a critique of the classical dichotomy between Islam and the state, or between the secular and the religious, this study proposes the conceptual framework of State Islam versus Oppositional Islam. State Islam refers to Islamic articulations and practices that are institutionalised, managed, and promoted by the apparatus of the state through regulation, economic policy, and development programmes. By contrast, Oppositional Islam refers to Islamic expressions that position themselves critically outside - or in opposition to - the hegemonic project of the state, even as their space for manoeuvre becomes increasingly restricted.

Using this framework, the study poses the following central question: how have relations and contestations between Islamic actors and the state transformed from external opposition in the Jokowi era towards internal incorporation in the Prabowo era, and what are the implications for the configuration of power and the future of Indonesian democracy? This question is elaborated through three guiding questions: (1) how did the Jokowi regime construct the dichotomy between State Islam and Oppositional Islam through technical-economic policies; (2) how does Prabowo's strategy of proactive co-optation alter the definition and modus operandi of Oppositional Islam; and (3) where are resistance and critique located when contestation shifts into the administrative arena?

Theoretically, this study contributes to the study of religion-state relations by offering a dynamic analytical framework for understanding religion as a governmental rationality, rather than merely as an identity or ideology. This framework complements the existing literature by highlighting mechanisms of power that operate through co-optation, standardisation, and the administration of religious diversity - aspects that are often overlooked in analyses of electoral politics.

Empirically, this study offers a critical reading of Indonesia's post-2024 political transition by highlighting the potential consolidation of an inclusive-authoritarian model of government that uses religious instruments as a glue for elite coalitions and as a source of legitimacy for development projects. The findings are expected to enrich discussions on the new challenges facing Indonesian democracy,

particularly those concerning the narrowing of critical public space and the transformation of political opposition into more fragmented and technocratic forms.

The article is structured as follows. It first discusses the theoretical framework, then analyses the Jokowi era, examines the transition to the Prabowo era, elaborates the new contestation and internal fragmentation, and finally presents a conclusion and normative reflection on the implications of the findings for Indonesian democracy.

B. METHODS

This study employs a qualitative approach with a comparative library research and document analysis design (Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 7-9; 127-133). Its main objective is to develop a theoretical explanation of the transformation of Islam-state relations in Indonesia through a systematic comparison of two periods of government: the final phase of Joko Widodo's presidency (2019-2024) and the early phase of Prabowo Subianto's administration (2024-present). A qualitative approach is selected because it enables an in-depth tracing of the complexity of socio-political dynamics through a critical reading of texts, making it relevant for identifying narrative patterns, discursive strategies, and the political rationalities of key actors (Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 42-45).

The research corpus consists of primary and secondary sources selected purposively to ensure analytical relevance and depth. Purposive sampling in qualitative research aims to select sources that are information-rich and relevant to the research focus (Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 156-158). Primary sources include official and authoritative documents, such as state policies, for example Law No. 33 of 2014 on Halal Product Assurance and its derivative regulations, state speeches, political party platforms, particularly those of PKS and PAN, and official statements issued by major Islamic civil society organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Secondary sources include academic articles from reputable journals, monographs by leading scholars, and analytical reports from credible think-tanks.

Data analysis is conducted integratively by combining three qualitative analytical techniques. First, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), developed by

Fairclough (1992, pp. 62-64; 73-75; 86-91), is used to identify power relations and ideologies embedded in texts. Fairclough's three-dimensional model allows the analysis to connect linguistic features in documents, the practices of discourse production and reproduction, and the socio-political context surrounding them.

Second, this approach is enriched by Foucault's perspective on power/knowledge relations and the formation of regimes of truth (Foucault, 1980, pp. 98-100; 119-122; 131-133), in order to trace how the constructions of State Islam and Oppositional Islam function as mechanisms of legitimation and delegitimation within contemporary power arrangements. Third, Qualitative Content Analysis is applied to identify, code, and systematically group the main themes emerging from the data corpus. This analytical process includes the stages of preparation, organisation, and reporting (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, pp. 109-113). The entire process is framed comparatively in order to examine differences in state strategies, actor positions, and issues of contestation across the two governmental periods.

The validity and consistency of findings are maintained through the application of triangulation. Source triangulation is conducted by comparing different types of documents, from official policies to academic analyses, in order to ensure informational coherence. Methodological triangulation is achieved by combining CDA, content analysis, and a comparative approach to test the consistency of interpretation from multiple theoretical perspectives (Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 259-262). In addition, all stages of data collection and analysis are systematically documented in the form of an audit trail to ensure transparency and traceability in the research process (Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 264-266).

Through this methodological design, the study does not stop at a phenomenological description. It seeks to reveal the mechanisms of power, discursive strategies, and political rationalities that shape the transformation of Islamic politics from a pattern of external opposition towards internal incorporation within contemporary Indonesian state governance. The integration of Fairclough's discursive approach and Foucault's analysis of power is expected to produce a deeper reading of the dynamics of State Islam and Oppositional Islam.

C. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

State Islam and Oppositional Islam

Relations between religion and the state in modern electoral democracies no longer appear simply as a binary struggle between secularism and theocracy. A number of studies show that democratic states are increasingly active in managing and integrating religion into political governance through regulation, policy, and institutional co-optation. In this configuration, religion does not function only as a source of counter-legitimation for social movements. It also becomes a political resource that can be administered by the state, without entirely eliminating its potential for external critique (Çaksu, 2025, pp. 3-5).

Building on these dynamics, this study uses the dichotomous analytical framework of State Islam and Oppositional Islam to read the transformation of Islamic politics in Indonesia. This framework aims to capture the shift from external opposition to the state towards a more complex relationship, in which Islam is simultaneously incorporated into the state project and remains a basis for the articulation of identity and resistance.

State Islam refers to Islamic articulations and practices adopted, institutionalised, and officially promoted by the ruling regime through state instruments. Its forms include technical-economic policies such as halal certification and Islamic finance, the mainstreaming of moderate Islamic narratives, and the co-optation of religious organisations and figures into structures of power. Unlike Islamic populism, which emphasises the mobilisation of religious symbols from below (Hadiz, 2016, pp. 23-27), State Islam is a top-down project intended to consolidate hegemony, stabilise government, and expand the regulatory capacity of the state (Mietzner, 2019, pp. 3-6). In the context of electoral democracy, this practice can be understood as part of authoritarian innovation, namely the use of legal-democratic mechanisms to maintain power and limit political contestation (Mietzner, 2019, pp. 2-4). A comparative study of Turkey shows a similar pattern, in which the state shifts Islamism towards a form of civil religion oriented towards the nation and national development (Çaksu, 2025, pp. 10-14).

By contrast, Oppositional Islam refers to Islamic articulations that position themselves critically or at a distance from the hegemonic project of State Islam. This opposition is not always radical or revolutionary. It often appears in the form of resistance to particular policies, the production of alternative religious narratives, or the formation of relatively autonomous socio-religious spaces. The position of Oppositional Islam is strongly influenced by the structure of political opportunity. When access to power is opened through inclusive coalitions or strategies of co-optation, the boundary between state and opposition becomes blurred, and contestation moves into the internal arena of power (Hadiz, 2016, pp. 97-103; Mietzner, 2019, pp. 10-12).

To understand this fluid relationship, the study uses Migdal's state-in-society perspective. In this framework, the state is understood not as a monolithic entity, but as a contested arena in which various actors - including bureaucrats, politicians, and co-opted religious actors - compete to influence policy and the definition of "official Islam" (Migdal, 2001, pp. 15-22). At the same time, society and Islamic groups are not passive actors; they possess the capacity to adapt, negotiate, and exercise limited resistance to state projects (Migdal, 2001, pp. 23-27). Thus, the dichotomy of State Islam and Oppositional Islam is understood as a dynamic relational position, not as a static category.

Through this framework, the article analyses how the Joko Widodo regime constructed a technocratic-defensive variant of State Islam, and how the transition to the Prabowo Subianto regime may shift the state's strategy towards more inclusive co-optation, thereby remapping the landscape of Oppositional Islam and the field of Islamic political contestation in contemporary Indonesia.

The Jokowi Era: "Oppositional Islam" and the State's Defensive-Combinative Strategy

Joko Widodo's second term (2019-2024) was a phase of consolidation in state-Islam relations, marked by a shift from open polarisation towards the administrative management of Islamic political expression. The polarisation that intensified after the 212 Movement (2016-2017) and the Jakarta gubernatorial election did not merely produce mass mobilisation based on religious sentiment. It also reshaped the structure of political opportunity for Islamic actors who used religious identity as an instrument of electoral competition. Ali Munhanif notes that the rise of identity politics during this period was not simply a spontaneous expression of public piety, but a strategic articulation of religious identity within an increasingly polarised configuration of political competition (Munhanif, 2018b, pp. 7-11). This polarisation created a sharp cleavage between nationalism-pluralism and electoral Islamism.

In this context, the state did not simply respond with open repression. Instead, it developed a defensive-combinative strategy by combining legal instruments, the bureaucratisation of religion, and symbolic co-optation. The coercive dimension can be seen in the issuance of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No. 2 of 2017 concerning Civil Society Organisations (Perppu No. 2 of 2017 concerning the Amendment to Law No. 2 of 2013, 2017), which gave the government authority to revoke the legal status of organisations deemed contrary to Pancasila without first going through a judicial process. Its considerations affirmed the state's obligation to protect the Pancasila ideology and the sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

Within the framework of democratic decline and executive aggrandisement, such policy reflects the strengthening of executive power through formal legal instruments while maintaining electoral democratic procedures (Mietzner, 2024, pp. 153-156). According to Mietzner, Indonesia is not experiencing open authoritarianism, but has become what he calls "a compromised but functionally solid democracy" - a democracy that continues to operate procedurally while its space for competition narrows (Mietzner, 2024, pp. 153-154).

The dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) became an important precedent in redefining the boundaries of religious citizenship. The public discourse surrounding this policy - including narratives about the infiltration of transnational ideology and threats to the NKRI - helped build social legitimacy for state action, as reflected in reports from NU Online and the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT). From a state-in-society perspective, the state does not merely impose its will. It builds social coalitions to preserve its normative authority (Migdal, 2001, pp. 16-23). Thus, the dissolution of HTI was not only an administrative act, but part of a broader reorganisation of power within the ideological arena of Islam.

The most significant transformation in the Jokowi era, however, lay in the technocratisation of religion. Law No. 33 of 2014 on Halal Product Assurance became a key instrument for administering religious norms within the framework of state regulation (Law No. 33 of 2014 on Halal Product Assurance, 2014). The law established halal certification as a legal requirement (Articles 4-5), implemented through BPJPH under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Here, religious norms were moved from the arena of political mobilisation into the bureaucracy of certification and economic governance. Hefner explains that Indonesian Islam has developed in a dialectical relationship with the public ethics of citizenship, not in total opposition to the state; religion becomes part of the construction of modern citizenship (Hefner, 2024, pp. 6-9). Thus, Islam is not negated, but integrated into the rationality of development.

The strengthening of the Religious Moderation narrative through Presidential Regulation No. 58 of 2023 further confirmed the state's construction of "legitimate Islam" (Presidential Regulation No. 58 of 2023 on the Strengthening of Religious Moderation, 2023). Moderation is positioned as an anti-violent, tolerant attitude compatible with the national development agenda (Munif et al., 2023, pp. 421-424). In the framework of discourse analysis, this policy can be understood as the production of a regime of truth regarding Islam compatible with Pancasila (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 60-63). The state does not merely enforce the law; it also defines the political orthodoxy of Islam.

This strategy unfolded in the context of democratic backsliding. Power and Warburton observe that Jokowi's second term was characterised by the consolidation of executive power and the narrowing of parliamentary opposition due to a large coalition dominating the legislature (Power & Warburton, 2020, pp. 3-8). When almost all major parties were part of the governing coalition, ideological opposition based on Islam lost its formal channels of representation. Oppositional Islam therefore faced two simultaneous pressures: legal pressure through the regulation of civil society organisations, and hegemonic pressure through the redefinition of moderate Islam as the only legitimate form of Islam.

Menchik describes this model as "toleration without liberalism", a model in which the state recognises religious plurality while maintaining control over the boundaries of public orthodoxy (Menchik, 2016, pp. 59-65). In the Jokowi context, tolerance was mediated by the state and institutionalised through policy, rather than emerging solely from the autonomous freedom of civil society. Cases such as the NKRI loyalty pledge by former FPI or HTI activists demonstrate how the state acted as both a moral and political authority in disciplining opposition.

Thus, the Jokowi era reveals the consolidation of State Islam in a technocratic-defensive form. The state neutralised ideological threats through legal instruments while incorporating religious norms into the logic of development and economic governance. Islamic politics was no longer dominated by street-based mass mobilisation, but by administration, certification, and regulation. Oppositional Islam did not disappear entirely, but was pushed into an increasingly narrow and fragmented residual space. This transformation became the foundation for the subsequent shift in the Prabowo era, in which proactive co-optation replaced defensive administration as the state's dominant strategy.

Transition to The Prabowo Era: Proactive Co-Optation and The Redefinition of Opposition

The transition to the presidency of Prabowo Subianto (2024-present) marks an important change in the mode of state-Islam relations in Indonesia. If Joko Widodo's second term (2019-2024) was characterised by a defensive-administrative strategy - namely the management and limitation of Islamic opposition through legal regulation and the production of moderation discourse - then the early phase of the Prabowo administration shows a shift towards proactive co-optation and structural integration. This strategy no longer focuses on neutralising opposition from the outside, but on absorbing and

redistributing the positions of Islamic actors into the heart of power through coalition consolidation and institutional access.

Institutionally, the formation of a large or oversized coalition became the main foundation of this approach. The inclusion of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and Haikal Hasan, Head of BPJPH - actors who under Jokowi had previously been outside government and had positioned themselves as a strategic opposition rooted in Islamic identity - became an important indicator of the redefinition of Oppositional Islam. PKS's official statement affirming its commitment as a coalition partner of the government and its support for the *Asta Cita* vision, accompanied by the acquisition of a ministerial seat in the cabinet, demonstrates both symbolic and structural repositioning (PKS, 2025; Kompas, 2025).

In the literature on Indonesian democracy, the phenomenon of oversized coalitions has ambivalent implications. On the one hand, it strengthens governmental stability through elite consolidation. On the other, it potentially weakens the function of parliamentary opposition and reduces substantive competition (Power & Warburton, 2020, pp. 12-15). Mietzner describes this pattern as part of executive consolidation within a compromised democracy, in which opposition shrinks not because of formal prohibition, but because elites are integrated into the orbit of power (Mietzner, 2024, pp. 156-160). Thus, the change in the Prabowo era is not a shift towards open authoritarianism, but a recalibration of the configuration of power within an electoral democratic system that continues to function.

The transformation of PKS from ideological opposition into part of the government reflects a shift from external antagonism towards internal competition within the state. From the perspective of state theory, Hay argues that the state is not a singular and monolithic entity, but a plural and layered field of power relations (Hay et al., 2006, pp. 9-13). The integration of PKS does not erase ideological differences, but moves the arena of contestation into the structure of power. Accordingly, Oppositional Islam is not dissolved; it is relocated into the internal dynamics of the coalition.

In addition to political co-optation, the government has strengthened the symbolic articulation of Islam in public policy and diplomacy. In 2024, President Prabowo publicly called for recognition of the Palestinian state in an international forum (PresidenRI.go.id, 2025). This stance was followed in 2026 by the strengthening of Indonesia's diplomacy on Gaza and partnerships with the Muslim world through involvement in the Board of Peace (Kemlu RI, 2026). This chronological sequence indicates continuity and expansion in policy: symbolic articulation at the beginning of the administration was followed by diplomatic institutionalisation at a later stage. In Hefner's analysis, the relationship between

Islam and democracy in Indonesia has always been mediated by a flexible and pragmatic public ethics of citizenship (Hefner, 2024, pp. 311-314). In this context, Palestinian diplomacy performs a dual function: strengthening Indonesia's geopolitical position while expanding domestic legitimacy among Muslim constituencies.

Symbolic strengthening is also visible in the government's decision to provide strategic land for the construction of the MUI building at the Hotel Indonesia Roundabout (Setkab, 2026). This step is not merely an administrative policy, but a political signal concerning the state's closeness to official religious authority. In a comparative study, Gözaydin shows that the modern state can institutionalise religion as an instrument of national legitimacy without transforming itself into a theocracy (Gözaydin, 2013, pp. 12-18). A similar pattern can be observed in state-MUI relations under Prabowo, where religious symbolism becomes part of the architecture of state legitimacy.

However, proactive co-optation does not produce total homogenisation. Criticism from elements of Islamic civil society continues to appear, including early debates about Indonesia's participation in the Board of Peace before it eventually gained support from most Islamic organisations. This chronology shows that co-optation does not eliminate the space for negotiation. Rather, it shifts the locus of debate from external antagonism to internal consultation and compromise.

Within Migdal's state-in-society framework, the state is an arena of contestation that is continually negotiated by social actors (Migdal, 2001, pp. 22-27). With almost all Islamic parties inside the coalition, the pluralism-Islamism cleavage that had previously served as a basis for electoral mobilisation (Fossati, 2022, pp. 4-7) has weakened. Yet contestation does not disappear. It is transformed into distributive competition among elites seeking symbolic and policy resources.

Therefore, the Prabowo era represents the evolution of State Islam from a technocratic-defensive form towards an inclusive-co-optative one. Whereas in the Jokowi era Islamic opposition was restricted through regulation and the production of moderation discourse, in the Prabowo era opposition is reduced through elite integration and the distribution of patronage. Indonesian Islamic politics has not experienced depoliticisation; rather, it has been rearticulated within a configuration of power that is more institutionalised and internal to the structure of the state.

Anatomy of a New Contestation: Internal Fragmentation and Residual Opposition

The broad co-optation undertaken by the Prabowo Subianto administration towards key actors in political Islam has not resulted in ideological consolidation within a homogeneous bloc that might be called State Islam. On the contrary, the process of

integration has generated a more complex and differentiated configuration of contestation. If, in the previous period, Islamic politics was relatively readable through the binary dichotomy between State Islam and Oppositional Islam, then in the post-co-optation phase this line of demarcation has shifted fundamentally. Contestation no longer primarily occurs through an antagonistic relationship between the state and Islamic opposition. Instead, it moves into two principal arenas: internal fragmentation within State Islam itself, and the emergence of residual, value-based opposition outside formal power structures. In this sense, co-optation does not end politics; it transforms the locus of conflict into the state and civil society.

D. CONCLUSION

This study has examined the transformation of Islam-state relations in Indonesia through the conceptual framework of State Islam and Oppositional Islam, by systematically comparing two periods of government: the Joko Widodo era (2019-2024) and the early Prabowo Subianto era (2024-present). The findings show that Indonesian Islamic politics has not undergone depoliticisation, but rather structural rearticulation into different arenas and forms. In the Jokowi era, the state developed a defensive-combinative strategy that brought together legal instruments, such as the dissolution of organisations, the technocratisation of religion through halal certification, and the production of moderation discourse to define the boundaries of legitimate Islam while neutralising ideological opposition. Meanwhile, the Prabowo era marks a shift towards proactive co-optation and structural integration, in which major Islamic actors are incorporated into the circle of power through large coalitions and institutional access, thereby blurring the boundary between state and opposition.

The implications of these findings for Indonesian democracy are ambivalent. On the one hand, the integration of Islamic elites into the structure of power creates political stability and reduces the potential for horizontal conflict based on identity. The state has succeeded in managing diverse Islamic expressions through administrative mechanisms and co-optation, so that identity politics is no longer primarily manifested in mass mobilisation that threatens public order.

On the other hand, this process potentially weakens democratic control and accountability. When almost all major Islamic parties and organisations are located

within the orbit of power, the space for substantive opposition narrows, and criticism of government policy tends to shift from the public realm into less transparent internal arenas. It is within this context that residual value-based opposition emerges from civil society, articulating concerns about the narrowing of democratic space and human rights through discursive channels rather than mass mobilisation.

The future of identity politics in Indonesia will be strongly shaped by how internal fragmentation within State Islam is managed. Competition among Islamic organisations and parties in seeking influence over policy and the representation of the interests of the Muslim community can function as a natural balancing mechanism against the consolidation of executive power. However, if this competition is not managed in a healthy and transparent manner, it may generate patronage and unequal resource distribution, which in turn could produce public disappointment and open space for alternative identity mobilisation outside formal structures.

Further research is needed to examine several aspects beyond the scope of this study in greater depth. First, comparative case studies of how particular Islamic organisations, such as NU, Muhammadiyah, or PKS, negotiate their positions within post-co-optation power structures would enrich understanding of the internal dynamics of State Islam. Second, research on the impact of technocratic religious policies, such as halal certification and the sharia economy, on citizens' religious practices and majority-minority relations is necessary to test the extent to which these administrative instruments genuinely serve the public interest, or instead become instruments of state control.

Third, longitudinal studies on the transformation of value-based opposition and its effectiveness in maintaining democratic accountability amid the narrowing of critical public space would make a significant contribution to understanding the future of Indonesian democracy. Finally, comparison with other Muslim-majority countries experiencing similar dynamics - such as Turkey, Egypt, or Malaysia - could enrich theoretical perspectives on the relations among religion, the state, and democracy in the contemporary Muslim world.

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